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ABSTRACT
STATE HEGEMONY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A POLITICAL
ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF TWO LOCAL EXPERIENCES IN TURKEY
FEBRUARY 2011
BENGİ AKBULUT, B.A., BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce
This dissertation examines state-society relationships in Turkey through the lens
of efforts to promote sustainable development at the local level. To this end, it first lays
out a theoretical framework to analyze the political economy of local sustainable
development, for which purpose the Gramscian state theory and its applications to the
political economy of the environment are deployed. The dissertation thus situates the
local social-economic-environmental processes within the making of state hegemony and
the uneven impacts of state behavior on the society. The dissertation employs two case
studies, each based on extensive qualitative study and quantitative data from the
administration of representative surveys to operationalize this framework. At both case
study sites, Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon, the Turkish state made explicit efforts to
implement

sustainable

development

through

projects

funded

by

the

Global

Environmental Facility, but failed to do so. In analyzing the reasons for failure, the
dissertation documents how the Turkish state’s hegemonic practices, interacting with
local power inequalities, undercut the implementation of sustainable development. It
further reveals how inequalities are perpetuated by the failure of sustainable development
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and how they, in turn, prove to be impediments on sustainable development
implementation at the local level.
The dissertation also provides a critical lens through which community-based
schemes, including co-governance and participatory management, can be examined. It
highlights, in particular, the role of local inequalities and anticipations shaped by the state
by conducting an econometric study. It demonstrates the different channels through
which exclusion from decision-making operates, impeding the democratic functioning of
these institutions and undermining efforts to promote sustainable development.
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CHAPTER 1
A “FAILED” STATE: SETTING OUT THE AGENDA
“Is it conceivable that the exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched? …
The answer must be no”.
(Lefebvre, 1991, p11)
Strolling through Sultan Sazlığı (Sultan Marshes), an internationally renowned
wetland complex situated at the center of the Anatolian Peninsula that was recognized in
1990 for its rich bird species, one cannot help but be unsettled by the sight of deserted
wood sailboats scattered around the grayish, drought-stricken landscape. Once home to
birds that departed long ago, the wetland was the sole source of livelihood for reed cutters
who now struggle to feed their families. From the abandoned boats, wealthy towns
surrounded by plots and orchards burgeoning with sugar beet and fruit trees are just a
short drive away. The shift in color from gray to green, and the striking contrast between
the rust-hued sickles of the reed cutters and trucks piled with ripe fruit, are evidence that
the water lost by some was gained by others.
In a very different scenery, visitors to Köprülü Kanyon (Köprülü Canyon) in
Southern Anatolia, where forests and ancient ruins are intertwined, might wonder how
some families can be as destitute, living in single-room homes with outhouses, while
thousands of tourists visit the area every year to enjoy one of the best white-water rafting
spots in Turkey. A few minutes of conversation with the villagers, however, provide
insights on the strict conservation rules that practically dictate poor living standards.
Some seem to evade the rules, however: owners of the rafting facilities enjoy high profits
brought by their illegally-built structures, and boast about how they managed to escape
punitive court orders.
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These two localities are sites that were recognized by the Turkish state for their
ecological and cultural importance and granted conservation status. Yet both ended up
being torn apart by interlinked environmental and socio-economic problems. What
further distinguishes them from similar sites in the country is that they are both places
where the Turkish state spent four years in attempts to operationalize internationallyfunded, community-based sustainable development projects, only to fail in these efforts
despite its seemingly enthusiastic committed to it. The degradation of natural resources
today continues at both sites, and associated socio-economic conflicts are left unresolved.
The making of these two wounded environments is the object of analysis in this
dissertation.
That the Turkish state is ineffective in implementing sustainable development is
widely recognized, a few successful instances notwithstanding. A state’s failure to
effectuate an equitable, environmentally-sound development path might not come as a
surprise, given that many states are thought to prioritize economic growth at the expense
of environmental and social concerns. What makes the Turkish case puzzling, however,
is the existence of a seemingly ideal mix for sustainable development implementation: a
comprehensive body of legislation, well-developed state machinery, and growing societal
demands for environmental protection and social justice. Scholars who have analyzed the
failure of sustainable development—despite the state’s rhetorical commitment to its
implementation—have approached the issue from a macro-perspective, and highlighted
general features of the state and state-society relationships in Turkey. These works have
made crucial contributions by drawing links between growth-oriented modernization,
top-down governance and particularistic interactions, and worsening sustainable
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development outcomes as proxied by aggregate environmental quality and social justice
measures.
However, macro approaches and structural explanations typically fall short of
painting a detailed and comprehensive picture of micro experiences. They cannot account
for local deviations from the stylized failure of sustainable development in Turkey. Nor
can they unveil how local dynamics (economic, social, and political) and development
processes impinge on each other. They cannot narrate the story of the drying wetlands
and the wealthy fruit growers in Sultan Sazlığı, or of the environmental costs of
unregulated tourism and impoverished villagers in Köprülü Kanyon. A more nuanced
theorization of the state-society relationship in Turkey calls for an analysis of local
histories and outcomes, grasping the mediation of structural characteristics at the local
scale.
The present work is situated at this junction of the structural and the local. It aims
to examine state-society relationships in Turkey through the lens of efforts to promote
sustainable development at the local level. To this end, it lays out a theoretical framework
in which to analyze the political economy of local sustainable development, and employs
two case studies based on extensive fieldwork to substantiate it. Utilizing two cases
makes it possible to adopt a comparative perspective and to juxtapose different socioeconomic structures, institutional settings, and historical experiences. Furthermore, the
plurality of methods used in the fieldwork provides both depth and breadth to the
analysis. In-depth interviews and focus groups furnish the study with details on the
making of local economic, social, and environmental processes while the quantitative
survey equips it with representative empirical data. The dissertation demonstrates that
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characteristics of the Turkish state, and its interactions with local power inequalities that
operate through class, gender, etc., account for failures at the local level. It unveils how
the failure of local sustainable development perpetuates and reinforces inequities, and
how they, in turn, hinder sustainable development implementation. It also draws policy
implications, especially with regard to operationalizing democratic and effective
participatory mechanisms of decision-making.
As the title suggests, the subject matter of the present work is sustainable
development, now a popular term that denotes the reconciliation of sound economic
development with environmental protection and social equity. Although its
operationalization remains ambiguous, I deploy the term here to imply the embeddedness
of the economy-society-nature relationship, where resource use and access is understood
to occur in specific contexts governed by social, economic, and political relations. I
regard social and environmental outcomes as being inextricably linked. In laying out a
theoretical framework to analyze the implementation of sustainable development,
understood in this sense, I adopt a political economy approach to depict the distribution
of benefits and costs associated with resource use patterns and trace the agents and
relations enmeshed in them.
This dissertation is specifically concerned with investigating the role of the
Turkish state in sustainable development. A growing body of work has drawn links
between the overall failure of sustainable development and prominent features of the
Turkish state, such as its growth-oriented modernist vision, paternalism, the dominance
of patron-client networks in state-society relationships and the weakness of civil society.
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As I demonstrate in chapter 2, these aspects have proven resilient and explain much of
the motivations behind state policy and state-society relationships in Turkey.
In order to understand why these features proved persistent in the face of
historical changes, one must delve into the making of the Turkish state. The Turkish
state, rather different from its counterparts in the West, is a patrimonial state, dominated
and navigated by a group of “elites” that cut across the bureaucracy and the military.
Highly disillusioned by the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the strong commitment of the
state elites to modernization shaped the history of Turkish Republic with the goal of
“elevating” the nation to the level of Western civilizations, and adopting a Western guise.
This modernization project encompassed a series of rapid transformations in all spheres
of life, with the bureaucratic-military elite acting over and above society to operationalize
it.
The long-lasting modernist vision of the Turkish state materialized in two
interrelated features: the prioritization of economic growth as the prerequisite to
modernization, while social and environmental issues are brushed aside; and the
paternalistic governance modality, reflected in top-down policy formation and
implementation. The 1950s saw the erosion of the stronghold of the state elite and the
roughly simultaneous rise of patronage networks. Operating through reciprocity-based
exchanges and social connections, these became the main venues in which contesting
voices to were handled.
The trinity of modernist vision, paternalism, and patronage has had far-reaching
repercussions in society. State-building in Turkey did not result from confrontations
among different socio-economic groups, but rather from the pitting of a strong state
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against a weak civil society. Even when civil society began to develop, it was prevented
from becoming a space of autonomy, opposition, and struggle, due to the systematic
exclusion of societal demands that were at odds with the growth imperative (e.g. those
related to intra-society conflicts), and the smothering effects of top-down governance and
patron-client relationships. The qualitative ineptitude of civil society, marked by a
general unwillingness to challenge state authority, despite its quantitative magnitude,
attests to this fact.
Building on the literature on contemporary Turkey, I argue that the modernismpaternalism-patronage trinity is still operative and that it bears significant implications for
sustainable development. The developmentalist agenda of the Turkish state, intensified in
the era of neoliberal capitalism, renders social and environmental concerns secondary,
resulting in an overall unwillingness to implement sustainable development. Although
state paternalism has been increasingly under attack since the late 1980s, state policies
are still largely formed independent of society and the state holds a reactive, rather than a
proactive, position. Given the significant level of distrust produced by top-down
governance, the implementation of any kind of policy—including sustainable
development—evokes contestation. Handling cases of contestation by patronage-based
measures causes considerable erosion of the public interest, and hampers the
implementation of effective sustainable development, even when there is a strong
impetus behind it. Finally, the emasculation of civil society translates into a political
landscape where the quest for modernization is seldom questioned; an overall reluctance
to mobilize even in the face of pressing environmental and socio-economic problems; and
a general absence of collective action-type struggles to address such issues.
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Although this dissertation is informed by contemporary scholarship on the
Turkish state, it aims to push its boundaries. Most of the literature on the Turkish state is
based on descriptive accounts of specific characteristics, be it patronage relationships,
paternalistic governance or motivations underlying its interventions in the economic
sphere. Rather than taking these accounts at face value, the dissertation adopts a
theoretical framework that can address different ontologies of the Turkish state, even
those that are seemingly contradictory (such as the simultaneous existence of
authoritarianism/paternalism associated with the “strong state” tradition, and the
predominance of patronage networks, implying a vulnerable state whose power has been
eroded by clientelism). The deployment of such a framework not only allows for the
analytical treatment of the linkages between stylized characteristics of the Turkish state,
but also serves as a theoretical anchor that can be extended to tackle crystallizations of
the Turkish state at the local scale.
This dissertation analyzes the form and the nature of the state within a Gramscian
theoretical framework. In other words, I argue that powerful groups attempt to justify
their dominance and gain the active consent of the ruled by various political, ideological,
and social practices. Political support is acquired not only in the field of class/economic
relations, but in the entire field of social relations. Antonio Gramsci, who famously
formulated the concept of hegemony as “consent backed by force,” emphasized that
hegemonic dominance is not exercised primarily or solely from the seat of government,
but also and more importantly within the sphere of civil society where consensus is
generated. Accordingly, states engage in a variety of efforts to appear impartial and
justify their claim to rule. In doing so, they strive to construct a national-collective
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outlook to surpass multiple interests in society, fragmented along different dimensions,
and to project an image representing the “universal interest”.
The Gramscian perspective is apt for the purposes of the present work for a
number of reasons. Since it rejects the economism/class-reductionism inherent in many
Marxian treatments of the state, and sheds light on non-economic motivations behind
state actions/political behavior and on non-economic dimensions of power, it is suited to
tackle forms of state and political behavior that fall outside the Western capitalist world,
including the particularities of the Turkish context. I stated above that the state in Turkey
is quite distinct from Western capitalist states, most notably manifested in the weakness
of the capitalist class to demand political power (and use the state apparatus for its
economic interests) as the Republic was being founded. The modernist objectives of the
bureaucratic-military elite, who substituted for the domestic bourgeoisie, went beyond
economic stakes. Similarly, the struggles that surfaced after the 1950s to capture and
dominate the state apparatus were not defined on strictly economic/class terms, but
reflected different divisions within dominant groups. Clearly, the Turkish state defies the
simplistic, economistic vision of the state as a class tool utilized for the reproduction of
capitalism. It calls for a framework in which the non-economic drives of the state elite
(such as the aspiration to transform society), and practices to legitimize and re-establish
state dominance can be analyzed. I argue that a Gramscian treatment of the state offers
such a framework.
Within this framework, I explain the persistence of developmentalism by the
state’s hegemonic practices to elicit consent. Specifically, I argue that achieving
economic growth to modernize has been crafted as the national-collective outlook, the
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universal interest through which the state elite established itself as representing the
general will, legitimized its claim to rule, and acquired the consent of the ruled. The fact
that the desire to modernize was not a representation of aggregate interests, nor backed
by any social group (as it typically is in Western capitalist states), necessitated that the
state elite act over and above society to achieve the modernization project and re/produce
the paternalistic style of governance.
One result of this state form has been the lack of organic links between state and
society, which are the typical mechanisms of acquiring active consent (via democratic
institutions) and consolidating hegemony in Western capitalist states. Building on this
insight, I argue that the Turkish case is not a “successful” consolidation of the hegemonic
project. Patron-client networks have arisen at this junction as one specific type of
representation, since they have served as a link between state and society, and became
mechanisms of acquiring consent. Contesting voices have been muffled through
patronage relationships, and threats to hegemony came to be settled this way.
The Gramscian perspective also offers an articulate treatment of the ways in
which state and society interact with and shape one another. Within this perspective, both
state and society are conceptualized as heterogeneous sites; the conflicts within dominant
groups and the multiplicity of societal interests can be underlined. Rather than rendering
Turkish society as a multitude governed by the state, the Gramscian view displays the
state’s uneven impact on society and the differing abilities of different groups in
accessing the state.
In analyzing the historical weaknesses of the civil society in Turkey, I employ the
Gramscian argument that states are structurally selective in allowing the formulation,
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representation, and articulation of social demands. I demonstrate that the demands that
were fundamentally in conflict with the hegemonic project of the state elite and its vision
of society as an organic unity—such as those related to distribution or the politics of
ethnic identity—have been systematically excluded by the Turkish state. The success of
the hegemonic project in Turkey (eliciting consent via the promise of benefits economic
growth would bring, backed by paternalism) is manifested in the under-questioning of the
modernization imperative and citizens’ overall reluctance to oppose state authority.
A significant part of this dissertation tackles with the state and the state theory, as
the preceding discussion shows. However, the primary purpose of the dissertation is not
to theorize the state per se, but rather to put together a framework in which the statesociety-environment relationships can be conveyed analytically. I deploy the Gramscian
state theory and its applications to the political economy of the environment to this end. I
unveil the ways in which the Turkish state transforms nature via hegemonic practices;
both directly, for instance by constructing dams to deliver economic growth and gain
consent, enclosing conservation areas to establish territorial control, and passing
environmental legislation as a means to organize collective living; and indirectly, through
its uneven impact on society, for instance via state policies that alter relations
surrounding resource use and access.
This makes it possible to situate the state’s transformation of the environment
within its broader practices to establish and justify its existence. The making of states is
thus analyzed via the remaking of nature. In this framework, the environment and
environment-society

relationships

(including

sustainable

development

policy

implementation) are arenas where constitutive practices of hegemony are exercised;
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where hegemony is consolidated, maintained, and contested. Grasping the complexity
and diversity of the ways in which the state and the society interact with each other, as
opposed to reducing the state to a “class” tool or addressing it only in juxtaposition to the
market, becomes possible. In the absence of such an analytical framework, the impact of
state action on the environment appear to be haphazard repercussions of state policies, the
motivations of which cannot be considered in a non-simplistic way.
The present work focuses explicitly on sustainable development implementation
at the local scale. Delving into the local is essential to advance our understanding of
sustainable development in Turkey since macro-level analyses are ill-equipped to depict
how—and through what—structural characteristics are mediated and manifested at the
local scale. Understanding local implications of the state-society-environment
relationship on sustainable development can enrich macro-level analyses and help to
move towards more nuanced theorizations of the state in Turkey. With these aims, the
Gramscian political economy of the environment framework is extended to analyze the
local.
The relational, decentralized understanding of state power in Gramsci, as opposed
to a monolithic vision of power exercised hierarchically by the state apparatus, is
especially suited to exploring local experiences. This framework unpacks “community”:
local power inequalities and the uneven impacts of the state-society-environment
relationship are explicitly considered. It accounts for the distribution of costs and benefits
associated with environmental processes. In a related vein, it provides a critical eye
through which community-based schemes, such as co-governance and participatory
management, can be examined. It rejects reducing resource-based struggles to economic
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and class relations, and retains axes of divisions such as gender, source of livelihood and
social status as important tools of analysis. Finally, unlike structuralist approaches, it
provides space to address the issue of agency and collective action.
Two case studies are employed to operationalize the framework summarized
above. At both case-study sites, Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon, natural resource
management projects were implemented between 2000-2007 with funds from the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), a collaboration of the World Bank (WB), United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP). In a nutshell, the GEF projects aimed at regulation of natural resource use and
biodiversity conservation while supporting environmentally-friendly livelihoods to ease
the pressure on existing resources. As many of their counterparts implemented
worldwide, these aims were meant to be achieved through participatory planning and
decision-making mechanisms. Planning of resource use, such as rules regarding time and
locality of access, was supposed to be based on participatory mechanisms wherein locals
could voice opinions and take an active role in decision-making. The Ministry of
Environment and Forestry was responsible for the overall execution of the projects, and
local Ministry employees carried out the implementation in the field.
The first site, Sultan Sazlığı, is a wetland complex located in the middle of a large
plain, surrounded by numerous dams and irrigation canals built by the Turkish state.
Redirection of water to agricultural irrigation, starting in the 1970s, not only altered the
ecological balance and caused serious environmental problems in the area, but also
served as an implicit redistributive policy favoring the already-wealthy. Farmers have
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enjoyed the profits of irrigated agriculture, while those whose lives depend directly on the
marshland and the pastures have increasingly come under intense pressure.
Köprülü Kanyon, the second site, is a remarkable forest-river ecosystem, a rafting
hotspot that also holds immense archeological value. Despite its designation as a national
park in 1973, the ecosystem suffers from unregulated resource use—the impact of which
is clearly visible but not yet pressing. The hostility felt toward the hard-park type
management of the past 35 years is palpable even after spending only a few hours in the
area. The state’s overwhelming presence –in terms of conservation—poses an interesting
contrast to its general “absence” in terms of providing public infrastructure. Although a
few settlements have enjoyed benefits connected to the booming rafting tourism, the rest
suffer from poor roads, inadequate health and education facilities, and limited access to
water and electricity.
What makes matters more tragic, in both study sites, is the fact that the
implementation of the GEF projects has not been remedy to any of the aforementioned
problems. State practices have changed neither with regard to the agricultural policies
pursued at Sultan Sazlığı nor with regard to the strict top-down governance of Köprülü
Kanyon. Unplanned resource use, resource degradation, and the socio-economic
problems to which they are linked, continue to go unresolved. These two sites exemplify
the contradiction between the seeming commitment to sustainable development of the
Turkish state, and its unwillingness and/or inability to implement it. This contradiction,
namely the state’s aversion to enact the very projects it has assumed responsibility for,
constitutes the subject that this dissertation explores.
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These sites should further be put into perspective in the light of recently
emerging, albeit sporadic, local responses to the Turkish state’s failure to implement
sustainable development. A notable example is the Bergama movement of the late 1990s,
where the residents of a Western Anatolian town had mobilized to resist the Turkish
state’s attempts to introduce gold mining, due to the risks posed by cyanide leaching.
More recent incidents are witnessed today in community-based struggles against the
construction of hydroelectrical power plants in the Black Sea coast. Neither in Sultan
Sazlığı nor in Köprülü Kanyon, however, can one observe such collective mobilizations
in the face of local failures of sustainable development.
The GEF project sites present a fitting opportunity for analyzing local sustainable
development in line with the framework sketched out earlier, since they set out—at least
rhetorically—by

envisioning

sustainable

resource

management

by

community

participation, explicitly targeting the empowerment of disadvantaged communities, and
supporting alternative livelihoods. In other words, they were built on the three pillars of
the sustainable development concept (environmental protection, economic well-being and
social equity), and aimed to address them in an interrelated manner. Furthermore, the
participatory decision-making component of the projects provides an avenue for
examining the extent to which effective participation was ensured, and to unpack the role
local power relations play in participation. Given the worldwide implementation of such
participatory schemes, the evaluation of community-based sustainable development
experiences can contribute to debates on their successes and failures, and inform better
policy-making.
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These localities also present an opportunity to consider the role the Turkish state
assumed in implementing local sustainable development in two related dimensions: in
terms of the historical making of these environments, and in terms of project
implementation. To this end, I explore how the structural characteristics of the Turkish
state played out in these localities; historically, by examining state policies pursued in
these two regions—taken as symptoms of the Turkish state—and during the GEF
implementation, by examining activities undertaken on the ground, with a special focus
on participatory decision-making mechanisms. Links between state policies, changing
patterns of resource use, and the distribution of costs and benefits associated with
resource use patterns become focal points in this exploration. Local perceptions of the
Turkish state and the GEF project teams, considered here as manifestations of the statesociety relationship, are also depicted. In other words, changes in resource use, local
inequalities, and perceptions are the main proxies utilized in operationalizing the
Gramscian political economy framework adopted here.
The methodology followed in the case studies relies on both qualitative and
quantitative techniques, since delineating the complex links between state and society,
and the embeddedness of social, economic and environmental processes necessitates a
combination of methods and an interdisciplinary approach. The studies are based on
extensive fieldwork conducted in 2008-2009. As the researcher, I stayed at the project
sites for about 20 days in 2008 and visited all project settlements with a local guide. I also
paid a number of shorter visits to the areas both before and after my stay. The qualitative
study, comprising a total of 98 in-depth interviews (14 with state officials, and 52 and 32
with local people at Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon, respectively) and four focus
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groups (two at each site), made it possible to acquire detailed information on the history
of the state-society relationship at the sites, map changes in resource use patterns over
time, and depict the dimensions of local inequalities. It also provided first-hand
information on the implementation of the GEF projects in the field, and how the projects
were perceived and assessed by the local communities.
The quantitative study was based on a survey administered to a total of 778
respondents (377 in Sultan Sazlığı, and 401 in Köprülü Kanyon). The survey provided
representative data on the above-mentioned proxies in some detail, and complemented
the qualitative study as the survey was designed and tailored according to qualitative
findings. In addition to providing descriptive quantitative data to supplement the
qualitative part of the study, the survey data are used in an econometric analysis of the
relationship between participation in decision-making mechanisms and the willingness to
contribute to sustainable development, used as proxies of local sustainable development;
and local inequalities and perceptions of the state, used as proxies of the state-society
relationship.
In examining local sustainable development, how the historical context of the
state-society relationship shaped local dynamics—especially in terms of resource use and
local inequalities—is delineated first. In the case of Sultan Sazlığı, the promotion of
irrigated farming at the expense of environmental quality and social equity—a symptom
of growth-orientation—has directly benefited farmers in the broader basin, whereas the
landless, who depend on the marshland and pastures, suffer from worsening
environmental conditions and the lack of alternative livelihoods. In the case of Köprülü
Kanyon, paternalism was embodied by strict top-down governance, yet those with
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political clout (correlated with socio-economic power) and/or owners of tourism facilities
have been able to enjoy lax enforcement of state regulations, owing to patronage
networks and the developmentalist state’s reluctance to punish the tourism sector.
As might have become apparent, the most significant axes of inequality in these
areas are based on types of resource use, which largely correspond to main sources of
livelihood. Socio-economic inequalities have been perpetuated as different user groups
map into the “winners” and “losers” of failed sustainable development. The landless reed
cutters in Sultan Sazlığı were further marginalized as a result of drought, while wealthy
farmers still enjoyed irrigation privileges to a large extent. In a similar vein, it was mostly
the poor and subsistence-based resource users in Köprülü Kanyon who bore the burden of
strict conservation practices, while owners of rafting facilities, who hold significant
economic power, were able to escape rule enforcement in terms of restrictions on
resource use and access.
Local inequalities are major impediments to the implementation of sustainable
development in these areas, as they correlate with the extent to which different groups’
voices are “heard” by the Turkish state, due to the type of demands formulated and
differential accessibility of representation mechanisms. The demands of the losers often
go unheard since they fundamentally contradict the developmentalist agenda of the
Turkish state. On the other hand, patronage—open only to powerful winners at both
sites—has been a representation mechanism by which environmental protection was
resisted and undercut. Within this context, the facts that the losers have not explored
other venues to voice their demands, such as engaging in local collective struggles, and
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that no NGOs are taking up the issues and mobilizing on their behalf, typify the general
weakness of civil society in Turkey.
Against this historical backdrop, on-site implementation of the GEF projects in
Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon began in 2003. Although highly promising on paper,
the projects failed on several counts: no effective regulations on resource use were
implemented; decision-making mechanisms lacked broad, democratic participation by
local stakeholders; and efforts to promote alternative livelihoods were ineffective.
Examination of these failures illustrates that the Turkish state was mostly unwilling to
fulfill what was envisioned by the projects, manifested in the persistence of its structural
characteristics during project implementation. Occasional genuine attempts by the project
teams, on the other hand, were stifled by state inability: an overall lack of skills, funds,
and staff.
The implementation of participatory decision-making mechanisms, in particular,
suffered from the combination of the paternalistic gaze of the Turkish state, specific
histories of the state-society relationship, and local inequalities including income and
wealth, gender, age and social status. Closer examination of the design and
implementation of decision-making mechanisms, as documented in Chapter 4, raises
serious doubts about the state’s willingness to institute such decision-making processes.
In a related vein, local people’s perceptions of the state proved to be central determinants
of participation. Their widely shared skepticism of the fairness and accountability of
decision-making processes and the implementation of decisions impinged on their
participation. Many chose not to participate, simply because they lacked faith that such
mechanisms would work. In the face of broad advocacy of participatory mechanisms,
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these cases provide stark evidence that the mere introduction of such mechanisms does
not mean they will be operationalized successfully and democratically.
Econometric analysis delves deeper into local participation in GEF’s decisionmaking mechanisms, and into willingness to contribute to local sustainable development.
I use these as two proxies for local sustainable development: the former represents both a
dimension of the effectiveness of local sustainable development and time contributions to
collective management, and the latter represents contributions in the form of constrained
resource use. Specifically, I test the relationship between these proxies and local
inequalities and perceptions of the state. Both local inequalities and perceptions of the
state’s priorities are found to be statistically significant in determining the commitment of
an individual to local sustainable development.
The present chapter served the purpose of portraying a highly-condensed version
of the arguments put forth in this dissertation. Building on this presentation, the
contributions of this dissertation can be situated in three realms. First, by providing an indepth study of the Turkish state’s role in sustainable development, the dissertation aims
to contribute to the body of work on state and development. It aspires to surpass
simplistic treatments of the state found in much of the economics literature, and proposes
a framework in which state and society are understood as mutually constituted,
heterogeneous sites. This framework is supplemented by an empirical exploration of local
experiences. The ways in which the Turkish state crystallizes at the local level,
interacting with historically specific local dynamics, provide rich material that
contributes to debates on the role of the state and state-society relationships in
development processes.
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Second, in a related vein, the dissertation contributes to discussions on the
Turkish state specifically. Although the peculiarities of the Turkish state have been the
focus of numerous studies, analyses of state-society relationships through the lens of
environmental politics is being undertaken only recently. The dissertation aims to
contribute to this line of work by taking local sustainable development implementation as
an arena where the characteristics of the Turkish state, and the interplay between state
and society, are manifested. In doing so, it aims to provide insights into theorizations of
the Turkish state by taking a path that differs from most studies on the issue; namely, by
focusing at the local level. By unpacking the paradox of sustainable development in
Turkey, and illuminating its equity implications, the dissertation offers arguments with
micro-level evidence that can feed into macro-level theorizations of the Turkish state and
its role in development processes.
Third, the dissertation engages with the extensive literature on the political
economy of the environment and participatory decision-making in natural resource
management, by delving into the distribution of benefits and costs of environmental
degradation, and into how inequalities influence effective participation in decisionmaking mechanisms. Despite the increasing emphasis on decentralized environmental
governance based on community participation, the success of such management
mechanisms in ensuring the effective participation of all stakeholders is often
questionable. The growing voices among academics and development practitioners that
participatory mechanisms should be approached with caution calls for more empirical
work to evaluate their success in bringing democratic and effective solutions to resource
management problems. This dissertation contributes to these debates. By adopting a
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multi-dimensional view of effective participation, and investigating its various underlying
factors, the dissertation intends to provide input to efforts aiming to operationalize
democratic and effective participatory mechanisms.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the
theoretical framework that situates local sustainable development in Turkey. Specifically,
I discuss the features of the Turkish state that underlie its unwillingness and inability to
implement an environmentally-sound and socially-equitable development strategy within
a Gramscian state-analytical framework. I then complement this framework with the
political economy of the environment approach and extend it to analyze the local. In
Chapter 3, the first step from the theoretical/abstract to the concrete, I explain how the
dissertation operationalizes this framework. To this end, I introduce the case studies and
research questions, including background information on study sites, a detailed
description of the fieldwork methodology, the goals of the qualitative and quantitative
studies, the number of interviews and focus groups conducted, the sampling strategy
followed in survey administration, and the proxies used to address concrete research
questions.
Chapter 4 presents the qualitative analysis of local sustainable development, and
is divided into two parts that discuss Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon respectively.
Both parts begin with background information on sources of livelihood and dimensions
of local inequalities to familiarize the reader with the setting. Next, I discuss the history
of the state-society relationship, socio-economic inequalities, and the political economy
of resource use in both locations. In this context, local manifestations of the Turkish
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state’s hegemonic practices, their asymmetric effects on local populations, and
implications in terms of resource use patterns are described.
The chapter then turns to the implementation of the GEF projects. First, I outline
what the projects promised, based on official documents, and discuss on-site activities
undertaken towards their implementation. In particular, I consider project goals and
outcomes in terms of implementing sustainable resource use, operationalizing
participatory decision-making, promoting alternative livelihoods and realizing gender
equality. This is followed by an analysis of the projects’ failures to implement sustainable
development considered along these four dimensions and their impacts on different
groups in the local communities. I explain the failures by the manifestations of state’s
hegemonic practices and local dynamics, based on the qualitative findings and descriptive
quantitative data. The chapter concludes by drawing out hypotheses, informed by
qualitative findings, which are empirically investigated in the following chapter.
The quantitative investigation of local sustainable development is carried out in
Chapter 5. An econometric study on the relationship between local sustainable
development, socio-economic inequalities, and the role of the state is presented, based on
the hypotheses advanced in the preceding chapter. The chapter explores the determinants
of two different proxies for commitment to sustainable development to test whether
different axes of power and perceptions of the state have statistically significant roles.
Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the main arguments and findings. The
chapter encapsulates the core idea put forth in the dissertation, namely that the Turkish
state’s hegemonic project can be read from its remaking of local environments. In doing
so, it points to the necessity of broader change in the state-society nexus if an
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environmentally-sound, socio-economically equitable vision of development is to be a
real possibility in Turkey. The chapter also draws policy conclusions on operationalizing
effective and democratic participatory decision-making mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A GRAMSCIAN UNDERSTANDING OF STATE-SOCIETYENVIRONMENT NEXUS
“The main objectives [in this period] are to reduce inequalities in income distribution and
thus alleviate poverty, and enable all segments of society to receive a fair share of the
increased prosperity”
th
8 Five-Year Development Plan of the Turkish Republic, Paragraph 910
“Everyone has a right to live in a healthy, balanced environment”
Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Chapter VIII (A), Article 56

2.1 Introduction
There are many lenses through which one can analyze the state. The case of
Turkey is no exception. Indeed, the state in Turkey has been examined in relation to
shifts in the economic policies it pursues (Öniş & Şenses, 2007), its relationship with the
domestic capitalist class (Buğra, 1994), the paths of development it has undertaken
(Keyder, 1989), its relationship with civil society (Keyman, 2005), and so forth. The
present work takes a different perspective in analyzing the Turkish state: it aims to
address the state-society relationship in Turkey through the viewpoint of local sustainable
development.
This chapter engages in the task of articulating a theoretical framework in which
the political economy of sustainable development can be studied at the local scale. I
begin with an overview of Turkey in section 2.2, where I provide a snapshot of the
country and argue that this general picture offers evidence of the failure of sustainable
development implementation. Then, in section 2.3, I give a descriptive explanation of this
failure, familiarizing the reader with the prominent characteristics of the Turkish state,
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based on the recent scholarship on the issue. In doing so, I present these arguments in
descriptive terms and do not engage in a theoretical investigation, i.e. I do not trace their
emergence or prominence analytically, and neither do I address the links between them.
Therefore, sections 2.2 and 2.3 can be thought as portraying the empirical puzzle that
motivates this dissertation; namely that the Turkish state fails to implement sustainable
development despite the existence of the necessary legislative infrastructure and a
capable state apparatus.
The theoretical exposition of these empirical observations is offered in sections
2.4 and 2.5. Section 2.4 addresses the terrain of theoretical thinking on the state, in
efforts to lay the groundwork to theoretically analyze the failure of sustainable
development in Turkey. First, I provide the broad contours of the neoclassical economists
and Marxian state theoreticians’ take on the state question—taken to be epitomes of the
individualist and the structuralist camps—and note their shortcomings. Next, I move on
to discuss the Gramscian state theory and justify why it is suited to my purposes.
In Section 2.5, I then situate the stylized features of the Turkish state within a
Gramscian formulation. I engage in a historical and analytical exploration, interpreting
the features of the Turkish state as symptoms of its hegemonic project. Finally, in section
2.6, I deploy the Gramscian state-analytical framework as a theoretical anchor and extend
it to address local sustainable development, complementing it with a political economy of
the environment approach. The chapter concludes by highlighting the hypotheses that
emerge from this framework.
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2.2 “Turkey: A Country at a Crossroads”
The subtitle above is how a UNDP report dubs Turkey in pointing out its peculiar
geographical location between Europe and Asia, where “a modern state meets deeprooted traditions” (UNDP, 2004a). It is indeed the case that the country escapes simple
dichotomies of East-West, traditional-modern, and developing-developed (Adaman &
Arsel, 2005). However, the UNDP report employs the term “crossroads” to further
underline the challenges the country faces in terms of socio-economic disparities and
environmental problems despite the improving economic outlook. Even a brief glance at
statistical indicators is suggestive: Turkey ranks 84th on the 2005 Human Development
Index (UNDP, 2007), while it ranks 66th in terms of per capita GDP, PPP $8,407.
Turkey covers approximately 780,000 square kilometers and has a rapidly
growing population of 73 million. The urban share of total population was 67.3 percent in
2005, a figure expected to go up to 72 percent by 2015 according to the UNDP (2007).
Although the country lately has been experiencing high levels of growth, mostly exportled, its economy remains vulnerable to crises (OECD, 2006). Socio-economic indicators,
on the other hand, tell a different story about how equitable the fruits of growth are
shared. Although absolute and food poverty levels are low, more than 17 percent of the
population lives below the national poverty line (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry
Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, 2010). Income and access to
infrastructural services, such as education and health, are highly unevenly distributed
across the country (UNDP, 2004a). In addition, largely unregulated economic activities,
coupled with socio-economic inequalities, have taken a toll on the environment, as
evidenced by intensified environmental degradation and pollution. Thus, Turkey stands at
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a crossroads to implement sustainable development; that is, to enforce social equity and
environmental protection while preserving a sound economic base.
It is repeatedly noted that one of the most pressing issues Turkey must deal with
is lack of effective environmental protection and overall worsening of environmental
quality (UNDP, 2004; 2007; WB, 2000). Turkey faces a number of environmental
challenges due to unsustainable production and consumption patterns, including high
material and pollution intensity of its economy, and disregard for environmental concerns
in efforts to speed economic and social development, especially at the sub-national level
(OECD, 2008). Environmental degradation and pollution, driven by resource overuse and
waste disposal beyond the assimilative capacity of the ecosystem, have worsened
especially since the 1980s. In addition to unregulated industrialization and urbanization,
intensified chemical use in agriculture, large energy and irrigation projects undertaken
without regard to their environmental implications, high levels of population growth,
uneven distribution of income, and persistent poverty have all put increasing pressure on
the environment (Adaman & Arsel, 2005). The overall performance of environmental
indicators provides ample evidence in this respect: For example, 500 million tons of
fertile soil is lost to erosion and 22,000- 27,000 square kilometers of forestland disappear
every year (Adaman & Arsel, 2010). Greenhouse emissions per capita increased by 119
percent between 1990 and 2007, a period marked by high growth rates (Adaman et al.,
2010). Despite the absence of reliable and comprehensive data, it is repeatedly pointed
out that the loss of biodiversity is alarming (OECD, 2008; UNDP, 2004a; WB, 2000).
The second set of important challenges ahead of Turkey on the path to sustainable
development is the stark inequalities indicated by measures of both economic welfare and
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human development. Although the incidence of absolute poverty is low, income
distribution is highly skewed, as the 2009 Gini value of 43.2 attests. While the poorest 10
percent of the population held 2 percent of GDP, the richest 10 percent held 34.1 percent
in 2005 (UNDP, 2007). Similarly, aggregate indicators of health and education paint an
optimistic picture that masks the highly uneven distribution of both the accessibility and
quality of these services. Rural areas, especially, suffer from underequipped and
understaffed schools and health facilities.
Among the multiple aspects of inequality tearing apart the socio-economic fabric
of the country, regional and gender-related disparities are arguably the most significant.
Regional differentials in income per capita and poverty incidence are not only longstanding, but also have been widening (UNDP, 2004a). In 2006, the average per capita
income in Turkey’s western provinces was more than twice as high as that in the eastern
and southeastern provinces (Adaman & Yükseker, 2008). Human development indicators
of health and education illuminate the multidimensionality of regional disparities. Life
expectancy in the east, for instance, is eight years lower than that in the west (Adaman &
Yükseker, 2008). Similarly, gross enrollment ratios in primary and secondary education
are well above 95 percent in the west, while barely exceeding 75 percent in the east
(UNDP, 2004b).
Although natural endowments and geographical accessibility partly account for
the wide gulf between the western and eastern regions of the country, the primary reason
is neglect on part of the Turkish state. Less-developed regions receive less public
investment than their share of population. The persistence and widening of regional
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disparities is even more striking given that the alleviation of regional disparities has been
a priority issue on the agenda of the Turkish state since the 1960s (UNDP, 2004a).
Gender-related disparities, on the other hand, are most visibly reflected in the
wide difference in women and men’s access to economic opportunities and entitlements,
and participation in political and social life. Gender-disaggregated data on indicators such
as property ownership, literacy and enrollment rates, labor force participation, and
political participation speak to this fact. In 2005, for instance, the female literacy rate was
79.6 percent, more than 15 percentage points lower than the male literacy rate. Female
labor force participation was around 28 percent the same year, compared to male
participation of 77 percent. Gender inequalities are especially amplified in rural areas,
where women suffer from limited access to land, technology, extension and financial
services, lack of education, limited household transfer of agricultural knowledge, intense
demands on labor time, and restrictions on mobility (Akder, 2003).
This broad sketch of the failure of sustainable development in Turkey might not
come as a surprise. After all, many states fail in effectuating an environmentally-sound
and socially-equitable development path. In Turkey, however, the failure of sustainable
development is something of a paradox, since an ideal mix for its implementation is
apparently in place. Worsening sustainable development outcomes in Turkey have
coincided with the continual emphasis on sustainable development by seemingly willing
state officials and far-reaching legislative arrangements. As the excerpts at the beginning
of this chapter suggests, environmental and social concerns seem to be integrated in
different stages of policymaking.
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The Turkish state has developed an impressive body of environmental legislation
within the last three decades. The first institutional attempts to deal with environmental
problems date back to 1978, when the Prime Ministry Undersecretariat was established to
coordinate

the

different

governmental

activities

in

environmental

protection.

Comprehensive legislation has been instilled since then, which specified the duties and
obligations of numerous state branches in environmental regulation and protection
(Adaman & Arsel, 2005). Furthermore, the Turkish state is a party to a number of
international conventions and has ratified documents that explicitly recognize and adopt a
sustainable development vision, such as those produced at the Rio and Johannesburg
Summits.
A second set of legislative arrangements regarding sustainable development
implementation concerns socio-economic inequalities. The mitigation of inequalities has
also been on the Turkish state’s agenda for some years now (UNDP, 2004a), and is
repeatedly identified in official documents as a priority to be addressed. In particular, the
alleviation of regional disparities has been an explicit goal of the Turkish state since the
1960s, the achievement of which was attempted primarily through regional programs.
The recognition of gender inequalities and attempts to tackle them through
institutionalized mechanisms are more recent, as evidenced by the establishment of the
General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women in 1990.
The legislative infrastructure for sustainable development should be considered in
conjunction with the existence of a well-developed state apparatus in Turkey. As
observed by many, the Turkish state—unlike the situation in many developing countries
where an effective state system is absent—exercises power through a complex and
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powerful machinery. Turkey inherited from the Ottomans an omnipresent, if not
omnipotent, national system that governs socioeconomic, cultural and political practices
(Adaman & Arsel, 2010, forthcoming). The presence of the legislation and the apparatus,
coupled with growing, albeit still weak societal demands for environmental protection
and socio-economic justice, makes the failure of sustainable development in the Turkish
case rather perplexing.
A recently growing literature seeks to explain this paradox (see, for instance, an
edited volume by Adaman & Arsel, 2005). Scholars trying to analyze it attribute the
contradiction between policy-making and implementation to enforcement failures on the
side of the Turkish state, the origins and manifestations of which are multi-faceted
(Adaman & Arsel, 2010, forthcoming). I take these up in the next section.

2.3 The Turkish State: Between Unwillingness and Inability
As stated above, there is now a body of work that analyzes the Turkish state’s
effectiveness in implementing sustainable development in general, and environmental
protection in particular. The punch line of these studies is that although sustainable
development is acknowledged as an imperative, the state may either be willing but
lacking in capacity to effectively implement sustainable development, or unwilling to do
so. The analyses within this body of work illuminate important links between stylized
features of the Turkish state, on the one hand, and aggregate measures of sustainable
development, such as national measures of environmental quality and inequality, on the
other.
In this section, based on my reading of the literature on the Turkish state, I discuss
the characteristics of the Turkish state that stand in the way of effective sustainable
31

development implementation. As I have stated in the introductory part of this chapter, I
do not set out to address these characteristics within a state-analytical framework in this
section, but rather provide a cursory understanding of the noticeable features of the
Turkish state. The features I discuss below, although presented in a taxonomical format,
are inter-related, as will be clarified in section 2.5. A combination of these features is
often observed to account for said failures. I use the below taxonomy for the sake of
presentational clarity, so it should not be read to imply that the points raised are
completely independent of each other.

2.3.1 Commitment to Modernization and Growth-Orientation
A glance through the history of Turkish politics would be sufficient to recognize
the preeminence of modernization as a societal goal. Achieving modernization and
1

economic progress has indeed been a long-standing objective of Turkish policymakers.

In the early years of the republic, this task entailed the injection of “European”
characteristics into society and the institution of strong state machinery capable of
enforcing measures required for progress (Arsel, 2005). Thus, it was a project of total
transformation of the entire social and political spheres rather than a mere agenda of
economic catching-up. For instance, strict state control was established over religion in
line with the secularist principles, a new legal system borrowed from Europe replaced
Islamic law, and Islamic attires were banned in order for Turkish society to achieve a
modern look. The Turkish society also seemed subscribed to this project of

1

In fact, the preeminence of modernization as a policy goal dates back to the late years of
Ottoman Empire.
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modernization, evidenced by the general absence of societal contestation in the face of
such rapid transformations.
Although the state’s modernization project encompassed a transformation process
that surpassed a solely economic one, there was a central role for economic growth
within it: rapid economic growth, fueled by the application of modern science and
technology to economic processes, was seen to provide support to the newly created
political and social order. Economic growth was, and still is, envisaged as the
precondition and the remedy for all the ills in the backward, traditional society. Growth
policies were given priority, based on the assumption that their achievement would
automatically resolve social and political issues as well. Thus, it is not surprising that
debates on how to best promote economic growth have always been important in Turkish
politics. These debates, however, never shifted from politics of “development
alternatives” to politics of “alternatives to development”. Thus the political landscape
does not contain proto-post-developmentalist propositions in the vein of Gandhi’s hind
swaraj (Arsel, 2005). A wide range of ideologies within Turkish politics shares the
common faith in economic growth as the precondition of progress. Proxies of economic
growth thus continue to be the sole criteria of assessing development.
Consequently, the Turkish state’s ability and willingness to address environmental
and social issues, and to implement policies accordingly, is often severely limited by its
growth-oriented modernist vision. The supremacy of economic growth as a goal renders
other issues, such as environmental quality and social justice, secondary. On the one
hand, development strategies undertaken by the Turkish state have served, among other
things, to put immense pressure on the environment. On the other, even when the Turkish
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state is willing and able to implement environmental protection policies, the development
2

strategies it pursues often impedes effective enforcement of these policies.

Within this context, a number of empirical studies demonstrate the implications of
the Turkish state’s growth-oriented modernization project on sustainable development.
Tosun and Fyall (2005), for instance, provide an account of the environmental pressure
that resulted from state efforts to promote tourism as the new growth industry in 1980s.
The primacy of developmentalist goals over environmental issues was also evident in the
lack of bans on the polluting activities of industrial firms, despite continuous lip service
paid in official documents to abatement of air and water pollution, deforestation and
desertification. Similarly, Çoban (2004) and Arsel (2005), in their discussions of
community-based resistance to gold mining activities in Western Turkey, make the case
that the Turkish state consistently ignored the environmental and social costs of mining in
order to attract foreign capital and promote economic growth.
Agricultural growth policies pursued by the Turkish state arguably provide the
most visible evidence of the repercussions of its modernist vision on sustainable
development. Aydın’s (2005) discussion of agricultural policies is especially illustrative
in this regard. The agricultural sector in Turkey underwent rapid commercialization as
part of the development strategy initiated in the 1950s. Green Revolution technologies
and use of agrochemicals were promoted with the aim of increasing productivity, with the
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The Turkish prime minister’s recent endorsement of hydroelectric power plants
exemplifies this perfectly. In a speech at a plant opening, he criticized environmental
activists who resisted the building of such power plants and stated “A country’s level of
electricity consumption reflects its level of development and its productive power…We
cannot take advantage of [natural] resources if we do not apply science and reason to
their utilization. We will use these resources and transfer them into production”. (Radikal
Newspaper, April 17th, 2010).
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state often acting as the main supplier of agricultural inputs. Agricultural intensification
was encouraged through various schemes and pricing mechanisms implemented by the
state and the large-scale agricultural projects pushed by international development
agencies. These processes, coupled with heightened land fragmentation and lack of offfarm employment opportunities in rural areas, led to further intensification of land use.
Another major component of the agricultural modernization policies has been
monumental irrigation works undertaken in many river basins in the country. The State
Hydraulic Works—the major public agency responsible for irrigation developments—
strongly emphasizes the importance of dam building. The state chose to ignore problems
caused by large dams, such as human displacement, loss of flora and fauna, salinization
and silting problems, while the economic gains of increased irrigation and productivity
were emphasized.
This strategy of agricultural modernization proved costly. Increased chemical use
led to pollution, especially of groundwater resources, as well as loss of soil fertility.
Agricultural intensification and chemical use have compromised the long-term
productivity of the agricultural sector. In the absence of redistributive land reforms and
measures to address the decreasing viability of livelihoods, the rural poor were forced to
overuse natural resources, resulting in further environmental problems. Finally, largescale dam construction has not only disrupted the natural hydrological cycle and led to
biodiversity losses, but also provided incentives to increase irrigated farming at the
expense of environmental quality.
To recap, the Turkish state’s commitment to a modernization agenda that
prioritizes economic growth results in undermining the effective implementation of
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sustainable development in numerous ways. The state continues to treat the environment
as a resource to exploit for economic growth. The preeminence of economic growth as a
societal goal makes social and environmental concerns secondary; such issues are not
critically examined in relation to the development process and the vision of development
held by the Turkish state (Arsel, 2005; Aydın, 2005). The social and environmental costs
of economic policies are either ignored, or the implementation of policies to address these
costs is undercut by the dominance of economic policies.

2.3.2 A Paternalistic Style of Governance
Many scholars have observed that a top-down, paternalistic style of governance is
the dominant way that the Turkish state relates to society (Aydın, 2005; İnsel, 1996;
Keyder, 1989). This has shaped state-society relationship to be defined, more than
anything, by distance. Although the paternalism of the state has been increasingly under
attack after the end of 1980’s, the state remains to be the main actor that defines the
parameters and boundaries of Turkish politics and of the modernization project (Keyman
3

& Öniş, 2007). The Turkish state still seeks to govern its constituency in a paternalistic
way where policies are formed largely independent of the society.
The predominance of paternalism as the modality of governance has two
consequences relevant to sustainable development implementation. First, the paternalist
gaze of the Turkish state crystallizes most visibly as a reactive, rather than proactive,
3

Keyman and Öniş (2007) evaluate the post-1980s as a period during which statecentrism and the top-down governance modality associated with it came to be challenged
by calls for greater recognition of societal demands and democratization. Others are not
that optimistic; Adaman and Arsel (2005), for instance, while acknowledging that
openness and dialogue have partly replaced control and domination as qualities of
governance, argue that the Turkish state still seeks to govern its constituency, seen as the
unitary Turkish nation, in a paternalistic manner.
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stance vis-à-vis sustainable development implementation (Öniş & Şenses, 2007). While
the state is often blind to the implications of its policies on society and the environment,
it takes action when faced with acute environmental problems that have built up over
time and involve life-threatening impacts that can no longer be ignored.
Second, skepticism produced by top-down governance stands as an obstacle to
sustainable development implementation. Given that paternalism reigns supreme, it is not
difficult to imagine that citizens’ perceptions of the state is marked by distrust. The topdown, paternalistic implementation of sustainable development policies evokes political
contestation, not necessarily due to any fundamental objection to the policies themselves,
but rather due to the fact that the implementation of any kind of policy, environmental or
otherwise, is often perceived as favoring certain social groups over others (Adaman &
Arsel, 2010, forthcoming). Top-down governance, and the lack of transparency
associated with it, has eroded trust in the state as a fair arbiter of conflicting interests.

2.3.3 Patronage Networks and Particularistic Interactions
Many scholars of Turkey note the dominance of patronage and particularistic
interactions in state-society relations (Adaman, Çarkoğlu & Şenatalar, 2001; GüneşAyata, 1994; Sunar, 1996, 2004). The type of patron-client networks witnessed in Turkey
is markedly different than the standard corruption/bribery activities addressed in the
economics literature, i.e. where one party offers a bribe to another; not necessarily
involving a personal relationship. Instead, patronage works as a reciprocity-based
relationship that is not necessarily monetary. Rather, the social connection of the parties
is important (e.g. a favor done for a friend of the family, or for someone who has helped
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someone in the family, or someone who is from the same town, etc.) and these
connections, unlike one-time bribe exchanges, seem to last a while.
Parties involved in these types of connections are rather unaware of the fact that
what they do is wrong in the sense that they are violating the public interest (Adaman &
Çarkoğlu, 2000). Yet, patron-client networks and particularistic interactions—mainly in
the form of reciprocal favoritism and voluntary contributions—cause considerable
erosion in the public sphere. Interactions of this type have weakened the capacity of the
Turkish bureaucracy to carry out policies, and curtailed effective implementation.
Environmental policy implementation and monitoring are no exceptions. Especially in
cases where policy imposes costs on a small group and benefits a large group, for
instance a policy that places a ban on industrial pollution, patronage severely undermines
policy implementation insofar as the small groups can organize more easily and put
pressure to achieve their goals. Therefore, even in the presence of a strong impetus to
pursue sustainable development, the predominance of clientelist networks hampers the
Turkish state’s ability to effectively operationalize it.

2.3.4 Role for Inability beyond Unwillingness? Lack of Motivation and Competence
Although conceptually different than the three features of the Turkish state I have
discussed so far, two additional factors have been identified as reasons for its failure to
implement sustainable development: local bureaucrats’ lack of motivation and incentives,
and a lack of competence. Turkish state’s modernist vision and paternalistic style of
governance, together with the prevalence of patron-client networks, emerge as
characteristics related to the state in Turkey, demonstrating its unwillingness to
implement sustainable development. Incentive and competence problems, on the other
38

hand, appear more as behavioral patterns and resource issues that explain the state’s
inability to implement sustainable development in few instances where it is willing to do
4

so. Therefore, I choose to address these two factors separately.
The governance structure in place in Turkey provides few incentives for locallevel bureaucrats to engage in efforts for effective implementation (Adaman, Özkaynak
& Hakyemez, 2009). The system provides few payoffs for performing well. Nor does it
provide a credible threat of penalty in the case of underperformance. It does not,
therefore, come as an utter surprise that local bureaucrats choose to underperform, and
enforcement problems arise at the local level. Environmental policy enforcement is no
exception. Consequently, even when the Turkish state is willing to implement sustainable
development, it might still be unable to do so due to enforcement problems at the local
level.
Even if the Turkish state is willing to implement sustainable development and
enforcement failures at the local level can be overcome, a lack of required competence
may impede effective operationalization. Aydın (2005) points out that although the
Turkish state has been active in introducing environmental laws, a lack of funds, trained
personnel and resources have undermined the effective implementation of these laws.
Similarly, in their case study of basin conservation in Turkey, Adaman, Özkaynak, and
Hakyemez (2009) state that inadequate human capital, equipment, organizational skills,
etc., impede the effective implementation of sustainable development.

4

It should be noted that motivation and competence issues do not prove to be obstacles
when the state shows real willingness to implement a policy. The striking level of
competence displayed in dam construction and the efficiency of the State Hydraulic
Works in general are excellent, yet ironic, examples.
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2.4 Towards Formulating a State-Analytical Framework: Pointers from the
Literature
The picture I have laid out in the previous section builds on the contemporary
scholarship on the Turkish state in important ways. The present work, however, aims to
diverge from this body work and push its boundaries. Specifically, I intend to formulate a
theoretical framework that will both encircle the main themes within this literature and be
extended to embrace their mediations at the local level. The present section constitutes
the first step towards this goal.
Most of the literature on the Turkish state is based on descriptive accounts of a
specific characteristic, be it patronage relationships, paternalistic governance or
motivations underlying its interventions in the economic sphere. These accounts provide
different ontologies of the Turkish state, which may at times look contradictory, such as
the simultaneous existence of authoritarianism/paternalism associated with the “Strong
State” tradition, and the prevalence of patronage networks, implying a vulnerable state
whose power has been eroded by clientelism. However, rather than adopting these
accounts at face value, the purposes of this dissertation necessitates the deployment of a
theoretical framework, rather than the adoption of these accounts at face value, in which
these different ontologies can be addressed, including those that are seemingly
contradictory. Such a framework would enable me to treat the linkages between the
stylized characteristics of the Turkish state analytically. It would also serve as a
theoretical anchor that may be extended to attend to local-scale crystallizations of the
Turkish state, one of the main themes addressed in this dissertation.
In an effort to formulate such a framework, I begin by exploring briefly how the
state has been conceptualized within the traditions of neoclassical economics and
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Marxian political economy. I then delve into the Gramscian scholarship on state and on
the concept of hegemony. In doing so, I also explain why the Gramscian approach is
well-suited to the purposes of this dissertation. This section leads to the next one, in
which I employ the concept of hegemony to address different yet interconnected
ontologies of the Turkish state.
My decision to focus on these two particular schools of thought was motivated by
the conviction that they typify two broad camps of approaches to the state question;
namely, the individualist and structuralist lines of thinking. Yet I do not intend so much
to provide a comprehensive tour d’horizon of these undoubtedly wealthy literatures, but
more to utilize them stylistically and to point out the reductionism inherent in both. More
specifically, my aim in engaging with the neoclassical and Marxian traditions is to
underline the shortcomings in their approaches to the state question and thereby
illuminate the strengths of the Gramscian framework, which is the theoretical framework
that informs this dissertation.

2.4.1 A Brief Consideration of Individualism and Structuralism
The intellectual terrain that addresses the question of state can be seen as being
broadly divided between the individualistic and structuralist approaches. While the
former camp views the state as arising from the rational actions of atomistic agents, the
latter reduces it to a necessary product of structure, e.g. class relations. I hold that both
lines of thinking reduce complex phenomena such as state behavior and state-society
relationships to explanations based solely on either individuals’ pursuit of self-interest or
the dictates of structure, and that both largely ignore interactions between the two.
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5

The traditional neoclassical stance is the epitome of the first camp. Such
treatments are based on the premise that the state is an agent of society that arose because
it was optimal, required only for correcting market failures. The relationship between the
state and the citizens is a market-type one, in which citizens pay taxes and the state
provides services. As this formulation rests on the assumption that individuals are selfinterested, utility-maximizing, rational agents, political behavior is reduced to being
6

determined by the pursuit of (material) self-interest. Within this context, state behavior
has primarily been tackled in relation to rent-seeking activities, which were extended to
encapsulate the nature of all governments (Krueger, 1974). Accordingly, government
activity/public policy creates rents and induces private actors to engage into outlays of
resources in pursuit of these rents. Subsequent neoclassical formulations of state behavior
within this framework (e.g. Buchanan, Tollison & Tullock, 1980), commonly referred as
Neoclassical Political Economy (NCPE), treat state power as a commodity that rational
agents within and outside the state compete to capture. This formulation effectively treats
rent-seeking as a “technology” and state as an input-output machine, where inputs are
7

resources spent for rent-seeking, and outputs are rent-creating policies (Rao, 1995). The
ability to influence policy becomes a function of rent-seeking expenditure (i.e. economic)
5

It should be noted that I do not explicitly address the more recent, evolutionary
perspectives on institutions that may be situated within neoclassical economics here.
However, I hold, however, these perspectives also suffer from the same individualist
reductionism. Specifically, the explanations put forward by such approaches regarding
the emergence and evolution of institutions such as the state, are based on individual
behavior. The state, yet again, is reduced to a consequence of individual action alone.
6
For instance, Downs conceptualized political parties as teams of men who seek office in
order to enjoy the income, prestige and power that go with running the government
apparatus; their social function is accomplished as a by-product of their private motives
(Downs, 1957, as cited in Orchard & Stretton, 1997).
7
See Rao (1995) for an eloquent treatment of theoretical inconsistencies within the
NCPE framework.
42

power. The state apparatus thus becomes merely an arena of competition, rather than an
agent in its own right.
Although there is now a recognition of the limits of these behavioral assumptions
even within the individualist camp (Buchanan, 1993; North, 1993), the individualistic
approach embodied in neoclassicism, and its broader ontological stance, has ramifications
on its ability to deal with complexities surrounding the question of state, such as the
historical and institutional contexts in which states operate; and the interaction of
structural factors with individual behavior and autonomous goals formulated and pursued
8

by states (Archer, 1995; Dequech, 2002; Hodgson, 2000) . By reducing state-society
relationships to isolated one-time exchange interactions, such conceptualization leaves no
space to consider how society is shaped by state actions, assent to be governed is elicited,
how preferences and perceptions of individuals are formed, altered or reinforced, and
how, in turn, social dynamics affect state actions.
Marxian approaches, on the other hand, offer radically different treatments of the
9

state. Although the range of positions under the banner of Marxian state theory makes it
difficult to proclaim a common understanding of the state, a broad consensus can be read
on some aspects. One such aspect, important for the purposes of this dissertation, is the
explicit assertion that there are, indeed, motives that underlie state behavior, and thus
8

It should be noted that these are not critiques of the individualistic approach to the state
question per se, but of individualism in general.
9
A close and detailed reading of Marxian tradition of state theory is beyond the scope of
this dissertation. Suffice it to say that some of the main works within the literature have
explored issues such as the emergence of state (as a class instrument vs. state as a factor
of cohesion), the institutional separation of state from society (the separation of the
political from the economic), and the (im)possibility of state autonomy; different state
forms correspond to different forms of capitalism and balance of class forces, structural
selectivity of state’s responsiveness to social demands, and state-civil society interactions
(see Jessop, 1982, for a comprehensive review).
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impartiality of the state is inconceivable (Marx, 1843/1970; Poulantzas, 1978). In line
with the class-analytical perspective, scholars in this tradition start with the premise that
society is a fragmented realm where multiple interests exist. Motives that underlie state
behavior, in turn, reflect the balance of forces within society. Accordingly, the exercise of
state power is geared towards furthering the interests of certain social groups, while
others are excluded (Hirsch, 1978; Offe, 1974; Poulantzas, 1978; Jessop, 1982, 1985).
This conception underscores the differential ability of social groups to access and shape
state policy, and poses a stark contrast to the neoclassical portrayal of the state as a
neutral “technology”.
Although it provides an analytical ground on which the motivations and uneven
impacts of state behavior can be dealt with, many Marxian treatments of the state suffer
from class-reductionism. Specifically, the exercise of state power is often conceptualized
as driven by the needs of capitalist reproduction, and state is reduced to a class tool, a
component of the superstructure that reflects the economic base. Consequently, political
struggle is reduced to a mirror of economic conflicts; the political becomes a mere
derivative of the economic, while the non-economic axes of struggle, dimensions of
power, and aspirations in governance are ignored.
This model has little explanatory power when we step outside the universe of
Western capitalist states and encounter states that “constitute” their societies (İnsel,
1996). The structuralist line within the Marxian tradition implicitly assumes a social
sphere populated by agents (e.g. classes), with practices and strategies defined by
economic relations. This premise does not offer much scope to analyze the making of the
social by the state, i.e. the shaping of agents, their strategies and interests in the course of
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their interaction with the state. İnsel (1996) asserts that many Third World countries are
characterized by states that conceive and produce their societies this way, where
interventions in the economic sphere reflect the states’ intentions to establish themselves
and justify their existence. He claims that such state forms debunk the portrayal of the
state as arising out of economic relations found in many Marxian treatments.
The Gramscian understanding of state and society is useful in moving beyond
both the individualism of the neoclassical tradition, and mechanistic approaches of the
Marxian tradition to address the interaction of agency and structure. It, therefore, offers
more insight into how states shape the form and process of development.

2.4.2 A Gramscian Understanding of State and Society
Our thinking about state and society is often framed by the juxtaposition of the
two as opposite poles. Such thinking (e.g. an “evil” state that dominates society, the arena
of autonomy) bears the danger of blanketing other types of linkages between state and
society, and rendering them as unified sites in our intellectual imaginations. Uncovering
the links between state and society, crucial for the exercise of state power, has arguably
been the most important contribution of Gramsci’s thinking.
In line with the Gramscian tradition, I understand both the realm of the state and
that of the society not as homogenous sites, but as sites where multiple and at most times
conflicting interests exist. The premise of a divided society discredits the idea of the state
as representing the “general interest”. Since society is fragmented along the lines of class,
gender, ethnicity, etc., it is impossible to envisage universal interest on the side of the
society. Portraying society as a unified whole is necessary to secure cohesion and
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reproduce the image of the state as a neutral actor that pursues the general interest, fully
differentiated from the society (Gramsci, 1971; Jessop, 1982).
The state should also be understood as a site of plural interests and an apparatus
that different groups try to capture.

10

Powerful groups that dominate the state (e.g.

different factions of the bourgeoisie) are likely to have conflicting interests and push for
different state policies. Unity within the “ruling bloc” does not come naturally, but needs
11

to be constituted through the mediation of conflicts among them.

It is in this context, the mediation of particular interests, where Gramsci’s
formulation of hegemony enters. The state’s hegemonic function involves surpassing the
diversity of interests and facilitating their unity; it is successfully fulfilled when the
abstract problem between conflicting particular interests and the general interest is
resolved. Constitution and reproduction of a collective will, a “national-popular” outlook,
play a crucial role in this respect. When an effective national-popular outlook—one that
different groups in society subscribe to—is fabricated, it becomes possible for the state to
12

appear as a neutral institution embodying the general interest.

By cementing consensus

among different groups in society, the national-popular outlook justifies the dominant

10

Providing a definition of the state is not my intention here. Throughout this
dissertation, the state is conceptualized as both a space where different groups aim to
dominate to further their interests, and as an actor with its own interests.
11
A substantial body of Marxian work, both within and outside of the Gramscian
tradition, investigates the organization of unity among dominant groups and implications
of its failure. I do not provide an account of that particular literature, since it is beyond
the scope of this dissertation, which aims to employ the Gramscian framework to analyze
state-society relationships in Turkey.
12
Poulantzas (1978) discusses the constitution of collective interest in terms of two
functions of the state: he argues that the juridico-political ideology of the state construes
“people” as mutually isolated, individual citizens in a “realm of citizenship” (isolation
effect), and ensures the public unity of the people-nation considered as the abstract sum
of formally free and equal legal subjects (unifying effect).
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groups’ claim to rule. Specific forms of representation and state intervention allow the
articulation of diverse interests to supplement the hegemonic project (Jessop, 1982,
1985). The state organizes and regulates the relationships among diverse individual
subjects and social categories through the bureaucratic framework to secure cohesion
(Poulantzas, 1978, Jessop, 1985).
Gramsci introduces the concept of hegemony as a category distinct from
dominance, and emphasizes the role of organic relations between civil society (trade
unions, political parties, mass education, voluntary associations, interest groups, etc.) and
state in its exercise (Gramsci, 1971).

13

What distinguishes hegemony is the establishment

of active consent, albeit backed by the threat of coercion, in society. Thus, Gramsci
envisages state to be comprised of all practical and theoretical activities that ruling
groups use not only to justify and maintain dominance, but also win the active consent of
the ruled (Gramsci, 1971). The state is made up of both political society and civil society,
where civil society is a field connected to the state through the rhythms of everyday life
14

(Burawoy, 2003).

Consent is never spontaneous, but needs to be formed. It is based on the
intellectual, moral, and political leadership and persuasion of the dominant group(s). It is
13

Arguably, an elaborate treatment of the ways in which various social relations are
articulated by the exercise of state power has been absent from the Marxian state theory
until Gramsci’s work. One reason for this absence is the underlying assumption in most
of this literature that economic forces, coupled with the necessary juridico-political form,
can ensure expanded reproduction of capital. Gramsci, on the other hand, refuses to
reduce political practice to an automatic effect of class relations (Jessop, 1982).
14
It is important to note, at this point, how the Gramscian concept of civil society is
positioned vis-à-vis the commonly held and naïve conception of civil society as a space
separate and autonomous from the state, where all social demands can be organized and
voiced to realize specific effects in state policy or where oppositional movements can be
mounted (Buttigieg, 2005). Instead, civil society, as a domain interlinked to the state
serves a vehicle of domination as well as a terrain of contestation.
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organized through specific institutions, and backed by force. The attempt, however, is to
always ensure that force also appears to be based on consent of the majority.
Within this context, Gramsci and Gramscian scholars (such as Nicos Poulantzas,
Joseph Buttigieg, and Bob Jessop) examined how political support is established and/or
undermined through economic, political and ideological practices that go beyond the field
of class relations and include the whole field of social relations. These practices,
instrumental in forging hegemony, can involve short-term material concessions to
subordinate groups elaborated via specific forms of representation and intervention
(Burawoy, 2003; Jessop, 1982, 1985). They can also be based on the inclusion of
elements of alternative (e.g. petty bourgeoisie, working-class) ideologies into the
dominant ideology as a condition of successfully cementing social cohesion and
establishing hegemony (Poulantzas, 1978, Jessop, 1985).
Hegemony, however, is never absolute and is always prone to crises. The
hegemonic function of the state breaks down when dominant groups fail to establish
leadership and constitute the national-popular outlook. Gramsci (1971), for instance,
discusses the Italian case where the dominant class failed to elicit the active consent of
the ruled but instead relied on the continuing absorption of political and intellectual
leaders of subordinate groups into the ruling class. Poulantzas (1979), on the other hand,
discusses crisis of the hegemony in terms of a transition to the exceptional state form.
When active consent cannot be established via organic state-society links, a repressive
state apparatus, increased bureaucratization, and material concessions to subordinate
classes are substituted in its place.
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Gramscian scholars consider the dialectics between state and society within this
framework. State form and interventions influence social/political forces asymmetrically.
Fragmentation of the society by multiple interests implies that state action will benefit
some and hurt others. On the other hand, as the state’s hegemonic function rests upon the
facilitation of diverse social interests, the state form reflects, in part, the overall structure
of society—including, but not limited to, economic relations and the dominant mode of
15

production—and the balance of power between different groups.

Although this is an

admittedly vague formulation of the society-state link, further precision differs across
contexts. The specifics of how society’s configuration casts upon the state depend on its
mediation: to rephrase Poulantzas (1978), state power is an institutionally mediated effect
of the balance among forces within the society in a given context.
Not all forces have the same weight in the balance, i.e. states are not equally
responsive to all groups in society. That is to say, demands that pose fundamental threats
to the hegemonic project do not receive consideration. In addition to the selective
responsiveness of the state to different interests, social groups vary in their ability to
access forms of representation (e.g. parliamentary democracy or clientelism) and realize
their interests through political action (Jessop, 1982). Even when access is acquired to the
various forms of representation, certain demands will be taken into consideration whereas
others will not. The state is not and cannot be a neutral instrument; structures of political
representation and forms of state intervention involve differential access to state

15

While many Marxian treatments of the state fall into economism in claiming that the
economic base determines the state form (e.g. state interventions reflect the needs of
capitalist reproduction), Gramscian scholars argue that political practice cannot be
reduced to economic relations (Gramsci, 1971; Jessop, 1982).
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apparatuses and opportunities to realize social demands, with further implications on
future ability to form and articulate them.
To recapitulate, the Gramscian framework throws light on the multitude of
asymmetric influences between state and society. In doing so, it underscores how
hegemony is continually reproduced and contested by practices beyond economic
relations. As such, it provides a road map in understanding the exercise of state power
within, rather than towards, the social sphere. I maintain in the following section that this
dialectical, non-economistic framework of the state-society relationship is well-suited to
tackle the particular ontologies of the Turkish state.

2.5 The Turkish State in a Gramscian Light
The last section drew the contours of how the state is treated by two different
schools of thought, neoclassical economics and Marxian tradition, and sketched the
alternative Gramscian theorizations of the state in some detail. This section
operationalizes the Gramscian state-analytical framework to tackle the stylized features
16

of the Turkish state discussed in section 2.3.

In doing so, I trace the historical origins

and persistence of these features to the building and re-establishment of state hegemony
in Turkey. Furthermore, I explicitly consider the constitution of the civil society sphere
vis-à-vis the Turkish state and point out its implications in terms of sustainable
development implementation.

16

This section is not intended to explain all aspects of the Turkish state or historically
analyze changes in the composition and balance of power in the ruling groups in Turkey.
See, for instance, Öncü (2003) for a Gramscian treatment of the history of the Turkish
state where he traces changes in state policy corresponding to changes in the composition
of the hegemonic bloc.
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Specifically, I demonstrate that the persistence of modernization as a societal goal
can be explained by its construction as the national-popular outlook, whereas paternalism
and patronage symptomize an atypical hegemonic project marked by the absence of
organic links between the Turkish state and society. That is to say, I address the links
between these three prominent features within the Gramscian framework. Finally, I
analyze the weakness of civil society within the context of the Turkish state’s hegemonic
project by exploring the dialectics of state and society in Turkey, and frame it in terms of
the state’s structural selectivity in allowing and responding to social demands.
The Gramscian perspective is apt for the purposes of the present work for a
number of reasons. As it rejects the economism/class-reductionism inherent in many
Marxian treatments of state, and sheds light on non-economic motivations behind state
actions/political behavior and non-economic dimensions of power, it is suited to tackle
the particularities of the Turkish context. While section 2.3 hinted at some of them, a
more explicit statement of these particularities is necessary to provide the reader with a
background on the Turkish state.
The state in Turkey is distinct from Western capitalist states, most notably in the
incapacity of the weak capitalist class to demand political power at the birth of the
republic. The motives of the bureaucratic-military elite, i.e. the elevation of Turkish
society to the level of modernity, who substituted for the domestic bourgeoisie,
transcended economic stakes. Similarly, struggles that surfaced after the 1950s to capture
and dominate the state apparatus were not on strictly economic/class terms, but reflected
different divisions within the dominant groups. Clearly, this state form defies the
economistic/simplistic vision of the state as essentially a class tool utilized for
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reproduction of capitalism. It calls for a framework in which the non-economic
motivations (such as aspirations to transform society) of the state elites, and practices to
legitimize and re-establish their dominance can be analyzed. The Gramscian treatments
of the state offer this framework.
The Gramscian perspective also offers the most articulate treatment of statesociety dialectics. In this perspective, both state and society are conceptualized as
heterogeneous sites; the conflicts within dominant groups and the multiplicity of interests
on the side of the society are underlined. The historical constitution of state and society in
Turkey can be unveiled in this framework. Rather than rendering Turkish society as a
multitude governed by the state, Gramscian light displays the state’s uneven impacts on
the society and the differential abilities of different groups to access the state.

2.5.1 Growth-Oriented Modernization
İnsel (1996), in his study of how the state strived to both radically transform the
society and maintain social order in Turkey, claims that the Turkish state constituted and
dominated the social sphere and the social imagery through its interventions in the
economic sphere to achieve modernization. Following İnsel, I hold that the goal of
achieving modernization via economic growth serves as an instrument for the Turkish
state to establish hegemony over the society. That is to say, the state’s motive in pursuing
this goal is not merely realizing economic development, but also legitimizing and
strengthening its existence.
The Turkish state achieved its power and legitimacy, first and foremost, from the
promise of fulfilling the ideal of modernization. The logic of Turkish state’s modernist
vision, and its construction of the economic sphere (e.g. support and development of the
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feeble domestic bourgeoisie; establishment of state-owned enterprises), enabled it to
17

extend and reproduce its power over society.

Even after the domestic bourgeoisie

gained strength, for instance, it always functioned within limits defined by the state and
remained “statist;” it did not “step out of line” to demand political power and/or
autonomy and remained within the paternalist ethic of the Turkish state (Keyder, 1989;
İnsel, 1996).
Besides being the means through which the Turkish state directly established and
reproduced its power within society, the urgency to modernize and realize economic
growth constituted the national-popular outlook around which a relative unity of social
forces was formed. As Eralp (1990) has observed, this was conceived as a national
endeavor, a common goal, questioning of which would be unpatriotic. As such, the
Turkish state was able to represent itself as a neutral institution that embodied the
collective will, and to gain the consent of its constituency. My argument is not that the
“real” motivation underlying the pursuit of modernization/Westernization via rapid
economic growth was to consolidate Turkish state’s hegemony; there are historical
reasons why this motive came to be prioritized by the state elite, dating back to their
disillusionment with the demise of the Ottoman Empire (Arsel, 2005). But the aspiration
to modernize was effectively established as the general/collective interest of Turkish
society through which the consent of the dominated classes (and of different factions
within dominant classes) was acquired.

17

İnsel (1996) analyzes the case of state-owned enterprises as an exemplar of this. He
claims that state-owned enterprises served beyond mere economic purposes since, by
enabling state’s existence within society, they reproduced state power within the social
realm.
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The general absence of societal contestation in the face of such rapid
transformations can be situated within this context. Although challenges to the
modernization project emerged especially after 1980s, these critiques were not of
modernization per se, but rather of its top-down implementation and, at times, its strict
interpretation as a replica of the Western model (Keyder, 1997). Arsel (2005) rightly
observes that although the foundations of the modern republic (such as secularism and
unitary nationalism) have been challenged by different political forces at times, the
connections between progress, developmentalism and economic growth have not been
contested.
That the discourses of the two main parties of parliamentary politics were
dominated by developmentalism is illustrative in this respect. Keyder (1989) states that
the discourses of both the Republican People’s Party—the traditional party of the
military-bureaucratic elite—and the resurgent Democrat Party—the main oppositional
party that came to power in the 1950s. These political discourses constituted economic
growth as the common goal where distributional questions and social justice were left as
side issues. That is to say, the clashes between the two parties were not centered on the
validity of the developmentalist goals to achieve modernization nor related to distribution
and social justice. The main problématique in the political landscape was related to how
to best use state power to realize economic growth.
The constitution of this general/collective interest involved the portrayal of
18

society by the Turkish state as a homogeneous entity with no internal divisions.

18

Since

The Turkish republic inherited, from the Ottoman times, a social sphere fractured
“vertically”, i.e. divided not along class lines, but more along occupational and religious
lines (Keyder, 1989; İnsel, 1996). The basic cleavage in Turkish polity continued to be
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modernization was the prioritized concern, society was to be unified behind this goal,
where even questioning its validity was considered unpatriotic (Eralp, 1990). This
allowed the Turkish state to preempt opposition mobilized around issues such as social
justice and distribution/redistribution. Class-based inequalities, for instance, were
brushed aside since “classes” have been invisible to begin with; there were no classes, but
rather a division of labor among the Turkish citizenry where each and every individual
worked hard to elevate the country to the level of Western civilization. Establishing the
national-popular outlook as modernization via economic growth served to unify different
groups around this “universal goal” and prevented the formulation of demands arising out
of intra-society divisions. Thus, I argue that Turkish state’s hegemonic project was built
around this outlook that could, albeit not indefinitely, resolve the conflict between
particular interests and the “general interest”.
The realization of economic growth was also a requisite to reproduce the
hegemony of the Turkish state by enabling the distribution of material concessions to
subordinate classes to ensure their consent. As mentioned in section 2.4.3, Gramscian
scholars have noted that the acquisition of consent can involve granting short-term
material concessions to the subordinate classes. Keyder’s (1989) observation that the
Turkish state managed to maintain legitimacy by its generosity as long as the urban petty
bourgeoisie and rural small producers could be subsidized can be interpreted in this vein.
Keyder (1989) argues that even the most impoverished groups in society were co-opted
by material improvements to their living standards. He further demonstrates how, with

between the state and the society (Heper, 1985; Aydın, 2005). The state made use of such
vertical fragmentation of the society to prevent the formation of a wide-spread and wellorganized opposition movement (İnsel, 1996).
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slackened economic growth during 1970s, distributional conflicts surfaced. With
increased marginalization of petty bourgeoisie and heightened regional disparities, it
became increasingly difficult to disguise the conflicts on how the costs of the
developmentalist agenda were to be distributed. The collective interest, realization of
economic growth, could no longer guarantee social cohesion and elicit the consent of the
ruled. On the contrary, economic growth proved to be the main source of conflict.
As I have stated earlier, the preeminence of modernization as a societal goal and
its privileged operationalization via economic growth remains largely unchallenged in
contemporary Turkey. The Turkish state is reluctant to implement measures that can
potentially jeopardize the realization of economic growth. In a context where economic
growth reigns supreme over all other concerns, any societal demands that might conflict
with the dictates of growth-oriented modernization are discarded by the state. For these
reasons, the willingness of the Turkish state to implement sustainable development is, to
say the least, dubious.

2.5.2 Paternalism
The paternalistic tradition of governance in Turkey is commonly traced back to
19

the Ottoman past of the Turkish Republic.

The politically dominant group in the

Ottoman system was a socio-cultural elite, rather than a bourgeois class, as was typically
the case in its Western counterparts. This group transformed itself into the political elite
that dominated the state when the Turkish Republic was born. Keyder (1989) attributes
the bureaucracy’s assumption of this role to the weakness of the domestic bourgeois
19

For a detailed treatment of the linkages between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic in terms of governance style and nature of bureaucracy, see, for instance, Heper
(1985), İnsel (1996), and Keyder (1997).
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class. Historically, the Ottoman agricultural sector had been marked with lack of big
landownership that could potentially transform into a national capitalist class. Added to
that was the expulsion of non-Muslim bourgeoisie in the early years of the republic,
which effectively eliminated almost all domestic bourgeoisie.
With the founding of the republic, the political elite undertook of the task of
modernizing what they perceived as a culturally and economically backward society.
Such portrayal of the Turkish society in the eyes of the state elite necessitated its
treatment with a mixture of benevolent paternalism and contempt (Adaman & Arsel,
2010, forthcoming; Heper, 1985). The Turkish state, of which this elite was an organic
part, acted almost independently of the society as the privileged and sovereign subjects of
this top-down transformation.

20

Since there were no social groups that in fact demanded

and/or supported the project of rapid modernization, the Turkish state relied on its own
cadres in its operationalization (İnsel, 1996). That is to say, although modernization and
economic growth had become the collective interest, as argued in the preceding section, it
had not been constituted as an aggregation of different interests that had existed in the
society.
This context produced and justified the distance between the paternalist Turkish
state and society, since the state had to act autonomously in order to realize
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There is a broad consensus within the literature on the Turkish state that the political
elite of the newly founded republic went unchallenged until at least the 1950s. During
1950s, it was clear that the power and legitimacy of the bureaucratic elite to steer social,
economic and political life had weakened, as evidenced by the election of the Democrat
Party to government. This is commonly attributed to the fact that national bourgeoisie
had then grown powerful enough to claim political power (Keyder, 1989; Sunar, 2004).
This shift in the balance of power should not be taken to imply that bureaucracy lost all
grounds; as Heper (1985) observes, it still exercised considerable power in molding state
policy according to its views.
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modernization; it had to be capable of formulating and operationalizing goals
independently of societal demands (Aydın, 2005). A paternalistic, top-down style of
governance served as the driving force of modernization and paved the way to pursue
policies “for society, against society” (İnsel, 1996). As such, the state continued to
acquire its legitimacy not from its citizens, but from the validity of the national-popular
outlook (Heper, 1985).
In a way, the modernist vision and developmentalist agenda of the Turkish state
enabled the perpetuation of its paternalism. The state elite single-handedly carried out
reforms in line with its modernist vision, including the adoption of the Latin alphabet,
banning of Islamic attires, and establishment of a legal system borrowed from Europe.
Meanwhile, the creation of a state-dependent industrial bourgeoisie preempted the
bourgeoisie’s potential to demand autonomy and political power. Contrary to the
supposition that the bourgeoisie would demand political power and impose its values on
civil bureaucracy as it grew stronger, Turkish bureaucracy remained dominant over all
21

social forces (İnsel, 1996).

By disallowing any autonomy in civil society and actively

interfering in the economic sphere (and constructing national unity behind the goal of
modernization), the Turkish bureaucracy reproduced its position over and above society
(Keyder, 1989). The “Father-state”, a term used widely in Turkey, was all-knowing and
all-powerful. Control, co-optation and regulation, rather than consultation and
coordination, marked the way the state related to society (Sunar, 2004).
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Certainly, this is not to suggest that the Turkish bureaucracy could always retain its
power over society. It is widely accepted that the Democratic Party’s coming to power in
1950 marks the loss of power and autonomy for the bureaucratic elite.
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Such authoritarian, paternalist state forms have been addressed in reference to the
crisis of hegemony within the Gramscian literature. Gramsci (1971) discusses them in his
formulation of the “Passive Revolution,” where far-reaching modifications in a country’s
economic structure are made from above through the agency of state apparatuses, without
relying on the active consent of the people. He distinguishes it as state domination, rather
than state hegemony. Poulantzas (1979) elaborates on such exceptional state forms
associated with a repressive state apparatus and increased bureaucratization, and argues
that they may emerge when the bourgeoisie fails to establish its leadership and to
constitute a national-popular outlook. Accordingly, this state form is reflective of the
imperatives of economic intervention and the instability of hegemony, as the resulting
ideological and political crisis cannot be resolved by normal democratic means.
I am reluctant, however, to interpret the Turkish state’s strong bureaucratic
22

tradition and paternalistic style of governance strictly in these terms.

I argue that the

persistence of paternalism as a style of governance in Turkey cannot be explained only by
the bourgeoisie’s failure to consolidate a hegemonic project. As noted above, Gramsci
used the term “Passive Revolution” to denote a variety of historical processes and
contexts where authoritarian state forms emerged, but seems to have perceived it as a
transitory phase. An implicit conviction or an explicit recognition that the intention of
state domination is for the bourgeoisie to mature, and that it ends after it serves its
purpose, can be read in his discussion. Poulantzas’s arguments, on the other hand, imply
a somewhat chronological transition from a “normal” state form where hegemony is
22

Jessop (1982) claims that the state can be examined in relation to axes of determination other
than class; for instance by sketching the state as a site of officialdom vs. people relations. Since
the political sphere is institutionally separate from the economic, relations among political
categories are relatively autonomous from class relations; it is therefore important to examine the
overall structure of social formation.

59

consolidated (via representative democratic institutions) to an authoritarian one, when
hegemonic function breaks down. He attributes this transition largely to the instability of
monopoly capital, and addresses authoritarian means as the tools that the bourgeoisie
resorts to in the face of economic instability.
The Turkish case eludes these formulations. As I have stated before, a national
bourgeoisie that is capable of demanding political power and undertaking the hegemonic
project did not exist at the time the Turkish state was founded. Even after it was created
and strengthened by the Turkish state, the bourgeoisie was unable to establish hegemony
over the bureaucratic-military elite. It would therefore be inappropriate, in my view, to
characterize paternalism as a transitory period or situate it vis-à-vis the breakdown of a
hegemonic function that could never be fully accomplished by the Turkish bourgeoisie.
More importantly, I hold that the Turkish bureaucratic elite had an independent
motivation of positioning itself over and above the society, and reproducing its position
(Keyder, 1989). Furthermore, these motivations went well beyond economic interests and
embodied aspirations to be modern. The state elite envisioned and consequently rendered
themselves as the privileged subjects who were capable of transforming society as a
whole to this end. Therefore, it would be misleading to attribute paternalism of the
Turkish state solely to class-based relationships whereby paternalistic governance and
authoritarianism are reduced to reflexes against the breakdown of hegemonic function.
Rather, as I attempted above, it should be considered within the historical context as a
function of both economic (and class) and non-economic determinants.
To reiterate, the paternalism of the Turkish state hampers sustainable
development implementation mainly in two ways; through its reactive stance against
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sustainable development, and the distrust and distance it produces in state-society
relationships. In addition, I hold that two factors stemming from paternalism further
impinge on sustainable development implementation. The first relates to incentive issues
embodied in governance structure that lead to motivational problems characterizing the
local bureaucracy’s performance. I argue that the paternalistic mode of governance has
shaped the central bureaucracy’s relationship not only with the society, but also with the
local bureaucracy. This is manifested in the central government’s conviction that
“carrots” are unnecessary forms of encouragement; local bureaucrats should already be
performing well because it is their duty. Added to this is lack of trust to local bureaucrats
and reluctance to give them autonomy. Secondly, tensions associated with top-down
policy implementation are usually resolved through measures based on particularistic
interactions. The role and impact of such interactions are taken up in the next section.

2.5.3 Patronage
Yet another persistent characteristic of the Turkish state is the predominance of
patron-client type of networks in state-society relationships. Scholars of the Turkish state
agree that patron-client networks began to gain dominance in the 1950s with the
dismantling of the absolute paternalism of the state, marked by the end of the single-party
system and the election of the Democrat Party (DP) to power; the major opposition to the
23

Republican People’s Party (RPP) backed by the state elite.

There is similar consensus

that the dominance of the patron-client type political dynamic is a byproduct of the top23

For a detailed treatment of this issue, see, for instance Güneş-Ayata (1994) and Sunar
(1990). Although patronage is usually mostly considered an instrument the DP used to
consolidate social support against the ruling political elite, Güneş-Ayata (1994)
demonstrates that it was also used by the RPP as a participative strategy.
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down modernization process (Keyman & Öniş, 2007; Sunar, 1996, 2004). As stated in
the previous subsection, patronage has been the main venue in which contestation evoked
by state policies is handled.
It is worth reiterating that the type of patronage relations witnessed in Turkey
cannot be grasped completely within standard formulations of the economics literature.
Patron-client networks in Turkey are markedly different than corruption/bribery type
activities, which has been the main topic of analysis by economics, i.e. where one party
offers a bribe to another, not necessarily involving a personal relationship. Instead,
patronage works as a reciprocity-based relationship, not based on calculations of the “true
value” of what is being exchanged. It typically lasts over time and operates through social
connections. Furthermore, the parties involved in patronage interactions are rather
unaware that they are violating the public interest.
Unfortunately, the Gramscian framework does not offer much in terms of
handling this issue, either. Although patron-client type relationships have never been
conceptualized fully within the Gramscian literature, Gramsci considers corruption in
passing, saying:
Between consent and force stands corruption/fraud (which is characteristic of
certain situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and when
the use of force is too risky). This consists in procuring the demoralization and
paralysis of the antagonist (or antagonists) by buying its leaders—either covertly,
or, in case of imminent danger, openly—in order to sow disarray and confusion in
its ranks (Gramsci, 1971, 80n).
This observation is based on the assumption that there exists a well-organized
opposition movement, whose leaders are “bought”. As will be explained in detail later in
this chapter, such an opposition could hardly ever be formed in Turkey. Furthermore, the
contexts in which patron-client type interactions occur are far from such well-defined
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situations, but rather extended in numerous spheres of policy-making and
implementation. Therefore, I choose to utilize and analyze a broader understanding of
patron-client networks in the case of Turkey.
The sociology literature offers more to address the type of patronage activities
witnessed in Turkey. Granovetter (2007), summarizing the literature, states that
definitions of “integrity” or “bribery” are elastic, time and context-dependent. He argues
that groups with conflicting interests present different sets of standards for what behavior
is appropriate/legitimate. What is considered “corrupt” may result from the balance of
power among groups struggling to define the dominant view and label behavior that
benefits competing groups as illegitimate. Judgments about what is legitimate is a part of
the larger normative framework, which itself is enacted, reproduced and changed over the
course of everyday life. Seen at the light of these arguments, the fact that parties involved
in clientelist networks in Turkey do not recognize their actions as violations of public
interest does not come as a surprise.
The literature that Granovetter summarizes provides a richer range of corruption
activities (than the standard economics literature) within which patron-client networks in
Turkey can be situated. He states that prevalent social principles and the particular history
of an exchange relationship govern the notion of what is appropriate in that exchange
relationship. Which norm applies in a certain situation and how it is to be interpreted
depends on the relationship between the exchanging parties, such as the social status
differential between the parties, past obligations accumulated, and the general social
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milieu surrounding the transaction; the form and longevity of the flow between the
24

involved parties are functions of these factors.

Accordingly, the case of patron-client relationships demonstrates an exchange
between politicians engaging in a relationship with lower-status constituents, where
favors flow down (e.g. employment, public works, items controlled by those in the
government) and political support flows up. This exchange is usually a long-term
relationship since politicians like to ensure and sustain support. Furthermore, loyalty and
subordination offered by the constituents in return can be “real”, in the sense of
exceeding what the incentives prescribe. Clients might not be mere utility-maximizing
agents who defect when incentives change and their loyalty might stick even when the
incentive structure shifts (Granovetter, 2007).
This formulation proves apt for analyzing the Turkish case. Building on this
formulation and the Gramscian concept of hegemony as the combination of consent and
coercion, I hold that patronage can be situated within the hegemonic function of the
Turkish state since it became the primary way through which the Turkish state tried to
elicit and consolidate social support. Instead of establishing active consent via persuasion
and opening up venues for the articulation of particular interests, dominant groups relied
on patron-client networks to safeguard state hegemony. As such, they replaced organic
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Granovetter, building on empirical evidence, underlines the importance of status
differentials. Accordingly, when bureaucrats are of lower status than businessmen, the
form is usually monetary exchanges, e.g. bribery. When the bureaucrats are of higher
status, bribes would be considered insulting and the form is usually long-term elaborated
gifts and favors.
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ties and institutionalized channels between state and society, which characterize most
25

Western capitalist states, in building consent.

Seen in this light, patron-client networks emerge as a specific form of
26

representation (Jessop, 1982).

Similar to formal representation mechanisms, such as

parliamentary democracy or civil society organizations, they are often characterized by
differential accessibility by social groups. That is to say, some groups would find it easier
than others to effectively utilize patron-client networks to formulate and realize their
demands. Conceivably, patronage networks would be closed to demands that are
fundamentally at odds with the Turkish state’s hegemonic project. It does not seem
plausible, for instance, that demands for environmental protection at the expense of
economic growth could make their way onto the state agenda even through patronage
channels. In addition, as discussed in section 2.3.3, patronage networks operate through
social connections, implying their selective accessibility.
This understanding of patron-client networks is consistent with arguments made
by scholars of the Turkish state on the role and roots of such networks. Sunar (2004), for
instance, states that the Turkish state desired to elicit social support consistent with the
ideological core tenets of the republic via clientelism, and there was no other way to gain
social support in the context of a top-down modernizing state and an unreconstructed
traditional society. Patron-client type interactions are in effect mechanisms to overcome
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The absence of organic ties between the state and civil society should be seen in light
of the Turkish state’s paternalism and distance from society.
26
Jessop (1982) states that state hegemony can be established through the use of various
systems of political representation, including clientelism, corporatism, parliamentarism,
pluralism, and raison d’état. In this respect, he considers how different forms of
representation can be used to complement state intervention by giving the example of
corporatism supplementing liberal parliamentarism under monopoly capitalism.
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the distance between state and society, and were used to elicit support. Aydın (2005)
argues that clientelist networks have been used to demonstrate to the masses that the state
was serving their interests.
In a related vein, it has been noted that clientelism has been deployed by the
Turkish state to co-opt oppositional forces and had a smothering effect on the formation
of an autonomous movement within the social sphere. İnsel (1996), discussing patronage
within the context of civil society, claims that while civil society began to exist as a more
autonomous field in the post-1980 period, its political operationalization was dominated
by patronage, where one group would acquire benefits by virtue of having a member with
access to financial opportunities. Keyder (1989), on the other hand, posits that patronage
and populism became channels of co-opting opposition against the state and hindered the
formation of an autonomous civil society. It seems, therefore, that patron-client networks
fulfilled the double function of co-opting oppositional movements and preempting any
autonomy that could have been claimed within the sphere of civil society.
To summarize, patronage networks—portrayed here as an integral component of
the Turkish state’s hegemonic practices—persist as unevenly accessed mechanisms that
link state and society. The predominance of such networks has obvious efficiency and
equity implications, as they are major obstacles to effective implementation of state
policies in general and sustainable development implementation in particular.

2.5.4 The Castration of Civil Society
Lastly, I consider how Turkish society was constituted vis-à-vis the Turkish state,
as the specific articulation of civil society in Turkey by the hegemonic practices of the
state emerges as another pillar in the failure of sustainable development. The qualitative
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weakness of civil society in Turkey has been briefly touched upon in a couple of
instances. In this section, I elucidate the ways in which state and society shape one
another, and trace the implications of state-society dialectics on sustainable development
implementation. Specifically, I maintain that the trinity of modernization, paternalism
and patronage smothered civil society in Turkey and reinforced the failure of sustainable
development implementation.
To reiterate, I hold that the state and society are constituted in relation to each
other, most importantly through the state’s hegemonic function. An integral part of the
hegemonic project is based on the links between state and society; civil society, therefore,
is not a site of complete autonomy, but rather a realm where hegemony is exercised
27

(Buttigieg, 2005).

Moreover, state structure and intervention have an impact on the

balance of power between different groups in society, as well as on forms of political
action open to them and their future abilities to organize and realize interests (Jessop,
1982).
Such dialectical lines between state and society can be identified in the case of
Turkey. I have claimed previously that modernization (via economic growth) had been
the national-popular outlook through which the Turkish state elicited consent. The state
envisioned society as unified around this general interest, and did not approach it as a
space containing individualism, pluralism, participation and claims to difference
(Keyman & Öniş, 2007). Consequently, demands associated with intra-society conflicts
were consistently denied validity (Keyder, 1989); this had a further, path-dependency27

This does not imply, of course, that there is no terrain of contestation within the civil
society. Yet one needs to move beyond such simplistic accounts to have a more
comprehensive understanding of how state and society shape one another.
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like effect on which demands would acquire legitimacy and momentum in the future.
Within this context, Keyman & Öniş (2007) underline the fact that only civil society
activities that were constitutive of the Turkish state’s organic vision of society and
28

reproduced the state-citizen unity were permissible in the eyes of the Turkish state.

I deploy the concept of hegemony and structural selectivity in explain the
29

differential validity of societal demands in Turkey.

That is to say, I hold that the

Turkish state systematically excluded demands that constituted threats to its hegemonic
project; namely, those that were incompatible with the national-popular outlook—
growth-oriented modernization—and/or the homogenous vision of society that the
construction of the national-popular outlook required, such as demands related to
equitable distribution and those based on identity or class politics. Demands that
fundamentally challenged these two pillars of the state’s hegemonic project were deemed
to be unpatriotic or divisive of national unity. Thus, groups with different demands were
affected differently in their ability to represent and realize them, as well as in their
prospective capability to do so.
Observations of the efficacy (or inefficacy) of civil society movements in Turkey
attest to the state’s selective responsiveness. In general, the state’s interaction with civil
society movements has been marked with control and/or co-optation (Paker, 2005). This
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Keyman and Öniş mark the 1980s as a breaking point at which the crisis of statecentricism culminated and demands that in the past could not be situated within the
organic vision of society surfaced. They argue that with the growing gap between the
state and societal demands (due to a combination of market liberalization, crisis of
representation and crisis of bureaucracy during the early 1980s), demands that challenge
the organic vision of society became more pronounced, as demonstrated in the case of
Kurdish movement questioning the notion of ethnic homogeneity.
29
I further argue that the Turkish state was structurally selective at the stage of allowing
the formulation of demands, more that their representation and articulation.
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pattern can be framed in terms of the state’s selective responsiveness outlined above.
Arsel (2005) and Aydın (2005) observe that civil society activities in general, and
environmental movements in particular, have to demonstrate their commitment to some
type of modernization agenda (read: national-popular outlook) to be successful. When the
activities of environmental NGO’s relate environmental issues with overall development
policies (read: challenge the state’s hegemonic project), the state either ignores them or
tries to prevent their activities.
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Upon this selectively colored landscape of civil society lies the paternalistic gaze
of the Turkish state. It has been argued that the paternalist style of governance,
conceptualized in this dissertation as a necessary practice of the Turkish state’ hegemonic
project, has led to the smothering of civil society autonomy and effectively prevented the
31

formation of social opposition against the state (İnsel, 1996; Keyder, 1989).

The fact

that the strong, centralist state had historically carried out institutional reforms, without
being backed by a social movement, prevented a civic culture of opposition and struggle
32

to develop in Turkey (Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1989).
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It is worth noting that economic development is actually not envisaged as an end in
itself, but rather as one—privileged—component of a larger civilizational goal. Adaman
and Arsel (2005) claim that a civilizational understanding of societal development makes
the introduction of new goals or the revision of existing ones possible. Therefore, they
argue, the challenge lies in integrating the discourse of developmentalism with that of
environmentalism.
31
Keyder (1989) demonstrates this by using the industrial bourgeoisie’s relationship with
the state as a case in point. He argues that the limited domestic bourgeoisie that began to
flourish under the guidance of the Turkish state avoided any conflict with the political
elite; they preferred not to demand autonomy vis-à-vis the bureaucracy and failed to
acquire independent political power. İnsel (1996) makes a similar argument in stating that
the bourgeoisie in fact desired the guidance and guardianship of the state and did not
want to move beyond state control.
32
Keyder (1989) further observes that in the absence of an established political culture of
opposition, dissent against the state was often voiced in the language of Islamic
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The particular way that the state hegemony was constituted in Turkey
corresponded to specific ways that state-society links have been realized. As I have noted
above, the state-society relationship in Turkey was not based on eliciting active consent
effectuated by the articulation of diverse interests through specific forms of
representation; there was no space for diverse interests to arise. Organic relations
between civil society and state in the Gramscian sense (e.g. mass political parties, sociocultural movements, etc.) and apparatuses that would operationalize those relations were
not established (İnsel, 1996).

33

The absence of such links typically found in Western

capitalist states can partly be attributed to the specific way that hegemony was constituted
in Turkey. A citizenship model based on the principle of national unity served as the link
between state and society (Keyman & Öniş, 2007). Citizenship rights came to be
conceived as being exercisable to the extent allowed by the state; this vision was
deepened by the state’s retrospective modifications of law, as evidenced during military
coups.
Building on these arguments and Keyder’s (1989) observation that reluctance to
oppose state authority was historically reproduced in all social, economic and political
institutions, I argue that the constitution of hegemony in Turkey relied not so much on
acquiring active consent as it did on the preemption of opposition. When opposition did
emerge, patron-client networks were the predominant way that it was dealt with.

conservatism (i.e. giving religion its former status in social life) in order to gain support
and legitimacy.
33
İnsel further argues that in the absence of hegemonic tools embedded in society, the
state used state-owned economic enterprises to enforce its presence within the social
sphere.
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Representation and articulation of interests via patronage further thwarted civil society to
become a realm of struggle and opposition.
So far, I have tried to illuminate how the Turkish state’s hegemonic project
moulded the civil society. The effective castration of civil society in turn reinforced the
Turkish state form. İnsel (1996), underscoring the dialectics between state and society,
argues that authoritarian, centralist way in which state relates to society shapes social
imagery; this imagery, in turn, legitimizes the authoritarian state form and its domination
over society. Heper (1985), in a parallel vein, draws links between state and society
forms in different contexts, and concludes that the incapacitated civil society in Turkey
reproduced the paternal, distant Turkish state.
Given that this is how the sphere of civil society was shaped historically, it was
hardly ever a terrain of struggle or autonomy. The impacts of modernization in the form
of the national-popular outlook, paternalistic governance and patronage emerge as
important determinants of how effectively social demands can be formed and articulated.
The outcome, as many have observed, is the absence of a rights-based political culture,
and a qualitatively under-developed, yet quantitatively growing, civil society (İnsel,
1996; Keyman & Öniş, 2007).
The emasculation of civil society translates into a political landscape where the
quest for growth-oriented modernization is rarely questioned and an overall reluctance to
mobilize even in the face of pressing environmental and socio-economic problems. In the
absence of effective social mobilization voicing sustainable development demands, the
Turkish state has even weaker incentives to implement it.
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2.6 From the Structural to the Local: A Framework to Analyze Local Sustainable
Development
A significant part of this dissertation is concerned with understanding the Turkish
state and its effectiveness in implementing sustainable development in particular, within
an analytical framework. The preceding parts of this chapter served this purpose, firstly
by accounting for the structural characteristics of the Turkish state that impinge on
sustainable development, and then addressing them within a Gramscian state-analytical
framework. However, the primary purpose of the dissertation is not theorizing the state
per se, but rather putting together a framework that analytically conveys state-societyenvironment relationships at the local level. In this section, I engage in this task by
extending and supplementing the state-analytical framework discussed so far.
Before spelling out the framework I utilize, however, let me reiterate why this
dissertation adopts a micro-perspective. Contemporary scholarship on sustainable
development in Turkey has undoubtedly furthered our understanding of an important
paradox. However, the macro approach adopted and the structural explanations provided
through this line of work often fall short of painting a detailed and comprehensive picture
of local experiences. Such approaches cannot account for the existence and reasons of
local deviations from the stylized failure of sustainable development in Turkey. More
specifically, macro-level analyses are not equipped to depict how—and through what—
structural characteristics are mediated at the local scale. Neither can they unveil how
local dynamics (economic, social and political) and development processes impinge on
each other. Therefore, delving into local histories and environments would enrich our
understanding of sustainable development processes and the ways in which state-society-
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environment relationships unravels in different contexts. It would also help produce more
nuanced theorizations of the state-society relationship.
In formulating a framework to address the local, I deploy a Gramscian state
theory and its applications to the political economy of the environment. That is to say, I
situate the states’ transformation of the environment within their broader practices to
establish and justify their existence. In this framework, the environment and
environment-society

relationships

(including

sustainable

development

policy

implementation) are arenas where constitutive practices of hegemony are exercised.
States, in enacting and justifying their presence, alter the material landscape and social
relations surrounding it. Consider, for instance, the construction of monumental physical
structures like dams by states. These structures would both establish the state’s existence
most visibly, and serve to win consent via promises of benefits a dam would bring by
fueling economic growth. Therefore, one of the numerous ways in which states
crystallize at the local level, and impinge on sustainable development, is their
transformation of local environments and the dynamics embedded within them in their
hegemonic quests.
In this vein, a growing body of work from the political ecology literature provides
a reading of transformations in the environment-society landscape as projects of stateformation. A number of these works addresses environmental policies, such as enclosures
of protected areas and establishment of new resource right regimes, and theorizes them as
claims and assertion of control over territory and citizens (Asher & Ojeda, 2009;
Goldman, 2004; Neumann, 2004). These studies make the point that states come into
being and establish their presence as a legitimate focus of polity through proprietary
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claims, and processes of mapping, bounding, and containing the environment and the
citizenry. Others, such as Loftus & Lumsden (2008) and Ekers (2009), more explicitly
deploy the Gramscian concept of hegemony to pinpoint the remaking of the environment
within hegemonic struggles. Loftus & Lumsden (2008) trace how the waterscape in
Inanda, South Africa, was altered during the course of the hegemonic struggle between
large landowners and newcomer large capital. In doing so, they demonstrate how socionatural relations comprising the waterscape were reconfigured towards the establishment
of a new hegemony based on the moral leadership of large capital. Ekers (2009), on the
other hand, investigates the changes in the forestscape of British Columbia, Canada,
during state attempts to re-establish hegemony via the provision of public works and
training programs in 1930s. He argues that the federal and provincial states’ response to
the hegemonic crisis precipitated by the Great Depression was to modernize the forestry
industry through public works and training programs, and to construct broad socionatural hegemony.
The works cited above have contributed to a specific understanding of the local;
namely the local manifestations of state behavior in establishing/reestablishing hegemony
by changing the social-environmental landscape. The “local” in this dissertation,
however, connotes more than this. It aims to account for the interplay between local
differentiations and sustainable development. I hold that the Gramscian recognition of
fragmented society and the multiple ways in which power operates is suited to undertake
this task, but needs to be supplemented. To this end, I draw upon a different line of
literature which analyzes inequalities in relation to natural resource use and access; the
political economy of the environment. In doing so, I aim at connecting Gramscian
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political ecology, which focuses on local hegemonic practices of the state, to the political
economy of the environment literature, which more explicitly maintains the link between
local inequalities and environmental processes as the object of inquiry.
The political economy approach to the environment unpacks the notion of
community by delineating axes of inequality dividing communities, such as class, gender,
age and ethnicity, and by documenting differing resource access and use by community
members. As such, it posits an understanding of environmental processes as being
enmeshed in surrounding social, economic and political relations. This literature
underscores the typically uneven distribution of benefits and costs accruing from resource
use. It highlights that different groups within the community hold different stakes and
interests regarding resources; consequently, their incentives to commit to sustainable
development differ.
In doing so, the political economy of the environment tradition situates the role of
inequalities and power relations as important analytical objects; as Agrawal and Gibson
(1999) state, local level processes that negotiate, implement, and resolve issues in
resource management are irreducibly influenced by the existing distribution of power.
Numerous studies within this tradition investigate the ways in which inequalities are
reproduced by environmental degradation and become impediments to enforcing
sustainable development (Baland & Platteau, 1999; Boyce, 2002). The shared recognition
of the heterogeneous social sphere and focus on power relations operating at multiple
scales make the Gramscian framework and the political economy of the environment
approach a fitting match.
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Two specific lines of work that may be situated within the political economy of
the environment tradition warrant further discussion for the purposes of this dissertation.
The first is concerned with how local communities overcome free-rider problems when
engaging in collective action to manage resources (Ostrom, 1990). The main theme of
this branch of scholarship concerns the conditions that induce individuals to cooperate for
natural resource management. In addition to the private costs and benefits of cooperation,
the role of trust, social norms, and values and knowledge about resources have been
highlighted (Ostrom, 1990, Baland & Platteau, 1996). Although a review of this
extensive literature is beyond my purposes, I hold that its importance in addressing the
role of agency in local sustainable development needs to be emphasized here.
The second and related branch is concerned with participatory decision-making
processes in natural resource management. Despite their worldwide implementation, the
success of participatory management practices in ensuring effective participation by all
local stakeholders often has been questionable. The political economy of the environment
approach provides a critical lens through which the workings and outcomes of such
mechanisms can be viewed. Specifically, it unveils how local relations of power, e.g.
based on gender, wealth or social status, can lead to the marginalization of some groups
and, thus, impede effective participation by all (Agarwal, 2001; Adhikari, Di Falco &
Lovett, 2004; Agrawal & Gupta, 2005). Power inequalities translate to asymmetric
incentives, opportunities and/or challenges in terms of participating in and shaping
decision-making processes. Given that different groups are likely to have conflicting
interests and needs regarding natural resources, both the process and the outcome of
decision-making process would reflect their relative powers (Boyce, 2002). As their
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policy outputs typically create winners and losers due to the diversity of interests among
local groups, participatory decision-making mechanisms are prone to perpetuate local
inequalities. It is, therefore, imperative to consider the political economy of participatory
decision-making.
To recapitulate, the present work pulls together Gramscian state theory and the
political economy of the environment tradition in formulating a framework to analyze
local sustainable development. In line with this framework, I hold that the state’s
hegemonic practices shape local environments, both directly by altering the physical
landscape, and indirectly, by influencing the relations surrounding resource use. A study
of local sustainable development, therefore, should account for how the state’s
hegemonic project is reflected in local histories and shapes the process of sustainable
development. Furthermore, I hypothesize that local histories of the state-society
interaction are inscribed with asymmetric influences on local communities. That is to say,
the state’s shaping of the society-environment nexus has uneven impacts on different
groups. These impacts go beyond economic gains and losses, and extend to differential
abilities in formulating and articulating demands.
This framework unpacks “community”. Local processes are imprinted with power
inequalities, and that these inequalities involve axes of differentiation that cannot be
reduced to strictly economic terms, such as gender, age, ethnicity and social status.
Likewise, resource use and access are marked with differentiated needs and interests.
Consequently, the distribution of costs and benefits associated with environmental
processes are uneven. Therefore, the failure of sustainable development creates winners
and losers. The ways in which winning and losing crystallize are context-dependent and
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multi-faceted, such as economic benefits and losses; changes in labor time and processes;
and differential exposure to environmental risk. In turn, power inequalities can be
important impediments to implementing sustainable development. Specifically, power
inequalities between those who benefit from worsening environmental quality and those
who bear its costs can hinder effective sustainable development implementation.
Within this context, I maintain that community-based schemes of sustainable
development, such as co-governance and participatory management, are arenas where
local power relations would be manifested. In particular, participatory decision-making
mechanisms should be critically examined since local inequalities impinge on different
groups’ ability to effectively participate. I argue that nominal participation, i.e. mere
presence in decision-making mechanisms, veils differential abilities to voice demands
and shape outcomes. Therefore, I hypothesize that local power inequalities would be
embodied in all dimensions of participation and may lead to the exclusion of some
groups.
I further hold that anticipations about the process and outcome of decisionmaking, e.g. about being taken into account, about decision implementation, etc. are
important determinants of participation. Anticipations would bear the marks of local
power inequalities. That is to say, the powerless groups are more likely to withdraw from
effective participation in anticipating that their presence in decision-making mechanisms
would be inappropriate or that they would not be “heard” in the decision-making process.
I claim that anticipations would also correlate with perceptions of the state, as these
perceptions signal the expected success with which decisions would be implemented.
Local perceptions of the state can be read as products of the ways that the state relates to
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society, and should be situated within manifestations of the state’s hegemonic practices.
Conceivably, the perception that the state is unwilling to implement sustainable
development would hamper participation.
Unlike structuralist approaches, this framework provides space to address the
issues of individual agency and collective action. Individuals can (and do) engage in
collective action to implement local sustainable development. There are a variety of
ways in which collective efforts can be carried out, ranging from contributions made to
sustain a specific resource by undertaking certain actions, such as constraining resource
use, to contributing to setting up and operating mechanisms for implementing sustainable
development. Individual willingness to commit to sustainable development would depend
on a number of factors, including cooperative norms, environmental values, and
anticipated fairness and success of engaging into collective action, in addition to private
costs and benefits of commitment.

2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has served the purpose of analytically framing the problématique
that informs the present work; namely, the paradox of sustainable development
implementation in Turkey. In doing so, it first laid out the “paradox” and pointed to
growing socio-economic inequalities and pressing environmental issues in Turkey,
despite the existence of a seemingly ideal mix for sustainable development
implementation. It then unpacked this paradox by explaining the state’s unwillingness
and/or inability to implement sustainable development via its prominent features. In
addressing these features within a state-analytical framework, the chapter adopted a
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Gramscian formulation of the state and argued that these characteristics are rooted in the
Turkish state’s practices to establish and maintain its hegemony.
The final section of this chapter was devoted to formulating a theoretical
framework to probe into local sustainable development. This framework draws upon both
Gramscian state theory and the political economy of the environment approach. In doing
so, it highlights the local reflections of the state’s hegemonic practices, local socialeconomic-environmental dynamics and the role of individual agency. The section
concluded with general hypotheses regarding local sustainable development.
In the following chapters, the framework formulated in this chapter will be put to
work. In Chapter 3, I explain how I operationalize the analytical framework proposed
here. I first provide an overview of GEF projects in Turkey and situate them within
sustainable development efforts of the state. I also briefly introduce the two sites I have
selected as cases in this part. I then explain the methodology I followed in conducting
the case studies. Specifically, I discuss the research questions through which I studied
local sustainable development and the methods and proxies I utilized in addressing them.
The qualitative and quantitative analyses coming out of the case studies, are presented in
Chapters 4 and 5.
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CHAPTER 3
OPERATIONALIZING THE QUEST

3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 has analytically fenced out an understanding of local sustainable
development and depicted general hypotheses regarding the object of the analysis in this
dissertation. This chapter presents the concrete cases by which the theoretical framework
will be put to operation, and substantiates the specific questions that will be tackled with
in this operationalization. To this end, the chapter discusses the details of the case studies
conducted in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon, including a description of the
fieldwork methodology, the goals of the qualitative and quantitative studies, and specifics
of the utilization of qualitative and quantitative techniques.
Section 3.2 provides information on the Global Environment Facility, the funding
institution of the sustainable development projects in the case study sites, and situates its
activities within the recent rise of green global governance. Section 3.3 moves onto the
discussion of the Biodiversity and Natural Resource Management Project funded by the
Global Environment Facility in Turkey, in which Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon
were included as sites to implement prototypes for effective resource management. In
this discussion, specific attention is paid to the participatory management component of
the project. The setting for the case studies is completed in section 3.4, which provides
brief descriptions of the case study sites.
The chapter then engages into the concretization of the framework on which this
dissertation builds on. Section 3.5 puts forth the specific questions addressed in the case
studies and the main parameters deployed in their investigation. The aims and specifics of
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the qualitative and quantitative studies are given in sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3,
including the desktop research, in-depth interviews and focus groups, and the
administration of the survey. Section 3.5.4 concludes.

3.2 The Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Peet and Watts (2004), in observing the increase of attempts to relieve the
tensions between economic growth and environmental degradation within the last two
decades, underscore two trends in particular: the invention of “sustainable development”
to bridge the (impassable, according to the authors) divide between growth and
environmental quality, and the rise of global governance, marked by the displacement of
environmental regulatory power to unelected and only partially responsible institutions,
who are normally dominated by neoliberal growth-based regimes but have learned to turn
a sympathetic eye to environmental concerns. Goldman (2005) points to the specific
forms of practices (classificatory systems, regulation, use of certain methodological tools
and analytical tools) and knowledges that come to be institutionalized by such
governance institutions, at the expense of delegitimizing others. The Global Environment
Facility is one such institution.
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an independent financial entity formed
in 1991 as a collaboration of the WB, UNDP and the UNEP. It stands as the largest single
source of funding for global environmental protection (GEF, 2005b). It unites 182
member governments to address global environmental issues and to support national
sustainable development initiatives exclusively in developing countries. Specifically, the
GEF functions as a mechanism of grant provision to developing countries for projects
that benefit the global environment and promote sustainable livelihoods in local
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communities. The funded projects, in turn, are implemented by one or more of ten
designated GEF agencies, which include the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Bank, and the
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), among others. To date, the GEF has
allocated $8.8 billions, supplemented by $38.7 billion of co-financing it mobilized, to
support more than 2400 projects in more than 165 countries (GEF, 2010).
The GEF activities are focused on six subject areas: biodiversity, international
waters, land degradation, ozone depletion, climate change, and persistent organic
pollutants. The lion’s share of GEF funds is directed at two among these, climate change
and biodiversity, which accounted for 34.5 and 35.9 percent of grants disbursed between
1991 and 2005, respectively (GEF, 2005b). Regarding biodiversity, the GEF states its
goals as the promotion of the conservation of biodiversity, sustainable resource use, and
fair and equitable sharing of benefits of the utilization of genetic resources. In terms of
climate change, it aims to develop and transform markets for energy and transportation in
developing countries so that they graduate towards less carbon-intensive paths (GEF,
2005b).
The interlinked nature of environmental protection and socio-economic equity is
repeatedly emphasized in the GEF documents and integrated (at least rhetorically) in the
GEF projects. That achieving sound environmental protection is critical for alleviating
poverty, improving health and remedying social inequalities is a recurring theme across
pages of publications produced by the institution. The recent attempts at gender
mainstreaming (GEF, 2007) and the explicit vision of contributing to the achievement of
the Millennium Development Goals via the GEF projects (GEF, 2005a) are illustrative in
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this respect.

Not only does “[t]he GEF sees environmental sustainability as a key

solution for meeting economic and social needs in ways that leave a legacy of
opportunities for succeeding generations” (GEF, 2005a: p.16), but it also explicitly
recognizes how inequalities can lead to ineffective environmental management and
protection; it underscores, for instance, the vitality of women’s active involvement for
efficiency and equitability of environmental management (GEF, 2007).
Parallel to its sustainable development vision is the GEF’s focus on local
communities and its goal to promote their livelihoods. More specifically, the GEF states
its aim as reconciling the needs of local people with environmental protection and
improve the quality of local lives. The emphasis on the local is reiterated in the Small
Grants Programme of the GEF, administered by the UNDP, which supports community
groups and local NGO’s in their initiatives to reconcile environmental benefits with
sustainable livelihoods. In focusing at the local, the GEF has targeted the establishment
of community-based management of natural resources via the projects it has funded in
numerous countries. Within the attempts to foster community-based schemes,
empowering marginalized groups, such as women, and enabling their active involvement
is a central stated objective of the GEF projects.
Insightful treatments of the specific understanding of human-nature relationships
operationalized by institutions like the GEF and the truth/power regimes produced with
the greening of global governance (or globalizing of green governance) have been
undertaken (Goldman, 2005; Zerner, 1994). Engaging in their comprehensive critique is
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beyond the purposes of this dissertation.
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What is of primary concern here is the

See, for instance, Goldman (1996, 2005) and Neumann (1996).
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effectiveness with which a specific group of GEF projects were implemented in Turkey.
I introduce and discuss them in the following section.

3.3 GEF in Turkey: Biodiversity and Natural Resource Management Project
“The project will establish mechanisms for community management of common
resources, such as pastures, forest products and reeds; support sustainable
management of agricultural and water resources; provide access to small grants
for conservation linked development; employ local individuals, and engage local
NGOs and small commercial enterprises in protected area management”.
Turkey Biodiversity and Natural Resource Management Project, GEF Project
Document, p15.
“More importantly, the [prescriptive] plans [developed by consultants] were
developed without participation of local stakeholders living in and around the
sites. Since experience in Turkey and elsewhere indicates that successful
conservation management solutions must be developed through a participatory
process of stakeholder involvement, management plans developed by the
consultants during preparation will not be adopted at the sites but, instead, will be
used as a source of background and reference material”.
Turkey Biodiversity and Natural Resource Management Project, GEF Project
Document, p11.
The Turkish state developed a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) in
1999 and a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) in 2001, with
substantial support from the WB and the UNDP. Both can be situated within its recently
amplified, albeit mostly ineffective, efforts towards implementing sustainable
development (see Chapter 2). The plans identify natural resource management and
biodiversity conservation as prioritized areas of environmental problems and identify
strategies for addressing them. In particular, the establishment of protected areas and the
preparation of management plans for natural resource management and conservation are
emphasized. The Turkey Biodiversity and Natural Resource Management Project, funded
by the GEF, was initiated in 2000 as a part of this juncture.
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The project consisted of two main components, the first of which envisioned
preparing a strategy for rationalization of the national legal framework for natural
resource management and conservation. The major chunk of the GEF funds, however,
was directed at the second component, namely, the establishment and monitoring of
prototypes for effective protected area management. These prototypes would, in a
nutshell, operationalize participatory planning and regulation of natural resource use.
Accordingly, the National Biodiversity Steering Committee, which was formed as a part
of the NBSAP, identified four sites where the prototypes would be set up: Camili Forest
District, Sultan Sazlığı Protected Area, Köprülü Kanyon National Park and İğneada
Protected Area. These four locations were selected since they represent four major
biogeographical zones in the country, exemplify the challenges to biodiversity
conservation identified in the NBSAP and the NEAP, and hold global and national
significance in terms of biodiversity (WB, 2000).
The supervision and coordination responsibility for the establishment of the
management prototypes lay with the project advisory committee, comprising of relevant
ministries, and the project management team, operating under the Directorate of Nature
Conservation and National Parks (DNCNP) at the national level. On-site implementation
of the projects, on the other hand, was undertaken by the protected area management
authorities formed in the selected sites. The management authorities were planned to be
comprised of local employees of the Directorate of Nature Conservation and National
Parks, an accountant, and specialists on biodiversity, community outreach and geographic
information systems. Despite the vision of setting such comprehensive management
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authorities with a breadth of specialties, the project activities mostly ended up being
implemented by local DNCNP employees.
The first excerpt quoted in the beginning of this section encapsulates the vision of
the GEF project in setting up prototypes for natural resource management. The main
objective, as the excerpt suggests, was to foster decentralized institutional arrangements
for local stakeholders to develop and operate conservation and management practices.
The main mechanism to accomplish this objective was the preparation and
implementation of management plans for the selected sites with the active participation of
local people. The GEF project aimed at formulating micro plans for specific resources,
where rules and regulations to remedy ongoing environmental problems and shift to
sustainable practices would be devised. The regulation decisions would be made by the
participation of local people and drafts of plans would be shared with them at all stages.
The micro-plans were typically based on the demarcation of resource use zones,
rationalization of local use rights and access areas, and quota and time restrictions.
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Provision of incentives, extension and training would supplement these regulatory
measures in promoting sustainable resource use and management.
In addition, the management prototypes aimed to link conservation and economic
development, mainly through financially supporting alternative, environment-friendly
livelihoods. That addressing socio-economic issues is a prerequisite for successful
conservation efforts is explicitly stated as a lesson learnt from past experience (WB,
2000). The GEF project explicitly envisioned directly benefiting the rural poor and
35

Although the projects have closed and some of the activities listed above have been
undertaken, I am reluctant to use a definitive tone and choose to frame them as “planned”
not to imply fulfillment, as the cases I have studied suggest largely ineffective
implementation.
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women by assisting environmentally-responsible and financially-lucrative livelihood
practices. To this end, a Small Grants Programme (SGP) was incorporated in the projects
to support income-generating activities that would relieve pressure on the natural
resources and/or counteract the impacts of use constraints brought by the management
plans. Accordingly, cash grants (up to $ 10,000) were distributed upon application to
individuals, partnerships and cooperatives within the populations affected by the
prototype projects. Consultants and rural development experts were employed to help
local people with the application process, development of proposal ideas, and preparation
and submission of proposals.
Proposals to be supported by the SGP were selected by a two-stage process.
Applications were first assessed by local pre-evaluation committees, comprising of the
management authorities and community representatives. Those proposals that qualified
after the first round were then sent to the national evaluation committee, who made the
final decision. In addition to the general selection standards (contribution to biodiversity
conservation, sustainable resource management, capacity development and community
awareness), local pre-evaluation committees devised site-specific criteria tailored
according to the prevalent issues in the sites.
Although the GEF project officially started in mid-2000, actual on-the-ground
activities in line with the establishment of prototypes did not begin until 2003. The threeyear delay was mainly due to staffing and capacity-building issues, since the Directorate
of Nature Conservation and National Parks staff, who were responsible of local
implementation, had little experience with participatory management mechanisms. This,
unsurprisingly, led to communication problems with the local communities and thwarted
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implementation. The projects ended with the completion of management plans and the
termination of GEF funding in 2007.
That participatory mechanisms have been envisaged in all of the above-mentioned
project activities is worth reiterating. The second excerpt quoted earlier is demonstrative
of the emphasis put by the GEF on the necessity of local people’s participation in the
developing and implementing effective management mechanisms. Accordingly, existing
resource use and dependencies were supposed to be assessed with the participation of
local user groups before micro-plan preparations were initiated. Regulations regarding
the use of and access to resources, as well as the institutional arrangements of
management, were to be devised and operated by the local stakeholders. In general,
participation of local people was to be integrated in all stages of the projects, from the
formulation of micro-plans to the design of long-term management strategies, from
operationalization of the SGP to the execution of the proposed management structures. It
was further stipulated that the disadvantaged groups within the communities, such as
women, would be empowered through taking part in project activities.
The GEF projects are by no means exceptional in this respect, given the
worldwide implementation of community-based resource management schemes based on
the participation of local stakeholders. The main idea behind the growing support for
participatory mechanisms is that they create “win-win” situations by providing efficient
and equitable solutions to the challenges of natural resource management (Holmes &
Scoones, 2000).

Such mechanisms are held to be efficiency-enhancing since they

produce more effective management practices by incorporating knowledge of local
resource users and ensuring higher compliance since rules are devised by stakeholders
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(Agrawal & Gupta 2005; Holmes & Scoones, 2000). By allowing local users to voice
their needs and priorities, on the other hand, participatory mechanisms are envisioned to
provide equitable solutions to management issues and promote social justice.
There is, however, often not all that much flesh attached to this wide advocacy of
participatory mechanisms.

Although they seem, on paper, to be the panacea of

sustainable and equitable resource management, the operationalization of participatory
mechanisms remains problematic (e.g. Adhikari, Di Falco & Lovett, 2004; Agarwal,
2001; Agrawal & Gupta, 2005). The success of such mechanisms in ensuring effective
participation by all local stakeholders is questionable. Given the fragmentation of local
communities along axes of inequality based on wealth, gender, social status, etc., it would
be naïve, to say the least, to assume that all community members face symmetric
incentives, opportunities and/or challenges in terms of participating in decision-making
processes.
A glance through the case studies conducted on participatory management
mechanisms suggests that exclusion from such mechanisms, or “participatory exclusions”
as Bina Agarwal (2001) has called them, are operative at multiple levels. Typically, not
all community members hold adequate information about the existence and purpose of
participatory mechanisms. In addition, uneven constraints and incentives to participate
seem to correlate with local power inequalities. The poor, for instance, are likely to have
binding time constraints that prevent them from taking part in decision-making. It has
been extensively documented that gender norms of appropriate female behavior and work
impinge on women’s participation (Agarwal, 2001; 2006). Furthermore, marginalized
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sections of local communities might choose not to participate, anticipating that they
would not be able to voice opinions or would not be taken into account when they do so.
Local inequalities of power thus emerge as crucial barriers to democratic and
effective functioning of participatory management mechanisms. Given that different local
groups are likely to have conflicting stakes regarding resource use and access, the
outcomes of the decision-making processes would reflect some interests more than others
and imply an asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits. Such mechanisms, therefore,
might not only be exclusionary, but also be prone to perpetuating existing inequalities.
Building on this observation, a political economy analysis of participatory decisionmaking is called for.

3.4 Study Sites
The GEF project sites present a fitting opportunity for analyzing local sustainable
development in line with the theoretical framework formulated in chapter 2. As I have
tried to demonstrate above, the GEF project, at least rhetorically, held a vision of
sustainable resource management by community participation, explicitly targeted the
empowerment of disadvantaged communities, and aimed at supporting alternative
livelihoods. They aimed to address the three pillars of the sustainable development
concept in an interrelated manner. The participatory decision-making component of the
projects provides an avenue for examining the extent to which effective participation was
ensured. An analysis of such mechanisms that unpacks the role of local power relations
can contribute to debates on their successes and failures, and inform better policymaking.
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The fact that these localities are sites where the Turkish state attempted to
implement sustainable development by way of GEF projects presents a unique
opportunity. All four sites have been recognized for the biodiversity values they host and
have been granted some form of protection status by the Turkish state prior to the GEF
project. In other words, they represent cases where biodiversity conservation and
environmental protection attempts were already made.
Two among the four sites where the GEF project was implemented, Sultan Sazlığı
and Köprülü Kanyon, were chosen for conducting case studies. There were two main
reasons for selecting these sites. First, they are the sites that host the largest number of
residents, and therefore possibly had impacts on a greater number of people. Second,
they present the opportunity to adopt a comparative perspective since they differ
significantly in terms of bio-geographical conditions, main economic activities, and
causes and consequences of resource conflicts. In the following two subsections, I
introduce the study sites by providing background information on their geographical and
ecological features and demographic characteristics.

3.4.1 Sultan Sazlığı
Sultan Sazlığı is a large wetland complex located in Central Anatolia, between the
districts of Yeşilhisar, Develi and Yahyalı, within the boundaries of Kayseri Province
(see figure 3.2). It is situated at the center of Develi closed basin and surrounded by
mountain ranges. The complex comprises of a combination of freshwater, brackish and
saline aquatic ecosystems and saline steppes. Precipitation, streams flowing from
uplands, and groundwater from springs feed the wetland. Inflows first fill up the
marshlands at the southern and northern parts of the area and then flow into the salinated
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Yay Lake, located at the center of the wetland. In addition to the unique combination of
aquatic ecoystems, the area hosts a remarkable range of plant species and is a major
feeding and resting area for birds due to its location at the junction of two main migratory
flyways.
Nine settlements populate the area, of which seven (one town center and six
villages) were included in the GEF project site.

The number of households and

population figures of the project settlements are given in Table 3.1. According to GEF
project documents, the population of the area had been increasing consistently since
1935, until it stabilized in early 2000’s (Rebuclic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and
Forestry General Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks [MEF
GDNCNP], 2007b). The protected area, surrounded by the settlements, extend over
almost 25,000 hectares, the majority of which is comprised of pastures and marshland, as
can be seen in Table 3.2. Pastures are used for grazing by animal owners from all
settlements surrounding the wetland, whereas the marshland is accessed by reed cutters in
Sindelhöyük, Ovaçiftlik, Yeşilova and Yenihayat. Around 10% of the protected area land
is made up of plots used in agricultural production. These are parts of privately-owned
plots (by farmers from Ovaçiftlik, Yeşilova, Çayırözü, Soysallı and Sindelhöyük), as
opposed to pastures and marshland, which are state property. The residential areas of
Ovaçiftlik, Soysallı and Çayırözü and temporary settlements used for seasonal grazing by
villagers from Sindelhöyük also partially lie within the protected area boundaries.
Sultan Sazlığı has been assigned a number of statuses under both Turkish
environmental regulations and international agreements. It was first designated as a
Wildlife Conservation Area in 1971, a Strict Nature Reserve in 1984, and then a
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Conservation Area of 1st rank in 1993 by the Turkish state. Under its current status, all
construction activities and physical intervention are banned, and only access for
recreational, educational and scientific purposes were permitted. With the beginning of
the GEF project in 2003, the boundaries of the protected area were expanded. Finally, in
2006, it was also designated as a national park.

36

The area has also been recognized for

its biodiversity value internationally, as it was designated as a Natural Habitat by the
Berne Convention in 1984, as an Important Bird Area by BirdLife International in 1990,
and as a Wetland of International Importance under Ramsar Convention in 1994.
As is the case with all national parks in Turkey, the overall administration of
Sultan Sazlığı lies with the Provincial (Kayseri) Directorate of Environment and Forestry,
more specifically, the Provincial Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks,
which holds the responsibility of monitoring resource use and rule enforcement. On the
other hand, the Regional Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, a different state office, is
responsible for the management of water resources in the broader basin. This fact
complicates the actual regulation of resource use in the area, since water inflow to Sultan
Sazlığı, and consequently the management of the other resources (e.g. marshland,
pastures), is closely connected to the management of overall water use in the Develi
basin.
Statuses granted to Sultan Sazlığı under national regulations have invariably
implied strict conservation practices, wherein all human intervention with the ecosystem
is prohibited in designated parts of the protected area, and well-defined and stringent
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Parts of residential areas in three villages (Çayırözü, Soysallı and Ovaçiftlik) fell under
the protection status as a result of the 2003 revision. This implied restrictions on
construction activities in these areas, where such activities were now only allowed as
long as certain rules about height and physical appearance were complied with.
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rules govern use and access in the rest. That is to say, the area has been subject to
rigorous conservation for over three decades. Degradation of natural resources could not
be prevented despite these measures: Water level in the wetland ecosystem has been
decreasing dramatically, most visibly since late 1990’s. Lately the wetland practically
dries out during most months of the year. In addition, degradation of both quality and
quantity of pasture and reed area is ongoing, and loss of biodiversity of both plant and
animal species is alarming (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007b).

3.4.2 Köprülü Kanyon
Köprülü Kanyon National Park is located in Southern Anatolia, to the northeast of
Antalya Province. The national park lies within the catchment area of Köprü River,
within two districts of Antalya (Manavgat and Serik) and one district of Isparta (Sütçüler)
(see figure 3.3). The national park, ranging from an altitude of 150 to 2500 meters above
the sea level, is composed of the Beşkonak area lying at the base of the canyon and
rugged mountains on both sides of the river. The area contains a wide variety of natural
ecosystems linked across a range of altitudes and local climates, the most important of
which is the 450 hectares of pure cypress forest, the largest natural cypress forest in the
entire Mediterranean region. The presence of the ancient coniferous forests-maquis
formation, and the diversity of plant and animal species are other significant features. In
addition to its ecological attributes, Köprülü Kanyon hosts important archeological sites,
including the ruins of Selge antique city, St. Paul’s trail and the antique bridges over
Köprü River.
The GEF project site in Köprülü Kanyon included eleven settlements, some of
which lie completely within the national park and others located adjacent to it. Data on
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the population figures of the settlements is given in Table 3.3. The population trend in the
area is marked by high levels of outmigration, mainly to the neighboring town, Serik and
to the nearest provincial center, Antalya. Lack of job opportunities and inadequate
provision of infrastructure (e.g. educational facilities, water, roads) are cited as the most
important reasons for migration (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a).
Approximately 90% of the national park area, 35,777 hectares, is made up of
forests. The remaining land, apart from settlements, is used for agricultural production,
grazing, and tourism purposes (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a). The main
use of land within the park is grazing, practiced where permitted. In addition, high
plateaus in Beşkonak, Ballıbucak, Değirmenözü and Beydilli are used for summer
grazing and temporary settlements. Agricultural land is highly fragmented due to the
mountainous geography, and average landholding size is small. Finally, land used for
tourism purposes comprises privately managed rafting bases, restaurants and B&B
facilities built along the river at the lower canyon area.
Köprülü Kanyon was designated as a national park in 1973 due to its natural,
cultural and recreational values. In addition, a number of sites within the national park
hold special, and stricter, conservation statuses due to their ecological and/or
archeological attributes. Namely, parts of Altınkaya and surroundings of the antique
bridges on Köprü River are designated Conservation Status of the 1st rank for the
archeological ruins they host, and the riverbanks are designated the same status for their
ecological value. The immediate surroundings of these zones are also granted protection
statuses (of the 3rd rank), but are subject to milder rules. The main implications of these
designations are in in terms of construction activities, which are completely forbidden,
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except for approved required infrastructure, within 1st rank zones. The milder 3rd rank
status permits construction as long as the building complies with height and physical
appearance restrictions.
The overall management responsibility of Köprülü Kanyon lies with the
Provincial Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks, under the Directorate
of Environment and Forestry. The protection and restoration of the zones with special
conservation statuses, on the other hand, are undertaken by the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism. There a number of additional laws that applies in the governance of the area,
which often results in overlapping legislation, conflicting implementation and confusion
about responsible agency for governance.

3.5 Concretizing the Theoretical Framework and Methodology
The case studies present the opportunity to operationalize the analytical
framework formulated earlier in two related dimensions; the historical making of the case
study sites and the implementation of GEF projects. In line with this framework, I aim,
firstly, to account for how the Turkish state’s hegemonic project has crystallized in the
local histories of Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon, by exploring the state policies
pursued in these two regions and by examining the GEF implementation. I specifically
probe into the local manifestations of the Turkish state in terms of growth-oriented
modernization, paternalism and patronage, the building blocks of its hegemonic project
identified in chapter 2, and consider their implications in terms of sustainable
development implementation. In doing so, I also document local people’s perceptions of
the state, as I consider them as indicators of the state-society dialectics.

97

In addition to local materializations of the Turkish state, I retain the links between
the state, society and environmental processes as the focal points in my analysis. In
particular, I concretize the state-society relationship by the re/production of local
fragmentations and the sculpting of incentives (e.g. regarding natural resource use) and
perceptions by state action. I hold that the Turkish state shapes the local environments by
forming/altering/reinforcing relations surrounding resource use via two main channels:
by re/producing local inequalities and by molding incentives and perceptions held by the
local people.
Building on this, I aim to document local inequalities, tackle their historical
making through the uneven impacts of state policies on different groups, and delve into
the implications of local inequalities and perceptions for sustainable development in
Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon. Furthermore, I intend to uncover the costs and
benefits associated with environmental processes and reveal how their uneven
distribution functions as an impediment on sustainable development implementation. I
envision local inequalities to surpass economic relations and embody non-economic
dimensions, such as gender and social status, and to be conveyed in a variety of ways,
including different groups’ relative abilities of forming, representing and articulating
demands.
Within this context, the GEF projects emerge as additional arenas where the
implications of state-society-environment links for sustainable development can be
unearthed. I operationalize the questions laid out above in analyzing the effectiveness of
the GEF projects in implementing sustainable development, concretized in the spheres of
enforcing environmental protection and promoting socio-economic justice. I examine the
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resource use regulations put in place, the processes by which regulations were made, their
effectiveness in fostering sustainable use, the efficacy of the SGP in promoting
alternative livelihoods and tackling of socio-economic inequalities in project
implementation.
I pay specific attention to the functioning of participatory management
mechanisms of the GEF projects, by depicting the extent and level of local people’s
participation in decision-making. I hold effective participation to encompass ability to
voice opinions and shape decision-making processes in addition to nominally taking part
in decision-making mechanisms. Building on this vision of participation, I probe into the
role of two factors in particular: local power relations, such as those based on wealth,
gender, source of livelihood, etc.; and the perceptions of the state’s commitment to
sustainable development, such as the importance given to environmental protection by
the Turkish state and the fairness with which it treats the citizens. In doing so, I
conceptualize the effective implementation of participatory management as one
dimension of local sustainable development, and deploy local inequalities and
perceptions as products of state-society relationships at the study sites.
I maintain that the questions I have framed around these parameters require an
interdisciplinary methodology and a historical analysis. Delineating the links between the
state, society and environment as concretized above necessitates the use of qualitative
and quantitative techniques, since their combination would furnish the analysis with
depth and breadth. The case studies, therefore, were conducted by utilizing both
qualitative methods, namely in-depth interviews and focus groups, and quantitative
methods, based on the administration of a survey. While the qualitative part of the study

99

provides depth to the analysis and furnishes it with details on the making of local
economic, social, and environmental processes, the quantitative survey equips it with
representative empirical data. In the following sections, I describe the details of the
methodology followed.

3.5.1 Desktop Research
Extensive research on GEF documents, compiled by the WB Office in Ankara,
GEF Project Coordination Unit and the individual project teams, was carried out prior to
the field study. In addition, official documents to map the history of different state
policies were acquired from the local directorates of relevant ministries. These documents
provided data on the basic socio-economic characteristics of the sites, histories of policymaking, and prevalent patterns of resource use and pressures on the eco-systems. The
project documents, in particular, supplied information on specific project goals devised
for each site and mechanisms to implement them, as well as some, albeit rudimentary,
data on project activities. It was thus possible to see, more clearly, what GEF projects
envisioned accomplishing and the mechanisms and activities formulated with their aims.
Although the project teams held records of some activities in project villages and
of SGP recipients, the records are not sufficiently informative for my purposes. For
instance, no meeting minutes (or records of seminars and workshops) on the number or
composition of participants, topics of discussions or decisions were taken in either site. It
is, therefore, impossible to gauge the extent of nominal or effective participation in the
management mechanisms incorporated within the projects, or how democratic the
decision-making processes were. No written document on specific regulations devised for
natural resource management could be accessed. Nor there were records of how
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environmental outcomes have fared since the implementation of the projects. Even
though it is stated in project documents that regular chronicles of changes in resource use
patterns and in resource user groups were to be kept, there were no such records. Project
teams did not compile any data on changes in socio-economic conditions in project sites
either. Thus, desktop research can provide no insights on how environmental quality or
well-being of local people have changed as a result of the projects.

3.5.2 Qualitative Study
The main motivation behind conducting a qualitative study was to acquire an indepth understanding of the questions informing the case studies. An adequate
understanding of the state-society interactions in the study sites necessitates a historical
analysis and thorough consideration of the local dynamics. With the qualitative study, I
aimed to map local stakeholders, their interests and relations to the environment, as well
as accounting for different dimensions and prevalence of inequalities among them, one of
the centerpieces of analysis in this dissertation.

Documenting the multidimensional

fashion in which I hypothesize local inequalities to be manifested required the use of
qualitative techniques. I also acquired a deeper grasp of the history of state actions in the
study sites, enabling me to depict the links between state behavior, its uneven impacts on
different groups and its implications in terms of resource use patterns.
In addition, the qualitative study enabled me to gain important insights about the
implementation of the GEF projects that would not have been otherwise possible. The
interviews and the focus groups were not only intended to supply detailed information
about on-site project activities, but also to draw out local people’s evaluations and
perceptions. Specifically, in terms of participatory decision-making mechanisms, my
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objective was to illustrate if and how exclusion from participation has operated, and to
delineate the factors that explain exclusion, such as information and time constraints,
local inequalities of wealth, gender and social status, and anticipations about the process
and outcomes.
The qualitative part of the field studies made use of in-depth interviews and focus
groups. The in-depth interviews can be classified into two categories, as those held with
state and project officials, and those held with local people. The focus groups, on the
other hand, were only held with local people in the study sites. The logistics and the
specifics of these are discussed in the following two subsections.

3.5.2.1 In-depth Interviews
The first set of in-depth interviews, a total of 14, were held with officials from the
Ministry of Environment and Forestry, GEF project coordinators, officials from the
World Bank and UNDP, representatives of environmental NGO’s, local bureaucrats in
Kayseri and Antalya, and members of local project teams, during June-December 2008
(see Appendix A for a full list of interviewees).
These interviews were geared towards obtaining information primarily about the
GEF projects, although I also probed into the historical backgrounds of the study sites by
inquiring about the specific policies that the Turkish state pursued, both in general and in
terms of natural resource management. The interviewees were further encouraged to
speculate on how these policies have affected local people.
With regards to the GEF projects, I firstly aimed at obtaining data on specific onsite activities that were undertaken. Although the desktop research of project documents
had provided information about the types of activities and institutional mechanisms
102

envisaged at the beginning of implementation, interviews proved crucial for
understanding on-the-ground experiences. In particular, questions on how the decisionmaking processes worked (dissemination of information about decision-making
mechanisms, frequency of meetings, criteria for decision-making, etc.), the formal
decisions that were made and the policies that were put in place (e.g. micro-management
plans and distribution of small grants) were asked. I also asked the interviewees to
evaluate the overall level of participation in management meetings and other project
activities and whether concrete attempts were made to induce participation, in particular
by potentially marginalized groups such as the women and the poor.
Secondly, I tried to elicit respondents’ perceptions of how successful the projects
had been in fulfilling their goals, particularly in terms of the effectiveness of participatory
decision-making mechanisms, sustainable resource use policies and the SGP’s. These
were followed up by questions on the respondents’ views on potential reasons underlying
the success and/or failure of these specific activities. Finally, I tried to acquire
information on the respondents’ evaluation of how the projects affected different local
stakeholders and if they perceive project impacts to be unevenly distributed.
The second set of in-depth interviews was held with local people residing in the
project settlements. I conducted the interviews in Sultan Sazlığı in October and those in
Köprülü Kanyon in November 2008. I stayed for about 10 days in each project site while
conducting the interviews, and had paid a number of short visits before and after the field
study. I visited the project settlements with a local guide in each site. The fact that I was
with one of the local people helped overcome the suspicion that villagers would
potentially have had towards me as an outsider. A total of 84 interviews were held, 52 in
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Sultan Sazlığı and 32 in Köprülü Kanyon (see Appendix A for a detailed listing). The
interviews were semi-structured, as I tried to frame the question-answer process as a
conversation and made interventions accordingly. I also had the opportunity to observe
the socio-economic characteristics, prevalent livelihood activities and resource use
patterns while staying in the project sites.
Interviews held with local people were intended, firstly, to acquire information
about prevalent livelihood activities and local inequalities. Accordingly, interviewees
were asked about local economic activities, labor use patterns and changes that have
occurred in the viability of livelihood sources over time. These inquiries were
supplemented by questions on the history of state policies pursued in the sites, informed
by the desktop research and the first-round of interviews. In addition, the interviewees
were asked about the incidence of landlessness, the distribution of income within and
across settlements, gender relations, and other dimensions of inequality hypothesized to
be locally prevalent.
Secondly, the natural resource use was probed into, by questions on the patterns
and informal rules of resource use, composition of user groups, and changes in resource
use over the years. The interviewees were further asked to speculate on the reasons and
impacts of changes in environmental processes, specifically on their perceptions of the
local environmental issues, whom they perceive as to contribute most to these issues, and
how these issues affect different groups. Finally, the interviewees were asked to elaborate
on how they think the local problems regarding the environment and the socio-economic
conditions can be solved. In this set of questions, the role of the state was paid particular

104

attention, by soliciting the interviewees’ perceptions of how the Turkish state has
impacted the above-mentioned processes.
The interviews then addressed questions related to the GEF project. The
respondents were asked if and how they heard of the GEF project, and if they had, if and
how they have been informed of specific activities (e.g. management meetings, training
activities, small grants projects, etc.) associated with the projects. In line with my focus
on the participatory mechanisms of decision-making, the management meetings were
paid special attention since they were the main channels through which local stakeholders
were most likely to voice opinions and shape decisions. Questions on participation
probed into the multiple dimensions of effective participation I have discussed earlier.
Specifically, the interviewees were asked if they have attended meetings, followed up
with questions probing into the reasons as to why or why not. Those who reported that
they have attended meetings were asked to evaluate the meetings, i.e. they were asked if
they spoke up and if their views were taken into account, followed up with questions on
why or why not. Similar questions were asked about the SGP, which delved into reasons
for applying (or not applying) for a grant.
Thirdly, the interviewees were asked to evaluate how effective specific project
activities have been, such as training activities, management meetings, the SGP, etc. and
to elaborate on their overall satisfaction with the project. Evaluation questions were
followed up with inquiries on the interviewees’ opinions about why or why not the
projects have been successful. Finally, they were asked to evaluate how they have been
affected by the project, and how they have perceived other stakeholders to be affected by
the project.
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3.5.2.2 Focus Groups
In addition to in-depth interviews, four focus groups with local people (two at
each site) were conducted in October-November 2008. Focus groups held with 6-7
participants (see Appendix A for a list of focus group participants). Focus groups were
structured around the same topics that were brought up during the in-depth interviews,
but the questions were posed in a more open-ended manner and a discussion among
participants was stimulated. I structured the focus group discussions around the
perceptions of natural resources and environmental problems, operationalization of
different dimensions of the GEF projects, why or why not they were successful, and their
impacts on different local groups.

3.5.3 Quantitative Study
The quantitative part of the field study was based on the administration of a
survey, which was designed and tailored according to the findings of the qualitative
study. That is to say, the quantitative study complements and extends the qualitative work
in investigating the questions motivating this dissertation, and provides results that will
be used both descriptively and econometrically. By undertaking the quantitative study, I
aimed at a more comprehensive and analytical exploration of evaluations and impacts of
the GEF project, participation in the projects’ decision-making mechanisms, and local
venues of contribution to sustainable development. This section lays out the aims of the
quantitative study more specifically, followed by the description of the sampling strategy
and administration of the survey in section 3.5.3.1 and the general structure of the survey
in section 3.5.3.2.
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First of all, I sought to document the levels and forms of participation in different
project activities, and specifically in decision-making processes, to provide a detailed and
more representative picture of project effectiveness in inducing participation. In line with
the hypotheses fleshed out earlier, I collected data to investigate econometrically the
determinants of participation in decision-making and to explore if different axes of
inequality, such as gender and wealth, and perceptions of the state, regarding its
willingness to implement sustainable development, are significantly correlated with
participation. Different levels of participation were captured by probing beyond presence
in decision-making mechanisms and scrutinizing expression of opinions and capability to
shape decisions, and by inquiring into the reasons underlying non/participation. If, in fact,
the disadvantaged groups in the communities have lower levels of participation,
important policy implications can be drawn. If perceptions about the state’s stance are
important for non-participation (both in the nominal sense of attendance and active sense
of voicing opinions), it can be concluded that mistrust to state has important implications
for local democratic governance of natural resources.
Secondly, I aimed at obtaining detailed information about local people’s
evaluation of the projects. Since the qualitative study was already completed when the
survey was designed, it builds on the insights I acquired on the successes (admittedly
few) and failures of the projects, and includes questions on perceptions of the project
teams, project success and project ineffectiveness.

These findings complement the

results of the qualitative study in providing the general level of satisfaction with the
projects and perceptions of why they have remained ineffective in certain respects,
particularly in participatory management and environmental protection.

107

Although they come with the caveat of being subjective and should be approached
with caution, I hold that perceptions and evaluations should be given importance. First of
all, local people’s evaluations of the projects, in addition to objective information on
project accomplishments, should be considered as significant dimensions of project
success. This is especially true for projects such as GEF that are meant to operationalize
community-based management. In addition, information on locals’ perceptions of the
reasons why the projects were ineffective would have important policy implications for
future implementations.

Perceptions about underlying causes of (persistent)

environmental problems and the role played by the Turkish state in bringing them about,
in particular, would provide important insights since it is likely that locals’ willingness to
take action, via community-level mobilizations, to implement local sustainable
development is in part determined by these perceptions.
Another goal of the quantitative study was to collect information on willingness to
contribute to local sustainable development. Willingness to contribute is proxied by a
number of different measures in the survey, discussed below. The main motivation to
collect such information is to explore if local people are willing to contribute, in different
ways, to realize sustainable development through formal or informal mechanisms. It is
then possible to investigate the factors, specifically the role of local inequalities and the
perceptions of the state, which determine willingness to contribute.
Finally, I document, albeit more descriptively, the types of inequities created by
the ineffectiveness of local sustainable development. The quantitative study complements
the qualitative findings on the distribution of costs and benefits of ongoing environmental
degradation in the sites, as well as the distribution of the impacts of the GEF project. The
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findings of the quantitative study thus feed into the political economy of the environment
framework adopted in this dissertation.
As the qualitative study equips me with findings on the relationship of different
stakeholders with natural resources in both sites, I can broadly differentiate between the
winners and losers of the failure of local sustainable development. It is thus possible to
study how the level and nature of participation, perceptions about the reasons of
environmental problems, evaluations about the GEF project, and willingness to contribute
to sustainable development differ across dimensions of inequalities.

3.5.3.1 Administration of the Survey
The survey was administered to in face-to-face interviews with individuals who
reside in the settlements that lie within the boundaries of project sites as defined in the
management plans.

37

It was pre-tested in two villages in each site prior to finalization. In

general terms, the survey consists of modules on knowledge of project activities,
participation in management meetings, participation in other project activities (e.g.
training activities and the small grants program), perceptions of project success and
impact, perceptions of the state, environmental values, perceptions of the sites,
perceptions of gender norms, willingness to contribute to local sustainable development,
and socio-economic status.

37

The survey was funded with the research grant (no. 09C103B) provided by Boğaziçi
University, İstanbul, Turkey, and FREKANS research company provided support during
its implementation.
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Seven settlements in Sultan Sazlığı and four settlements in Köprülü Kanyon were
38

included in the population to be surveyed.

Only individuals of age 24 and over were

included in the relevant population. This was done in order to represent the population
who was of age 18 and over at the time when on-site implementation of the projects
started in 2003. Sampling was clustered at the village level. Visited households were
randomly selected. Randomization at the household level was also imposed. A total of
778 surveys were administered, with 377 surveys in Sultan Sazlığı and 401 in Köprülü
Kanyon. These sample sizes ensure a 95% confidence interval with a 0.05 margin of error
in sampling. The sample sizes for each settlement are given in tables 3.4 and 3.5.
Two different survey versions were administered in the two sites. The questions in
the two versions are very similar except for modifications based on different types of
natural resources and different sources of prevailing livelihoods. That is to say, while
questions on participation in project activities, perceptions of the state, environmental
values, etc. are identical, questions on perceptions about the sites and socio-economic
status are constructed according to site-specific circumstances. For instance, the questions
in the Sultan Sazlığı survey are predominantly about the water issue while those in the
Köprülü Kanyon survey are focused on unplanned resource use.
All seven settlements were included in the population to be surveyed in Sultan
Sazlığı. The relevant population figures and sample sizes in the included settlements are
provided in table 3.4. Note that the population in Yenihayat is oversampled and that in
Sindelhöyük is undersampled. The main reason I adopt this strategy is that the relevant
stakeholders for our analysis are underrepresented in Sindelhöyük and overrepresented in
38

Not all settlements within the project sites are included in the population. The reason
for sampling only certain settlements will be explained in detail.
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Yenihayat. Yenihayat is a small village that was settled mainly by reed cutters from
Sindelhöyük. Sindelhöyük, on the other hand, is a larger town where a significant part of
the population is working in the service sector. Thus, the proportion of population who
has a direct link with the natural resources for livelihood purposes is likely to be lower in
Sindelhöyük and higher in Yenihayat than they are in the other settlements.
In Köprülü Kanyon, only four settlements (out of eleven) were included in the
population to be surveyed, as can be seen in table 3.5. Consequently, the sample is not
representative of the entire population residing in the area. This strategy was followed
due to three interrelated reasons. Firstly, included settlements are the ones where main
livelihood activities involve access to and use of natural resources. While forest and
pasture resources are being used for subsistence purposes in all settlemetns, these four are
the ones in which resource use is more oriented towards income generating activities.
Beşkonak and Karabük, lying at the base of the canyon, are villages where rafting
tourism is important. A significant source of livelihood is based on tourism in Altınkaya
as well. Finally, oregano harvesting is the most important income generating activity in
Çaltepe.
Secondly, the types of resource use in these four villages are the ones that are
associated most closely with the threats on the ecosystem in the area and/or involve
serious conflicts. Forest cover and Köprü river are under pressure from unregulated and
heavy tourism activities. Oregano cover has recently started degrading, both qualitatively
and quantitatively. Cultural and natural resources in Altınkaya are threatened by illegal
construction activities.

Moreover, Beşkonak, Karabük and Altınkaya are the three

villages where the conflict between local people and the national park authorities is most
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visible. Finally, villages other than the four included in the sample have not really been
affected by the implementation of the GEF project. Most project activities were oriented
towards and carried out in Beşkonak, Karabük, Altınkaya and Çaltepe.
For the reasons discussed above, I followed a sampling strategy that would allow
for capturing the most relevant information for my purposes, i.e. participation in GEF
project activities, types of resource use, perceptions about the GEF project, willingness to
contribute to local sustainable development, etc. Obviously, this strategy compromises
representativeness in exchange for relevance.

3.5.3.2 General Structure of the Survey
As stated before, the survey consists of modules on knowledge of project
activities, participation in management meetings, participation in other project activities
(e.g. training activities and the small grants program), perceptions of project success and
impact, perceptions of the state, environmental values, perceptions of the sites,
perceptions of gender norms, willingness to contribute to local sustainable development,
and socio-economic status. This last module includes questions on basic demographic
data, household composition, household income and assets, household sources of
livelihood and changes within the last six years. In this section, I lay out the structure of
the survey and explain survey modules in detail.
The survey starts by two elimination questions (having resided in the area since
and being older than 18 when on-the-ground implementation of the projects started) and a
question on whether or not the respondent is aware that the project has been implemented
in the area (see figure 3.4). Those who do not know of the project are directed to the
modules on environmental values, perceptions of the state, perceptions of gender norms,
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willingness to contribute and socio-economic status (Modules Z). For those who know of
the project, the survey continues with a module on knowledge of various features of the
projects, such as having seen a draft of the management plan, having been informed of
management meetings, having been informed of training activities, etc.
Those who have been informed of management meetings are then asked if they
have attended these meetings. Those who have not been informed of the meetings, on the
other hand, are asked of their opinions on why they have not been informed and asked
whether or not they would have attended the meetings if they had been informed. Both
hypothetical and actual participants, as well as hypothetical and actual non-participants,
are asked of reasons why they have not/participated. Specifically, respondents are asked
to choose two best applying reasons for non/participation, from a list of reasons that I
compiled based on the literature on participation in decision-making and the results of the
qualitative study (see Appendix B for details). The list of reasons for non-participation
includes not having a stake, free-riding, inappropriate meeting times and places, social
norms, anticipation of not being taken into account, anticipation that project team will
favor some groups and anticipation that meeting decisions would not be implemented by
the state. The list of reasons for participation, on the other hand, includes having stakes in
meeting topics, democratic values and skepticism. The lists provided to actual and
hypothetical participators and to actual and hypothetical non-participators are identical.
Actual participants in the meetings are further asked to evaluate how effective
their and other attendees’ participation were, i.e. they are asked if they spoke up in the
meetings and if their views were taken into consideration. With these questions, I aimed
to probe beyond participation at the nominal level and explore other dimensions of
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participation than mere attendance in meetings, such as voicing opinions and ability to
influence decisions. If the participators state that they have not spoken up or that their
views were not taken into account, they are asked to state why not. Similar to the case
with participation questions, respondents are provided with a list of reasons from which
they are asked to choose the two that apply the best. The list of reasons for not speaking
up includes anticipation of not being taken into account, anticipation that some groups
would be favored, social norms and anticipation that meeting decisions would not be
implemented by the state. The list of reasons for not being taken into account includes
top-down style of governance, project team’s favoritism and local power relations (see
Appendix B for details).
All those who are aware that the project has been implemented, regardless of
whether or not they have been informed of or participated in any project activity, are
directed to the modules on evaluations and perceptions of the project activities (Modules
F and G in figure 3.4) after the participation module. Evaluations and perceptions
modules consist of questions on participation in and evaluations of impacts of SGP and
training activities, perceptions of the project team, evaluations of the success with which
objectives of the projects are fulfilled and perceptions of the reasons why unsuccessful
implementation occurred.
Specifically, respondents are asked to evaluate how successful the project has
been, on a scale of 1 to 5, in achieving the specific goals spelled out in the management
plans. Then, they are asked to evaluate the project team, where they state their level of
agreement with statements about project team’s effort, accessibility and honesty, on a
scale of 1 to 5. Next, respondents are asked specifically about why the projects have been
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ineffective in implementing environmental protection, where they are provided with
statements about reasons that might be accounting for ineffective regulation of resource
use and asked to assess how much they agree with the statements on a scale of 1 to 5.
These statements were mainly formulated according to the findings of the qualitative
study; they also map quite closely with characterizations of the Turkish state that account
for its unwillingness to implement sustainable development (see chapter 2). The reasons
incorporated into the statements are project team’s failure to take into locals’ opinions
into account, favoritism, lack of adequate information and resources, local power
relations and prioritizing economic growth by the Turkish state (see Appendix B for
details). Finally, respondents are asked to evaluate how the project has affected different
local stakeholders and themselves.

This way, I tried to capture perceptions on the

distribution of project impacts.
The final modules (Modules Z) are asked to all respondents to whom the survey
has been administered. As stated before, the sub-modules in this part are environmental
values, perceptions of and trust to state, feeling of belonging to the community,
perceptions about gender norms, perceptions related to the environmental problems in the
sites, willingness to contribute to local sustainable development, socio-economic status
and changes within the last six years.
Environmental values are measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where the respondent
reports how much s/he agrees with five statements about environmental values. These
statements pose trade-offs between economic gains and environmental quality in different
contexts (see Appendix B for detailed explanations). Perceptions of the state are captured
in two different ways; firstly, respondents are presented statements about central state’s,
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provincial governors’ and village heads’ equal treatment of citizens, with which they are
asked to report level agreement on a scale of 1 to 5. Secondly, respondents are asked to
evaluate, again on a scale of 1 to 5, how much they think environmental considerations,
economic growth and national security issues are prioritized by the Turkish state. In
addition, they are asked, on a scale of 1 to 5, how much they trust local branches of
different ministries and local governors.
Feeling of belonging to the community is also captured in multiple ways. The
respondents are first asked, to evaluate on a scale of 1 to 5, how much they feel they
belong to the area they live in. Next, they are asked to evaluate the frequency, on a scale
of 1 to 5, with which they participate and voice their opinions in solving community-level
problems. In addition, one question on having voted in local elections and one on
participation frequency in informal labor sharing arrangements are posed to capture more
objective information on belonging to the community and participating in community
activities.

Perceptions on gender norms are captured by respondents’ self-reported

agreements, on a scale of 1 to 5, with statements about women’s outside work, gender
segregation of public space, household decisions about expenditures, and sharing
inheritance between female and male children.
Questions on attitudes towards and perceptions of local environmental problems
are tailored to site-specific environmental problems and resource use patterns, as I have
stated in Section 3.5.3.1. These questions address respondents’ perceptions of local
environmental problems, as well as underlying reasons and impacts of these issues. In
Sultan Sazlığı, the problem of water scarcity was treated as an objective fact (since it has
been persistent for the last 6 years and its effects are highly visible). In Köprülü Kanyon,
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on the other hand, survey questions first inquire about whether or not respondents agree
with the existence of pressures on natural resources. Consequently, while Sultan Sazlığı
version of this module incorporates questions on why problems related to water use
cannot be solved, Köprülü Kanyon versions include questions both on what underlies
overuse of resources (asked if respondent stated there is overuse) and what underlies the
prevention of overuse of resources.
These questions provide respondents with a set of choices, formulated based on
both the literature on management of natural resources and the findings of the
quantitative study. Reasons that potentially account for the overuse of natural resources
include problems related to collective action issues, weak monitoring, myopia of resource
users and local power inequalities as well as patron-client relationships at the local level,
Turkish state’s prioritization of growth, lack of competence and top-down governance
style. Reasons that might enable sustainable resource use, on the other hand, include
successful formal enforcement of resource use rules, informal arrangements among
natural resource users and far-sighted resource users. The sets provided in a given site
were tailored according to the factors (especially in terms of local manifestations of
Turkish state’s characteristics that underlie its unwillingness and/or inability to enforce
sustainable development) that I have found to explain ineffective environmental
protection in that specific site as a result of the qualitative study.
In Sultan Sazlığı, respondents were first asked how much they are concerned, on a
scale of 1 to 5, about the water scarcity. Then, they were asked about negative effects of
drought (where they were to state two worst effects) and the most important causes of it,
where they were to state the two most important reasons among three (climate change,
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dams constructed in the area and deep wells). Respondents were also asked about the
most important reason why the water scarcity problem cannot be solved. They were
provided with a list of reasons that might account for the persistence of the problem,
including Turkish state’s lack of interest in environmental problems, its failure to take
into account local people’s interests in policy making, patron-client relationships, the
failure of locals to act collectively for a solution and the failure to reach consensus on
who is responsible for the problem.
In Köprülü Kanyon, three different survey versions were administered based on
location-specific resource uses and environmental problems. All respondents were first
asked to evaluate environmental impacts of a number of activities (illegal tree cutting,
overgrazing, oregano collection, construction of tourism facilities, tourism activities) on a
scale of 1 to 5. I adopted this strategy since environmental problems in Köprülü Kanyon
are not as visible and cannot easily be reduced to one main issue, such as the case is with
water scarcity in Sultan Sazlığı. Respondents were then asked about their general level
of concern with overuse of natural resources in the area. After these two questions, the
survey continued with questions related to specific resource use activities, i.e. grazing,
oregano picking, rafting tourism and construction. While questions on grazing were
asked to all respondents, those on oregano picking are only asked in Çaltepe, on rafting
tourism only in Beşkonak and Karabük and on construction only in Altınkaya.
The questions on grazing started with respondents’ perceptions on the change in
quantity of pastures over the last 10 years, how they would be affected if pastures were
exhausted and whether or not overgrazing is prevalent in the area. If the respondent
stated that overgrazing is prevalent, s/he was asked about causes of overgrazing, where a
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list of reasons was provided. The list was comprised of lack of adequate monitoring of
the grazing plan, heavy dependence on pastures by the poor animal grazers, myopia of
animal grazers and failure of grazers to collectively limit their grazing. If the respondent
stated that overgrazing is not prevalent, on the other hand, s/he was provided with a list of
reasons that might account for no overgrazing, including existence of strict conservation
rules, informal agreement among animal grazers about not overgrazing and farsightedness of animal grazers (i.e. that they individually take future costs of overgrazing
into account and choose not to overgraze). These respondents were then posed a scenario
in which they were asked to hypothesize that pastures degrade due to overgrazing some
time in the future. They were provided with a list of potential reasons that might account
for overgrazing in the hypothetical case, identical to that provided to respondents who
stated that overgrazing is prevalent in the area.
Questions on oregano picking, as well as the lists of reasons that might account
for prevalence and absence of over-picking, were identical to those on grazing. Those on
rafting tourism and construction differed, although they aimed at capturing the same
underlying information about respondents’ perceptions and attitudes.

Questions on

rafting tourism started, similarly, with perceptions on whether rafting tourism harms the
environment or not. If the respondent stated that it does, s/he is asked why and provided
with a list of reasons, including lack of adequate monitoring, myopia on the side of
rafting companies and failure of rafting companies to collectively decide on a regulation.
If the respondent stated that rafting tourism does not harm the environment, s/he was
provided with a list of reasons why it does not, including strict conservation rules and farsightedness of rafting companies. They were then posed with a scenario in which they
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were asked to hypothesize that rafting activities harm the environment and provided with
a list of potential reasons that might account for this, identical to that provided to
respondents who stated that rafting hurts the environment.
Finally, questions on construction started with perceptions on whether or not
illegal construction activities hurt the number of tourists visiting Altınkaya (by damaging
cultural resources). Next, respondents were provided with a scenario in which a permit
for construction activities that would improve the welfare of the villagers is passed, on
the condition that no harm will be done to cultural resources, but some abuse the permit
39

and over-construct at the expense of cultural resources.

They were then asked what

might account for such abuse and provided with a list of reasons, including lack of
adequate monitoring, myopia of villagers and failure of villagers to collectively reach an
agreement to prevent illegal construction.
Note that the list of reasons for prevalence or absence of overuse for rafting
tourism and that for construction overlap closely with those in grazing and oreganopicking questions, except slight modifications. For instance, the possibility of an informal
agreement among rafting companies to limit number of rafting tourists to be carried was
discarded since qualitative study findings indicated there was no such agreement. That
poor users depend heavily on the resources, on the other hand, was not a relevant reason

39

Given the qualitative findings on Altınkaya’s context and history, instead of asking
whether or not illegal construction is prevalent, I opted for presenting respondents
directly with a scenario. As will become apparent in chapter 4, there is already
considerable discomfort among villagers because of the construction ban, and they
complain that strict enforcement of the ban does not allow them to lead decent lives.
Under these circumstances, I did not want to antagonize and alienate respondents by
asking about the prevalence of illegal construction.
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for overuse in the case of rafting tourism (none of the rafting companies are owned by
poor users) and construction (construction is not a livelihood activity).
Next, the survey presented a set of questions aimed at capturing individuals’
willingness to contribute to local sustainable development. It should be noted that the
notion of “willingness to contribute” operationalized here is not willingness-to-pay
(WTP) employed in contingent evaluation methods. Given the widely debated
shortcomings of WTP and its problematic methodology (see, for instance, Heinzerling &
Ackerman, 2002), I have preferred using multiple questions (with binary outcomes)
related to different types of contribution in different contexts.
While some willingness to contribute questions were identical in different survey
versions, some were designed specifically for the location where the survey is
administered. Five questions on whether or not the respondent would be willing to limit
resource use in general, to contribute labor to a management mechanism, to contribute
funds compatible with her/his income, to attend a training activity on environmental
issues and to help clean up garbage in their village was asked to everyone to whom the
survey is administered.

If the respondent answered affirmatively to any of these

questions, s/he was read out a list of possible reasons for being willing to contribute,
comprised of being hurt economically by environmental degradation, environmental
values and other-regarding preferences, i.e. that others in the community are hurt by
environmental degradation. If, on the other hand, the respondent answered negatively to
any, s/he was read out a list of reasons for not being willing to contribute, comprised of
not being responsible for degradation, anticipated free-riding by others in the community,
and anticipated uneven distribution of benefits of environmental quality, i.e. that others
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would benefit more. These lists were compiled mainly by relying on the literature on
40

contribution to collective action regarding natural asset use.

In addition, scenario questions, tailored according to site-specific natural resource
uses, inquiring about respondents’ willing to limit consumption of natural resources were
included in the survey. The motivation behind having the latter set of questions was my
anticipation, based on similar empirical studies conducted in Turkey, that the first five
measures would not show a lot of variance since they are not formulated around
contributing something as pressing as foregoing current consumption. Furthermore,
giving up short-term economic gains by limiting consumption of resource use might in
fact be a better proxy (than, say, attending a training activity) for willingness to
contribute to local sustainable development.
In Sultan Sazlığı, three scenarios were presented to all respondents in which s/he
was asked to put her/himself in the shoes of a farmer, an animal grazer and a reed cutter,
respectively. The scenarios, after laying out the specific trade-off between short-term
economic gains and long-term environmental quality in each case, posited an informal
agreement among resource users to collectively limit their use. The resource of interest in
the farmer scenario is irrigation water, while that in the animal grazer scenario is pastures
and that in the reed cutter scenario is reed area. The survey then asked the respondent if
s/he would voluntarily join this agreement. In Köprülü Kanyon versions of the survey,
four different scenarios related to animal grazing, oregano-picking, rafting tourism and
construction were formulated. While animal grazing scenario was administered to all
40

As can be imagined, some people had replied affirmatively to some questions and
negatively to others. They are, therefore, provided with both lists of reasons. This will, in
fact, provide me with a richer material since I will be able to explore why individuals
choose to contribute in some ways and why they choose not to contribute in other ways.
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respondents, the latter three were administered, respectively, only in Çaltepe, in
Beşkonak-Karabük and in Altınkaya.

Similar those in Sultan Sazlığı, the scenarios

posited an informal agreement among resource users to collectively limit their use.
Specifically, the agreement in the rafting tourism scenario was to limit the number of
rafting tourists carried by each company, and that in the construction scenario was to not
abuse the hypothetical construction permit (see above).
The last two sub-modules of the survey addressed current socio-economic status
of the household that respondent belongs to and changes in socio-economic status since
the implementation of the GEF project. Questions on socio-economic status were related
to demographic characteristics of the respondent, educational attainment, demographic
composition of the household, ownership of a list of household assets, monthly household
income (measured in income brackets of 250 TL, $ 169 PPP), ownership of land and
animals, and sources of household income (percentage share of income from different
sources in household income).
Based on reported sources of income, respondents were directed to smaller submodules on the details of livelihood activities. Those who reported acquiring income
from farming, for instance, were asked about methods of irrigation, crop patterns,
subsistence vs. market production, primary decision-maker of irrigation method and crop
patterns, as well as changes in irrigation methods, crop patterns, share of farming income
in total household income and time spent in farming within the last six years. Analogous
questions were asked for animal grazing, reed cutting, oregano-picking, and tourism
employment. Finally, all respondents are asked, regardless of source of household
income, of changes in the socio-economic conditions of the area they live in, in annual
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household income, in household assets, in household expenditures, in the main source of
household income, in hours of market work and in labor force participation of household
members within the last six years.

3.6 Conclusion
This chapter serves as the bridge between chapter 2, where a theoretical
framework to understand local sustainable development was presented, and chapters 4
and 5, where an empirical study of two localities, Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon, by
combining qualitative and quantitive analyses is carried out. In connecting the abstract to
the concrete by this bridge, I aimed to provide the groundwork by which abstract
hypotheses about local sustainable development are concretized in the remainder of this
dissertation and supply the reader with an intellectual map of how I operationalize
theoretical questions in studying specific cases.
In doing so, I have emphasized the use of specific parameters in studying local
sustainable development, namely, concrete crystallizations of state practices, the way
state practices produce, reproduce and alter local inequalities and perceptions, and the
mechanisms in which local inequalities and perceptions impinge on local sustainable
development. I have also put forth how these parameters are investigated by the use of
desktop research, in-depth interviews and focus groups, and a survey.
In chapter 4, I undertake a mostly qualitative examination of Sultan Sazlığı and
Köprülü Kanyon, both in terms of the process of their making and implementation of the
GEF projects, by mobilizing the above-mentioned parameters. In chapter 5, I then
engage into the quantitative analysis of the participatory decision-making mechanisms of
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GEF and local peoples’ willingness to contribute to community-level efforts to
implement sustainable development.
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Table 3.1 Population and number of households in Sultan Sazlığı, by settlement
Number of
Population over 18
Population (2003)
Households (2003)
(2003)
Sindelhöyük
1000
4684
2356
Musahacılı
380
1448
796
Soysallı
350
1294
757
Çayırözü
171
707
409
Ovaçiftlik
120
505
267
Yeşilova
115
477
252
Yenihayat
25
116
55
Source: Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007b; Voter Registration Records, 2009.
Settlement

Table 3.2 Land use in Sultan Sazlığı, by use type
Type of Land Use

Total Area
(ha)

Proportion of
Protected Area

Pastures

13,503

55.06%

Marshland

3,817

15.56%

Agricultural Land

2,340

9.54%

Residential

1589

0.65%

64

0.25%

Seasonal Grazing

Source: Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007b
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Users
Accessed by local
livestock breeders in all
surrounding villagers
Accessed by reed
cutters in Sindelhöyük,
Ovaçiftlik, Yeşilova and
Yenihayat
Sindelhöyük: 817 ha
Çayırözü: 139.9 ha
Soysallı: 540 ha
Ovaçiftlik: 302.9 ha
Yeşilova: 139.9 ha
Ovaçiftlik, Soysallı and
Çayırözü
Four temporary
settlements (mezra) in
Sindelhoyuk

Table 3.3 Population and number of households in Köprülü Kanyon, by settlement

Beşkonak

Number of
Households (2003)
452

2408

Population over
18 (2003)
1145

Karabük

142

710

384

Altınkaya

180

628

364

Gaziler

135

515

272

Ballıbucak

200

357

155

Çaltepe

148

578

321

Değirmenözü

175

604

291

Hasdümen

107

322

211

Demirciler

100

299

161

Yeşilvadi

70

193

116

Beydilli

60

200

321

Settlement

Population (2003)

Source: Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a; Voter Registration Records, 2009.

Table 3.4 Population and sample size in Sultan Sazlığı
Settlement
Sindelhöyük
Musahacılı
Soysallı
Çayırözü
Ovaçiftlik
Yeşilova
Yenihayat

Population over 24 in
2009
2356
796
757
409
267
252
55
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Sample size at the
settlement
163
68
45
37
27
22
15

Percentage of
sample (%)
43
18
12
10
7
6
4

Table 3.5 Population and sample size in Köprülü Kanyon
Settlement

Population over 24 in
2009

Sample size at the
settlement

Percentage of
sample (%)

Beşkonak
Karabük
Altınkaya
Çaltepe

1145
384
364
321

200
69
61
71

50
17
15
18
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Figure 3.1 GEF project sites
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Figure 3.2 Sultan Sazlığı wetland complex
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Figure 3.3 Köprülü Kanyon National Park

Research route
Streams
National Park Boundary
Koprucay River
Forest compartments
Peaks
Roads
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Figure 3.4 Structure of the survey
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CHAPTER 4
SULTAN SAZLIĞI AND KÖPRÜLÜ KANYON: CONTEXTUALIZED
FAILURES

4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the first part of the empirical analysis that informs this
dissertation, namely the qualitative investigation of the failure of sustainable
development in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon. I explore how the Turkish state’s
local manifestations and the way it has interacted with local dynamics have shaped local
sustainable development, by probing into two inter-related processes in these two sites:
the history of the state-society relationships and the implementation of the GEF projects.
In doing so, I document the environmental processes and the local inequalities triggered
by the Turkish state, and discuss how the local people’s incentives and anticipations came
to be shaped vis-à-vis the state. Furthermore, I pay specific attention to the ways in which
inequalities and anticipations, conceptualized as the two indicators of the state-society
relationship, impinge on the implementation of local sustainable development. Then I
engage in the investigation of the GEF projects, where I demonstrate that local
manifestations of the Turkish state and its interaction with the local dynamics underlie
the failure of the projects.
The remainder of this chapter is made up of two main components, sections 4.2
and 4.3, where the analyses of Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon are taken up
respectively. These sections are organized similarly: they first set the scene for the
subsequent analyses, by depicting the prevalent dimensions of local inequalities. Then, a
political economy analysis of the local environmental problems is provided, where the
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state-society-environment interlinks are concretized and highlighted.

Finally, the

sections tackle the implementation of the GEF projects, both what they have aimed and
why and how they have failed. Section 4.4 concludes by summarizing the main
arguments of the chapter.

4.2 Sultan Sazlığı: Political Economy of Water Scarcity
If you pick up a guide on ecotourism in Turkey, you are not likely to miss the
name Sultan Sazlığı, as it is an internationally renown “bird paradise” and wetland,
attractive to birdwatchers and ecologists all around the world. If you walk into the
Provincial Directorate of Ministry of Environment and Forestry in Kayseri, a colorful
poster depicting the bird species found in the wetland, more than 160 in number, proudly
salutes you. If you decide to visit Sultan Sazlığı, however, a drought-stricken landscape
will welcome you. The rust-colored signs will direct you to a huge but empty building,
meant to be a visitor center, next to which rises a tall bird-watching tower, but no birds
will be in sight.
This picture becomes even more tragic when one considers the local people,
populating seven settlements around the wetland, many of whom depend directly on the
ecosystem for gaining livelihoods. Animal grazers complain of how their sheep got
skinnier, while the reed cutters, in nostalgia, recall the days when they used to sail around
the marshland. The burgeoning apple orchards and the thriving plots with ripe sugar beet
in Develi plain surrounding the wetland, on the other hand, suggest who stole the water
from Sultan Sazlığı.
It is staggering that such a site of international importance can be so devastated
despite various conservation regulations it has been subject to for more than 40 years (see
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chapter 3).

What makes matters more puzzling is the fact that the environmental

problems in Sultan Sazlığı have induced the Turkish state to implement a project, namely
the GEF project, to ensure sustainable resource use and management in the area. The
portrayal presented above is evidence enough that these attempts have failed miserably.
This section provides a narrative of this failure, building on the findings of the field study
conducted in Sultan Sazlığı. In doing so, it demonstrates that the rigorous pursuit of
agricultural growth by the Turkish state, a constitutive practice in building its hegemony,
has been the primary reason that hampered this attempt to implement sustainable
development.
I start by setting the scene of the analysis in section 4.2.1, where I provide a
discussion of the prevalent livelihood activities in Sultan Sazlığı. In section 4.2.2, I delve
into the political economy of water use in the area, exploring how the local stakeholders,
namely the farmers, animal grazers and the reed cutters, are positioned vis-à-vis the
environment, and how they have been impacted by the prioritization of agricultural
growth by the Turkish state. Finally, in section 4.2.3, I describe and unpack the failure of
the GEF project, emphasizing the significant role played by the Turkish state’s persistent
growth-oriented logic of modernization and the local dynamics it has brought forth.

4.2.1 Setting the Scene
Sultan Sazlığı covers 3,800 hectares of marshland at the center of a large plain,
surrounded by agricultural plots, orchards and pastures. This landscape is suggestive of
major livelihood activities in the area, namely, agriculture, animal husbandry and reed
cutting. According to 2007 records, 13% of the households in the project settlements rely
on all three sources of livelihoods, whereas 22% depend on farming and reed cutting,
135

10% on animal husbandry and reed cutting, and 6% on agriculture and animal husbandry;
18% of the households acquire income only from reed cutting, 7% only from animal
husbandry, and 9% only from farming (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007b).
Although the figures above demonstrate that most households rely on some
combination of farming, animal husbandry and reed cutting, their prevalence varies
geographically. More specifically, reed cutting is practiced in only four settlements
(Ovaçiftlik, Yeşilova, Yenihayat and Sindelhöyük), and agricultural production is very
41

limited in Yenihayat mainly due to unavailability of arable land.

Seasonal variations are

added to the geographical dimension, as households adjust to changing viability of
different livelihoods by shifting relative dependence on a certain activity within the mix.
For instance, many households in the south started relying more on reed-cutting in 2001,
a notoriously dry year, after encountering low crop yields due to insufficient irrigation
(field interviews, 2008). In a similar vein, declining returns to animal husbandry, rooted
in poor milk yields and increasing costs of grazing (discussed in detail later in this
chapter), precipitated a shift from animal husbandry to farming and/or reed-cutting in the
early 2000’s (Karabaşa, 2002).
In the remainder of this section, I provide details about these three livelihood
activities, such as the prevailing crop pattern, irrigation methods, types of livestock
raised, etc. In doing so, I will set the scene for the arguments made in the rest of the
chapter about natural resource use and local sustainable development. As will become
obvious shortly, agriculture, animal husbandry and reed cutting are associated with
different but overlapping uses of the ecosystem services. Thus, they are closely linked to
41

Yenihayat is a small village that used to be a temporary settlement for animal grazing
(mezra) for Sindelhöyük town.
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the ongoing environmental problems and to each other, where overuse by one group
might imply costs on others. The final part of the section discusses the main axes of
socio-economic fragmentations in Sultan Sazlığı, by bringing together the aspects of
inequality that emerge from reliance on different livelihood activities and those based on
gender relations.

4.2.1.1 Agriculture
Agriculture is a major economic activity in Sultan Sazlığı, as almost half of the
households in the project settlements depend on farming income (Sultan Sazlığı
Management Report, 2007). Its significance, however, should be considered alongside
two striking features of the agrarian structure: highly-skewed distribution of land and
acute landlessness. Almost half of the households in Ovaçiftlik and Yeşilova, and more
than two-thirds of those in Soysallı and Çayırözü, do not own any land (Karabaşa, 2002).
Roughly 15 households (out of a total of 756 households, making up 2%) in these four
villages, on the other hand, own over 20 hectares of land. Landownership structure in
Musahacılı is exceptional in the sense that all households own at least three hectares of
land, thanks to the land reform in 1953, but the distribution remains highly unequal with
ten households (out of 380 households, making up 3%) owning over 20 hectares.
The main crops that Sultan Sazlığı farmers produce are sugar beets and
sunflowers, in addition to the less extensively cultivated cereals such as wheat and barley.
Table 4.1 provides a picture of agricultural production in the area by listing the crops
cultivated, as well as the sizes of total arable land, decomposed at the settlement level.
Although this crop pattern has persisted in the area (similar to the broader Develi plain)
since the early 1970’s, two recent trends should be noted: Fruit production, in particular
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of apples, became important in the southern villages (Ovaçiftlik and Yeşilova) starting in
the late 1990’s and has spread to northern villages in the last couple of years. In addition,
within the last 5 years, crop pattern has shifted, especially in Musahacılı and Soysallı,
towards the cultivation of animal feed crops (mostly corn and fodder to be silaged),
which replaced sugar beet and sunflower. In fact, the rising share of animal feed in the
crop mix is in line with the general trend in the broader Develi plain, according to the
records of Kayseri Provincial Directorate of Agriculture (Republic of Turkey Kayseri
Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, 2009). This shift is mainly driven by the provision
of incentives for animal feed cultivation: credit and price subsidies for seed purchasing,
as well as extension support, are provided by the Turkish state in order to promote
42

sustainable grazing via substitution of stall feeding for open grazing.

As can be inferred from the prevailing crop pattern, agricultural production is
mostly market-oriented. The main market for sugar beet is the processing plant in
Kayseri, the provincial center. Likewise, sunflower and animal feed crops are sold to the
oil processing and silage plants in the surrounding towns.

Apple is sold to small

merchants who visit the area during harvest time and provide the means of transportation
of the product (and occasionally the labor power for apple picking). Negligible amounts
of surplus vegetables and other fruits produced in the orchards are sold in village
markets. Wheat and barley cultivation, on the other hand, is subsistence-based.
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It is ironic, however, that some animal feed crops, especially silage corn, have high
irrigation requirements. I will discuss later in this chapter that an important reason
underlying the environmental problems in the area is the crop pattern. More specifically,
the crops cultivated both in Sultan Sazlığı area and in the broader Develi Plain are highly
water-demanding. A shift towards animal feed cultivation, therefore, is potentially
exacerbating the water issue in the area.
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Although becoming a more frequent practice lately, most farming households do
not resort to hiring paid agricultural workers and rely instead on family labor and
43

informal labor sharing arrangements (imece) in agricultural production.

Labor sharing

typically takes place between 6-10 people, usually belonging to the same neighborhood
or extended family. The group collectively works on every member’s plot until harvest
is (or almost) done. A clear gender-based division of labor can be seen in agricultural
production, as women are responsible for preparing and hoeing the land, as well as for
fruit picking in orchards, while men undertake tilling and reaping.
As is the case in almost all of the Develi plain, farming is primarily irrigated. In
fact, the crops cultivated in the area require quite high levels of irrigation water (Gürer,
2004). Plots in the south of Sultan Sazlığı rely on irrigation from Ağcaşar and Kovalı
dams, built on two streams feeding the wetland in the1980’s as a part the Develi
44

Irrigation Project.

Farmers in the north, on the other hand, take advantage of the natural

springs located nearby, whose water is then released to the wetland. Well-irrigation is
also heavily utilized all around the wetland: Farmers in Sindelhöyük rely almost
exclusively on deep wells, reported to be 28, opened by the State Hydraulic Works.
Apart from the numerous deep wells that the State Hydraulic Works opened in other
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The notable exception to this general pattern is Musahacılı, where hiring agricultural
laborers is common. Around 10% of the villagers in Musahacılı work as seasonal
agricultural workers (Karabaşa, 2002).
44
The Develi Irrigation Project, as attested by its name, is a comprehensive undertaking
planned and implemented by the State Hydraulic Works with the aim of developing
irrigated agriculture in the Develi basin. It started in the late 1960’s and comprised of the
construction of three dams and various irrigation structures. A detailed discussion of the
project and its impact both on the environment and on different local groups will be
presented later in this chapter.
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villages (around 40), many farmers have opened, and currently rely on, illegal deep wells
after experiencing a highly dry year in 2001.
The prominence of irrigated farming goes hand-in-hand with inefficient water use
in Sultan Sazlığı, as attested by the widespread use of wild flooding in irrigation, where
water is allowed to flow freely across farmlands. Unsurprisingly, wild flooding is
preferred by farmers for its low infrastructural requirements, since it implies direct, or
ditch or strip-controlled, water application to the land. Utilization of water-conserving
methods, such as sprinkler and drip systems, has only started recently and remain limited
in scope.
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4.2.1.2 Animal Husbandry
Animal husbandry is practiced widely, and almost all households in Sultan Sazlığı
have at least two beef cattle or a few sheep (see table 4.2 for cattle and sheep ownership
by settlement). Milking and preparation of dairy products are tasks that fall exclusively
within the female domain of household production. Animal products are primarily used
for household consumption, while around two-thirds of animal owners in the area sell
surplus production in local markets.

46

Milk is the main product marketed by animal

owners, sold to cooperatives in Musahacılı and Sindelhöyük, with the exception of
animal owners in Yenihayat, who rely more on selling cheese in local markets since

45

Although there are state-led attempts to initiate a shift to water-efficient irrigation
methods, they mostly fail in bringing about a change. This failure will be discussed in
detail later in this chapter.
46
Market-orientation is less frequent among the animal owners in Ovaçiftlik and
Yeşilova.
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marketing milk, an easily perishable product, is infeasible for them due to poor
transportation opportunities (field interviews, 2008).
Animal owners often make use of the pastures in the surroundings of the wetland
to graze their animals. In most cases, the village herdsman takes all animals in the village
to grazing in various parts of the national park and brings them back at night. In addition,
some villagers use a specific type of reed after drying on rooftops for about two weeks to
feed their animals. Despite the existence of various subsidies to promote it, animal feed
is still rarely used, mostly by few relatively well-off animal owners.
Although animal husbandry has been the most prevalent source of livelihood in
the area for a long time, its importance has been declining since the mid-80’s and
especially deteriorated within the last decade (Karabaşa, 2002; Şarkışla, 2002; field
interviews, 2008). In addition to the detrimental effects of water scarcity on the pastures,
which will be discussed in detail later, accessibility of upland meadows was severely
limited by two events: meadows that were accessed free of charge by Musahacılı
residents were started to be rented out by the state, which made sheep raising
prohibitively costly; meadows used by Soysallı, on the other hand, can no longer be
accessed since they fell within the boundaries of the protected area as a result of the 2003
revisions (see section 3.4.1 in chapter 3). Such intensified constraints on grazing
translated into declining milk yields and diminishing viability of animal husbandry as a
livelihood option.
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4.2.1.3 Reed Cutting
Reed cutting has been practiced in Sultan Sazlığı for a long time, for both
47

household and commercial use.

Until early the 1980’s, cutting reed for weaving mats

and baskets, stuffing pillows and making fences was widespread among the local people.
These traditional activities, however, faded in time with the area’s increased integration
with the market economy and the degradation of the marshland (Karabaşa, 2002). Today,
reed cutting is primarily done for commercial purposes. A specific, thin type of reed,
suitable for roof thatching, is cut and sold to reed companies in Sindelhöyük, who then
export it to European countries.
While residents of Ovaçiftlik, Yeşilova, Yenihayat and Sindelhöyük rely heavily
on it, almost no one in the remaining villages engages in reed cutting (Karabaşa, 2002;
field interviews, 2008). According to field interviews conducted in 2008, 80-90% of
households in Ovaçiftlik, Yeşilova and Yenihayat engage in reed-cutting for generating
income (see table 4.3 for more accurate figures for 2002). Reed cutters usually form
groups of 4-6 people who work together and share the proceeds afterwards. In most
cases, it is the male household head who goes out to reed cutting. Women do not often
engage in the actual cutting of the reed, since it demands considerable physical strength,
but usually help with the cleaning and bundling of the cut reed (field interviews, 2008).
The exception is Sindelhöyük, where women frequently went with their husbands to the
marshland to help cut, clean, bundle and carry reed.

47

Although it is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is worth noting that Sultan
Sazlığı marshlands host a variety of reed types suitable for different uses. For a detailed
description, see Karabaşa (2002).
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Cutting starts around October-November, when reed plant is mature (known when
it releases its leaves) and can go until February. The specific type of reed used in roof
thatching is cut for about 2-3 weeks, starting in mid-November. Cutting is done primarily
by hand, with sickles slightly bigger than those used in harvest reaping, though
occasionally tractors were utilized until they were banned in the late 1990’s. Before the
wetland started to dry out completely, it was customary for reed cutters to travel around
the marshland with boats and cut only the part above the water level.
As there are no individual property rights over the marshland, how much each
group or individual would cut is set by the practice of “encircling” (çevrik), an informal
arrangement according to which reed cutters (or groups of them) encircle their claimed
area by cutting the reeds marking its boundaries first. A single reed-cutter can cut 75-150
bundles per day if reed is adequate; the number falls to 25-30 in times of scarcity. Cut
reed is first assembled in bundles, 10-30 of which are grouped together to be carried
outside of the marshland. After being transported to the villages, reed bundles are opened
and cleaned out of the useless shorter reed. They are then re-bundled, put together in
stacks (of 100 bundles) and left in an open area ready for sale.
Reed companies, based in Sindelhöyük, export the reed to European countries
(mainly Germany) after some more cleaning and re-bundling. Since there are only three
reed cutting companies to whom cut reed can be sold, reed companies have considerable
power on determining the price, i.e. reed cutters face monopsonistic prices, much lower
than what reed commands in international markets. Karabaşa (2002), based on the
assumption that 50 bundles are cut per day, estimates that a month of reed cutting
provided a net return of 1,350 TL per person (in 2010 prices) on average in 2002; given
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that commercial reed cutting was being practiced for 60 days that year, this translates into
2,700 TL (in 2010 prices) of annual income, equivalent to $1,600. This compares to
Turkey’s annual average per capita income of $3, 311. I was told during field interviews
in 2008, on the other hand, that a reed cutter earns around 1,650-2,750 TL in 2010 prices,
approximately $980-1,630 per year; a close figure to Karabaşa’s estimate.
As these figures suggest, those who depend on reed cutting as the primary source
of income are the most marginalized and poor section of the community. Although it was
used as a supplementary option in the past, today only those who do not own any land or
livestock resort to reed cutting since it is a highly labor-intensive task with low returns.
Stricter regulations introduced by the GEF project, as will be explained in detail, also
serve as a disincentive for those who have alternative means of livelihood. Lack of
alternative means of generating income, coupled with low cash returns of reed cutting,
makes it virtually inconceivable for reed cutters to shift to other economic activities.
Furthermore, many reed cutters are trapped into a debt cycle, as borrowing from reed
companies to cover transportation and labor expenses is common. Cutters start the season
indebted to the buyers, anticipating covering previous year’s debt with the current year’s
income.

Given the absence of alternative cash-generating opportunities, this debt-

bondage cycle proves to be hard to break.
The impact of heightened environmental problems, linked to water scarcity, on
the reed cutting practices will be discussed extensively in the following section. Suffice
it to say for the present discussion that one implication of environmental distress has been
the increased dependence on reed-cutting as a source of livelihood, which has produced
resource conflicts among users.

Disputes over use rights between cutters from
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Sindelhöyük, not neighboring the marshland, and those from the remaining villages have
been ongoing since the late 1990’s. Until then, access rights were granted to nonneighboring settlements in exchange for a fee paid to the neighboring settlements. This
arrangement disappeared, with many rejecting to pay the fee, as the number of reed
cutters increased and reeds became scarcer (Karabaşa, 2002). Inequalities between the
few wealthy cutters, who cut more by hiring wage laborers, and the poorer majority also
spark conflicts. Karabaşa (2002) states that norms of fairness, which used to govern the
practice of encircling, are increasingly replaced by self-interest. This observation is
supported by my field interviews, during which locals complained that while everyone
used to cut only as much as they needed in the past and respected others’ right to gain
livelihood, the pressing need to generate cash and competition between reed cutters made
them “greedy”; not only are the poor reed cutters spiteful of the wealthy, but also they too
are driven to cut as much as they can, as soon as they can, by their debt obligations to the
reed companies.

4.2.1.4 Local Fragmentations: Land, Livelihood and Gender
The preceding presentation of economic activities in Sultan Sazlığı speaks
foremost to the salience of land-based inequalities. Given the backdrop of striking land
inequality, accessibility of income-generating opportunities varies significantly in the
area. Land ownership corresponds to farming income, which is not only more lucrative
but also more reliable than animal husbandry and reed cutting, as farmers face little price
and market uncertainty thanks to the state agricultural subsidy policies. Landlessness, on
the other hand, largely implies reliance on animal husbandry or reed cutting for gaining
livelihoods.
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In particular, reed cutters make up the most marginalized and poor section of the
community, who lack access to land and other productive assets. The debt-bondage most
of them are trapped in, as mentioned earlier, leads to heightened subsistence pressures on
reed-cutting households. Virtually all reed cutters lack alternative income-generation
options and depend solely on the marshland for gaining their livelihoods. Despite the fact
that local people have chosen to supplement household incomes by reed cutting in the
past, almost everyone who owns some land or livestock has opted out of it with the
deterioration of the reed cover and access restrictions brought about by the GEF.

48

The

current “pool” of reed cutters, therefore, is more deprived, in general, than before.
Variations in land ownership and corresponding sources of livelihoods
undoubtedly correlate with living standards and economic power. Moreover, livelihood
groups defined in terms of agriculture, animal husbandry and reed cutting signify power
that comes with social status. Where farmers are overall the most respected group in the
villages, reed cutters are looked down upon to be ignorant, lazy, or even lacking adequate
morals (field interviews, 2008). This stereotype is especially epitomized in the narratives
of farmers, who speak of reed cutters as savages and causes of discomfort; in the words
of a fruit producer, she would rather the marshland was completely dried since then “the
reed people would then have to leave and we’d all be better off”.
Socio-economic fragmentations defined as such do not only prevail within
specific settlements, but also mark inequalities, to a certain extent, across settlements, as
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There were no formal restrictions on reed cutting prior to the first reed-cutting plan
implemented in 2001. Accordingly, cutting was allowed for three months (October,
November and December) anywhere in the marshland as long as it does not exceed 30%
of the total reed area and does not damage breeding areas of birds. Restrictions
introduced by the GEF, however, are stricter, as will be described later.
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the degree of reliance on different livelihoods differs based on location.

More

specifically, the settlements in Sultan Sazlığı can be broadly categorized as those on the
north, Soysallı and Çayırözü, relying heavily on animal husbandry, those on the west,
Musahacılı and Sindelhöyük, where agriculture is more important compared to the rest of
the settlements, and those in the south, Yeşilova and Ovaçiftlik, the reed cutter villages.
The farmer settlements Musahacılı and Sindelhöyük are not only wealthier than the rest,
but also have better health care and education infrastructure.
Another axis of inequality, which cannot be reduced to economic relations, is
based on gender. Although women seem more vocal and visible at times than what is
commonly observed in rural Anatolia, gender norms of appropriate female behavior can
be clearly discerned. Some places, such as village coffee houses, as well as some actions,
such as traveling alone outside of their settlements, are considered to be off limits for
“proper” women. Undoubtedly, such norms operate as strong constraints on women’s
participation in public life. Musahacılı seems to be more gender-egalitarian in this
respect, as women seemed more confident and mobile.
Carrying out household chores such as cooking, cleaning, looking after children,
and taking care of animals, milking and preparation of dairy products are the types labor
that are almost exclusively in the female domain of work, largely undervalued by the men
in the communities. Non-substitutability of female-male labor in these tasks puts
significant pressures on women’s labor time, as they cannot “bargain” them away, even
when they have outside labor responsibilities.
Although there are no social norms that restrict it, it seems that women’s outside
work is usually a livelihood strategy adopted by poor households out of need. Women
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from wealthy households seem to perceive paid employment to be degrading more than
empowering (field interviews, 2008). Women’s outside work often consists of seasonal
agricultural labor with daily remuneration. It is not common, however, for women to
hold onto their income; household income is either pooled or controlled by the male
household head (field interviews, 2008). Building on this observation, it would not be
unfair to say that women hold significantly less economic power than men.

4.2.2 The Political Economy of Water Scarcity
Sultan Sazlığı has been suffering from drought for a while, as the water level in
the wetland ecosystem has been decreasing dramatically, most visibly since 1998. The
problem has become acute lately, as the wetland dries out completely during most months
of the year. Calculations in GEF reports state that current inflow into the wetland falls 30
million m3 short of the amount required for the ecosystem’s survival. Water shortage
hurts the plant cover, as exemplified by the degradation of both the quality and quantity
of pasture and the marshland. According to the records of State Hydraulic Works, the
total area of Yay Lake and the marshland decreased by 20% between 1970 and 2003
(Sultan Sazlığı Management Report, 2007). According to Sultan Sazlığı Management
Report (2007), the area of the reed cover fell from 3,900 to 400 hectares within the last
two decades.
In this section, I undertake a political economy analysis of water scarcity and the
environmental problems it causes in Sultan Sazlığı. To reiterate, I understand the resource
use patterns and environmental change as embedded in social, economic and political
processes. Specifically, I explore the ways in which the state’s agricultural policies have
shaped resource use patterns and altered local dynamics. In doing so, I demonstrate that
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the benefits and costs associated with the activities that hurt the environment are
unevenly distributed. My main argument is that the Turkish state’s growth-oriented
modernist vision, a part of its hegemonic practices, had translated into the promotion of
irrigated agriculture in Develi plain at all costs. In the discussion below, I substantiate
how the reproduction of state hegemony via the pursuit of economic growth has shaped
the local environment, both directly and indirectly, and re/produced local inequalities.
Though I structure most of the following discussion around the main resource
groups (farmers, animal grazers, and reed cutters), demarcating the boundaries between
them and their interests is not always easy, since there are significant overlaps between
(e.g. animal grazers and farmers, or animal grazers and reed-cutters) and heterogeneities
within user groups, as will be explained.

4.2.2.1 Farmers
Farmers’ main relationship with the wetland ecosystem is through their use of
irrigation water, as was described in section 4.2.1.1. Not only the farmers in Sultan
Sazlığı, but those in the broader Develi plain have a direct relationship with the wetland:
Develi river basin is a big plain where the main source of livelihood is –mostly irrigatedagriculture. Since irrigation water is obtained either from the dams built on sources
flowing into the wetland or from wells tapping into underground water, farmer practices
in the broader plain have direct implications for water scarcity in Sultan Sazlığı.
Cultivation and irrigation practices in the basin need to be unpacked to clearly
understand Develi farmers’ relationship with Sultan Sazlığı. Farming in the plain is
almost entirely irrigated: In 2003, irrigated farming was practiced in 78,000 of 81,200
hectares (96%) of all arable land (Gürer, 2004). Cereals, beans, sugar beet, sunflower,
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fodder, fruits and vegetables are the main crops cultivated, though their relative
importance varies across different regions. The total areas of cultivation for each crop, as
well as corresponding proportion of arable land in the plain, are presented in table 4.4.
As stated earlier, the existing crop pattern is skewed towards water-intensive crops and
has prevailed since 1970’s. Gürer (2004), after taking irrigation requirements of
cultivated crops, harvesting seasons, and efficiency of irrigation methods employed in the
plain into account, estimates that the existing crop pattern requires 398 million m3 of
irrigation water annually.
The infrequency of water-saving irrigation methods in the plain, a pattern echoed
in Sultan Sazlığı as stated before, should be considered alongside the plain-wide tendency
to cultivate water-consuming crops. Gürer (2004) states that about 90% of irrigation in
the basin is based on flooding, resulting in 60-65% of water loss. It would not be wrong
to claim, therefore, the burden on Sultan Sazlığı is primarily created by water used –and
wasted— by farmers in the Develi plain: water diverted by dams and vacuumed out by
wells for agricultural production constitute the main cause of water scarcity.
Generally speaking, Develi farmers have been enjoying, albeit to differing
degrees, the fruits of irrigated farming, but not bearing most of its costs. Irrigated farming
has generated high profits for landowners and fueled much of the region’s economic
growth. Sugar beet and sunflower, cultivated by almost all farmers in the plain, are highly
marketable cash crops with high net returns. Sugar beet producers have benefited from
guaranteed markets, predictable prices well above international prices, ease of credit
access and technical support.

Likewise, oilseed producers are supported by input

subsidies, as well as premiums paid per unit of land cultivated. Fruit production, carried
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out by larger landowners, is also promoted by various state-initiated support schemes and
is very profitable. Lately, Develi farmers have taken advantage of subsidized fodder
cultivation, which has the highest per hectare monetary returns among all the crops
cultivated in the basin.
The primary implication of environmental degradation on farmers is insufficiency
of irrigation water, as very few among them make use of pastures or marshland in Sultan
Sazlığı; they have not been hit, therefore, by the degradation of the plant cover. Although
the effects of water shortage on agricultural production are being felt recently, it does not
seem to have yet posed a serious problem in terms of sustained reductions in farm output
or incomes. This is mainly because the needs of agricultural production have always
been, and continue to be, prioritized: the fulfillment of irrigation needs in the plain was
ensured by the state even if it meant huge reductions of water inflow to Sultan Sazlığı.
Some farmers, however, feel the costs of water shortage more bitterly than others.
Broadly speaking, geographical location and source of irrigation seem to be two decisive
factors on how farmers are impacted. Villages in the north of Sultan Sazlığı, Çayırözü
and Soysallı, rely on natural springs for irrigation and thus do not feel the burden of water
shortage (field interviews, 2008). The distribution of costs on farmers who utilize dam
irrigation, on the other hand, is very much related to plot locations. Water released from
Ağcaşar and Kovalı dams is given to the wetland after traveling through plots in the
plain. Plots in the closer vicinity of Sultan Sazlığı, by virtue of being at the end of the
canal system, are the final receivers of irrigation. Consequently, they are the ones to
suffer first and most of water shortage (Özesmi and Gürer, 2003; field interviews, 2008).
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Those farmers who are less fortunate, and thus affected adversely, complain about
the unpredictable dam irrigation and rising saline levels of underground water vacuumed
out by wells. Furthermore, harsher climatic conditions brought about by the drought have
affected fruit producers in the immediate surroundings of Sultan Sazlığı, but not those
farther away from the wetland: fruit producers complain that quality and quantity of
annual output have been hurt by wide temperature oscillations. Based on these accounts,
it would not be unfair to assert that while all farmers in the broader Develi plain have
been contributing to the water crisis, those in the surrounding of Sultan Sazlığı have been
bearing its costs more than others.

4.2.2.2 Animal Grazers
The second group, animal owners, relates to the ecosystem through their use of
the pastures in the surroundings of the wetland for grazing purposes. However, as
reliance on pastures correlate with wealth, i.e. well-off animal owners do not resort to
open grazing, neither the contribution by animal grazers to degradation by overgrazing,
nor the impacts of degrading pastures on animal grazers are uniform, as will be
elaborated below.
Although overgrazing is admittedly an issue, the primary reason for the
degradation of pastures in Sultan Sazlığı is the scarcity of water. Meadows and pastures
started deteriorating with reductions in both underground and surface water. This,
unsurprisingly, resulted in increased pressure on the relatively intact pastures and in turn
accelerated their degradation. In the face of decreasing livestock yields and falling
household incomes, the landless open grazers have opted for two strategies:
supplementing their livelihoods by reed cutting, which intensified the pressure on the
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marshland, or stress sales of livestock. Karabaşa (2002) reports, for instance, that the
number of livestock kept in Yenihayat decreased by a fifth between 1985 and 2001. The
relatively well-off animal owners who are engaged in stall breeding and/or own land, on
the other hand, were not affected by the degradation of pastures.
Landed animal owners, however, are contributing to the deterioration of pastures
to the extent they cultivate water-intensive crops. More specifically, I argue that
distribution of costs associated with the degradation of pastures, as well as that of
contribution to it, is correlated with landownership. The landless, whose consumption of
irrigation water is nil, bear the burnt of declining pasture quality, while the landed who
have a hand in bringing about water shortage also have the means, i.e. purchasing or
growing animal feed, to avoid most of its costs.

4.2.2.3 Reed Cutters
As stated earlier, reed cutters are the most marginalized and poor, with no access
to productive assets.
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It is clear that they have been the worst hit by the degradation,

specifically of the marshland, since they lack opportunities to switch to other livelihood
practices. Their contribution to degradation, however, is far from comparable to the costs
they bear. The main mechanisms through which the reed cutters take part in the
degradation of the marshland are premature reed cutting and overharvesting. Premature
cutting hurts the regeneration of the resource base, whereas overharvesting leads to its
depletion.
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As hinted earlier, it was common for local people to undertake reed cutting to
supplement household incomes. In the present discussion, however, I use the term to
refer to those for whom reed cutting is the primary source of livelihood and not to those
who engage in reed cutting as an alternative/supplementary activity.
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Field interviews with the reed cutters, as well as with the GEF project team,
indicate that premature cutting is somewhat a recent phenomenon. In fact, the reed cutters
were well aware of the harm premature cutting would do and they knew, based on years
of experience, the best cutting time for the plant’s healthy growth. They stated that the
“genuine” reed cutters (who rely on reed cutting as the main livelihood activity) would
never cut prematurely, since the practice would ultimately hurt their only source of
livelihood. They admitted, however, that some are forced to do it because of financial
hardship.
I argue that the incidence of premature cutting, in this case, typifies how
inequality operates to induce degradation. It has been precipitated by the general
deprivation of the reed cutters, and the structure of their relationship to the reed
companies. As I described earlier, most reed cutters start the cutting season indebted to
the reed companies. With progressive worsening of their economic well-being over the
years with the degradation of the reed cover, the burden of debt becomes more pressing
for most reed cutters. In addition, competition between the reed companies has led them
to offer buying premature reed despite the agreement they had with the national park
(field interviews). As a result, reed cutters who want to be freed of their debt as soon as
possible cut prematurely and cause considerable damage on the long-term sustainability
of the marshland.
The causes and effects of overharvesting are not as simple as they look, either.
While overharvesting clearly puts pressure on the reed cover, its scope and severity seem
to have varied with the composition of the reed cutter pool. Since overharvesting
manually is not probable, overharvesters are often the wealthier reed cutters who own
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tractors or can afford to hire additional labor. With the better-off villagers who have
alternative means of generating income dropping out of the reed cutting pool,
overharvesting is not a pressing issue anymore. In other words, those who rely solely on
the marshland for gaining their livelihoods (the current pool of reed cutters) lack the
means to overharvest. They did, however, end up shouldering its burden in the past, as a
consequence of which their livelihoods suffer and standards of living deteriorate
significantly.
Similar to the situation with the pastures, the primary reason accounting for the
degradation of the marshland, however, is water shortage precipitated by the agricultural
practices in the plain.
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Apart from leading to substantial degradation of both quality and

quantity of the reed area, the drought had hurt the marshland in three additional, more
indirect, channels. Firstly, it has served to open up a larger portion of the marshland to be
harvested. Secondly, it facilitated overharvesting, since the tractor use became possible
only after marshland dried.
Thirdly, the drought’s negative impacts on other livelihood practices, such as
animal husbandry, have exacerbated the pressure on the reed ecosystem to the extent that
it prompted supplementing of household incomes by reed cutting. Karabaşa (2002) states
that falling agricultural productivity and degradation of pastures due to water scarcity,
coupled with declining agricultural prices and the economic crisis in 2001, resulted in a
steady increase both in the number of households engaged in reed-cutting and in the
quantity of reed cut per household starting in early 2000’s. Unsurprisingly, such
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In fact, the first blow on the reed area was the draining of the northern marshes by the
Turkish state with the intention of opening up arable land, which was later distributed to
residents of Musahacılı, in the early 1950’s.
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intensified pressure on the marshland led cutting area to expand. While only one-third of
the marshland was accessed by reed-cutters prior to 1990’s, reed was cut from the whole
marshland in 2001 (Özesmi, 2002). It can be argued, therefore, that water scarcity has
proved to be a double-blow on the marshland, through its direct impact on the reed cover
and its effects on resource use. Shifts in the availability and viability of alternative
livelihoods increased the pressure on the reed eco-system and accelerated its degradation.
As should be clear from the above discussion, reed cutters’ contribution to water
scarcity and the implications they are faced with are highly asymmetric. Since the reed
cutters are predominantly landless, they have not been taking part in irrigation practices
underlying water shortage. They are, however, forced to bear its costs since opting out of
reed cutting is nearly impossible for them.

4.2.2.4 The State
I have tried to demonstrate that the environmental problems in Sultan Sazlığı, as
well as the social and economic dynamics they are enmeshed within, are closely related
to the agricultural practices in Develi plain. In this subsection, I discuss the role played
by the Turkish state in the making of these dynamics, especially regarding its growthorientation in promoting agricultural production at all costs, and unpack the history of
sustainable development’s failure in the area. In doing so, I take up two aspects of this
failure in turn, the Turkish state’s promotion of agriculture, and its futile attempts to
enforce sustainable water use.

156

4.2.2.4.1 Develi Plain: A History of Growth-Orientation
Historically, a main pillar of the Turkish state’s strategy to promote agricultural
growth has been undertaking monumental irrigation schemes around the country.
Against this backdrop, it initiated the Develi Irrigation Project (DIP hereafter) in 1960’s
with the intention of developing water resources and promoting irrigated agriculture, by
which cash crops such as sugar beet and sunflower could be cultivated. The project
comprised of two stages, during the first of which three dams, groundwater pumping
facilities and irrigation and drainage structures were built. The second stage, on the other
hand, was envisaged to transfer water for irrigation purposes from a neighboring basin,
Zamantı. A total of 52,500 hectares was aimed to be irrigated with DIP.
It is worth noting that the original plan was to drain the entire Sultan Sazlığı
wetland when DIP was first started. The plans were revised in 1976, five years after the
wetland was declared as a Wildlife Conservation Area, and an agreement on the
minimum quantity of water to be released into the wetland was reached between State
Hydraulic Works and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
With the implementation of DIP, Akköy, Ağcaşar and Kovalı dams were
constructed in 1967, 1986 and 1987, respectively. The dams alone led to a reduction of
86 million m3 water inflow to Sultan Sazlığı. Furthermore, State Hydarulic Works drilled
390 wells with irrigation purposes between 1968 and 2002, 159 of which were drilled
after all the dams became functional (Gürer, 2004). Such large number of wells drilled by
the state and the lax monitoring of (illegal) personal wells led to a boom in well irrigation
over the years. Gürer (2004) illustrates this with figures: Currently, irrigated farming is
practiced on around 78,000 hectares in the plain, while the dam irrigation capacity is
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approximately 28,000 hectares. 50,000 hectares of difference indicates the amount of
land irrigated by personal wells, of which approximately one-third (by an optimistic
estimation) are illegal (Gürer, 2004).
Added to the handing down of irrigation infrastructure by the state is the nonvolumetric pricing of irrigation water. Accordingly, a fixed annual amount is charged per
hectare of land, determined separately for each crop, regardless of how much water is
actually utilized. This irrigation pricing policy has not only sparked a dramatic expansion
of irrigated land, but also led highly water-wasting irrigation methods to take root
throughout the plain. Since farmers perceive water to be abundant and cheap, they have
virtually no incentive to undertake costly investments to deploy efficient irrigation
methods, such as drip or sprinkler systems.
Yet another result of DIP and the irrigation policy, which should be considered
alongside the expansion of irrigated area and water use, was the notable change in the
cropping pattern. While cereals predominated in cultivation prior to the 1970’s, cash
crops like sugar beet and sunflower, as well as fruit production and animal feed
cultivation, gained increasing importance afterwards (interviews with employees of
Kayseri Provincial Directorate of Agriculture). This shift in the cultivation pattern
signified a rise in the water-intensiveness of agricultural production and thus had a direct
effect on plain-wide water use. I explain below that the price, credit and market
incentives accompanied the readily available irrigation resources and cheap irrigation
water in bringing about the change in the cropping pattern.
In line with its attempts to boost the agricultural sector, the Turkish state had a
number of protective measures and subsidies in place until the recent liberalization
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program of 2001.
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In sugar beet production, state’s agricultural policy translated into

guaranteed markets and subsidized prices, as well as fertilizer support and access to
harvesting equipment and services (EU Screening Report, 2006). Accordingly, almost all
sugar beet was produced under contract with processing plants operated by state-owned
or state-regulated agencies, which effectively eliminated market-related risks. In a similar
vein, sugar procurement prices, well above world prices, removed price uncertainties.
Sunflower production was (and still is) supported by price subsidies according to which a
per-kilogram premium is paid to growers. Furthermore, state-regulated agricultural sales
cooperatives provided storage, processing and marketing assistance.
More recently, animal feed cultivation and fruit production are being promoted in
the basin. A number of plain-wide projects to encourage fruit production via subsidized
sale of seedlings and provision of extension services are ongoing, in addition to those
planned yet to be implemented (Kayseri Provincial Directorate of Agriculture Records,
2008). Likewise, animal feed crops are strongly promoted by direct support in purchases
of input and farm equipment. Fruits and animal feed have both proved to command high
prices in agricultural markets, which gave farmers further incentives to expand their
production.
To recap, DIP and the accompanying agricultural subsidies, e.g. price and market
incentives, water pricing schemes, input and extension support, demonstrate the Turkish
state’s growth-oriented vision, crystallized as the prioritization of agricultural production
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Although a comprehensive discussion of agricultural liberalization is beyond the
present purposes, it should be noted that sugar beet subsidies were eliminated and supply
control measures were introduced in 2001 as a part of the reform package. Their
sustained existence until then, however, had shaped producer incentives and resulting
cropping patterns significantly.
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in the Develi plain. Unsurprisingly, this strategy led to a dramatic increase in irrigated
farming and widespread cultivation of highly water-demanding crops in the last 40 years.
Farmers who practice irrigated farming have been the clear winners of this agricultural
policy, as they enjoyed profits accruing from subsidized production of highly marketable
crops. However, altered farming practices, coupled with the predominance of inefficient
irrigation methods, have put an immense pressure on the basin’s water budget, whose
costs were becoming clearly visible since the late 1990’s.

4.2.2.4.2 Failed Attempts at Sustainability
Although the Turkish state has made attempts to conserve Sultan Sazlığı recently,
it could not reverse the impacts of the past agricultural and irrigation policies. Below I
describe these attempts, and demonstrate and interpret their ineffectiveness as symptoms
of the Turkish state’s nature. I hold that the failure of the sustainability efforts can partly
be explained by the overall lack of motivation at the local level, but is fundamentally
rooted in the hegemonic practices of the Turkish state, more precisely, in its persistence
in prioritizing economic growth.
Ineffectiveness of the state in enforcing sustainable development has been
manifested in different ways in the face of growing environmental problems. First of all,
monitoring of illegal wells is virtually non-existent. It is worth reiterating that well
irrigation is heavily utilized and more than one-third of the wells in the basin are illegal.
There is no systematic mechanism of detecting them and action is taken only when an
illegal well is reported to authorities.

State Hydraulic Works choose to ignore the

problem and rejected revising their water budget calculations to take illegal wells into
account (field interviews, 2008).

This is puzzling given the fact that the huge
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discrepancy between provided irrigation (by dams and recorded wells) and the existing
water requirement (under the prevailing cropping pattern and land use) is unaccounted
for.
Secondly, efforts to promote efficient irrigation methods have mostly failed. As I
have stated before, established practices of irrigation are closely related to past policies,
which prioritized agricultural production over sustainable water use. Thus, farmers did
not have an incentive to adopt water-saving methods until the last couple of years when
they began to feel the costs of drought. Most farmers are still reluctant to switch to
efficient irrigation methods because of their high capital costs. The Turkish state has
started providing financial support for the adoption of such methods in the early 2000’s,
but has not been successful in initiating a change so far. The procedure and requirements
for application to state support, where they need to provide legal land titles and certify
source of irrigation, seem too burdensome to farmers. Furthermore, since many farmers
rely on illegally opened wells or lack proper land titles, they are ineligible to apply.
Efforts to change the prevailing agricultural practices, specifically to limit the
amount of irrigated land and to shift to a less water-intensive cropping pattern, were also
undertaken by the Turkish state. Direct payments (based on unit of land) to farmers
adopting less water-intensive production and/or giving up water-intensive crops, as well
as subsidies in acquiring seeds and technical support, are provided. These initiatives are
yet to bring a significant change. So far, farmers have been hesitant to alter their
cropping patterns because cultivating less water-consuming crops is not as profitable.
Besides, they complain that there are no markets for such crops, whereas markets for
sugar beet and sunflower, for instance, had already been established.
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It should also be noted that policies to promote water-saving crops are
undermined by the incentives provided by existing schemes. For instance, silage corn
and fruit production, both with high irrigation requirements, are being encouraged with a
number of projects, as I have explained earlier.
The state initiatives’ failure in addressing the water issue reflects a combination of
its inability and unwillingness to implement sustainable development. Improper design of
programs to promote efficient irrigation methods and water-saving crops, as well as the
absence of a comprehensive strategy to tackle with illegal wells, can be taken to signify
local bureaucrats’ lack of motivation. Promotion of less water-consuming but marketable
crops, or negotiations with the farmers to have a one-time pardoning of illegal wells with
the condition of switching to more efficient methods of irrigation, stand better chances of
making a difference.
The Turkish state’s commitment to a growth-oriented modernization agenda,
however, is tougher to break. The promotion of profitable fruit production as the engine
of agricultural growth despite its water intensity, alongside the water conservation
policies, attests to the economism it preserves. The reluctance to properly monitor illegal
wells and to take strong action can also be seen as a part of its commitment to economic
growth, as it signals hesitance to punish and disrupt irrigated farming.
Perhaps more importantly, the Turkish state has been carrying on with the second
stage of DIP and framing it as the proposed solution for the water issue. As I have stated
above, this stage is based on the derivation of water from a different river basin via the
construction of a tunnel (Zamantı tunnel), with the primary intention of agricultural
irrigation (field interviews, 2008). It is obvious that the completion of DIP will lead to

162

further increases in irrigated land and provide incentives to maintain current cultivation
and irrigation practices. Thus, I hold that growth is still the ultimate priority over other
concerns in the plain despite the implementation, albeit piece-meal, of sustainable
development policies.
The growth-oriented modernization vision has implications beyond the state’s
current attempts to enforce sustainable development. Long-term promotion of irrigated
farming via numerous measures has instigated an incentive structure which now proves
difficult to alter. As I have hinted at before, water came to be portrayed as a readily
available, cheap input for the farmers, at the service of agricultural production, due to
uninterrupted prioritizing of agricultural growth by the state. This perception, coupled
with the fact that the farmers have not fully born the costs of water scarcity, translated
into lack of incentives to change irrigation methods, reluctance to adopt water-saving
crops and resistance to limiting amount of irrigated land. Not only are farmers generally
unwilling to sacrifice short-term economic gains in return for long-term sustainability,
but also most are unaware that their production patterns are the main cause of the drought
(personal interviews). The anticipation of Zamantı Tunnel and the belief that water will
be abundant again perpetuate the existing incentive structure and strenghtens the inertia
related to the adoption of water-saving agricultural practices. Thus, the history of state
policies has shaped perceptions and incentives in ways that undermine, if not altogether
halt, local sustainable development.

4.2.2.5 Tying the Threads: The Making of State Hegemony in the Develi Plain
This dissertation envisions environmental processes as embedded in the
economic, social and political contexts that they occur. One of my aims in this section
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was to unpack and exemplify the relationship between resource use patterns and changes
in them, on the one hand, and the surrounding socio-economic and political dynamics, on
the other. This subsection aims to present the arguments made so far in a condensed way
and put them into the framework of state-society relationships in Turkey.
It is evident that the agricultural practices in the broader Develi plain are directly
related to the environmental problems in Sultan Sazlığı. To reiterate, water use in
irrigation since the 1970’s significantly disrupted the water cycle in the wetland. The
agricultural policy pursued in the region, which I hold to be a constitutive part of the
Turkish state’s hegemonic project, resulted in cultivation and irrigation patterns that
relied on intensive water use. The consequences of irrigated farming in the Develi plain
first and foremost were felt in Sultan Sazlığı, as evidenced by the dry wetland, degraded
plant cover, loss of biodiversity, in addition to the detriment of local livelihoods.
The Turkish state’s strategy to foster agricultural growth not only led to
unsustainable use of water (benefits and costs of which were unevenly distributed), but
was also inherently associated with favoring of the landowners over other groups. DIP
implied redirecting of water resources to farmers and ultimately depriving others of
water. In addition, only the landowners, who had access to assets to take advantage of
agricultural policies, could benefit from investments in irrigation and subsidies provided
to farming. In the absence of rural development policies to ensure the viability of nonland based economic activities and to provide adequate infrastructure for human
development, the Turkish state’s economism perpetuated land-based inequalities.
It is clear that the animal owners and the reed cutters in Sultan Sazlığı, to the
extent they are not engaged in irrigated farming, are hurt by the externality produced by
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farming in Develi plain. While farmers in the broader plain have enjoyed handsome
profits, animal owners and reed cutters ended up being the main bearer of costs
52

associated with unsustainable water use.

Existing wealth and income inequalities

between landed farmers and the landless, who rely on animal grazing and reed cutting,
have been perpetuated by environmental degradation, as the latter groups faced
deteriorating living standards.
However, this should not be taken to imply that resource user groups defined as
such are homogenous units. To reiterate, there is considerable overlap among these
groups, as many people undertake a combination of farming, animal husbandry and reed
cutting. Unsurprisingly, the degree of command over productive assets becomes the
decisive factor in how the costs of environmental degradation is distributed. Those who
have access to productive assets such as land and livestock, i.e. the wealthier, can opt to
drop a certain type of livelihood if it becomes unviable and rely more heavily on
(an)other(s).
The distribution of costs and benefits within those who rely solely on one
livelihood activity (such as those who rely only on farming, or on animal husbandry) also
mirrors the distribution of wealth and income, but depends on geographical location as
well. Obviously, the size of benefits accruing from irrigated farming correspond to the
size of landholdings and the accessibility of markets, both of which correlate with
economic power. Furthermore, as I have discussed earlier, farmers who have plots nearer
to Sultan Sazlığı, i.e. at the end of the cannal system, are impacted more by water
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In fact, a short trip around the basin provides the most dramatic evidence of this: while
one would see beautiful green orchards in towns and villages farther away from Sultan
Sazlığı in Develi plain, the landscape changes significantly when the wetland is
approached, where the effects of drought, as well as of poverty, are apparent.
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scarcity. Wealthy animal owners who can afford to purchase animal feed do not rely on
pastures, and thus do not feel the costs of their degradation, at least in the form of
declining animal yields.
Perpetuation of inequalities based on wealth and income, and the destitution of
some groups, has in turn intensified the pressures on the ecosystem and accelerated
degradation. I have demonstrated that the grazing pressure on the pastures has increased
as the availability of the resource base declined with drought. Similarly, the intensity of
reed cutting spiked due to three inter-related reasons. Firstly, fading viability of animal
husbandry and recent shocks to agricultural production due to water scarcity led more
people to engage in reed cutting to supplement household incomes. This rise in the
number of reed cutters accompanied a fall in the availability of reed due to water scarcity,
aggravating degradation. Lately, premature cutting, which is closely related to
progressive economic marginalization of reed cutters, poses a significant threat to the
reed ecosystem.
In line with the Gramscian political economy framework adopted in this
dissertation, the prioritization of agricultural growth in Develi plain can be seen as a part
of the Turkish state’s hegemonic project; specifically, the consitution of the urgency of
economic growth as the national-popular outlook. The pursuit of economic growth in
order to elicit consent has shaped the environmental processes in Sultan Sazlığı in
particular ways. These were entailed by the direct interventions of the state, such as the
building of dams and drainage canals; by types of incentives provided by state actions,
such as the adoption of certain cultivation and irrigation practices, and the anticipation of
future availability of irrigation water; and by inducing and/or perpetuating (mostly
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economic) inequalities, as a consequence of which the pressures on the ecosystem was
heightened.
A related point is the role of power inequalities between the “winners” and
“losers” from environmental degradation in Sultan Sazlığı in explaining the dynamics
leading to and perpetuating this degradation (Boyce, 2002). There are obvious economic
inequalities between resource user groups, which shape their respective ability to
influence decisions and processes that affect their lives. This is reinforced by the
structural selectivity of the Turkish state in allowing the formulation and representation
of societal demands and their ultimate articulation into state policy. The winners and the
losers, corresponding to those who benefit from and those who are disadvantaged by the
growth policies, differ in their abilities to make their demands be recognized by the state.
Questioning the underlying causes and consequences of environmental
degradation in this context implies questioning of the Turkish state’s modernist logic. As
I have argued in chapter 2, the Turkish state never allowed the formulation of demands
that are fundamentally at odds with its hegemonic project. Thus, apart from the economic
disparities translating into power inequalities, the demands of the losers are threats to the
collective outlook. Therefore, the winners and losers have unequal power to access and
shape state policy partly as a consequence of the state’s disregard of demands that contest
its hegemonic practices.
A Gramscian understanding of state-society relations is also apt for analyzing the
actions/struggles, or lack thereof, of the bearers of the costs. The link between
prioritization of agricultural growth and the environmental problems in Sultan Sazlığı is
only very recently being established. Losers from environmental degradation are not
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articulating their demands for the resolution of water issue in terms of limiting growth; in
fact, they do not attest its validity as a societal aim. This, in my view, speaks to the
success of the constitution of the collective outlook and cultivation of consent, i.e. the
promise of rising living standards as the area flourishes with agricultural growth.

4.2.3 The GEF Comes to Sultan Sazlığı: Unpacking a Failure
Against this backdrop of the relentless pursuit of agricultural growth for three
decades, the Turkish state initiated the execution of the GEF project in Sultan Sazlığı in
an effort to implement sustainable development, whose vision was to “[t]o rehabilitate
and restore the ecological balance of Sultan Sazlığı National Park and Ramsar Site and to
ensure wise use of its natural resources, through participation and support of all
stakeholders” (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007b, p.17). Given the drastically
low water level in the wetland and the pronounced discontent of the locals with its
implementation process, it is doubtful that the project has fulfilled any part of this vision.
In general terms, the GEF project in Sultan Sazlığı aimed at regulating resource
use via the preparation and implementation of micro-plans for the management of water
use, grazing and reed cutting with the participation of local stakeholders, while
supporting alternative income-generating activities by disbursing small grants in order to
relieve the pressure on the ecosystem and to counteract the burden of constrained
resource use on local stakeholders. On-site activities to implement these goals started in
2003, carried out by the GEF project team comprising three employees of Kayseri
Provincial DNCNP (see table 4.5 for a list of project activities).
The project has failed, however, on all three accounts. The water level in the
wetland did not recover and the environmental problems it entails, e.g. degradation of the
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marshland and pastures, are ongoing. A striking number of local people have not heard of
the project (or of the specific project activities) according to the field interviews, let alone
having attended meetings and workshops organized as a part of the attempt to
operationalize participatory management. Finally, it seems that the SGP was ineffective
in promoting alternative livelihoods and its impact was very limited.
Perceptions about this failure, and the reasons accounting for it, differ
significantly among different groups. The reasons for the failure to save the wetland
ecosystem, according to the local people, range from the corrupt project team to the
existence of dams and the promotion of irrigated farming in the plain. The project team,
on the other hand, complains that the local people did not want to change their
agricultural practices and were not open to new ideas, and that they refused to participate
in the project because they thought their livelihoods would suffer.
The existence of multiple truths and discourses regarding the situation makes it
necessary to unpack the “failure” of the GEF project and account for the underlying
explanations of its different aspects. This section engages in this task and traces the role
of local-level dynamics and the materializations of the Turkish state’s hegemonic project.
I start by presenting a stylized depiction of the GEF project in Sultan Sazlığı in table 4.6,
and provide a detailed treatment of the failure embodied by the project structured around
this depiction. To this end, the first subsection takes up the failure to implement
sustainable resource use, followed by the subsequent considerations of the failure to
operationalize participatory management, promote of alternative livelihoods and realize
gender equality.
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Before moving on, note should be taken that the following analysis draws mostly
upon the qualitative study conducted in Sultan Sazlığı and will be supplemented by
survey findings (see chapter 3).
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4.2.3.1 Failure to Implement Sustainable Resource Use
In regards to ensuring sustainable resource use and biodiversity conservation, the
GEF project aimed at addressing the problems related to unsustainable water use,
unplanned reed cutting and unsustainable grazing in particular. The conservation plans
formulated during the GEF project, however, have proved to be partial and ineffective.
Specifically, the way that the project has tackled with water management has been far
from satisfactory, attested by the fact that the only visible proposal for saving the
ecosystem is the foreseen completion of Zamantı derivation. As I have argued in detail
earlier, this solution does not only fail to address the underlying reasons of degradation
(i.e. the agricultural practices in the region and the irrigation methods adopted by the
farmers), but also paves the way for its exacerbation, besides running the obvious risk of
disrupting the water cycle of another basin. The project’s accomplishments on the side of
the pastures and the marshland do not look any brighter: the grazing plan has not yet been
finalized, let alone implemented. Despite the fact that a reed-cutting plan was devised and
implemented, the reed cover continues to diminish and illegal reed cutting is widespread.
Unsurprisingly, the project’s evident failure in realizing sustainable resource
management is paralleled by the local people’s perceptions.

Figure 4.1 depicts

evaluations of the project’s specific aims in terms of sustainable resource management,
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It should be noted that a detailed quantitative examination of the survey data,
especially regarding participation in management mechanisms, is going to be provided in
chapter 5.
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namely, ensuring sustained water entry in the wetland, promotion of sustainable farming
and grazing practices, and regeneration of the reed area. As can be seen, the majority of
the survey respondents who have been aware of the project (174 people) hold that it has
been ineffective in fulfilling these aims. Figure 4.2 probes the perceived reasons
54

underlying ineffectiveness.

Notably, explanations related to the project team are

endorsed most strongly: the frequencies of agreement with statements about the project
team are higher than those of agreement with statements about local power relationships
or primacy of growth orientation.
Admittedly, the GEF project’s failure partly owes to the challenges presented by
the impacts of the past policies in the region. Notwithstanding the difficulty of
overcoming these impacts, I hold that the failure embodied in the project’s approach to
natural resource management cannot be solely attributed to them. I explain and analyze
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this failure in the spheres of water use and reed cutting in the subsections that follow.

4.2.3.1.1 Water Use
Although a variety of programs to grapple with water use were envisaged at the
planning stage of the project, the construction of Zamantı tunnel (see section 4.2.2.4.2 in
this chapter) was envisioned to be the primary way to revive water flow into the wetland.
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Recall, from chapter 3, that the list of reasons presented to respondents was prepared
based on the findings of the qualitative study, which are presented in the remainder of
this section.
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Although sustainable management of pastures was another aim that went unfulfilled by
the GEF project, I do not engage in its analysis. This choice is motivated by my
conviction that water use and reed cutting are the most significant dimensions of the
project’s failure: It is imperative to take up water use as an object of analysis since efforts
to sustainably manage pastures and marshland are inextricably linked to how the water
issue is (not) addressed. Reed cutting, on the other hand, is the only type of resource use
that a plan was formulated and implemented within the GEF project.
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That water derivation by Zamantı cannot be the only solution, however, was
acknowledged and the need to promote water-conserving agricultural practices in the
whole plain was emphasized. In addition, the release of uninterrupted water into the
wetland except during agricultural irrigation periods, i.e. between November 1st and
March 31st, was to be guaranteed by an agreement between the State Hyraulic Works and
the local irrigation unions, but the specifics of how to operationalize this target were left
vague.
Although it was explicitly recognized, at all stages of the project, that DIP has
severely damaged the water cycle in Sultan Sazlığı and plain-wide resource use practices
underlie much of the environmental problems in the wetland, no meaningful strategies to
address them were formulated (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007b). Ironically,
the main solution proposed by the project relies on the construction of Zamantı tunnel,
which most likely will exacerbate the problem rather than solving it. To reiterate, the
primary aim of Zamantı is agricultural irrigation, and water transferred by it will only be
released into the wetland after returning from irrigation.

This, coupled with the

incentives it is going to provide for expanding irrigated farming, makes clear that
Zamantı tunnel cannot be a sustainable solution to the water issue. In addition, irrigation
needs were given priority over the wetland’s recovery in planned water use by the
project. In other words, even the GEF project, whose aim was to contrive policies to
remedy the environmental problems in the area, internalized the priority of agricultural
production over environmental quality. I argue that this exemplifies the growth-oriented
modernist logic of the Turkish state, persistent even in the midst of a growing
environmental crisis.
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The misconceived project scale raises curiosity, if not signals insincerity, in the
face of the project’s recognition that the water budget of the ecosystem depends crucially
on the water use patterns in the whole Develi plain, and not only of the villages in the
immediate vicinity of the wetland. For the GEF project to have attained the goal of
reviving the ecosystem in Sultan Sazlığı, it should have been carried out at the plain
level. Since the project did not address the practices in the broader plain, it remained
ineffective in tackling with the water scarcity problem. Although the improper project
design is clearly suggests lack of competence, it also reflects unwillingness to interfere
with agricultural production in Develi plain.
A similar blend of incompetence and growth-orientation is manifested concerning
the launching of efficient irrigation methods and promotion of water-conserving crops,
two specific goals that the project aimed at in order to address the issue of water use. The
implementation of these measures would have required concerted efforts at the level of
the Develi plain and the collaboration of different state agencies. How the project could
achieve such coordination of plain-wide practices of both farmers and state agencies was
left ambigous at the planning stage.
A review of on-site project activities suggests that some, albeit mostly futile,
efforts were made towards promoting water-saving crops and efficient irrigation
methods. In terms of altering the crop pattern, direct payment incentives and seed
subsidies provided by the project remained insufficient: it seems that more marketable
crops should have been promoted, as farmers mostly complained of the lack of markets
for the subsidized crops (field interviews, 2008). The attempts to initiate a shift to watersaving irrigation practices, on the other hand, were mostly halted by the ineffective
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design of the support programs. The procedure and requirements of application seemed
too onerous to the farmers (field interviews, 2008). Furthermore, the fact that application
to support requires the source of irrigation to be certified preempted the efficacy of these
programs given the prevalence of illegal wells. Although many farmers relying on water
from illegal wells want to switch to efficient irrigation methods, since well irrigation is
becoming pricy (due to the increase in energy prices) and salty (due to falling levels of
underground water), they cannot apply for financial subsidies.
Apart from being an impediment to possible solutions, illegal wells are in fact a
significant contributor to the on-going water crisis. I have explained earlier that farming
in the entire Develi plain relies heavily on wells, a substantial share of which are illegal. I
have also mentioned that the issue is simultaneously acknowledged and ignored by the
state (see section 4.2.2.4.1).

The deadlock regarding the issue of illegal wells has

multiple layers: more effective monitoring and a comprehensive field study would help
better enforcement of the regulations. State agencies act when a complaint is reported,
however, rather than taking initiative, which can be attributed to motivational issues at
the level of local bureaucrats.
More structural, and more deep-rooted, factors than unmotivated bureaucrats
underlie the issue, however. Patronage-based networks hamper the enforcement of
regulations even when an illegal well incident is reported (field interviews, 2008). On the
other hand, the fact that the State Hydraulic Works turns a blind eye to the issue because
the act is illegal to begin with, and “[the wells] should not have been drilled in the first
place” (interview with official in Regional Directorate of State Hydraulic Works),
captures the essence of Turkish state’s paternalism.
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This vision crystallizes in the

perceived unnecessity to design a support program that would attend to the reality of the
field, so to speak, such as one based on a negotiation and/or one-time pardoning of illegal
wells conditional upon the adoption of efficient irrigation methods.
To recapitulate, different facets of the GEF project’s failure in ensuring
sustainable water use, e.g. project scale, crop pattern, and irrigation methods, can largely
be read as a combination of the Turkish state’s growth-oriented modernist vision and
motivational problems at the local level. It reflects the state’s modernist logic to the
extent that it correlates with the absence of sincere willingness to undertake radical action
that would disrupt agricultural production. It also reflects lack of motivation, at the local
level, to undertake actions that would bring effective solutions but are admittedly
challenging tasks. The prevalence of illegal wells, on the other hand, emerges as an
embodiment of paternalism and patronage, in addition to lack of motivation.
Farmers have been largely unresponsive to the project’s efforts regarding the
adoption of efficient irrigation methods and water-saving crops. Field interviews
provided three explanations underlying farmers’ reluctance to alter their practices: their
myopic vision, as they value short-term economic gains over longer terms costs;
collective action-type problems, since most of them did not think their isolated action
would make a significant action; and a more fundamental, or at least harder to alter,
factor, the incentive structure instigated by the Turkish state’s past policies (see section
4.2.2.4.2), rooted in the anticipation that irrigation needs would ultimately met.

4.2.3.1.2 Reed Cutting
Among the micro management plans of specific resource uses, only the reed
cutting plan, put into effect in 2003, is operational. A number of meetings with the reed
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cutters and the reed companies were held, with the participation of an expert in
participatory natural resource management, where a compromise between the reed
cutters’ livelihood needs and the ecological requirements of the marshland was reached.
The plan specifies restrictions on timing (between November 15th and December 31st,
during day time) and locality (in designated parts of Southern marshes, which would be
rotated annually) of reed cutting. It also introduces constraints on the number of reed
cutters via issuing of permits.
The actual implementation of the reed cutting plan produced considerable tension.
Reed cutters complain about having to purchase reed cutting permits and the strictness of
regulations. Although some of them acknowledged having attended meetings where the
reed cutting plan was discussed, they do not feel that the implemented plan incorporates
56

their demands or takes their livelihood into account.

The resentment associated with the

making of the plan translates into not feeling obligated to abide by it, and justifies
trespassing in the eyes of the reed cutters. In addition, many reed cutters claimed that the
project team was corrupt and accepted bribes from the reed companies, who, in turn, not
only gained access to the marshland, but also utilized tractors and damaged the reed
cover.
Monitoring of compliance with the plan is unsatisfactory and inconsistent, as
evidenced by high prevalence of illegal cutting, which can be explained by the
inadequacy of staff and equipment to effectively monitor the vast marshland area. While
the southern entrance to the marshland can be monitored somewhat effectively, the
northern one is subject to laxer monitoring. Reed cutters from the southern villages,
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The effectiveness of participatory mechanisms will be taken up in the next section.
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Ovaçiftlik and Yeşilova, complain that even though they want to abide by the regulations,
northern cutters from Sindelhöyük trespass and cut prematurely. They, therefore, are
forced to trespass as well, since if they wait there would be no reed left for them to cut.
This dynamic is suggestive of a collective action problem on the side of the reed cutters,
in which rule breaking by some induces others to follow, and undermines the efforts at
sustainable reed cutting.

4.2.3.2 Failure to Implement Participatory Mechanisms
As I have explained in chapter 3, the necessity of local people’s participation in
the regulation of resource use was repeatedly pointed out in the planning stage of the
GEF project. Accordingly, participation of community members was to be ensured by
direct measures, such as face-to-face interviews, meetings and workshops, where they
can express opinions and ideas, as well as by indirect measures, such as interviews,
meetings and workships with community representatives, union members and NGO
representatives. In particular, it was envisaged that the micro-plans related to the use of
specific resources would be made, revised and implemented by the participation of local
stakeholders. In addition, copies of the management plan and annual progress reports
were supposed to be shared with local stakeholders at all stages of their preparation and
implementation, in order to incorporate their input.
In spite of the emphasized importance of local people’s participation, there is
surprisingly little substance attached to it. There is no elaboration, for instance, on what
exactly these mechanisms would be (e.g. meetings, workshops, councils, interviews,
etc.), other than broad statements about the utilization of a variety of mechanisms to
acquire information on local people’s opinions and demands.
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Details on the

dissemination of information, eligibility to participate (e.g. all members of the
community, only resource users, one person per household, representatives elected by the
community, etc.), decision-making rules, impact intensity of decisions made (e.g. binding
or mere recommendations), etc. are not discussed either.
Lack of attention to these issues constitutes the first stage of the project’s failure
to implement participatory decision-making mechanisms. Potential difficulties that the
novelty of such mechanisms for local people and their perceptions of the project team
(employees of the local DNCNP) would pose were ignored, and rules regarding the
process and the outcomes of decision-making were not fleshed out. A clear strategy to
ensure that information regarding the project activities in general and participatory
mechanisms in particular has reached community members is absent, let alone measures
to induce effective participation by all stakeholders who are informed of decision-making
mechanisms.
Against the backdrop of such deficiencies of institutional design, the realization of
participatory mechanisms mostly depended on ad hoc measures and failed to ensure
effective and democratic participation by local stakeholders. The fact that the project
team had no expertise and/or experience in implementing and operating participatory
mechanisms further thwarted the implementation of participatory management. The
project team’s inexperience translated into the reproduction of paternalism, as the
tradition of the hierarchical relationships between the non-state actors and bureaucrats got
reflected in how local participation was operationalized by the project team.
The project team visited the area in the first few years with the purpose of
informing the local population about the project, and held a number of informational
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meetings (field interviews, 2008). These meetings were announced by the village heads
and fliers posted around the village, and have been held in all settlements (in coffee
houses). Findings of the qualitative study suggest, however, that the extent of project
awareness is generally low. In addition to the fact that many interviewees were unaware
of the project, those who were aware often had inaccurate information about it, e.g. they
thought its sole purpose was the conservation of wildlife or protection of the marshland,
or have not been informed of specific activities, such as the management meetings and
the SGP, after the initial introductory meetings. The level and extent of awareness,
however, seemed to vary across settlements, highlighting the importance of village
heads’ role in disseminating information.

For instance, almost all interviewees in

Musahacılı (12 interviewees) had learned about the project, and the activities associated
with it, through the village head’s efforts. Residents of predominantly unaware villages,
on the other hand, blamed village heads for not fulfilling their responsibilities.
It seems that visits and meetings/workshops became infrequent in the last few
years of the project (field interviews, 2008). Some claimed that the team was not sincere
in taking the locals’ demands into account and stopped holding meetings for this reason.
Others believed that the project team withheld information deliberately from those who
criticized them, so that they could avoid facing negative opinions. A pronounced
perception held by the local people was that the project team was corrupt and prevented
broad participation to guarantee that the outcomes of the meetings would benefit the
groups they favor. Most of the reed cutters, for instance, stated that they had found out
about the meetings either at the last minute and could not attend or after they were held.
They believed this was an intentional strategy to exclude them from the decision-making
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processes, since the project team wanted to strike a deal with the reed companies behind
the scenes. These perceptions were stated as powerful disincentives to participate, as they
translated into anticipations of not being taken into account.
Furthermore, the majority of those who had attended meetings were dissatisfied
with the process. Again, reed cutters were among the most skeptical of the decisionmaking processes: they stated that they were always the minority in the meetings and
their voices were not heard. As a consequence, they came to believe that the meetings
were a façade and the team had no intention of taking local people’s, especially reed
cutters’, opinions into account; they, therefore, stopped attending. Representatives of the
irrigation unions and the local gendarmerie made similar remarks about the decisionmaking process. They stated that although everyone was aware that the underlying issue
was the water use in the plain, no one –including the project team— seemed willing to
solve it. It should be noted, however, that while the reed cutters had the perception that
their demands in particular were not taken into account, because other participants had
economic power and ties with the project team, irrigation union representatives and the
local gendarmerie seemed to think that the team lacked the necessary competence to
provide an effective solution to the issue of water use.
The preceding argument does not imply that the local people are homogenous in
their perceptions and evaluations of the project; there is indeed considerable variation. I
argue that the variation of perceptions and evaluations, which correspond to inequalities
in access to information and ability to participate, correlate with local inequalities based
on livelihood sources. Farmers differ markedly from reed cutters both in terms of
awareness and participation. They seemed to trust the team more and did not perceive of
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any inequalities in terms of effective participation in decision-making. Furthermore,
interviews held at Musahacılı indicate that the information regarding meetings was made
widely available and everyone was invited to attend and voice opinions. When asked
about the decision-making processes Musahacılı interviewees stated that everyone who
wanted spoke up and was taken into account. The fact that the main livelihoods in this
village are animal husbandry and agriculture (and reed cutting is not practiced) supports
my argument that the main inequalities in terms of awareness of and participation in
decision-making mechanisms were among different resource user groups.
Against this backdrop, I present descriptive quantitative findings on the
effectiveness of participatory mechanisms. Figure 4.3, which depicts evaluations of the
participatory mechanisms’ success, provides a striking picture in terms of local people’s
perceptions. The majority of the sample assessed the implementation of participatory
mechanisms as ineffective. Table 4.7 decomposes evaluations by source of livelihood.
The disparity between the evaluations of the reed cutters, of 80 percent of whom thought
the participatory mechanisms were unsuccesful, and the farmers, who had milder
assessments, is striking. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 portray the perceptions about the project
team’s willingness to take locals’ opinions into account and favoritism, echoing the stated
skepticism during the interviews.
The objective data on the level of participation resonate with the subjective
evalutions, as suggested by table 4.8 and figure 4.6. While table 4.8 demonstrates
awareness of different GEF activities, figure 4.6 illustrates the prevalence of awareness
and participation in the project’s decision-making mechanisms. Accordingly, only 174
people in the sample (46 percent of the sample) were aware of the project, of which 55
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have seen a document related to the project, 41 have seen a draft of the management plan,
67 have been informed of a training activity and 82 have been informed of meetings. Of
those 82, 50 have attended meetings, among which 32 have spoken up and 19 stated that
57

their views were listened.

Apart from documenting the low level of project awareness,

the statistics portray the project’s failure in inducing broad-based participation. In
particular, the fact that only 64 percent of the meeting attendees has actually voiced
opinions, and 38 percent thought they were taken into account worths attention, as it
attests to failures in the process of decision-making.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 probe the reasons underlying participation and nonparticipation. The conviction that the local people should be the ones making decisions
about Sultan Sazlığı seems to be the strongest reason for both actual and hypothetical
participation. The majority of non-participators, on the other hand, stated that the
inappropriate meeting times and locations have been the major impediments on their
participation. In addition, 15 percent of the non-participators stated that they were not
properly informed about the meetings. These figures provide some pointers on why the
implementation of participatory mechanisms have failed: it seems that if more suitable
meeting times and locations were chosen, and adequate dissemination of information
were ensured, participatory management could have fared better.
To recap, the implementation of participatory mechanisms has been partial and
inconsistent, and largely failed to realize democratic, effective decision-making.
Underlying this failure is both the lack of competence of the project team, reflected in the
deficiencies of information dissemination, inadequate monitoring, and the choice of
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Since a thorough quantitative study of awareness and participation will be undertaken
in the next chapter, I do not go into more detail here.
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inappropriate meeting times and places, and the paternalistic gaze of the Turkish state,
demonstrated in the project team’s general unwillingness of take measures to induce
broader-based participation and in the neglect of local power relations in dissemination of
information about the decision-making mechanisms.
At the local level, on the other hand, the general distrust towards the project team,
made up of the employees of the DNCNP, seem to have hindered participation by
shaping anticipations about the decision-making process. Local socio-economic
inequalities also seem to have played a major role. Their impacts are an object of
separate, econometric analysis in chapter 5.

4.2.3.3 Ineffectiveness of Alternative Livelihoods
I explained in chapter 3 that the GEF projects aimed to promote alternative,
environmentally-friendly livelihoods by way of distributing small grants to local
stakeholders. In Sultan Sazlığı, the local committee, who held the responsibility of
executing the SGP, comprised of the project team and four community representatives
chosen by the local people, concentrating on agriculture, reed cutting, animal grazing and
ecotourism respectively. The committee was responsible of disseminating information
related to the SGP and undertaking the first round of proposal evaluation. The local
committee was also supposed to monitor supported projects, regularly record their
activities and prepare reports on the supported projects every six months.
Glancing at the process of information dissemination on SGP, it becomes
apparent that its design neglected to take the potential role of local power relations into
account. The responsibility of informing community members about the details of the
SGP (its purpose, eligibility to apply, application process, selection criteria) lay primarily
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with the village heads and the community representatives. This should be seen in the light
of the fact that village headship often coincides with being locally powerful as it
correlates with socio-economic status.

In addition, details on the election of the

community representatives, e.g. if and how fair election would be ensured, could be
discerned neither from the project documents nor during the interviews.
In the absence of institutionalized mechanisms to guarantee and monitor effective
dissemination of information to all groups in the community, one can imagine scenarios
of exclusion from the SGP. Village heads and community representatives held de facto
power to withhold information about the SGP, as they could, more or less, decide whom
to share it with. Selective dissemination of information could very well perpetuate local
inequalities, if the locally powerless were denied adequate information. Bearing in mind
that those who lack (economic) power in the area bear the heaviest burden of degradation
(e.g. reed cutters), the implications of selective dissemination become even graver.
The project, indeed, fared poorly in promoting of alternative livelihoods. A total
of $199,000 was disbursed to fund 23 projects (see table 4.11). The amount of support
given via the SGP in Sultan Sazlığı ranks third among the four GEF pilot project sites,
which is surprising given the fact that it hosts the largest population size. It is also
interesting, to say the least, that nine out of 23 projects were on education and awareness
raising, as opposed to seven on rational use of water resources, and four on promotion of
livelihoods that would relieve the pressure on natural resources. A quick glance at the list
of SGP-supported projects, therefore, suggests that it has not been instrumental in either
compensating the burden of constrained resource use on local people (e.g. reed cutters) or
promotion of environmentally-friendly livelihoods.
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Field interviews demonstrate the general dissatisfaction with the SGP. The
exception to this general sentiment is, again, Musahacılı residents, who had been
provided information and guidance by the village head. This is reflected in both the
number of projects supported in Musahacılı, as can be seen in Table 4.11, and evaluation
of the SGP by its residents. During the interviews, Musahacılı villagers acknowledged
that extensive training services and financial support was provided to promote efficient
irrigation methods and stall breeding. They held that the SGP was effective in both
altering unsustainable production patterns and supporting alternative livelihoods such as
beekeeping. Musahacılı village head stated that SGP support enabled the establishment of
infrastructure required for switching to efficient irrigation methods and helped build
community awareness.
The overwhelming majority of the rest of the locals, however, complained of
inadequate provision of information and guidance regarding the goals of the SGP,
eligibility rules, application procedures, and details on grant writing. Although the project
team stated that village-wide announcements were made, informational fliers were posted
and booklets were distributed, many locals claimed that they have not heard of the grants
until after the deadline was passed or it was too late for them to put together a good
proposal. General mistrust as to the project team’s honesty was manifested in their
perceptions of the SGP as well, as most of them blamed the local evaluation team of
favoritism, both in the process of information dissemination and selection of proposals,
and using the project money for their personal needs. As a result, most interviewees
perceived the SGP as a mechanism that benefited the already-advantaged but did not
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offer anything to the groups feeling the burden of environmental degradation and
resource use restrictions introduced by the GEF project.
Furthermore, it seems that, besides failing to fulfill its aim, the SGP perpetuated
local inequalities, partly due to unequal access to information and guidance by local
people. The majority of the SGP recipients are either farmers or groups who do not
depend on the resources for livelihood purposes, i.e. groups who are not the main bearers
of the costs associated environmental degradation and/or constrained resource access.
Groups who are hit worse by the degradation of the resource base, such as the reed
cutters and the poor animal grazers, on the other hand, effectively were denied
opportunities to shift to alternative livelihoods.
The quantitative data on the effectiveness of the SGP resonates with the
qualitative findings. According to the data provided by the survey, of the 174 people who
were aware of the GEF project, 111 (64 percent of those who were project-aware) was
not informed of the existence of the SGP. Of the remaining 63, twelve people (19 percent
of those who knew about the SGP) were not sufficiently informed about the application
process and chose not to apply. These figures provide an apt depiction the project’s
failure at the level of disseminating information. Eighteeen people (29 percent of those
who knew about the SGP), on the other hand, did not apply in anticipating that their
proposals would not be selected, suggestive of the locals’ mistrust to the project team.
Finally, as can be seen on figure 4.7, majority of the sample have evaluated the SGP to be
unsuccessful.
It seems that the major obstacle to the SGP’s successful promotion of alternative
livelihoods was information-related problems.
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In addition to the poor levels of

informedness of the programme in general, the fact that the locals were inexperienced in
grant proposal applications and the absence of training given on grant application
procedures have impeded the effectiveness of the SGP. This points to the lack of
competence on the side of the project team, as they have not foreseen the difficulties that
the application process might pose for the local people. On the other hand, the field
observations indeed suggest that the SGP recipients were groups who had ties with the
project team; this, coupled with the unusually low number of supported proposals and the
reluctance of the project team to elaborate on the process of the SGP implementation,
raises serious doubts about the fairness and honesty with which the grants were
distributed.

4.2.3.4 Failure to Realize Gender Equality
Despite the lip service paid to gender equality and women’s empowerment both at
the level of the GEF and by the project coordinators in Turkey (field interviews, 2008),
the results at the local level are quite disappointing. Very few women knew about the
project, and even fewer went to meetings; notably, the only women who reported having
attended meetings were in Musahacılı. No women received grant support, except few
who submitted joint proposals with their husbands in Musahacılı. The exception that
Musahacılı presents to the general exclusion of women from the project activities can be
interpreted as a manifestation of the more egalitarian gender norms peculiar to the
community, as mentioned in section 4.2.1.4.
The project team, during the interviews, acknowledged this problem and linked it
to the gender norms prevalent in the area. They also stated that it had been very difficult
for them to interact with women, given that all members of the project team were male.
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They have not, however, taken the initiative to request the appointment of a female team
member. The meetings have been held in coffee houses in the villages, which are not
appropriate places for women to be. Furthermore, given their pressing (unpaid) labor
burden, it is plausible that time constraints would be more binding for women then they
are for men in terms of attending meetings. This is not to imply that women necessarily
spend more labor time, but that it might have been harder for women to bargain away
their daily responsibilities to attend project activities than for men.
In addition, women’s work regarding the natural resources, as well as their unpaid
labor, were rendered invisible by both the community members and the project team;
thus, their attendance was not seen as crucial. Some women, for instance, stated that they
were not invited to meetings because women do not go to reed cutting (field interviews,
2008). This is not completely accurate, since many women engage in reed cutting and/or
undertake tasks that are integral to the reed cutting labor process (see section 4.2.1.3).
More importantly, reed cutting is only one form of natural resource use, and women are
heavily involved in activities surrounding other uses, such as agriculture and animal
grazing. Even if one were willing to accept the premise that women of Sultan Sazlığı do
not make use of natural resources, they would still have stakes in the decisions made
regarding natural resources, given that the burden of constraints on resource use, e.g.
financial, labor time, etc. is mediated at the household level, i.e. all household members
will be affected by the constraints, but the relative sizes of costs shouldered by the
women and men depend on household power relations.
Table 4.12 depicts the prevalence of awareness and participation among the
women in the survey sample, and attest to the project’s failure in realizing gender
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equality at the level of inclusion. As can be seen, of the 175 women within the sample,
only 35 percent were aware of the GEF project, 6 percent have seen a document related
to the GEF, 4 percent attended meetings and 3 percent have seen a draft of the
management plan. Strikingly, no women within the sample applied to the SGP. Table
4.13 on the other hand, underscores the role of gender norms in impeding women’s
participation, as 8 women (out of 13, 62 percent) stated inappropriate meeting times and
locations as the main reason for non-participation, while two stated (out of 13, 15
percent) that their participation would not be considered appropriate by others.
It seems, therefore, that the women’s general level of un-informedness and nonparticipation in project activities bear the marks of the prevailing local gender norms. The
project team, while acknowledging this, did not make any efforts, such as employing a
female consultant to facilitate accessibility of women, to address the issue. Moreover, by
rendering women’s labor regarding natural resources invisible, the team helped reproduce
the very perceptions that impede on women’s participation in the decision-making
processes and project activities.

4.3 Köprülü Kanyon: The Political Economy of Unplanned Resource Use
After you pass through Karabük, one of the two settlements lying at the base of
the canyon carved by Köprü river, it takes about five more minutes of driving to
encounter possibly one of the most beautiful landscapes one can see. An ancient bridge,
surrounded by the Meditterenean’s largest natural cypress forests, arches over the craggy
hills closing in, under which flows the glaring river. An exchange of few sentences with
the street vendors positioned next to the bridge as they anticipate making sales to the
tourists, on the other hand, might surprise you, as they sound almost scornful of what
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surrounds them. They would, indeed, be speaking the sentiments of the majority of the
locals with their portrayal of Köprülü Kanyon as a place to flee from.
Köprülü Kanyon, renowned for its ecological and archeological values, was
designated as a national park in 1973, after which hard-park type governance took hold.
The stringent national park regulations, however, precipitated dissent more than they
have ensured effective conservation practices. The river-forest ecosystem is brought
under increasing pressure by the booming rafting tourism, to whom the iron hand of the
national park does not (want to) reach, as well as the unregulated use of forest products
and illegal construction activities. While the degradation of resources is not yet
physically striking, the conflict between the locals and the national park certainly is: the
demolished fences and walls, which were built by the national park for conservation
purposes, embody the reaction sparked by the paternalist environmentalism of the
Turkish state.
The state’s virtual non-existence in the provision of basic infrastructural services,
such health care and education, on the other hand, poses a remarkable contrast to its
overwhelming presence in stipulating conservation rules. The salience of outmigration
brought by the inadequacy of rural infrastructure can be discerned from the numerous
empty houses, particularly in settlements located on mountains surrounding the canyon.
After 30 years of ineffective conservation, the Turkish state initiated the GEF
project in Köprülü Kanyon. This too has proved to be a dissappointment for both the
local people and the executive team of the project. This section aims to provide an
account of this two interlinked failures of the Turkish state in implementing sustainable
development. It highlights, in particular, the implications of the state’s paternalistic style
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of governance, which has shaped the perceptions and anticipations of the local people,
and the role of patronage-based relationships in thwarting local sustainable development.
I begin by presenting the prevalent livelihood activities, as well as the the main
dimensions of local inequalities in Köprülü Kanyon, in section 4.3.1. This is followed by
a political economy analysis of resource use in the area, where the history and
implications of the national park’s conservation practices are explored in detail. Finally,
the GEF project is taken up in section 4.3.3, where I depict the interrelated aspects of its
failure in fullfilling the aims of sustainable development, and probe into the underlying
explanations, drawing upon the nature of the Turkish state’s hegemonic project and the
local dynamics.

4.3.1 Setting the Scene
Squeezed between rugged mountain hills, the settlements in Köprülü Kanyon are
further cordoned off from the urban centers due to poor road connections.
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Consequently, the economic activities in the area are largely resource-based and
subsistence-oriented, offering limited employment and income generation opportunities.
Animal husbandry and agriculture are the main sources of livelihood, while tourism,
oregano harvesting, forestry and seasonal employment also prevail with varying degrees
across the settlements, largely correlating with differences in geographic conditions and
accessibility of resources. Table 4.14 lists the most prevalent livelihood activities for each
settlement.
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See chapter 3 for a discussion of the settlements, demographics and administrative
framework of the area.
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The seclusion of Köprülü Kanyon from local markets and the consequent absence
of employment opportunities, coupled with the inadequacy of infrastructural facilities,
marks the area with high levels of out-migration, mostly to the neighboring towns where
tourism sector has flourished. Another striking feature of the area, as hinted in chapter 3,
is the vast differences among the socio-economic conditions and welfare levels of the
lowland settlements, Beşkonak and Karabük, and the mountain villages, which are
significantly more deprived than the rest.
This section provides background information on local dynamics in Köprülü
Kanyon, by presenting the socio-economic conditions in the area. I first discuss the main
livelihood activities and the availability of rural infrastructure, and attempt to depict the
overall deprivation within which local people live.

I then consider the prominent

dimensions of local inequalities, namely, those based on location, which are reflected in
disparities across settlements, and those based on gender.

4.3.1.1 Sources of Livelihood
Livestock breeding is the single most important source of livelihood in Köprülü
Kanyon (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a). Approximate numbers of different
types of livestock owned in each settlement are given in Table 4.15. As suggested by the
reported figures, goats are preferred over other types of livestock due to harsh conditions
of the landscape and inadequacy of grass pastures. Keeping large numbers of sheep or
cows is out of question for most people, since vast open grazing areas, a requisite for
sheep and cattle raising, are not sufficient (field interviews, 2008).
Local communities make use of the surrounding bush and forest areas, within the
boundaries stipulated by the national park, for grazing.
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Grazing is governed by

customary arrangements; every settlement has a forest/maquis area for grazing within its
boundaries, which is (informally) shared among settlement residents. In addition, upland
pastures in the plateaus of Beşkonak, Ballıbucak, Değirmenözü and Beydilli are used for
summer grazing by the animal owners in these settlements, who typically move to the
temporary settlements in the plateaus during summer months (field interviews, 2008).
Cattle raising, as stated above, is less significant, although some villagers have
recently invested in modern cattle breeds to be able produce marketable quantities of
milk. As cattle need to be kept and fed in stalls, especially during the winter, and their
yields are lower than those of goats and sheep, cattle is not an attractive source of
livelihood for most animal owners. Only relatively wealthy households can afford to keep
them, due to the costs involved with the construction of stalls and purchase of animal
feed (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a).
Animal products, such as milk, cheese and butter, are used primarily for domestic
consumption and not marketed. The exception to this general pattern is found in
Beşkonak, Gaziler, Çaltepe and Yeşilvadi, where animal owners sell their products in
local markets, mostly in Serik, the neighboring town center (Çetin, 2003). The main
reason underlying the dominance of subsistence-orientation is the area’s remote location
and the low quality of roads, which are pressing issues especially for the marketing of
animal products. Most households cannot afford to transport easily perishable products
such as milk and cheese to the markets in Serik. Almost all animal owners, on the other
hand, generate income, albeit meager, by selling some of the livestock they keep,
especially when the Islamic holiday of sacrifice approaches, during which animals
(mostly sheep) are sacrificed for God.
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Similar to the case with animal husbandry, small-scale dry farming is prevalent in
all settlements, practiced in small, fragmented landholdings. In addition, irrigated farming
is practiced in Beşkonak, Çaltepe, Değirmenözü, Hasdümen and Demirciler, as can be
seen in table 4.16. The main type of crop cultivated is cereals (wheat, barley, corn and
oats), although beans, potatoes and onions are also cultivated with varying degrees, and
fruits (apples, grapes, pears, fig) and vegetables (tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers, eggplant)
are grown where irrigation is available. Table 4.17 presents data on crops cultivated in
different settlements, as well as the average size of household landholdings.
As is the case with animal husbandry, agricultural production is subsistence based
and there is little or no surplus production for marketing (Çetin, 2003; field interviews,
2008). The primary constraint on commercial agriculture, again, seems to be the distance
of the

markets and the difficulty of transportation. For many villagers, the costs

associated with transportation are greater than the potential income they would acquire
from the sale of agricultural products (field interviews, 2008). Besides, limited land
availability for agricultural production presents a further constraint to production of a
marketable agricultural surplus.
Against this backdrop of subsistence-based animal husbandry and agriculture,
local people mostly rely on employment in forestry or tourism, or take up seasonal jobs
outside the area for generating cash income. Oregano harvesting is an important source of
livelihood for the residents of one settlement, Çaltepe, in particular.
Timber harvesting from the forests within the national park is permitted only
under the control of the General Directorate of Forestry, undertaken either by the General
Directorate itself or outsourced to private contractors. Every fall, the General Directorate

194

designates harvesting areas and hires workers from the surrounding settlements. Workers
from outside are hired only if the labor demand cannot be met from the settlements in the
vicinity of the harvesting area. Based on the field interviews, it seems that Karabük,
Beşkonak and Değirmenözü are the main villages involved in forestry work.
Typically, workers form teams of 6-10 people and share the earnings. They
usually stay in tents within temporary settlements in the area during harvesting, which
goes on about 2 months, starting at the end of September. Most forestry workers are
male, though some women also participate in harvesting, together with their husbands.
While women’s participation in forestry work is generally considered normal, some find
it unacceptable or see it as done out of financial desperation (field interviews, 2008).
Women are not usually involved in the cutting of trees, but help with carrying the wood
and take care of cooking in the temporary settlements.
Payment for forestry work is based on the volume of timber harvested: In 2008,
workers were paid 38 TL in 2010 prices ($22.5 PPP) per meter cube of timber harvested.
A group of 10 workers harvest around 50 meter cubes per day, which makes around 190
TL in 2010 prices ($122.5 PPP) per day per worker (field interviews, 2008). The
earnings provided by forestry labor, however, should be interpreted in the face of its
seasonality and its risky nature. None of the forest workers have insurance against the
high risks involved in tree cutting and accidents, some resulting in death, that are
common (field interviews, 2008).
Rafting tourism, the major contributor to the area’s renown, presents another,
albeit limited, venue of employment to the local people. Of the 600,000-700,000 tourists
who visit Köprülü Kanyon every year, 90 percent come for rafting, through organized
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tours arranged by the rafting companies, around 40 in number, based in Karabük
(Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a, field interviews, 2008). Rafting companies
are obliged to obtain a permit and renew it regularly in order to operate. No new permits
are being issued since 2004, however, in line with the attempts to keep the pressure
tourism puts on the ecosystem under control.
Rafting tourists are mostly daily visitors who have hotel accommodations in
other, bigger, tourism towns. A rafting tour typically starts with visitors being picked up
from their hotels in the morning, brought to the base of the canyon by buses where they
get changed, transported to the upper canyon area where rafting starts, served lunch in the
restaurants by the river, and taken back to their hotels after rafting ends.
Rafting-based tourism provides opportunities of employment as tour operators or
service employees (waiters/waitresses, cooks, cleaners, etc.) in the restaurants and B&Bs
along the river. Mostly the residents of Karabük and Beşkonak, located at the base of the
canyon, take advantage of the jobs generated by tourism, although some residents of
Çaltepe and Altınkaya are also employed in rafting or related businesses. Many villagers
complain, however, that most of the rafting companies are based outside of the area and
often opt for bringing their own staff rather than hiring locals of Köprülü Kanyon (field
interviews, 2008). Restaurant and B&B owners, on the other hand, have different
complaints, as they hold that the national park status prevents the area’s tourism potential
from being fully realized. They claim that the restrictions on construction in particular,
hurt the local economy, as they cannot expand their facilities and many tourists who want
to stay in the area cannot do so since there is not enough accommodation capacity.
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In addition to rafting activities, Selge antique city located in Altınkaya attracts
around 3,000-5,000 visitors annually. However, Selge lost its lure after rafting became an
important touristic activity and the number of tourists visiting the site dropped
considerably within the last 10 years (field interviews, 2008). Tourism, therefore, hardly
makes a contribution to the economic welfare of the village today. The main benefit
villagers derive from tourism is through the sale of handicrafts (necklaces, wooden
spoons, etc.) to visitors by village women.
As should be clear from the discussion so far, one of the most pressing problems
for the people of Köprülü Kanyon is the lack of employment opportunities. Many people,
especially the younger generation, seek employment in seasonal jobs outside the area, as
demonstrated in table 4.18. Since Antalya, the nearest provincial center, is the tourism
capital of Turkey, such jobs are mostly in the tourism facilities based in the surrounding
districts, Manavgat and Serik: almost half of those who work as seasonal laborers are
employed as waiters/waitresses, laundry workers, etc. in the tourism sector (field
interviews, 2008). The rest, on the other hand, are employed as agricultural wagelaborers, mostly working in the cotton fields, greenhouses and orchards around Manavgat
and Serik.
Although both women and men take up seasonal employment, there seems to be a
gender segregation of occupations. Fruit picking in orchards, working in greenhouses
and laundry work in hotels are heavily feminized as opposed to employment in tourism,
which is more gender-balanced (field interviews, 2008). In addition, women’s labor
arrangements seem to differ from men’s, as female workers are typically organized in
teams of 8-10 people, supervised by a captain. This arrangement is mostly brought by the
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demands of the employers, as they first contact and access the laborers through the team
captain, who then recruits and puts together the team (field interviews, 2008).
Finally, harvesting of wild oregano, the most important non-timber forest product
in Köprülü Kanyon, provides a significant livelihood for the residents of Çaltepe, as it is
relied upon by nearly four-fifths of the households in the village, harvesting 250-300 tons
annually (field interviews, 2008). All villagers, except the elderly and young children,
engage in oregano harvesting. Harvesting is done during the last weeks of August from
the hills behind the village, during which villagers stay in temporary settlements they
establish. Harvested oregano is air-dried for about a month, and then carried back to the
village. There is no means of transportation other than mules to the oregano hills, since
the path connecting the hills to the village is a dirt road in bad condition and cannot be
paved because of the national park rules. Villagers reach the harvesting areas on foot, a
hike that takes almost eight hours.
Dried oregano is sold to local traders, who then sell it in bigger markets. Many
villagers complain that the traders dictate the purchasing price since there are so few of
them (three or four). Oregano harvesters’ inability to form direct links with the markets
does not only imply monopsonistic prices, but also significant risks, as they have been
denied payment by the local traders a number of times. The villagers had formed a
cooperative and built a processing and packaging plant to produce oregano oil, but the
facility has not started functioning yet because of legal problems (as of March 2010).

4.3.1.2 Rural Infrastructure
To reiterate, all settlements in Köprülü Kanyon suffer from the overall
underprovision of infrastructure by the state. Tables 4.19 and 4.20 portray infrastructure
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availability by settlement, including educational facilities, health facilities, phone lines,
59

clean water, electricity and transportation.

As can be seen in table 4.19, health services

are virtually non-existent in the area, as most villages lack health facilities, and no
personnel is found where there are facilities. Those who can afford go to Serik to get
medical treatment, but professional health care is mostly seen as a luxury, accessed only
when a serious medical issue occurs (field interviews, 2008). Similarly, although
educational facilities exist, they are usually under-staffed. In some villages, complaints
were voiced that the appointed teachers do not stay and find ways to get transferred
elsewhere.
As depicted in Table 4.20, infrastructure related to water and transportation is also
of low quality. All villages except Gaziler and Altınkaya have access to adequate water,
but its availability is interrupted during summer months. As water is obtained from Köprü
River and brought to households via canals, lowland villages, usually have easier and
regular access to water, while upland villages can have interruptions due to wear and tear
of canals. Electricity and phone lines generally work well, although occasional outages
occur during winter.
A major complaint voiced by the local people is related to the quality of roads and
problems of transportation. Apart from the general remoteness of the area from urban
centers, the roads connecting the upland settlement to the base of the canyon are in poor
condition. While the roads to Gaziler and Ballıbucak were paved with asphalt very
recently, in 2007 and 2006 respectively, those connecting Yeşilvadi and Demirciler to the
base area remains to be dirt paths.
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Since it is not a pressing issue in Sultan Sazlığı, discussion of the availability of rural
infrastructure was not presented in section 4.2.1.
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Clearly, the basic infrastructure in the area in terms of education, health, water,
electricity and transportation is very poor. In addition to this general inadequacy, access
to such infrastructural facilities is highly asymmetric across villages, as will be explained
in detail below. This can be interpreted as a part of the general failure of the Turkish state
to ensure human development, especially in rural areas. The locals hold that the state
officials do not pay sufficient attention to their needs and provide the necessary services
although it is their responsibility. It is interesting, however, that such views and criticisms
are not directed towards the Turkish State per se, but rather are framed as shortcomings
of the local bureaucrats, the representatives of the Turkish state with whom the locals
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have daily interactions.

4.3.1.3 Local Fragmentations: Location and Gender
I have stated earlier that Köprülü Kanyon is marked with wide inequalities, which
seem to fragment the community along different settlements. That is to say, economic
conditions and welfare levels vary significantly across settlements, but not so much
within them. Gender, on the other hand, is a notable axis of inequality within the
community as a whole. This section aims to elaborate on these two aspects of local
dynamics.
The settlements located in the lower canyon area, Beşkonak and Karabük, are the
closest to the neighboring urban centers and have considerably better roads. Education
and health care services in these settlements are relatively better as well: the only 8-year
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This is similar to what Sirman (1990) argues in her case study of two villages in
Western Turkey. She states that villagers’ perceptions are divorced from day-to-day
interactions with local bureaucrats, and the paternalistic provider image of the state is
maintained. Deviations from this image, such as corruption, are seen as attributes of the
individuals but not extended to the state, or even to particular governments or parties.
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school and the largest health facility (albeit without doctors) in the Köprülü Kanyon area,
for instance, is in Beşkonak. More importantly, better connection to the urban centers
translates into easier accessibility of health and education services outside Köprülü
Kanyon by the lower canyon residents.
In addition, Beşkonak and Karabük are the settlements where the benefits of the
booming rafting tourism have been (somewhat) captured. Despite the fact that only four
among the rafting companies are owned by locals of Köprülü Kanyon, employment
opportunities (as rafting tour guides or service workers in restaurants and B&B’s)
provided by the rafting-based tourism sector have been mainly enjoyed by Beşkonak and
Karabük residents. Indeed, the main source of livelihood in the lower canyon area is
often stated to be tourism in the summer and forestry employment in the winter (field
interviews, 2008).

Furthermore, as the main entrance to the national park and its

recreational areas lie within the boundaries of these two settlements, they end up being
frequently visited by non-rafting tourists as well as rafting tourists. This has effectively
established a market for the local people for the sale of handicrafts, traditional homemade
food, etc. and created opportunities of income generation.
As opposed to Beşkonak and Karabük, Altınkaya, which is a 15-minute drive
away from the lower canyon area, can easily be categorized as the poorest village in
Köprülü Kanyon. As I have mentioned in chapter 3, a significant portion of Altınkaya is
under 1st rank conservation, and the rest is protected by 3rd rank conservation status since
the village hosts the ruins of Selge antique city. The main implication of these protection
statuses for the villagers is in terms of construction restrictions, as construction activities
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and modifications to existing buildings are not allowed in 1st rank conservation sites, and
can only be done with the approval of designated state agencies in 3rd rank sites.
To further concretize what this entails, suffice it to say that most households in
Altınkaya lack in-house toilet facilities; while village men use public areas for their
needs, women are forced to wait until it gets dark (field interviews, 2008). Villagers
complain that they are not allowed to build toilets inside their houses or repair their roofs,
and that the state/national park (as these concepts are conflated in their accounts) does not
treat them as human beings. In some cases, up to ten people live in single-occupancy
houses, as they can neither build new homes nor modify the existing ones.
Added to the pressure put on the villagers by the conservation restrictions is the
fact that the village is especially disadvantaged in terms of rural infrastructure. The
inadequacy of the clean water supply, in particular, is a severe problem. The necessary
piping infrastructure for the provision of drinking water to the households was put in
place only in 2007. Water is still scarcely available, however: half of the households in
the village get water until noon and the other half gets it in the afternoon (field
interviews, 2008).

The low living standards in the village are crystallized in the

statement “this is not life”, frequently made by the villagers, and their repeated claim that
if the state designated an area for them to migrate to and provided adequate
infrastructure, no one would stay in the village.
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The remaining villages fall somewhere in between the lower canyon villages and
Altınkaya on the scale of socio-economic conditions. They are, in general, considerably
harder to access than the lower canyon area and Altınkaya. As stated earlier, some
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What the villagers refer here is the Turkish government’s subsidized housing program.
The villagers stated that this program is being implemented in areas close to Manavgat.
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(Gaziler, Ballıbucak) had paved roads constructed as recent as in 2007, whereas others
(Demirciler, Yeşilvadi, Hasdümen) are connected to the lower canyon area only by a dirt
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road.

In addition, Gaziler still has no access to drinking water. Among them, Çaltepe

has the most diverse sources of livelihood, where oregano harvesting, in addition to
animal husbandry and subsistence agriculture, is an important source of livelihood.
Unsurprisingly, the overall absence of infrastructural services and employment
opportunities in Köprülü Kanyon have produced considerable resentment among the local
people and precipitated the perception that the Turkish state has “forgotten” about them.
Against this backdrop, many families have chosen to migrate, especially to nearby towns
where tourism provides lucrative employment opportunities. That only seven households
are active in Gaziler, compared to the official number of 135, or that no one under the age
of 45 is in sight in Değirmenözü, provides glaring evidence to the general destitution of
the area, pushing its people to seek livelihood elsewhere.
The second prevalent dimension of inequality in the area is gender-based. Women
are largely invisible in public spaces and seem highly reluctant to speak with outsiders.
As opposed to the case in Sultan Sazlığı, where women were observed to have retained
some public spaces, such as street corners and orchards, women in Köprülü Kanyon were
strikingly absent from daily rural public life. Furthermore, women’s invisibility and
quietness in public spaces seem to be more pronounced in mountain villages than it is in
the lower canyon area and Altınkaya.
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The road connecting these villages to the lower canyon area is not paved, but there is a
paved road from them to the neighboring provincial center of Isparta that passes through
the other side of the mountain.
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The level of female education is significantly low; although there seems to be no
pattern of not sending female children to primary school, girls’ attendance to secondary
school and beyond is seen as a luxury (field interviews, 2008). If the family cannot
afford to provide education to all children in the household, girls are the first to be cut
off. Even in cases where the family could afford it, it is exceptional for girls to be
allowed to go to high school, since they would have to travel outside of the area.
Women are, as typical in rural Turkey, primarily engaged in unpaid household
work, including household chores such as cooking, cleaning, and childcare, milking
animals, preparation of animal products and taking care of orchards. Informal labor
sharing arrangements are common among women in baking bread and preparation of
durable food items such as jams and pickles. In land-owning households, women usually
prepare the soil, hoe and reap. In some villages, women also graze the animals and cut
firewood, though it has been stated that only men or men and women jointly undertake
these tasks in other villages. Finally, there is no gender division of labor in oreganopicking and all household members take part in it.
Perhaps not surprisingly, women do not perceive these activities as “work” and
when asked what kinds of labor women are usually engaged in, their response had
consistently been that women do not work. When followed up by questions on daily
activities they are engaged in, however, they describe various types of unpaid productive
tasks they undertake. Furthermore, even the activities that were stated to be carried out
jointly by men and women of the household, such as collecting firewood and grazing,
were observed to be predominantly female responsibilities. The notion that work is
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associated with earning money income, disguises and devalues women’s unpaid work,
and is internalized by both women and men.
Although female employment in market labor is limited in general, it seems to be
attributed to the insufficiency of such employment opportunities rather than gender-based
social norms (field interviews, 2008) Notably, many women in Altınkaya and some in
Karabük are engaged in petty trading and handicrafts, such as selling wooden spoons,
scarves and simple jewelry to the tourists visiting the area. A few women in Beşkonak
and Çaltepe, on the other hand, stated that they occasionally sell surplus agricultural
products in market places in Serik. As I have discussed before, some women take up
outside employment in seasonal jobs, but the prevalence of female outside employment
varies across villages. It seems that most women engaged in such work are from
Altınkaya: female interviewees from Altınkaya stated that they take up every outside
employment opportunity they get. Women interviewed in Çaltepe and Demirciler, on the
other hand, stated that men would not allow a woman to undertake market work if she
has to travel outside of the village.
To recap, the prominent lines of local fragmentations in Köprülü Kanyon are
across settlements and gender-based. Although the whole area suffers from limited
income generating opportunities and the underprovision of crucial services, villages at the
base of the canyon and those in the uplands differ considerably in terms of economic
welfare and availability of infrastructural facilities. The state’s general neglect of rural
development, given the geographical disadvantages of upland villages, led to growing
inequalities. While those who can afford to migrate did so to neighboring towns and
cities, those who cannot continue to lack opportunities to fulfill most of their basic needs.
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Within this context of general deprivation, women are further disadvantaged, as their
ability to participate in social and economic life is severely limited.

4.3.2 The Political Economy of Unplanned Resource Use
In Köprülü Kanyon, unlike Sultan Sazlığı, the pressing issues regarding natural
resources have yet to materialize in heightened levels of degradation, but they are
certainly visible. The most prominent problem in the area is the rampant unplanned use
of forests, pastures, oregano cover and the river. While illegal tree cutting and grazing
strain the ecosystem, the lion’s share of the pressure on the natural resources is accounted
for by illegal construction and unregulated rafting tourism.
This section explores how the problem of unregulated use comes about in a
national park, governed by rigid conservation rules for over 30 years, and its unequal
implications on the local people. More specifically, I argue that the paternalistic way that
the natural resource management policies are formed and implemented in the area has
undercut their effective implementation. Furthermore, I unpack the processes of resource
use and depict the uneven distribution of their costs and benefits.
In section 4.3.2.1, I lay out the main types of resource use in Köprülü Kanyon and
their impacts on the environment. In section 4.3.2.2 I portray the paternalism embodied
in the history of Köprülü Kanyon National Park and discuss its implications in terms of
local dynamics, paying particular attention to the state-society relationship. Finally, in
section 4.3.2.3, I delve into how the Turkish state’s paternalistic style of governance
impeded local sustainable development in the area, specifically by the making of
impractical policies, shaping perceptions and precipitating patron-client networks.
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4.3.2.1 Resource Use Patterns
The relationship of the local people with the ecosystem is through their use of the
pastures, collection of firewood and harvest of oregano, whereas that of rafting
companies is through their non-extractive use of the natural resources. Both local people
and the rafting companies, on the other hand, use Köprü river as an environmental sink,
since proper waste treatment systems in the area are mostly insufficient.
There are no clear-cut boundaries between local user groups (e.g. firewood
collectors, animal grazers and oregano harvesters) since many households undertake a
combination of different uses of the ecosystem. Almost all households in the area collect
wood for household needs, for use mainly as fuel and construction material, from parts of
the national park where collection is allowed.

Similarly, all households who own

livestock graze their animals in the pastures found nearby their settlements.
Oregano harvesting, however, is practiced in a more geographically-confined
fashion compared to the widespread use of forests and pastures.

As stated earlier,

oregano harvesting is practiced mostly in Çaltepe, and to some extent in Ballıbucak and
Altınkaya, which are upland villages located close to oregano plateaus. There is a similar
overlap between animal grazers and oregano harvesters, since most villagers who harvest
oregano also own animals and make use of pastures.
The rafting companies, on the other hand, make non-extractive use of the natural
resources. The fact that Köprü River is among the few rivers suitable for rafting and the
beauty of the landscape in general makes the area an attractive rafting spot.
All the activities mentioned above put pressure on the ecosystem. Although
degradation of resources has not yet reached pressing levels in Köprülü Kanyon, threats
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to the ecosystem are visible. The forest cover is under pressure from illegal tree cutting,
overgrazing of goats and illegal construction, as well as from the heavy (unregulated)
rafting tourism (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a; field interviews, 2008). The
national park status stipulates certain locations where cutting tree twigs and branches are
permitted, but reports of trespassing and illegal cutting in protected parts of the forests
are prevalent. According to national park records, illegal cutting is mostly concentrated in
hills surrounding Ballıbucak, Çaltepe, Altınkaya and Beşkonak villages. Local people, on
other hand, hold that the designated collection areas are located too far away from the
settlements and thus difficult to access; therefore, they are forced to trespass in the
national park. They also claim that the collection of firewood for household use is smallscale, so it does not harm the forest cover.
Illegal construction is arguably a more pressing issue than illegal tree cutting. It is
particularly a prominent problem in Altınkaya and in the lower canyon area along the
riverbanks, which not only harms the forest cover, but also disrupts the fabric of
historical architecture and contributes to the decay of cultural resources. Overgrazing,
especially of goats, seems to be another major threat on the ecosystem. Goats, the
preferred type of livestock kept by the locals, are said to be especially harmful to the
forest cover, since they feed on saplings, leading to soil compaction, erosion and
suppression of natural regeneration (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a).
Köprü River is threatened by the unregulated tourism activities and the disposal of
wastes from the surrounding villages. As the upper catchment of the river does not lie
within the national park boundaries, concerns about the decreasing quality and quantity
of water entering the area from outside cannot be addressed (Republic of Turkey MEF
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GDNCNP, 2007a). The most immediate threats on the river ecosystem, however, are
associated with the lower canyon area.

The inadequacy of waste collection and

management systems in the villages results in the use of Köprü river as a sink for waste
disposal. In addition, heavy and unregulated touristic activity puts pressure on the
ecosystem, as the wastes produced by the rafting centers and restaurants, which lack
sufficient waste treatment systems, and the heavy inflow of tourists during peak seasons
produce pollution.
Finally, it is reported that the oregano cover in Çaltepe hills is degrading, in both
quantitative and qualitative terms, and that in Yeşilvadi had already depleted due to
unsustainable harvesting practices (field interviews, 2008). While some oregano
harvesters hold that natural reasons, such as changes in climatic conditions, are
responsible for the degradation of oregano cover, others claim that harvesting of large
quantities consistently over the years is the underlying reason. The oregano plan, a
component of the national park regulations, governs the use of oregano cover since the
mid-1990’s and puts limitations on the period of harvesting, which seem to be followed,
but not on the amount. Given that oregano can only be transported down from the
plateaus by mules, it does not seem plausible that overharvesting at the individual level
can pose a threat to the oregano cover. That is to say, difficulties associated with
transportation effectively prevent large amounts to be harvested by an individual
household. That a large number of households might be relying on the resource and
harvesting oregano, however, might pose a threat.
As I have stated in the beginning, the effects of the degradation are not being felt
by resource users yet, but are likely to have critical implications in the near future if
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unplanned use persists. I have demonstrated above that there is a range of activities and
incentives that contribute to degradation. The benefits associated with these activities are
distributed asymmetrically across different groups. Rafting companies are able generate
high profits, mostly captured by themselves and not shared by the local people, by using
the ecosystem as an environmental sink. The local people’s use of resources, on the other
hand, are mostly subsistence-based and not associated with high material returns.
The costs of degradation will conceivably be distributed unevenly across different
groups, as well. The bearers of the brunt of the degradation will be the poorer local users
who do not have access to alternative livelihood options. It is likely, therefore, that their
livelihoods will suffer as a consequence of degrading pastures or deteriorating oregano
cover. On the other hand, rafting companies are likely to avoid bearing the costs
associated with degradation, unless, of course, the pollution in Köprü River reaches
levels that deter tourists from coming into the area.

4.3.2.2 Köprülü Kanyon National Park: A History of Paternalism
The national park status of Köprülü Kanyon, and the rigid conservation practices
associated with it, have produced significant dissent among the local people. As a
consequence, the relationship between the local people and the national park authorities
has been marked with strife and distrust. This section probes into the history of the
governance of the national park and its implications in terms of the state-society
relationship in the area. In doing so, it paves the way to the next section, where I discuss
the how the paternalism of the Turkish state, exemplified in the history of Köprülü
Kanyon, hinders the implementation of local sustainable development.
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Köprülü Kanyon was declared as a national park in 1973, when all lands within
the national park boundaries became the property of the Turkish state, i.e. they could not
be held as private property. The problems related to property rights that the national park
status has fomented, indeed, are the primary reason underlying the conflict between the
local people and the national park authorities. Currently, Beşkonak, Karabük, Altınkaya
and Ballıbucak lack proper cadastral work and legal land titles. Residential areas, as well
as agricultural plots in these settlements, fall within the boundaries of the national park,
i.e. all livelihood activities carried out in these villages are, in fact, technically illegal.
According to the accounts of the local people, when the decision was first made to
declare Köprülü Kanyon as a national park, government officials did not actually visit the
area, but settled the boundaries of the park just by examining the maps (field interviews,
2008). That is to say, the original legislation about the boundaries of Köprülü Kanyon
National Park did not take into account the settlements where people had been living for
years, or even centuries. A story repeatedly narrated by the locals is that the village
heads of the time were misinformed and manipulated into giving their consent for the
63

national park to be established.

The overwhelming sentiment among the local people,

therefore, is that since the national park status was first declared they have been subject to
rules and regulations on which they had no decision-making power.
The governance structure of Köprülü Kanyon has indeed excluded local people’s
participation in decisions that affect their lives. To reiterate, according to the Turkish
legal framework, the General Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks, a
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In order for the area, including the settlements, to be designated as a national park, the
heads of villages that would remain inside the park had to officially agree and sign
official documents stating their consent.
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subdivision of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, manages national parks. That
is to say, Köprülü Kanyon has been managed by top-down mechanisms, with “hardpark” type policies, implemented by the central government, and with virtually no
participation of the local people. Until the implementation of the GEF pilot project, local
communities were never consulted on issues regarding the management of the national
park or of the natural resources.
Due to the restrictions implied by the protection statuses of various locations
within the national park, and the stipulations of the national parks law, construction and
repair activities are seriously limited, if not altogether banned, in the settlements that fall
within national park boundaries. Specifically, three documents should be presented to the
relevant authorities for any type of new construction, even a single-structure restoration,
to be allowed: a legal document verifying the applicant’s ownership of the land on which
the proposed construction is to happen (a title or a legal authorization certificate), an
approved plan of the construction prepared on a topographical map, and an architectural
project prepared in consistency with the codes of the approved plan. Land ownership is
very complicated as discussed below, and not likely to be resolved in the near future.
Therefore, acquiring permits for construction is virtually impossible, as the local people
mostly lack recognized ownership rights to the land they reside on.
The impacts of these restrictions on the local people are multifold: they complain
that they cannot repair their roofs or build toilets inside their houses; the implications of
such restrictions on the locals’ living standards are obvious, as I have illustrated in the
discussion of Altınkaya in section 4.3.1.2. Many villagers complain that young people
cannot get married and choose to migrate out of the area, since, according to local norms,
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a man should be able to establish an independent household to become eligible for
marriage. They also hold that such restrictions hurt the local economy: since no facilities
can be built for the accommodation of rafting tourists, the full potential of the area cannot
64

be fulfilled.

Furthermore, a number of local-owned wood workshops were closed down,

as no activities other than scientific research and recreation can be undertaken inside the
national park.
The national park regulations also entail absurd scenes; for instance, when a tree
located in a privately-owned plot falls, even due to natural reasons, the law prohibits it to
be carried somewhere else. This is because trees are under the protection of the national
park, thus are the property of the state, even if they are located outside the national park
boundaries. The field interviews are full of anecdotes, epitomizing the Turkish state’s
top-down governance style, of how plots could not be tilled for days after a tree fell, since
the national park employees had to come and remove it.
Technically, the problems surrounding the property rights issue can be solved by
revising the national park boundaries and declaring the residential areas as such, i.e.
declare them outside the park boundaries. In order for that to happen, however, the
cadastral works must be completed. Currently, most of the land that the villagers live on
is “no man’s land”, as no one has formal property rights over them. During the cadastral
process, the property rights over these lands are first assigned to the state, more precisely
to the State Treasury, which then declares them, upon application and approval, as
residential lands that can be held as private property. There is no guarantee, however, that
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This statement is not entirely accurate, as there are B&B facilities in the lower canyon,
but they are reluctant to expand their business. The case of tourism facilities will be
discussed in detail in the next section.
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the Treasury will approve the applications once the lands are under its ownership. In
other words, once the property rights over them are established, the Treasury can choose
to hold onto these lands and not designate them as residential areas.
Given that their relationship with the state authorities has historically been based
on mutual distrust, the local people are skeptical of the legal process outlined above.
Specifically, they fear that once the cadastral process is initiated, the state would decide
to introduce even more stringent protection measures, or force them out of their lands
altogether. In fact, the residents of Altınkaya had agreed to start the cadastral work in the
past but changed their minds when officials showed up, because they were convinced that
the officials would designate the whole village as a conservation site.
It is important to note that what I describe above is the general sentiment, and
does not represent the perceptions of all community members. A case in point is Çaltepe,
where cadastral work was completed without any complaints from the villagers in 2005.
Residents of those settlements that lack proper cadastral work also differ on their
attitudes towards the national park. Although most people encountered during the field
interviews expressed distrust and hostility towards the national park authorities, some
claimed that the village heads are to blame for the persistence of the issue, as their
approval of the official application is required for the cadastral work to start. This latter
group was notably less skeptical of the national park and held that the residential areas
could be designated as such if the required legal process is followed.
More specifically, some villagers in Beşkonak and Karabük reported having
demanded, from their village head, to initiate the cadastral process, but their demands
were rejected as the village head claimed that the national park would take all of their
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lands if the cadastral work starts. When probed into why they think the village heads are
blocking the cadastral work if indeed the majority wants it to be done, a satisfactory
response was largely absent, but it was implied that the issue is a question of power for
65

the village heads.

The insinuated link between the non-resolution of the property rights

issue and the locally powerful, such as the village heads, was echoed by the national park
authorities. In particular, the national park authorities held that the village heads benefit
from the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the issue, as they acquire political rents by
reproducing the conflict between the local people and the national park, and hold de facto
control over land and people in the absence of formalized property rights.
It is also worth noting that the term “national park authorities” has become
conflated in the local people’s narratives with different public authorities that have
administrative responsibilities in the area.

They implicitly hold the national park

responsible for the absence of public infrastructure, the provision of which is the
responsibility of other offices of the Turkish state: for the inadequacy of educational and
health services, for the poor quality of roads, the lack of waste disposal facilities, etc. It
would not be unfair to say that the conflicts and deprivation they experience as citizens
get projected on their relationship with the national park authorities, who are the most
accessible representatives of the central government.
To recap, the non-resolution of the problems related to property rights has
intensified the feelings of distrust on the side of the villagers towards the national park
authorities. Restrictions on goat raising and oregano harvesting, in line with the national
park stipulations, have contributed to the general feeling of hostility sparked by
65

It should be kept in mind that the villagers might have felt intimidated by overtly
stating what they think of the village heads especially on a delicate issue such as this one.
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construction regulations. Hostility towards the national park grew as more rigid
conservation rules were introduced; local people living in Beşkonak, Karabük and
Altınkaya have at times undertaken violent actions as a reaction to the national park
authorities, such as blocking a vehicle of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in
Altınkaya, for which they were taken to court, and destroying the walls and fences built
in the lower canyon. The portrayal of the national park authorities as a manipulative
group motivated to pass even more stringent conservation rules continually comes up in
the local people’s narratives. Added to this is the unpredictability of future policies and
fear of further limitations on resource use. The history of top-down governance, under
which local people have been subject to decisions made without their input (or even
awareness), coupled with the overlapping and complicated legislation about different
resources in the area have produced considerable uncertainty.
Many among the local people hold that the national park authorities are not
needed, and that the local people themselves are the best protectors of the forests.
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They

pointed out that the local people have the best knowledge of how to take care of the
forests and the incentives for sustainable use since their livelihoods depend on them. It
has also been expressed, by the national park authorities and some of the locals, that the
villagers’ perceptions of the local environment are negatively shaped due to the strict
restrictions of the national park, and that they started seeing the forest as their “enemy”,
as practices to conserve it threaten their livelihoods. This finding is illustrative of how
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Interestingly, even a field agent employed by the General Directorate of Forestry,
claimed that there is no need for such a protection status in Köprülü Kanyon, and that the
area has been designated as a national park in order to protect only a specific tree species.
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perceptions and values about natural resources are partly determined by the types of
mechanisms with which they are managed.

4.3.2.3 The Political Economy of Unplanned Resource Use: Paternalism-cumPatronage
Despite the fact that Köprülü Kanyon is regulated by such seemingly
comprehensive and rigid rules of conservation, rule enforcement remains inadequate and
selective. In the first part of this section, I unpack the failure of local sustainable
development by demonstrating, in particular, the role of the Turkish state’s paternalism
and the deployment of patron-client networks in handling the contestation it produces. In
the second part I discuss the equity implications of this failure.
The paternalist gaze of the Turkish state is immediately detectable in the rules
governing natural resource use in Köprülü Kanyon. The national park stipulations on
natural resource use often materialize as impractical rules that disregard local needs, and
consequently, are broken frequently. The designated forest areas where collection is
permitted are distant from the settlements, which induces trespassing in the closer areas.
Similarly, the restriction on the number of goats that can be kept around the national park
proves untenable, as goats are the only type of livestock that is suited to the geographic
conditions. The issue of the construction prohibitions is another case in point, as pressing
needs, such as the repairing of damaged structures, push the local people to violate them.
The Turkish state’s paternalistic style of governance impedes the implementation
sustainable development not only by rule non-compliance exemplified above, but also by
shaping local positions and precipitating contestation. The local peoples’ positions vis-àvis natural resources are in part determined by their exclusion from the making of
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decisions regarding their management.
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The perceptions that came to be sculpted this

way, along with the distrust entailed by the history of top-down policy-making, sparks
significant contestation against the implementation of any policy in Köprülü Kanyon,
rendering the area increasingly “unmanageable” and intensifying the pressures on the
ecosystem.
Heightened contestation, on the other hand, is handled by patronage-based
relations. I have noted earlier that the restaurants and the B&B’s along Köprü River have
been constructed illegally. There are, in fact, outstanding court orders for the demolition
of these facilties, but they have not been enforced yet. The account given by a B&B
owner epitomizes how patronage dynamics thwart the implementation of sustainable
development: the owner stated that although there was a court order for the demolition of
his B&B, he had managed to postpone its execution for five years, after which the
pending order became invalidated. He mentioned, with discernible pride, his
“acquaintances” high up in the Turkish bureaucracy, through whose help the enforcement
of the order was delayed and ultimately dropped. It is not difficult to imagine that similar
processes underlie the non-execution of demolition orders for the other B&B’s and
restaurants.
This anecdote is illustrative of the argument made in chapter 2 that patronage is
deployed as a mechanism to coopt contestation by the Turkish state, and thus an integral
part of the reproduction of state hegemony via eliciting consent. I further argue that the
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Agrawal (2005) argues that the positions of environmental subjects (in this case, in
terms of attitudes towards conservation of natural resources) are shaped by their roles in
governance of the resource. He demonstrates how perceptions held by villagers in
Kumaon in Northern India changed over the shift from top-down governance to
community-based management of forests. The findings I report here can be interpreted in
the same vein.
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non-enforcement of conservation rules against the tourism sector can be read as a microlevel manifestation of the national-popular outlook constructed around growth-oriented
modernization. More specifically, I hold that the fact that rafting tourism is seen as the
engine of economic growth in the area and that this is another factor underlying the
authorities’ reluctance to take action.
The hegemonic project of the Turkish state, which has crystallized most
pronouncedly as paternalist governance, blended with patronage-based prioritization of
economic growth in Köprülü Kanyon, has entailed ineffective implementation of local
sustainable development. The failure of sustainable development in general, and the
selective enforcement of conservation regulations in particular, coupled with the existing
imbalances of welfare, reproduce and reinforce local inequalities. I have demonstrated
above that access to patronage-based networks correlate with political clout. Such clout,
in turn, is closely related to economic and social status, i.e. such networks are selective
mechanisms of representation, as I have argued in chapter 2. As a result, only the locally
powerful can evade enforcement and avoid the costs implied by the conservation
regulations. Although construction bans and constraints on resource use are enforced for
some villagers, most visibly in Altınkaya, laws against the construction of tourism
facilities along the river are not enforced, either because the owners have access to
political connections who can exert pressure on the local executive bodies, or because
they are a powerful business group with whom the national park authorities do not want
to clash and disrupt tourism-led economic growth.
As a result, the rafting sector, having the power to evade punishment, can sustain
its profits and economic power. On the other hand, the rest of the community, who
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already have been disadvantaged by the strict top-down enforcement, is further
marginalized, as they lack the power to access policy-making or implementation
processes, whether via legitimate channels of representation or patron-client networks.
Moreover, the failure of sustainable development in Köprülü Kanyon is likely to
exacerbate inequalities in the future, as the poor resource users are the losers of
unsustainable resource use, whereas the tourism sector is the winner.

4.3.3 The GEF Comes to Köprülü Kanyon: Unpacking a Failure
Against the backdrop of distance and distrust produced by 30 years of
paternalism, the GEF project, which held a vision diametrically opposed to top-down
governance, was initiated in Köprülü Kanyon in 2003. The long-term management vision
devised for the area paints an ambitious, yet heartening picture, as it states: “[w]e want a
place where [the] Beşkonak Basin (including the western skirts of Bozburun Mountain) is
protected with all their natural and cultural values, where the problems of the people
residing in the region such as settlement, education, health, transportation, livelihood and
property are solved, where income obtained from the sustainable use of resources is
prioritized for the welfare of the local community and where the people living in the area
participate in its administration” (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a, p14). This
statement encapsulates the crux of what went wrong with three decades hard-park
management. What has remained of the GEF project in the area, however, hardly goes
beyond the reinforced feelings of resentment of the locals, and the bitter disappointment
of the project executers.
The project in Köprülü Kanyon, similar to the case in Sultan Sazlığı, aimed at
regulating resource use via the preparation and implementation of micro-plans for the
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management of forestry, grazing and oregano harvesting with the participation of local
users, while supporting alternative livelihoods by the distribution of small grants, to
remedy the threats on the ecosystem and relieve the burden of constrained resource use
on local stakeholders. Furthermore, the resolution of problems related to property rights
has been prioritized as an issue to be addressed (Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP,
2007a). On-site activities of the GEF project have started in 2003, carried out by the GEF
project team comprised of four employees of Antalya Provincial DNCNP (see table 4.21
for a list of selected project activities).
The level of motivation and effort displayed by the project team pose a striking
contrast to the case in Sultan Sazlığı, as they have genuinely worked towards
implementing the type of development envisaged in the GEF project. This is reflected, to
some extent, in table 4.21, though accurate records of project activities were not kept by
the Köprülü Kanyon team, either. The team was hopeful of what could have been
accomplished through the GEF project, since they were highly critical of the top-down
manner by which the area has been governed. In fact, the team’s demoralization at the
end of the project could be read as indicative of its failure. The GEF project has not
managed to effectively implement any environmental protection policy, and illegal
construction activities are ongoing along Köprü River. The locals do not think they have
contributed any input to the project, and the SGP remained ineffective given the
infrastructural inadequacy of the area. Perhaps more importantly, no significant
improvement occurred in the local people’s perceptions of the national park, which, as I
will illustrate below, stands out as the primary constituent of the project’s failure.
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I provide a portrait of the GEF project’s failure in Köprülü Kanyon in table 4.22,
drawing on the structural characteristics of the Turkish state and local dynamics in line
with the theoretical framework informing this dissertation. Unsurprisingly, this depiction
is different than that of Sultan Sazlığı, presented in table 4.6, as the most pronounced
features and explanations of the “failure” differ considerably across the two sites.
Specifically in the case of Köprülü Kanyon, the perceptions of the local people and the
strife between them and the national park authorities seem to explain a significant part of
the failure of the project in fulfilling all of its aims, which is taken up in section 4.3.3.1.
Other dimensions of the failure, namely, the failure to implement sustainable resource
use, the lack of holistic mechanisms, the failure to operationalize participatory decisionmaking mechanisms, the ineffectiveness of alternative livelihoods and the failure to
realize gender equality are taken up the subsequent sections respectively. As accurate
records of specific project activities and outcomes were largely absent, the analysis
presented below relies heavily on qualitative findings and some descriptive data provided
by the survey, and is supplemented by records kept by the WB Ankara office.

4.3.3.1 Conflict between the Locals and the Project Team
The history of the interaction between the national park authorities and the local
people, discussed at length earlier, has been crucial in shaping the locals’ attitude towards
the GEF project as well. It was conceived to be, more than anything, a national park
attempt to make their lives worse. Distrust and hostility on the side of the locals have
proved to be the major impediment on the effective implementation of the entirety of the
project, including the implementation of sustainable resource use, participatory decisionmaking mechanisms and the SGP. I hold, therefore, that this feature of the general failure
222

of the project warrants to be discussed separately at the outset and provide a background
for the discussion in the remainder of this section.
The project team consisted of officials from Antalya Provincial DCNP, who were
already employed as national park administrators. When the project was initiated,
therefore, the local people already had a quite negative perception of the project team,
whom they saw as responsible for the rigid conservation practices within the national
park, as well as of the lack of infrastuctural services the locals expect the state to deliver.
As I have noted earlier, the local people tend to blame the national park authorities for the
absence of services, such as health care and education, the delivery of which is in fact not
the national park’s responsibility.
During the field interviews, most of the local people explicitly stated that they
knew what the national park authorities were like, and that the national park would never
do anything positive for the local people’s well being. Some even stated that they do not
want any projects and do not understand why Köprülü Kanyon was chosen to implement
a project. Others asserted that no project affiliated with the national park could ever be
successful unless the conflict between the people and the national park is resolved, since
the locals believe that anything carried out by the national park would unexceptionally
imply more constraints on resource use. The fact that the project team was made up of
national park employees, about whom the locals had rigid prior negative perceptions, thus
seemed to have doomed the project from the very start.
Against this backdrop, the local people regarded the project exclusively as an
attempt to introduce more constraints on resource use, and either did not know about
other activities associated with it, or thought of them as a cover-up of the national park’s
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true intentions. Consequently, they not only have rejected taking part in project activities,
but have explicitly attempted to undercut their implementation, by road-blockading to
prevent the project team from entering the area, sabotaging their equipment, or even
being violent with the team.
Earlier in this chapter, I elaborated on how the history of top-down governance in
Köprülü Kanyon has produced significant distance and distrust, aggravated by the void of
services that the state is responsible of delivering. That this governance modality erodes
trust in state to be a fair arbiter and evokes contestation to policy implementation is
perfectly exemplified in the case of Köprülü Kanyon: the implementation of sustainable
development policies associated with GEF has evoked considerable contestation, not
because local people were against the policies per se, but they were skeptical of the
intentions of the project as a whole (field interviews, 2008). The fact that the project was
poorly designed, i.e. the project team consisted of the national park employees, and the
project team’s failure to alter local people’s perceptions despite their good intentions
signal lack of competency at the local level.
Even when the project team made progress towards breaking the locals’
skepticism, local dynamics, especially peer pressure and the fear of being stigmatized by
fellow community members, thwarted their attempts. The qualitative findings suggest
that some local groups benefit by virtue of the ongoing chaotic administration and might
have the incentive to reproduce the conflicts existing between the locals and the national
park. I have hinted earlier that some village heads acquire political rents by virtue of the
ongoing strife between the local people and the national park authorities. Rafting
companies, on the other hand, are the clear winners from lax enforcement of regulations
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on touristic activities in Köprü River, as argued in section 4.3.2.3. Therefore, groups who
benefit from the rafting activities in the area, such as B&B and restaurant owners and
employees, might also have had an incentive to block implementation of sustainable use
policies.

4.3.3.2 Failure to Implement Sustainable Resource Use
As I explained in chapter 3, the GEF projects aimed at the formulation of microplans in order to regulate the resource use. In the case of Köprülü Kanyon, micro-plans
for the use of forests, pastures, and oregano cover were supposed to be prepared and
implemented. After four years of project implementation, however, it is apparent that
hardly anything could be accomplished. The forestry micro-plan has been formulated but
awaits approval from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. The grazing micro-plan
has been rejected because it was deemed to be incompatible with the Ministry’s countrylevel grazing plans. There is an oregano plan in place, but it will expire in 2012, and there
are no foreseen plans to renew it. Rafting tourism has been tied to regulation based on the
number of rafting companies permitted to operate in the area, but there are no stipulations
on the environmental pressures created by it, e.g. in terms of the number of tourists that
can be hosted or the installation of appropriate waste management systems in rafting
bases.
Based on these observations, it would not be unfair to claim that the project has
failed in planning and regulating the resource use. The resource use patterns that were
held to pose threats to the ecosystem (see section 4.3.3.1) are ongoing. Recall that I have
argued, in section 4.3.3.3, that the history of paternalist governance is an important factor
underlying the unregulated nature of resource use in Köprülü Kanyon. The perceptions
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molded by this history, on the other hand, undermined the GEF attempts to move towards
an inclusive management scheme, where policies would reflect the needs of the local
people and thus can be implemented more effectively. The local people have undercut the
implementation of the few regulations that were made, such as on grazing, forestry and
conservation of the archeological sites, by non-compliance, disputing enforcement, and
engaging in petty violence.
In addition to the conflictual relationship between the local people and the project
team, the selective enforcement of conservation regulations emerges as an important
reason underlying the project’s failure to implement sustainable resource use. The
resource regulations governing the area only selectively enforced: although construction
activities are forbidden in the river banks, due to their conservation status of 1st rank,
there are many B&Bs and restaurants along the river. While the court orders for the
demolition of these facilities are not carried out, conservation regulations are strongly
enforced on ordinary residents.
The case of Köprülü Kanyon neatly exemplifies the predominance of patronage
networks in handling of contestation evoked by top-down policy implementation
whereby some groups’ demands are fulfilled. As I have argued in section 4.3.2.3, escape
from the top-down implementation of conservation regulations seems to occur by virtue
of having political connections, placed higher up in the bureaucracy than the local
bureaucrats. It usually involves reciprocation through gifts or a favor to be done in the
future, and not a material exchange, e.g. bribery. Although having such acquaintances is
not necessarily related to one’s level of wealth, such political connections are correlated
with socio-economic status. Therefore, the patron-client networks perpetuate pre-existing
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socio-economic inequalities, since those who could form and maintain those ties, the
locally powerful, are able to enjoy laxer enforcement, while the locally powerless are
marginalized by strict conservation practices.
In addition, the partial implementation of resource regulations suggests that there
is a general tendency to avoid punishing the tourism sector. This can be read as a
reflection of the growth-orientation of the state. Tourism is seen as the sector that would
realize rapid economic development, not only in Köprülü Kanyon but in the whole
Mediterranean region of Turkey.
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Given this context, state authorities may be reluctant

to inflict harm on the tourism sector. Prioritizing promotion of tourism as the driving
force of economic development, however, has made environmental considerations
secondary.
Given the GEF project’s failure to implement sustainable use of natural resources,
I provide descriptive quantitative findings on local people’s evaluations and perceptions
in figures 4.8 and 4.9. As depicted in figure 4.8, the local people have overwhelmingly
evaluated the project to be unsuccessful in ensuring the sustainable use of natural and
cultural resources. Figure 4.9 demonstrates that the main reasons perceived by the locals
to be underlying this failure are related to the project team, where the perception that they
have not taken the local considerations into account is emphasized.
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In fact, the same argument is widely made for Turkey as a country as well. It is argued
that Turkey’s comparative advantage lies in tourism due to its geographical and historical
characteristics, as well as its ability to provide tourism services cheaply. However,
environmental and social costs of unplanned touristic activities are largely ignored in
pursuit of this development strategy (see, for instance, Tosun and Fyall, 2005).
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4.3.3.3 Lack of Holistic Management Mechanisms
As attested by its visionary statement cited in the beginning of section 4.3.3, the
type of management foreseen in the GEF project incorporated many dimensions, from the
resolution of property rights to the amelioration of the infrastructure, from the promotion
of ecotourism to the effective conservation of natural and cultural resources. The
envisaged management for the area is unquestionably a step in the right direction, as it
encapsulates a comprehensive understanding of sustainable development and addresses
the issues that rendered Köprülü Kanyon “unmanageable” to begin with, such as the
exclusion of its people from governance, inadequacy of basic services and lack of viable
livelihoods. This realization of this vision, however, called for a holistic management
scheme that was never operationalized.
The project team lacked the necessary equipment and staff to effectively
implement the type of management foreseen in the GEF project. The team admitted the
need to administer the area with the participation of people, and that a holistic approach,
one that is close to the sustainable development concept, is needed for effective
management, but they stated that they lacked adequate staff. It is true that the area is vast
and monitoring resource use is challenging. Furthermore, the realization of a holistic
management mechanism calls for a team composed not only of forestry engineers (as was
the GEF project team), but also of experts in different specialties (e.g. sociologists,
geographers, political ecologists) and civil society representatives.
The project team held the central administration’s traditional top-down
governance style responsible for the failure to operationalize such a management
mechanism (field interviews, 2008). They stated that although a participatory approach
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and a holistic management were aimed at in Köprülü Kanyon, the central administration
still operates by the rules of top-down governance. I have stated earlier that GEF microplans prepared with (some) input of the local stakeholders have been rejected on the
grounds that they are not in line with country-level plans formulated by the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry.

The team stated that proposals they brought up on the

management of the area prior to the GEF project have also been rejected (or even
unheard) for similar reasons; “[bureaucrats] in the central administration do not want to
hear us”.
I conclude, therefore, that this dimension of the failure signifies both a lack of
competence (lack of funds and staff) and the paternalistic style of governance adopted by
the central government. Realization of a holistic, participatory management vision at the
local level depends on the fundamental reforming of the way that the central
administration governs, as well as its ability and/or willingness to supply the necessary
support for implementation.

4.3.3.4 Failure to Implement Participatory Mechanisms
The formulation of regulations about natural resources, such as rules on levels and
periods of resource use, were supposed to be made together with resource users via
regular meetings to be held with users. Copies of the management plan and official
reports were to be shared with all key stakeholders, and mechanisms for individuals and
stakeholders to contribute to decision-making were supposed to be implemented
(Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a). There was no clear discussion at the
planning stage, however, of what is implied by such mechanisms or how they will ensure
the participation of local stakeholders. For instance, there was no elaboration on how the
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hostility and mistrust of the local people, known as a fact by the project team, would be
overcome in operationalizing participatory mechanisms. Likewise, how dissemination of
information and effective participation of all stakeholders would be ensured, at the face
of existing local inequalities, was not addressed during the formulation of the GEF
project plans. In addition, similar to the case in Sultan Sazlığı, the specifics of the
decision-making processes, e.g. rules on decision-making, how binding the decisions
would be, etc. were not fleshed out.
During on-site implementation, the project team’s strategy had been first to gain
local people’s trust to overcome their hostility. They frequently visited the villages in
order to do so. Initially, the project team preferred to have informal conversations with
local people about the project instead of holding formal meetings. This has proved
successful, to some extent, in breaking local people’s skepticism about the project and in
changing their perceptions of the national park. The project team holds that the locals
started feeling more comfortable in communicating their demands and opinions as a
result of this strategy. More formal meetings at each village were held afterwards;
announcement of these meetings was the responsibility of village heads, but the project
team visited the area frequently to make sure that the information about the meetings (and
about the project activities in general) was widely announced.
In addition to informal and formal meetings held at villages, village-level
representatives, including the village head, village cooperative head, and representatives
from each neighborhood, were elected. The representatives (other than the village head
and the cooperative head) were chosen by the villagers themselves and the project team
did not intervene in how they were chosen. Village-level representatives attended regular
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meetings, usually held somewhere outside of the area.

At these meetings, drafts of the

management plan (and associated micro-plans), guidelines on resource use, information
on small grants and on project activities were shared with the representatives.
Representatives participated in the decision-making process by voicing their opinions on
the suggestions made by the project team. Revisions were made when a consensus among
the representatives and project team was reached. The representatives were responsible of
sharing information about the meetings with people in their respective villages.
Despite these formal and informal measures taken to ensure that information
about the project was disseminated, field interviews indicate that most people, although
aware of the existence of the project, do not have accurate information about what it
aimed at. Most interviewees among the local people acknowledged that the project team
frequently visited the area to hold meetings and stated that they had been informed of the
meetings, but the majority reported not having attended. Some stated that they never
attended the meetings because they do not want anything (from the state) other than the
resolution of the property rights issue. Similarly, many stated they did not attend
meetings because they were critical of the GEF project; they held that infrastructural
problems should be prioritized if a project is to be implemented and that Köprülü Kanyon
does not need another conservation project.
Another pronounced reason for being skeptical of the project and refusing to
participate in project activities was the expectation that it would only bring additional
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The project team head stated that holding meetings outside of the area was a deliberate
strategy. He stated that the local people affected each other’s attitudes negatively and
that people who were sympathetic of the project were shown hostility by fellow villagers.
When meetings were held at places outside of the area, people seemed more open and
welcoming.
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constraints on the resource use and restrict livelihoods. It was repeated a number of times
that when the team first approached local people, they only mentioned the zoning plans
and failed to inform them adequately about the aim of the project or specific activities
associated with it. As a result, local people’s suspicion grew and they thought their
expectations of more restrictions were validated. In addition, the idea of outsiders coming
in to “protect the resources” further antagonized them, since they held that the local
residents are the best protectors of resources.
Apart from skepticism about the project itself, mistrust of the decision-making
mechanisms was a significant reason underlying non-participation by local people. The
anticipation that their opinions would not be taken into account served as a deterrent,
crystallized in statements such as “[The project team] would not have listened to us
anyway, why should we have gone?” or “All [the project team] want[s] is to make more
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rules, they don’t want to listen to what people think”.

Very few among the

interviewees, on the other hand, reported having attended meetings and felt that their
views were taken into account.
Interestingly enough, distrust, both to the project and its decision-making
processes, seemed to have motivated some participation as well as non-participation.
That is to say, being skeptical of the kinds of decisions that would be made, regulations
that would be passed, etc. has been an important driving force for those who participated
in decision-making mechanisms. Those who acknowledged participating in management
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This mechanism, coined as “the rule of anticipated reaction” by Friedrich (1937), is in
fact a manifestation of power relations. Accordingly, the powerless does not raise
demands anticipating the likely reaction of the powerful. Akbulut and Soylu (2010)
operationalize this concept in analyzing the role of power relations in participatory
decision-making in natural resource management.
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meetings either insinuated or explicitly stated that their motive was to “witness” the
process and ensure that no decisions that would disadvantage them would come out of the
meetings. This finding illustrates that multiple motivations can underlie participation, and
how trust/distrust can operate in contradictory ways.
Based on these accounts it seems that the project has not been successful in
operationalizing participatory decision-making mechanisms. The quantitative data
provides striking evidence in line with this observation: as depicted in table 4.23, less
than 31 percent of the representative survey sample in Köprülü Kanyon (123 out of 401
people) were aware of the project. Within this group, only 21 people have seen a
document related to the project, and only 19 people have seen a draft of the management
plan. Only 36% of the people who have been informed of the GEF project knew about
the management meetings. Within this group of 44 people, 17 participated in the
meetings, and only 10 spoke up to voice opinions, as can be seen in figure 4.10. Given
this picture, the local people’s evaluations of the participatory mechanisms, depicted in
figure 4.11, are hardly surprising: they overwhelmingly stated that the project has been
unsuccessful in operationalizing participatory decision-making mechanisms.
Tables 4.24 and 4.25 probe into the reasons underlying participation and nonparticipation: as can be seen, the conviction that the local people should be making the
decisions about Köprülü Kanyon seems to be the most prominent reason for both actual
and hypothetical participation. Regarding non-participation, on the other hand,
inappropriate meeting times and locations is the most prevalent reason, while distrust to
the decision-making mechanism is also pronounced.
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The failure of participatory mechanism in Köprülü Kanyon is clearly related to
the locals’ skepticism, precipitated by the history of paternalist state-society relationships
in the area. The failure to alter locals’ perceptions and expectations was exacerbated by
poor institutional design and the project team’s lack of necessary expertise and
experience. Although the project team undertook ad hoc and informal methods of
ensuring participation by local people, sustainable and well-working participatory
mechanisms could not be established. Lack of competence (in institutional design, lack of
necessary organizational skills and expertise), in addition to the paternalistic style of
governance of the Turkish state, was responsible for the failure of participatory
mechanisms.

4.3.3.5 Ineffectiveness of Alternative Livelihoods
One of the aims of the GEF project was the promotion of alternative,
environmentally-friendly livelihoods by distributing small grants to local stakeholders.
In Köprülü Kanyon, information related to the SGP was to be disseminated by meetings
separately held in every village. These meetings would be the first step in establishing
village-related working groups, one per every settlement, whose main responsibility
would be to help residents with the development of project proposals and the process of
application. The groups were envisaged to comprise of two representatives from each
neighborhood in the settlement, the village head, the head of village cooperative and the
heads of other village associations and to work in close collaboration with the project
team. Furthermore, the project team introduced additional (site-specific) criteria for the
selection of proposals, which included rewarding applications submitted by women or
those directly affected by grazing constraints by premium points in evaluation.
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The introduction of premium criteria that rewards female applicants, or those who
are negatively affected by grazing constraints, are positive steps towards ameliorating
local inequalities. Some features built-in to the process of information dissemination,
however, could also lead to inequitable outcomes. More specifically, there was no
institutionalized mechanism set up to monitor how effectively the village working groups
disseminated information about the SGP. It is conceivable that the village groups would
selectively share information. If, for instance, it would not be appropriate for women to
apply, according to the prevailing gender norms, they might have just disseminated the
information among men.
Although it seems to have fared relatively better than in Sultan Sazlığı, the SGP
could not make a significant change in local people’s livelihoods or welfare in Köprülü
Kanyon, either. Field interviews indicate that although many people have heard of the
grants, only a few have applied despite the project team’s genuine efforts to mobilize
applications and by providing guidance, training and motivation (field interviews, 2008).
A total of 45 projects, as listed in table 4.26, were funded with a $300,000 budget.
It was repeated a number of times that the local people did not apply to the SGP
as a way of protesting the national park authorities, manifested in the words “We don’t
want [the project team’s] money, we don’t want anything from them, we just want them
to leave”. Furthermore, those who received grant support were subject to hostility by
fellow villagers, as they were seen as “accomplices” to the national park authorities. In
Altınkaya, for instance, a few applicants started the process but withdrew their
applications, as they would have been stigmatized if they went ahead. It was also
reported that the village heads in the lower canyon area did not share the information
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with the local people, as they were on bad terms with the project team and did not want
anyone to participate (field interviews, 2008). Based on these accounts, the conflictual
relationship between local people and the project team seems to be responsible for the
low participation in the SGP, too.
With few exceptions, grant receivers stated that they have benefited only
meagerly. Beekeeping has not taken off as an alternative livelihood since most bees either
abandoned the beehives or were dead by the end of the first year. Most of fruit orchards
supported by the SGP dried out due to irrigation difficulties in upland villages. Although
trainings were given on handicrafts and weaving, and materials were purchased, these
activities failed to become sustainable livelihood options since there were no markets to
sell the products. Similarly, most ecotourism projects (B&B and camping projects) could
not take off financially. The recipients complained that they could attract very few
tourists due to difficulties of transportation, inability to promote their facilities
effectively, and lack of business connections with tourism agencies that regularly serves
the area. An exception to this general feeling, however, can be found in Çaltepe, where
the owners of two B&B supported by the SGP felt they have benefited greatly from the
programme. In addition, an oregano festival has been organized for three consecutive
years with SGP support, during which the villagers could sell surplus agricultural and
animal products, as well as oregano. It seems that the oregano festival served effectively
as a market and helped generate monetary income for villagers.
To summarize, although a few recipients have been quite content with the
program, the overall sentiment held by the local people was that the SGP could not have
been a solution unless infrastructure was established. Distance from markets, poor
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transportation opportunities, and absence of advertising for ecotourism have been
important reasons why supported livelihoods could not become viable, long-lived
options. It seems that a more comprehensive approach that tackles especially the
inadequacy of infrastructure is needed for SGP’s vision to be accomplished.
The quantitative data on the SGP illustrates these points raised. Of the 123 people
who were aware of the GEF project, only seventeen, less than 14 percent, applied to the
SGP, among which ten actually received grant support. Among the ten SGP recipients
within the sample, three stated that it had no impact on their welfare, while four stated
that it had affected them negatively. Only two respondents stated that they had benefited
from the SGP.
Those who have not applied, on the other hand, cited information-related
constraints to be the major reason on non-participation in the SGP: 57 people, 54 percent
of those who have not applied to the SGP, stated they have not been informed of it at all;
and sixteen people, 15 percent of the non-applicants, stated they were not adequately
informed. It is also worth noting that the conviction that the SGP was against the
interests of the local people, i.e. the motivation to protest the project, has been stated as a
reason by twelve people, making up eleven percent of the non-applicants. The overall
dissatisfaction with the SGP is reflected in the local people’s evaluations, attested by the
fact that the majority of the people who were aware of the project have assessed it to be
unsuccessful, as shown in figure 4.12.
To recapitulate, apart from the strife between the local people and the project
team, local dynamics and the project team’s failure to break locals’ perceptions by
adequately informing them about the SGP explain the limited interest in the program.

237

Lack of competence again lies behind the failure of the SGP in realizing a shift to
alternative livelihoods. The program was carried out as if providing grants to local
people, by itself, would be sufficient for the promotion of alternative livelihoods.
Difficulties related to infrastructural facilities, such as distance to markets, poor
transportation opportunities and irrigation systems, and lack of business connections with
the tourism sector, were not taken into account, signaling the absence of necessary skills
and resources on the side of the project team. Therefore, many of the supported projects
failed to become sustainable, and locals reverted to traditional livelihood practices.
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4.3.3.6 Failure to Realize Gender Equality
The level of awareness of the GEF project and its activities is strikingly low
among women (field interviews, 2008). Very few women knew about the project, and if
so they often had partial information about it, i.e. they knew that the national park
employees have frequently visited the area for some reason but did not exactly know
why. None of the female interviewees attended meetings where decisions about resource
use were made, although quite a few had received trainings or grants. It was clear,
however, that women’s involvement in project activities usually happened through
initiatives of the project team, as discussed below.
The project team relied on the help of two female members, who were familiar
with the area by virtue of being employees of the national park, in trying to ensure
women’s participation in project activities. The team was well aware of the challenges
posed by the prevailing gender norms in the area, i.e. they were aware that it would not
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The project team holds the central state bureaucracy responsible for this. They stated
that the central bureaucracy is not operating with a comprehensive, holistic approach and
fail to take measure to ensure sustainability of GEF project activities in general.
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appropriate for women to attend to formal meetings. Therefore, they opted to conduct
informal discussions with women or held women-only activities in order to ensure
women’s participation. Furthermore, female applicants to the SGP was encouraged by
the introduction of the premium criteria, as discussed previously, and a number of grants
were distributed to female recipients, as can be seen in table 4.26. Namely, the orchard
project, cotton cord weaving project and plastic arts training and production projects were
directed to women.
Both men and women among interviewees and the project team members
acknowledged the role played by the prevailing gender norms as obstacles to women’s
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participation in the meetings and activities associated with the project.

It is not

considered women’s “place” to attend meetings on such matters or voice opinions.
Women frequently stated that they are not educated enough to participate in meetings, or
interact with national park employees, and that their husbands would know better and
would represent their interests as well, evidenced by statements such as “women do not
go to meetings here” or “it is men’s job to make decisions, not women’s”. In addition,
women’s work regarding natural resources, such as collecting wood and grazing animals,
is devalued and made invisible, which conceivably contributed to lack of women’s
participation. This devaluation is internalized by women; as I have discussed in section
4.3.1.3, when asked what types of work they are engaged in, most women answered they
did not work, but listed the daily unpaid productive activities they undertake when
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One male interviewee, when asked if any women attended meetings and why they have
not, replied by saying “There are women’s rights in urban areas but they have not arrived
in our villages yet”.
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prompted. Due to such perceptions about women’s unpaid labor held by both men and
women, women’s participation in meetings was considered irrelevant.
Furthermore, the history of the relationship between the locals and the national
park has exacerbated the negative impact of gender norms on women’s effective
participation in meetings and other project activities. Attempts at inducing women’s
participation were undercut by the general feeling of hostility towards the project team.
An anecdote attests to this observation. A weaving training project directed to women in
Altınkaya was initiated by the project team, who state that considerable progress was
made in breaking women’s skepticism. The group, however, withdrew from participation
when the application process was about to be finalized, as the village men convinced
them that the project was a strategy to co-opt them.
The quantitative data provided by the survey illustrate the poor level of women’s
awareness of the project and its activities, as well as their lack of participation in them.
Table 4.27 depicts the prevalence of women’s awareness and participation. Of the 139
women within the sample, only 32 (23 percent) were aware of the project, eleven (8
percent) have been informed of the management meetings, and nine (6 percent) have
been informed of training activities. Only four (3 percent), on the other hand, have seen a
draft of the management plan. Strikingly, only three (2 percent) women within the
sample participated in the meetings, while none applied to the SGP.
The data on the reasons of non-participation by women demonstrate the role of
time and location constraints, as well as that of distrust. As can be seen in table 4.28, 30
percent of the female non-participators stated inappropriate meeting times and locations
as the reason why they have not participated. This finding is suggestive of how gender
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norms can operate to impede women’s participation if restrictions on women’s mobility
and labor responsibilities are not taken into account. On the other hand, one of the most
pronounced reasons for female hypothetical non-participation was distrust to the
decision-making mechanism: 31 percent of the women who declared they would not have
participated even if they were informed of the management meetings.

4.4 Conclusion
The GEF projects in Turkey were officially concluded in 2007 with the
termination of seven years of funding. The standing plans prepared for the management
of Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon add cruel irony to their failure in accomplishing
what they have promised: sustainable resource use could not be ensured in either site,
participatory decision-making could not be operationalized, let alone sustained; and the
efforts to promote alternative income-generating activities made no significant change in
the local people’s livelihood practices. This chapter delineated the failure of the Turkish
state in implementing sustainable development via the GEF projects in these two
localities, highlighting the local manifestation of the Turkish state’s structural
characteristics and their interactions with the local dynamics.

In doing so, it also

provided a detailed portrayal of the background of state-society relationships and
sustainable development in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon.
I have argued that the Turkish state’s hegemonic practices have most visibly
crystallized as the persistence of agricultural growth in Sultan Sazlığı, and hindered both
the formulation and the implementation of effective policies to address the issue of water
scarcity. The prioritization of agricultural growth is detectable in the history of state
policies pursued in the region, as well as in the GEF project. In Köprülü Kanyon, on the
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other hand, the paternalistic style adopted by the Turkish state in relating to the society,
together with the patronage networks it erupts, undercut the implementation of local
sustainable development. While the discontent precipitated by the top-down governance
has made it almost impossible to enforce any kind of policy, including those envisaged
by the GEF project, the locally powerful’s evasion of environmental regulations by virtue
of patronage further curtailed sustainable development implementation.
The arguments I have put forth in this chapter underscore the importance of the
historical making of these localities for sustainable development efforts. In the case of
Sultan Sazlığı, I have demonstrated how the pursuit of agricultural growth, a symptom of
the Turkish state’s growth-oriented modernization project, has not only set off resource
use processes that severely damaged the environment, but also instigated an incentive
structure, namely of unsustainable use of water by the farmers, which now proves
difficult to alter. In Köprülü Kanyon I have shown that the state’s paternalistic gaze has
alienated and antagonized the local people, and rendered the place “unmanageable”, with
important implications for the implementation of sustainable development. Furthermore,
the discussion in this chapter illustrates how local inequalities are produced and/or
perpetuated by the failure of sustainable development. The case of the reed cutters in
Sultan Sazlığı is a striking exemplar of this dimension: not only have they been hit worst
by water scarcity, shouldering the burden of the deterioration of their sole livelihood, but
also were subjected to the only effective restriction of the GEF project in terms of
resource use, namely the stipulations of the reed cutting plan, while irrigated farming
goes undisrupted.
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The role of inequalities, together with that of perceptions and anticipations, were
underscored in the analysis of participatory decision-making as well. A wealth of
qualitative findings and quantitative descriptions show that the GEF projects in both
Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon have failed to induce the effective participation of
local people in decision-making processes, starting at the level of informedness; the
marginalized groups in these communities have been excluded from taking part in these
processes. Given that these groups are also the losers in the failure of sustainable
development in the two sites, e.g. reed cutters vs. the farmers in Sultan Sazlığı, upland
villagers vs. the rafting sector in Köprülü Kanyon, their exclusion from decision-making
is an important obstacle to the effective implementation of environmental protection.
Against this backdrop, chapter 5 complements the present chapter by a engaging
in a quantitative investigation. Specifically, chapter 5 delves into the examination of two
dimensions of local sustainable development in particular: participation in the decisionmaking mechanisms of the GEF project, and willingness to contribute to communitylevel mobilizations to enforce sustainable development.
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Table 4.1 Agricultural land and crop pattern in Sultan Sazlığı, by settlement
Settlement

Total Arable
Land (ha)

Cereals

Sugar Beet Sunflower

Wheat,
Yes
Yes
barley
Wheat,
Musahacılı
1,655
Yes
Yes
barley
Wheat,
Soysallı
1,005
Yes
Yes
barley, rye
Wheat,
Çayırözü
213
Yes
Yes
barley
Wheat,
Ovaçiftlik
1,000
Yes
Yes
barley
Wheat,
Yeşilova
1,190
Yes
Yes
barley
Wheat,
Yenihayat
136
Yes
Yes
barley
Source: Karabaşa, 2002; Şarkışla, 2002; field interviews, 2008
Sindelhöyük

1,319

Animal
feed

Fruits

Yes

Apple

Yes

Apple,
melon

Yes

Apple

No

No

No

Apple

No

Apple

No

No

Table 4.2 Livestock ownership in Sultan Sazlığı, by settlement
Settlement
Sindelhöyük
Musahacılı
Soysallı
Çayırözü
Ovaçiftlik
Yeşilova
Yenihayat
Source: Şarkışla, 2002.

Cattle
(Beef and Water Buffalo)

Sheep

5048
500
800
920
500
500
200

13700
3000
7000
1600
2000
1000
1000

244

Table 4.3 Prevalence of reed-cutting in Sultan Sazlığı, by settlement

Sindelhöyük

1000

Number of ReedCutting Households
(2002)
200

Ovaçiftlik

120

84

70%

Yeşilova

115

83

72%

15

60%

Settlement

Number of
Households (2002)

Yenihayat
25
Source: Karabaşa, 2002; Şarkışla, 2002.

Proportion of ReedCutting Households
(2002)
20%

Table 4.4 Crop pattern in Develi plain
Crop Type
Cereals
Beans
Fruits
Sugar beet
Fodder
Sunflower
Vegetables
Source: Gürer, 2004.

Area Cultivated
(ha)
51, 607
7, 580
6, 348
4, 407
2, 060
1, 800
1, 463
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Proportion of Total Arable
Land in the Basin
66%
10%
8%
6%
3%
2%
2%

Table 4.5 GEF project activities in Sultan Sazlığı
Year
2002
2002
2003
2004

Activity
SGP promotion
meetings
Awareness raising
on ecotourism
Meetings on water
use and grazing
plans
Reed cutting plan
meetings

Participants
Local people, project team
Project team, tour operators
Project team, local administrators,
municipalities, local NGOs

Stakeholder
opinions collected

Project team, local administrators,
reed companies, consultants
Project team, provincial
governorships, mayors, village
heads
Local people, project team,
provincial governorship, local
administrators

Stakeholder
opinions collected
Revisions based
on stakeholder
input were made

2005

Reed cutting plan
meetings

2005

SGP presentation
meetings

2005

SGP local
management board

Project team, community
representatives

2005

SGP assessment
meetings

Project team, local management
board

Sharing of
management plan
with stakeholders
Raising awareness
of local
administrators
about the project

Project team, general directorate of
nature conservation and national
parks, mayors, village heads.

2005

2005

2005,
2007

Bird watching day

2006

Sharing of zoning
plan drafts

2006

SGP trainings

2007

Monitoring of
SGPs

Output

SGP local
management
board was
established
Selection of
projects to be
supported by SGP

Project team, general directorate of
ministry and environment, village
heads, mayors, district governors
Project team, local governors,
representatives from directorate of
environment and forestry, local
people
Project team, representatives from
local settlements
Project team, local pre-evaluation
committee, supported project
participators
Project team, local management
board
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Monitoring and
assessment of
SGP projects

Table 4.6 Unpacking the failure in Sultan Sazlığı

Water Use

Scale of the
project

X

Prevailing
irrigation
methods

X

Reed cutting
Failure to
implement
participatory
mechanisms
Ineffectiveness of
alternative
livelihoods
Failure to realize
gender equality

Lack of
motivation/
incentives/
competence

Patronage

X

Crop pattern in
the plain

Illegal deep
wells

Paternalistic
State

Explanations of
Failure 
Features of Failure

Growth
Orientation

State Level
Local Level

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Local power
relations,
perceptions

X
X
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Collective
action, myopic
vision
Collective
action, myopic
vision
Collective
action, myopic
vision
Collective
action, myopic
vision

Gender norms

Table 4.7 Evaluation of participatory mechanisms in Sultan Sazlığı, by livelihood
Source of
livelihood
Reed cutter
(20)
Animal
grazer
(58)
Farmer
(86)

13
(65%)

4
(20%)

Neither
successful
nor
unsuccessful
1
(5%)

25
(43%)

12
(21%)

10
(17%)

5
(9%)

5
(9%)

36
(42%)

14
(16%)

15
(17%)

11
(13%)

7
(8%)

Definitely
Unsuccessful
unsuccessful

Successful

Definitely
successful

2
(10%)

--

Table 4.8 Knowledge of GEF and GEF-related activities, Sultan Sazlığı
Dimensions of Awareness

Number of observations

Proportion (%)

Have heard of GEF

174

46.15

Have seen GEF-related
documents*

55

31.61

Have seen management
plan draft*

41

23.74

Have heard of training
activities*

67

38.51

Have heard of management
meetings*

82

47.13

Note: The sample for the asterisked dimensions consists of only those who have heard of
the GEF project.
Table 4.9 Reasons for participation in management meetings, Sultan Sazlığı

Participators
(50)
Hypothetical
participators
(77)

“Local people
should make the
decisions about the
area”
23
(46%)

“Meeting topics were
concerning my
interests”

“I wished to see
what was going
to be discussed”

10
(20%)

17
(34%)

22
(29%)

24
(31%)

31
(40%)
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“It
would
be
inappropriate for me
to go to the
meetings”

7
(22%)
14
(44%)
2
(6%)
2
(6%)
2
(6%)
5
(15%)

10
(67%)
1
(7%)
4
(27%)
__
__
__
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“I was not properly
informed”

“I did not think my
participation
was
necessary”

“I did not trust the
meetings”

“Meeting times and
locations were not
appropriate”

Nonparticipators
(32)
Hypothetical
Nonparticipators
(15)
“Meeting
topics
were not concerning
my interests”

Table 4.10 Reasons for non-participation in management meetings, Sultan Sazlığı

Table 4.11 SGP supported projects, Sultan Sazlığı
Project Name
Develi Plain Effective
Use of Water
Resources
Fly Birds Fly,
Immigrate to Sultan
Sazlığı
Photo Safari in Sultan
Sazlığı
Labor Coming to Our
Table From Marshes:
Straw Mats

Location
All project
villages

Objectives
Promotion of waterefficient irrigation
methods

Develi
Municipality

Biodiversity
awareness raising

Develi
Municipality

Promotion of Sultan
Sazlığı
Promotion and
protection of
traditional reed-based
livelihoods

Develi
Municipality

Activities
Training provided to
130 farmers
900 primary school
kids given education
Photo contest
5 women trained,
mats displayed in
local markets
22 people trained,
beehives and
equipment
purchased
Training to 145
farmers (18 women),
80% of sugar beet
producers switched
to sprinkler systems
Machinery
purchased, fodder
seeds distributed to
34 farmers

Musahacılı

Promotion of
beekeeping as an
alternative livelihood

Training on Modern
Irrigation Techniques

Musahacılı

Promotion of waterefficient irrigation
methods

Fodder Plant Growing
and Processing

Musahacılı

Relieving grazing
pressure on pastures

Reed Weaving
Facilities

Sindelhöyük

Revival and promotion
of reed weaving

Reed weaving
machines purchased

Awareness Raising
among the town youth

Yeşilhisar

Training and
awareness raising on
the biodiversity

85 people were
provided education

Sultan Sazlığı Barbara
Bed & Breakfast

Ovaçiftlik

Promotion of
ecotourism

Purchase of
equipment for the
B&B

Çayırözü

Awareness raising on
biodiversity

Purchase of
equipment

Yeşilhisar

Awareness raising on
biodiversity

1250 people were
taken to excursions

Emek Bee Joint
Venture

Çayırözü Primary
School Environment
Club
Excursion and
Training Program
Continued on next page
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Table 4.11 (continued) SGP supported projects, Sultan Sazlığı
Project Name

Location

Objectives

Planting of Almond
and Walnut Orchards

Yeşilhisar

Promotion of
alternative livelihoods

Yeşilhisar

Building local
capacity and
encourage local
activities for
conservation

Establishment of the
NGO, purchase of
office equipment

Yeşilhisar

Promotion of Sultan
Sazlığı

Distributed to public
institutions, NGOs
and local TV
channels

Association for the
Protection and
Sustainability of
Sultan Sazlığı
Documentary
Advertisement Movie
for Sultan Sazlığı
Training for
Sprinkling Irrigation
Piping Workmanship
Productive Irrigation
Systems Training and
Application
Development of Stock
Raising and
Decreasing Use of
Water in Agriculture

Yeşilhisar
Yeşilhisar

Yeşilova

Yeşilova Village
Sprinkling Irrigation
System

Yeşilova

Sprinkling Irrigation
System

Ovaçiftlik

Construction of a
Park Area in
Ovaçiftlik Village
Education and
Enlightenment in
Villages and Schools
Sultan Bed &
Breakfast

Ovaçiftlik
Sindelhöyük

Ovaçiftlik

Promotion of waterefficient irrigation
methods
Promotion of waterefficient irrigation
methods
Promotion of waterefficient irrigation
methods and non-land
livelihoods
Promotion of waterefficient irrigation
methods
Promotion of waterefficient irrigation
methods
Training and
awareness raising on
biodiversity
Training and
awareness raising on
biodiversity
Promotion of
ecotourism as an
alternative livelihood
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Activities
Sample orchard with
sprinkler irrigation,
100 seedlings
distributed

Irrigation piping
training to 30 people
43 farmers received
training
40 farmers received
training
Equipment
purchased,
demonstrative
training
Switch to sprinkler
irrigation system on
one apple orchard
Building of training
and awareness
raising center
24 people trained on
biodiversity
Equipment
purchased for the
B&B

Table 4.12 Awareness and participation of women, Sultan Sazlığı
Yes
Knows GEF
61 (35%)
Seen document
11 (6%)
Seen draft of management plan
5 (3%)
Attended training
18 (10%)
Applied to the SGP
0 (0%)
Knows meeting
20 (11%)
Attended meeting
7 (4%)
Note: Reported percentages are of females within the sample

No
114 (65%)
50 (29%)
56 (32%)
43 (25%)
61 (35%)
41 (24%)
13 (31%)

“I
was
properly
informed”

2
(15%)

1
(8%)

__

__

7
(70%)

1
(10%)

2
(30%)

__

__

__
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not

“I did not think
my participation
was necessary”

8
(62%)

“It would be
inappropriate for
me to go to the
meetings”

2
(15%)

“Meeting topics
were
not
concerning my
interests”
“Meeting times
and
locations
were
not
appropriate”
Nonparticipators
(13)
Hypothetica
l
Nonparticipators
(10)

“I did not trust
the meetings”

Table 4.13 Reasons for female non-participation, Sultan Sazlığı

Table 4.14 Main sources of livelihood in Köprülü Kanyon, by settlement
Settlements

Main Sources of Livelihood

Beşkonak

Livestock breeding, seasonal labor
and seasonal forestry, tourism

Karabük

Livestock breeding, seasonal labor
and seasonal forestry, tourism

Altınkaya

Livestock breeding, seasonal labor,
tourism

Gaziler

Livestock breeding

Ballıbucak

Livestock breeding, seasonal labor,
some beekeeping

Çaltepe

Oregano harvesting, livestock
breeding, agriculture, beekeeping

Değirmenözü

Livestock breeding, seasonal labor
and seasonal forestry

Hasdümen

Livestock breeding, seasonal labor

Demirciler

Livestock breeding, agriculture,
seasonal labor

Yeşilvadi
Source: Field interviews, 2008

Livestock breeding
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Table 4.15 Livestock ownership in Köprülü Kanyon, by settlement
Number of Goats and

Settlements

Sheep

Number of Cattle

Beşkonak

3,000

1,000

Karabük

1,000
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Altınkaya

1,000-1500

500-600

Gaziler

6,000

150

Ballıbucak

2,000

500

Çaltepe

3,000

150

Değirmenözü

5,000

450

Hasdümen

1,500

100

Demirciler

500-600

100-150

Yeşilvadi

300-350

40-50

Source: Çetin, 2003
Table 4.16 Agricultural land use in Köprülü Kanyon, by settlement
Total Cultivated

Area under Dry

Area under Irrigated

Land (ha)

Farming (ha)

Farming (ha)

Beşkonak

1200

800

400

Karabük

700

700

-

Altınkaya

35

35

-

Gaziler

800

800

-

Ballıbucak

150

150

-

Çaltepe

150

50

100

Değirmenözü

600

450

150

Hasdümen

300

200

100

Demirciler

100

80

20

Yeşilvadi

70

70

-

Beydilli

15

15

-

Settlements

Source: Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a
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Table 4.17 Average landholding size and agricultural production in Köprülü
Kanyon, by settlement

Beşkonak

Average
land per
household
(ha)
3

Karabük

4-5

Yes

No

No

No

No

Altınkaya

2.5-3

Yes

No

Yes

Little

No

5-6

Yes

No

Yes

Little

No

Ballıbucak

3

Yes

No

Yes

Little

No

Çaltepe

1

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1-2

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Hasdümen

2.5-3

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Demirciler

1.5-2

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Little

Yeşilvadi

1-1.5

Yes

Yes

Little

Yes

Little

Settlements

Gaziler

Değirmenözü

Grains

Beans

Root
Vegetables

Fruits

Vegetables

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Source: Çetin, 2003
Table 4.18 Number of people employed in seasonal jobs in Köprülü Kanyon, by
settlement

Beşkonak

Number of people working in
seasonal jobs
100-120

Karabük

40-60

10-16%

Altınkaya

40-60

11-16%

80

29%

Ballıbucak

None

__

Çaltepe

None

__

Değirmenözü

100-150

34-51%

Hasdümen

100-110

47-52%

Demirciler

30-40

19-25%

Yeşilvadi

30-35

26-30%

Beydilli

None

__

Settlements

Gaziler

Source: Çetin, 2003
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Share of population over 18
9-10%

Table 4.19 Education and health facilities in Köprülü Kanyon, by settlement
Settlement

Education

Health

Beşkonak

Two 5-year schools
One 8-year school

One village clinic, no
doctors.

Karabük

One 5-year school

No facilities.

Altınkaya

One 5-year school

No facilities.

No facilities

No facilities.

Ballıbucak

One 5-year school

One village clinic, no
personnel.

Çaltepe

One 5-year school

No facilities.

Değirmenözü

One 5-year school

Gaziler

One village clinic, no
personnel.
One village clinic, no
personnel.

Hasdümen

No facilities

Demirciler

One 5-year school

No facilities.

Yeşilvadi

One 5-year school

No facilities.

One five-year school, no
No facilities
personnel
Source: Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a; field interviews, 2008
Beydilli
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Table 4.20 Electricity, water and transportation facilities in Köprülü Kanyon, by
settlement
Settlement

Electricity

Drinking water

Transportation

Beşkonak

Yes

Sufficient

Private vehicles

Karabük

Yes

Insufficient in
summer

Village owned bus

Altınkaya

Yes

Insufficient

Private vehicles

Gaziler

Yes

Insufficient

Other villages’
buses

Ballıbucak

Yes

Insufficient in
summer

Private vehicles

Çaltepe

Yes

Sufficient

Village owned bus

Değirmenözü

Yes

Insufficient

Village coop
owned bus

Hasdümen

Yes

Insufficient

Village owned bus

Demirciler

Yes

Sufficient

Village owned bus

Yeşilvadi

Yes

Insufficient

Private vehicles

Insufficient in
Private vehicles
summer
Source: Republic of Turkey MEF GDNCNP, 2007a; field interviews, 2008
Beydilli

No
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Table 4.21 GEF project activities in Köprülü Kanyon
Year

Activity

2001

Formation of local committees

2001
2002

Project promotion meeting
Beşkonak
Sustainable grazing meeting

Participants
GEF project team, local people,
representatives of NGO's, village
heads
in

GEF project team, local people
GEF project team, goat shepherds

2005
2005

GEF project team, flora specialist,
factory agricultural
provincial
director,
Çaltepe village association and
cooperation presidents, villagers
Meetings for the selection of GEF project team, village heads, local
stakeholders
people
GEF project team, stakeholder
Governance model meetings
representatives
GEF project team, representatives
Selge Cultural Management Plan
from the Ministry of Culture and
meeting
Tourism, villagers
Grant informative meeting
GEF project team, local people
SGP promotion meeting
GEF project team, local people

2006

Zoning information meeting

2003

2004
2005
2005

Oregano
processing
preliminary meeting

GEF project team, local people

2006

GEF project team, representatives
Selge Cultural Management Plan from the Ministry of Culture and
meeting
Tourism, village representatives,
NGO's and stakeholders
Informative meeting on the project GEF project team, local people

2006

Awareness building meeting

GEF project team, local people

2006

SGP evaluation meeting

GEF project team, grant recipients

2007

Beydilli cultural village meeting

GEF project team, local people

2006
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Table 4.22 Unpacking the Failure in Köprülü Kanyon

1. Conflict and perceptions
2. Failure to Implement
Sustainable Resource Use
3. Lack of holistic
management mechanisms
4. Failure to implement
participatory mechanisms
5. Ineffectiveness of
alternative livelihoods
6. Failure to realize gender
equality

Lack of
motivation/
Competence

Patronage

Paternalistic
State

Explanations of Failure 
Features of Failure

Growth
Orientation

State Level

X
X

X

X
X

Local Level

Local power
relations- winners
of unruliness
Local power
relations

X

X

X

X

Perceptions

X

X

Perceptions

X

Gender norms

Table 4.23 Knowledge of GEF and GEF-related activities, Köprülü Kanyon
Dimensions of Awareness

Number of observations

Proportion (%)

Have heard of GEF

123

30.67

Have seen GEF-related
documents*

21

17.07

Have seen management
plan draft*

19

15.45

Have heard of training
activities*

33

26.83

Have heard of
management meetings*

44

35.77

Note: The sample for the asterisked dimensions consists of only those who have heard of
the GEF project.
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Table 4.24 Reasons for participation in management meetings, Köprülü Kanyon

Participators
(17)
Hypothetical
participators
(46)

“Local people
should make the
decisions about the
area”
10
(58.82%)

“Meeting topics
were concerning my
interests”

“I wished to see
what was going to
be discussed”

5
(29.41%)

2
(11.76%)

13
(24.53%)

10
(18.87%)

30
(56.60%)

8
(29.63%)

3
(11.11%)

4
(14.81%)

5
(18.52%)

10
(38.46%)

3
(11.54%)

4
(15.38%)

8
(30.77%)

1
(3.85%)
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“I did not think
my
participation
was necessary”

“It would be
inappropriate
for me to go to
the meetings”

7
(25.93%)

“I did not trust
the meetings”

“Meeting times
and locations
were not
appropriate”

Nonparticipators
(27)
Hypothetical
Nonparticipators
(26)

“Meeting
topics were not
concerning my
interests”

Table 4.25 Reasons for non-participation in management meetings, Köprülü
Kanyon

Table 4.26 SGP supported projects, Köprülü Kanyon
Project Name
Ballıbucak
Promotional
Project

Location
Ballıbucak

Ballıbucak
Ballıbucak
Handcrafts Project
Kübülük
Traditional Home Ballıbucak
Cuisine
Sheep
Stock
Breeding Project
Selge
Nature
Protection
and
Sustainable
Development
Project
Village
Home
B&B Project
Köprülü Kanyon
Accomodation
Project
Stone
Houses
B&B Project

Altınkaya

Altınkaya

Promotional material was
Promotion of Selge
produced
(brochures,
antique city
website)

Çaltepe

Promotion
ecotourism

of Training,
supplies

purchase

of

Çaltepe

Promotion
ecotourism

of Training,
supplies

purchase

of

Demirciler

Promotion
ecotourism

Cotton
Cord
Demirciler
Weaving Project
Çaltepe
Beekeping
Çaltepe
Development
Projects
Beekeping
Production
and Hasdümen
Marketing Project
Ballıbucak
Beekeping Project

Objectives
Activities
Promotion of the 5 people received training,
village
as
an promotional
brochures
ecotourism center
were prepared
Wood and equipment was
Starting
wooden
purchased,
2
people
handicraft production
received training.
Promotion
of
A stone house was
traditional
home
repaired as a restaurant,
cooking as a touristic
equipment purchased
attraction
Promotion of sheep 30 sheep, fodder and hay
breeding
purchased.

Ballıbucak

Demirciler Cherry
Demirciler
Orchard Project

of Training, purchase of
supplies
Training given to 12
Promotion
of
young women, yarn and
alternative livelihoods
weaving lathes purchased
Promotion
beekeeping

of

Training given to 4
people, hives and bees
purchased

Training given to 4
people, hives and bees
were purchased
Training given to 18
Promotion
of
people, hives and bees
beekeeping
were purchased
Training given to 14
Promotion of organic
people,
purchase
of
fruit production
saplings
Promotion
beekeeping

Continued on next page
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of

Table 4.26 (continued) SGP supported projects, Köprülü Kanyon
Project Name

Location

Objectives

Walnut
Tree
Hasdümen
Orchard Project

Promotion of organic
fruit production

Demirciler
Vineyard Project

Demirciler

Promotion of organic
fruit production

Demirciler
Apricot Project

Demirciler

Promotion of organic
fruit production

Yeşilvadi Apricot
Yeşilvadi
Project

Promotion of organic
fruit production

Altınkaya
Vineyard Project

Altınkaya

Promotion of organic
fruit production

Ballıbucak

Promotion of camping
as an eco-touristic
attraction

Ballıbucak
Camping Project

Karabük Village
Home
B&B Karabük
Project
Beşkonak Village
Beşkonak
Home Project
Karabük,
Plastic
Arts
Beşkonak,
Training
and
Selge,
Production Project
Çaltepe
Beydilli Culture
Beydilli
Village Project

Activities
Training given to 3
people,
purchase
of
saplings
Training given to 6
people,
purchase
of
saplings
Training given to 4
people,
purchase
of
saplings
Training given to 2
people,
purchase
of
saplings
Training given to 25
people,
purchase
of
saplings
Purchase
of
tents,
installment of electrical
and sanitation system,
training

Promotion
ecotourism

of Training and purchase of
supplies

Promotion
ecotourism

of Training
supplies

Promotion
of Training
handcrafts
as
an building,
alternative livelihood
supplies

purchase

of

and capacity
purchase of

Promotion of local
Model homes were chosen
culture
and
and
repaired,
B&B
architecture
as
a
equipment purchased
touristic attraction
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Table 4.27 Awareness and participation of women, Köprülü Kanyon
Yes
Knows GEF
32 (23%)
Seen document
5 (4%)
Seen draft of management plan
4 (3%)
Attended training
9 (6%)
Applied to the SGP
0 (0%)
Knows meeting
11 (8%)
Attended meeting
3 (2%)
Note: Reported percentages are of females within the sample.

No
107 (77%)
27 (19%)
28 (20%)
23 (17%)
32 (23%)
21 (15%)
29 (21%)

Nonparticipators
(27)
Hypothetical
Nonparticipators
(26)

“I did not think
my participation
was necessary”

“I did not trust the
meetings”

“It
would
be
inappropriate for
me to go to the
meetings”

“Meeting
times
and locations were
not appropriate”

“Meeting topics
were
not
concerning
my
interests”

Table 4.28 Reasons for female non-participation, Köprülü Kanyon

7
(26%)

8
(30%)

3
(11%)

4
(15%)

5
(19%)

10
(38%)

3
(12%)

4
(15%)

8
(30%)

1
(4%)
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Figure 4.1 Evaluation of sustainable resource management, Sultan Sazlığı

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people

Figure 4.2 Perceptions about explanations of ineffectiveness, Sultan Sazlığı

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people

264

Figure 4.3 Evaluation of participatory mechanisms, Sultan Sazlığı

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people

Figure 4.4 Evaluation of the project team’s willingness to take locals into account,
Sultan Sazlığı

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people
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Figure 4.5 Evaluation of the project team’s favoring of some groups, Sultan Sazlığı

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people

Figure 4.6 Awareness and participation in the GEF project, Sultan Sazlığı
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Figure 4.7 Evaluation of the SGP, Sultan Sazlığı

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people
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Figure 4.8 Evaluation of sustainable resource management, Köprülü Kanyon

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people
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Figure 4.9 Perceptions about explanations of ineffectiveness, Köprülü Kanyon

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people
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Figure 4.10 Awareness and participation in the GEF project, Köprülü Kanyon

Figure 4.11 Evaluation of participatory mechanisms, Köprülü Kanyon

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people
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Figure 4.12 Evaluation of the SGP, Köprülü Kanyon

Note: Y-axis denotes number of people
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CHAPTER 5
FROM THE QUALITATIVE TO THE QUANTITATIVE: AN ECONOMETRIC
INVESTIGATION

5.1 Introduction
The primary aim of this dissertation is to explore the role of the state-society
relationship in sustainable development in Turkey. The preceding chapters have
undertaken a variety of tasks towards this end, such as the articulation of a theoretical
framework, the formulation of a methodology to study local sustainable development,
and conducting qualitative analyses of local sustainable development via case studies.
This chapter constitutes the quantitative operationalization of the questions informing this
dissertation.
The present chapter delves deeper into participation in GEF’s decision-making
mechanisms, and willingness to contribute to local sustainable development. These two
proxies are used as qualitatively different measures of local sustainable development; the
former represents both a dimension of effective local sustainable development and time
contributions to collective management, and the latter represents contributions in the
form of constrained resource use. These two measures also epitomize community-level
mobilizations, and capture the civil society pillar of sustainable development
implementation.
In particular, this chapter intends to further probe into the Turkish state’s role in
shaping local sustainable development. I hold that the particular histories and
manifestations of state-society relationship can thwart or facilitate both participation and
willingness to contribute. I further postulate that local inequalities and local people’s
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perceptions of the state are two channels in which state-society relationships operate to
shape participation and willingness to contribute. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the
specific histories of state-society relationships in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon
(including the state’s failure to implement sustainable development) have produced
and/or reproduced socio-economic inequalities at the local level. These specific histories
have shaped local people’s perceptions of the Turkish state as a fair arbiter of conflicting
interests and of its priorities in policy-making. Building on these arguments, I see local
inequalities and perceptions as two instances where the state and the society “touch” each
other, so to speak.
In this chapter, I deploy the survey data collected in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü
Kanyon to explore empirically the relationship between local inequalities and the
perceptions of the state, on the one hand, and participation in decision-making and
willingness to contribute to local sustainable development, on the other. Building on the
insights gained from the qualitative study, I utilize socio-economic characteristics, such
as age, education, gender, wealth and source of livelihood, as variables capturing
different dimensions of local inequalities. The perceptions of the state, on the other hand,
are proxied by perceived equal treatment of citizens by the Turkish state, and perceived
priorities given to economic growth and environmental protection in policy-making.
In the following section, I provide an overview by depicting sample
characteristics, and then engage in an in-depth descriptive analysis of the informedness of
the GEF project in general, and of the decision-making mechanisms in particular. In
section 5.3, I undertake an econometric study of the determinants of participation in
decision-making to provide a comparative analysis of Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü
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Kanyon. In section 5.4, I tackle willingness to contribute to local sustainable
development and investigate the factors underlying it econometrically. In section 5.5, I
summarize the main findings and conclude.

5.2 Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics
5.2.1 Overview of Data and Variables
The sampling process and measurement issues have been explained in detail in
chapter 3, where the structure of the survey was also discussed at length. To reiterate, the
sample size in Sultan Sazlığı is 377 and that in Köprülü Kanyon is 401, both of which are
representative of the underlying populations with a 95% level of confidence interval and
0.05 margin of error. A detailed listing of the variables utilized in the present analyses is
given in table 5.1.
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Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics for Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü
Kanyon are provided in tables 5.2-5.8. Statistics based on complete samples are reported
first to familiarize the reader with sample characteristics. As can be seen in proportions
of households earning income from different sources of income, the Sultan Sazlığı
sample is predominantly made up of farmers. The average size of landholdings in the
sample is 15.7 hectares; the median value and the spread of landholding size, on the other
hand, is suggestive of land inequality. Köprülü Kanyon sample also consists mostly of
farmer households, although the sample average of landholding size is much lower.
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All indexed measures are constructed by using a Principal Component Analysis, where
I

index I over variables X is defined as I = ∑ PCi (X i − meanX i ) /StdDevX i , where PCi is
i=1

the first principal component of the variable X i .
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In table 5.4, a comparison of the two samples in terms of means and proportions
of select variables is reported, and differences significant at 95% confidence level are
asterisked. A quick glance suggests notable differences especially in sample means of
community participation proxies. While frequency of participation in labor sharing is
one scale point higher in the Köprülü Kanyon sample on average (corresponding to move
from, say, not participating at all to occasionally participating), all other variables have
74

higher mean values in the Sultan Sazlığı sample.

Recall, however, that these variables

are frequency measures on a scale of 1 to 5; therefore, 0.1 points in participation in
village decisions, even if statistically significant, signifies a small difference in sample
means.
Differences in sample means of state perception variables, on the other hand, are
both statistically significant and large. Again, the differences in sample means should be
interpreted on the scale in which these variables are measured (of 1 to 5). On average, the
level of trust to the national park and the belief that the state treats citizens equally are
much lower in Köprülü Kanyon. This descriptive picture can be interpreted as suggestive
of how perceptions and trust are shaped by the history of state-society relationships, i.e.
rigid conservation rules and overall deficiency of infrastructural services in Köprülü
Kanyon have produced visible skepticism towards the national park and the state’s
fairness in serving its citizens.
Finally, the proportion of females in the Sultan Sazlığı sample is significantly
lower than that in the Köprülü Kanyon sample. This is not surprising given that women
are more visible and vocal in Sultan Sazlığı and given the sampling procedure
74

Although I provide descriptions of variables in table 5.1, more detailed discussion of
variable definitions and measurements can be found in chapter 3.
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followed.

Furthermore, the proportion of people from households whose monthly

incomes are below 250 TL ($159 PPP) is higher in the Sultan Sazlığı sample, by almost
10 percentage points.

5.2.2 Levels of Awareness
This section decomposes sample characteristics by different levels of awareness.
Apart from the general ineffectiveness of the project team in disseminating information
about the project, there are likely to be individual, household and community level
characteristics that explain the degree of awareness, such as education, gender and
wealth. Findings of the qualitative study presented in chapter 4 lend support to this
argument. For example, most female interviewees were unaware that a project had been
implemented in the area, stating that information on such issues was never shared with
them, since women were considered to be ignorant on those issues and it is not their
business to get involved. Many among the reed cutters in Sultan Sazlığı and some
villagers, particularly among the residents of Altınkaya, in Köprülü Kanyon, have
claimed that the project team provided insufficient information to certain groups on
purpose because they did not want to face negative opinions. I utilized quantitative
survey results to demonstrate local people’s perceptions about why they might not have
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Specifically, random sampling at the village and household level were imposed. A
different household member was selected as a respondent if the original randomly
selected household member rejected response. As is typical in rural areas in Turkey,
differential rejection rates between men and women resulted in underrepresentation of
females in sampling.
276

been informed in chapter 4. Here I undertake a more detailed descriptive analysis of
awareness.
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It is conceivable that factors that impinge on being informed of the project and its
activities might be reflected on sample characteristics at the following dimensions, which
were discussed in chapter 2:
• Education: In general, it would be expected that higher level of education would be
positively correlated with awareness. More educated people would find it easier
to access information about the project and activities related with it. It is also
possible that dissemination of information was biased towards the more educated.
That is to say, those responsible for spreading information (e.g. village heads,
project teams) might have specifically targeted the more educated within the
community with the assumption that their involvement in the project is more
important or valuable.
• Involvement in the community: Those who are more involved in community level
activities or more attached to their communities would be more likely to get
exposed to information related to the project and project-related activities.
• Socio-economic power: Certain groups in the community, such as women, the
landless and the poor, are expected to be less likely to be exposed to information
about the project and specific project activities due to local power relations.
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I have opted for a descriptive analysis, rather than empirically modeling the
relationship between being aware and these characteristics, primarily because being
aware is not a choice, but a matter of being exposed to information. That is to say,
awareness is different, for instance, than participation, which ultimately is an individual
choice. A significant part of being aware, on the other hand depends on other agents’
choices. Since I cannot theoretically model the determinants of awareness, as I do with
participation, I confine this analysis to a descriptive level.
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Information about the projects and/or decision-making mechanisms might not
have been shared with such groups (either by the project team or by the village
heads/locally powerful) if their participation was not considered necessary,
leading to their explicit exclusion from such mechanisms. In addition, time and
locality constraints might be binding for those groups, impeding on the flow of
information and leading to their implicit exclusion, e.g. information about the
project and project activities might have been shared at times and places that
effectively prevented some groups from acquiring information.
• Trust in the state: Although theoretically there are no reasons to expect project
awareness to vary systematically with the level of trust in the state (since
awareness is mostly a matter of exposition to information), it is conceivable that
the project team (employees of the national park) might have chosen not to share
information about the project with the more skeptical among the local people. Or,
the skeptics might be more withdrawn from interacting with state officials in
general, which makes exposition to information less likely. Perhaps more
importantly, it is possible that trust in the state varies with power inequalities and
brings about the powerless’ exclusion from information. On the other hand, the
measure of trust in national park authorities in particular might vary among the
subsamples due to differential exposition to the project activities; the qualitative
findings suggest that the projects came to be perceived as exclusively a national
park endeavor. Observed failure (or success) of the projects was thus reflected on
local people’s evaluations of the national park employees, but did not
significantly alter perceptions of the central state or other local state agencies.
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In the following two subsections I undertake awareness-based decompositions of
the Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon samples, respectively. I first tabulate descriptive
statistics on the characteristics of the subsamples of those not aware of the GEF project
and those aware; then I tabulate statistics related to the characteristics of those who have
heard of the meetings and those who have not, among all who are aware of the project.
As before, characteristics whose mean values are statistically different across the relative
subsamples at 95% confidence level are asterisked. An accompanying depiction can be
found in figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, where I provide an overview of sampling stages and
different levels of awareness corresponding to these stages in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü
Kanyon. I also tabulate the decompositions at different levels of awareness based on
gender, landownership and poverty in figures 5.2 and 5.3 to provide a preliminary view
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on how these dimensions of inequalities affect awareness.

5.2.2.1 Sultan Sazlığı
Table 5.4 depicts the decomposition of sample characteristics with respect to
being informed of the GEF project. Note that this decomposition corresponds to the
comparison of boxes 2 and 3 in figure 5.1. As I have stated above, it would be expected
that higher level of education and more involvement in community activities would be
positively correlated with awareness. The comparison of the means across project-aware
and -unaware samples confirms this expectation: as can be seen, those who are aware of
GEF within the Sultan Sazlığı sample, on average, have 0.5 more years of education and
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The category of the “poor” is defined loosely as those whose monthly income is below
the national rural poverty line for a 4-person household.
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are more involved in community activities, as the 0.6 point difference in community
participation index suggests.
I have speculated above on why the level of trust to the state might be different
across the project aware and project unaware samples. In the case of Sultan Sazlığı, many
people had claimed that they were not adequately informed because they were critical of
the national park. The comparison of mean values of state perceptions, however, depicts
an opposite pattern: the project-aware subsample, on average, has a lower level of trust in
the national park (0.3 points on a 5-point scale). The project-unaware in this sample are
also less likely to think that the state treats citizen equally (0.5 points on a 5-point scale).
Although these statistics are silent on how the underlying relationship between trust in
state and awareness operates, the correlation between the two is interesting. The fact that
those who have been informed of GEF has a lower level of trust in the national park
might be interpreted to support my expectation that being exposed to GEF led some to
downwardly adapt their perceptions of the national park.
I have made a case above that measures of socio-economic power might correlate
with awareness. In the case of Sultan Sazlığı, in addition to power dimensions such as
wealth and gender that seemed to correlate with awareness, sources of livelihood
emerged as an important dimension of socio-economic inequality, where farmers possess
significant power and reed cutters are marginalized. Being a reed cutter largely implied
being denied information on management meetings, rather than the project. Therefore,
wealth and gender, but not prevalence of livelihood sources, differ significantly across
GEF awareness subsamples.
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The comparison of project-aware and unaware subsample in terms of socioeconomic power suggests a mixed pattern. As can be seen in table 5.5, although those
who are aware of the project within the Sultan Sazlığı sample have larger landholdings
(almost eight hectares) on average, the difference is not statistically significant. The
difference in the shares of the landless within the subsamples is not statistically
significant, either. Similarly, neither the differences in the mean values of shares of types
of incomes (in household income) nor those in the prevalence of different livelihoods
(measured by proportions of people depending on different livelihood sources) across
subsamples are statistically meaningful; this, as I stated above, is expected since we are
more likely to see livelihood-based differences at the level of meeting awareness or
participation.

Note, however, that the project-aware subsample is composed of

significantly fewer women and more farmers. These two findings are in line with my
expectation that the marginalized sections of the community, such as women and the
poor, might have been uninformed.
Descriptive statistics of subsamples based on awareness of management meetings
are tabulated next. The comparison presented in table 5.6 corresponds to boxes 4 and 5
on figure 5.1. Note that these subsamples are not drawn from the relevant subpopulations
directly (i.e. from the meeting aware vs. meeting unaware population), but correspond to
a second level of subsamples within the original sample. That is to say, the descriptive
characteristics depicted here do not relate to meeting awareness in general, but to meeting
awareness for those who have been informed of the GEF projects to begin with.
Contrary to my expectations, mean years of education do not vary significantly
across meeting awareness subsamples. The difference between the average frequencies
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in taking part in informal labor sharing (0.5 on a 5-point scale) is not statistically
significant, either. The mean values of the other two proxies of involvement in
community activities are, however, significantly different across the meeting-aware and
unaware subsamples. On average, those who are aware of the management meetings
within the Sultan Sazlığı sample have a higher level of feeling of belonging to the
community; the difference is small (0.2 on a 5-point scale), but statistically significant.
The mean value of community participation index is also 0.6 points higher for the
meeting aware subsample. When seen within the spread of values this variable takes (-5.5
to 1.7), it is apparent that although both subsamples are marked with high levels of
community participation on average, those who have been aware of the meetings within
the project aware subsample participate more frequently in community-level activities. It
can be argued, therefore, within the project-aware subsample, those who have a feeling of
attachment to and are more involved in the community have been more likely to be
informed of management meetings.
Although the level of trust in the state shows significant variation at the level of
project awareness, this does not seem to be the case for meeting-awareness level among
the project aware subsample. That is to say, within the project-aware subsample, the
average level of trust in the state does not differ significantly across those who have been
informed of meetings and those who have not. Thus, even if the project team had indeed
deliberately denied information to the skeptics among the community, this has not been
reflected on descriptive statistics.
Proxies of local power relations, however, are suggestive of the power dimension
of exclusion from information. Within the project-aware subsample, average size of
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landholdings is higher in the meeting-aware subsample but not statistically different than
that in the meeting-unaware subsample. However, the share of the landless, the group
most marginalized in the Sultan Sazlığı, within the latter group is much higher (by 17.5
percentage points) and the difference is statistically significant. This pattern is echoed by
the larger share of farmers, who are the locally powerful, within the meeting-aware
subsample. In addition, the share of women within the meeting-unaware subsample is
lower by 20 percentage points.
Variations in the prevalence of livelihoods pose a contrast to the picture portrayed
above. The average share of reed income in household income is higher among those
who are aware of the meetings and the difference is statistically significant. Furthermore,
the proportion of reed cutters is also higher, albeit not statistically significantly, within
the meeting-aware subsample. Given that reed cutters make up the most marginalized
section of the community (and have repeatedly claimed that they were denied information
on purpose), this finding looks counter-intuitive. One explanation for this pattern is
related to the nature of the tabulated statistics. That is to say, the data reported here do
not provide information on the share of reed cutters who were informed (versus not
informed), but the share of reed cutters within the subsample of those informed.
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5.2.2.2 Köprülü Kanyon
Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of project awareness subsamples in
Köprülü Kanyon, corresponding to boxes 2 and 3 in figure 5.1, are reported in table 5.7.
To reiterate, it is conceivable that the educated within the community were better
78

The share of informed reed cutters among all reed cutters within the sample is indeed
lower than that of uninformed reed cutters.
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informed of the project. The descriptive statistics on years of education are in line with
this: the project-aware subsample has a higher level of education (almost one more year)
on average. The probable correlation between community involvement and project
awareness can be observed as well, as the differences in the mean values of frequency of
participation in labor sharing, the community participation index and the feeling of
belonging suggest. It should be noted, however, that these differences are not very large
in size despite being statistically significant: the difference in the sample means of feeling
of belonging is 0.2 (on a 5-point scale), that of participation in labor sharing is 0.3 (on a
5-point scale) and that of index of community participation is 0.3 (on a spread from -5.2
to 2.1).
I have stated earlier that level of trust in the state would be expected to show
variation across project-awareness subsamples. In the case of Köprülü Kanyon, however,
I do not expect to see a significant pattern, since the qualitative findings did not suggest
such a correlation. Although the level of trust in the state is overall very low in the area,
it did not seem to vary with project awareness; this can partly be explained by the
genuine efforts on the side of the project team to disseminate information. Given this, the
descriptive statistics are a bit surprising: the measures of the level of trust in the state
differ significantly across subsamples based on project awareness, though the sizes of the
gaps are small (0.3 points on a 5-point scale). As was the case with Sultan Sazlığı, the
project-aware subsample, on average, has a lower level of trust in the national park. In
contrast, those uninformed of the project within the Köprülü Kanyon sample are, on
average, more skeptical of equal treatment by the state. That higher skepticism of equal
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treatment correlates with unawareness of the project is silent about the underlying
relationship between the two, but it is an interesting observation nonetheless.
The role of local power relations in being exposed to information about the
project might be reflected in significant variation in mean values of socio-economic
variables across samples. I specifically expect gender and wealth to correlate with project
awareness. The descriptive statistics, again, provide a mixed picture: the average number
of cattle and size of land owned by the household, two most important assets in Köprülü
Kanyon, do not differ across project-awareness subsamples. The average share of
household income from farming does, however, although the difference is small in size.
The same pattern is suggested by the fact that the proportion of those who earn income
from farming is significantly greater (by almost 10 percentage points) in the projectaware subsample. Since most farming is done at the lower canyon area and implies
access to productive inputs in addition to land (sharecropping is not prevalent and
farming income does not include agricultural wages), a higher share of farming income
overlaps with higher economic well-being.

Thus, it seems that project awareness

correlates with economic power. It also correlates with gender, as women account for a
significantly lower proportion of the project unaware subsample. While women make up
more than 38% of the project-unaware sample, only 26% of the project-aware sample are
women.
Finally, table 5.8 tabulates mean values of Köprülü Kanyon sample characteristics
decomposed at the level of meeting awareness. As can be seen, those who have been
informed of meetings within the project-aware subsample have less years of education on
average, which is somewhat surprising, but the difference is not statistically significant.
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In addition, none of the proxies of community involvement are significantly different
across the subsamples. It seems, therefore, that the meeting-aware and unaware
subsamples in Köprülü Kanyon do not differ, at least statistically significantly, in terms
of average levels of education and community involvement.
Based on my qualitative findings, I do not expect to see a correlation between
perceptions of the state and awareness in Köprülü Kanyon. Mean values of state
perception proxies, however, do differ significantly across meeting awareness
subsamples. Specifically, those who have been informed of the meetings with this sample
have higher levels of trust in state agencies in general (0.6 difference on a 7.3-point
spread), and are more likely to think that the state treats the citizens equally (0.5 points on
a 5-point scale). This pattern might be driven by location (some villages are
pronouncedly more skeptical of the state and were visited less frequently by the project
team) or other socio-economic characteristics, such as gender or source of livelihood.
Finally, contrary to my expectation, there is no significant difference between the
proportion of women among those who were informed of meetings and those were not
within this sample. This is partly due to the fact that most women have not been aware of
the project to begin with; it seems that the gender dimension of awareness had operated
mainly at the level of project awareness and not at that of meeting awareness. Meetingawareness subsamples do not differ significantly in terms of mean values of most
economic indicators, either. Household ownership of cattle is one notable exception, as
the average number of cattle owned by the household is lower in the meeting-unaware
subsample.
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5.2.3 Awareness as a Dimension of Exclusion
Being informed is not a choice, but rather a matter of exposure. An important
component explaining the extent to which local people have been exposed to information
about the project and the management meetings is the project team’s effectiveness in
disseminating such information. In this section, I have tried to demonstrate that there is
more to awareness. Specifically, I have argued that there are likely to be individual and
household-level characteristics that explain differential degrees of awareness among the
local people.
Characteristics depicted by decomposing Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon
samples suggest that being exposed to information about the project and project activities
is not random, but rather correlated with socio-economic characteristics such as
education, gender, wealth and source of livelihood. I have demonstrated that there are
notable differences in the composition of subsamples based on the levels of awareness of
GEF and management meetings. As I expected, those who have been aware of the
project and its related activities in both of the samples are more likely to be involved in
community activities and local problem solving, as captured by the community
participation proxies. This pattern is more visible in the case of Sultan Sazlığı. On the
other hand, local power relations along the lines of gender and wealth seem to differ
significantly at different levels of awareness, again more pronouncedly in Sultan Sazlığı.
The descriptive findings reported so far suggest that accessibility of information is
systematically related to local power inequalities, manifested in dimensions such as
gender, wealth, social status, etc.

The failure of the project teams to adequately

disseminate information should be interpreted in the light of their failure to take such
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local dynamics into account. I hold that local inequalities could be a major factor
underlying the level of awareness of the existence of decision-making mechanisms, and
consequently participation in them; being uninformed about the mechanisms results in
implicit exclusion from taking part in them. Thus, socio-economic inequalities operate in
multiple levels of informedness, prior to actual participation, in impeding democratic
functioning of decision-making mechanisms.

5.3 Participation in Decision-Making Mechanisms
This section investigates econometrically the determinants of participation in
decision-making mechanisms. As I have stated earlier, I hold that the operationalization
of democratic, effective decision-making mechanisms in which local people can
participate and voice opinions is one of the main pillars of sustainable development
implementation. Participation in mechanisms for making decisions about natural resource
use and access can be envisioned as a measure of an individual’s commitment to
sustainable development as it indicates labor contribution to collective management.
Two types of participation are considered in the empirical investigation presented
here: actual and hypothetical. Actual participation indicates whether or not a person who
has been informed of GEF’s management meetings attended or not.

Hypothetical

participation, on the other hand, indicates whether or not a person would have attended
the meetings if s/he has been informed of them. These variables are admittedly very
limited measures of participation since they only capture the nominal dimension of
participation, i.e. attendance in meetings, and do not integrate the ability to voice
opinions or the extent to which voiced opinions are taken into account. Therefore, they do
not account for the multidimensionality of effective participation. However, utilizing a
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more comprehensive proxy of participation was not feasible due to the small sample
sizes.
The econometric analysis is intended to test two hypotheses about participation in
particular; namely, about the role of local power inequalities, based on wealth, gender,
social status, etc., and the perceptions of the state. I deploy local inequalities and the
perceptions of the state as two indicators of the state-society relationship. I hypothesize,
based on both the empirical literature on participatory decision-making mechanisms and
the qualitative findings presented in chapter 4, that socio-economic inequalities are
significant impediments on participation. These inequalities would not only imply
different needs and interests regarding the decision-making mechanisms, but also are
associated with different abilities to attend meetings and voice opinions, and anticipations
about being taken into account. Secondly, I hypothesize that local people’s anticipations
about the process and outcomes of the decision-making mechanisms are shaped by
perceived fairness of the Turkish state, perceived priorities of state policies and the level
of trust in the state to effectively operationalize these mechanisms. Thus, the perceptions
of the state are expected to be significant determinants of effective sustainable
development implementation at the local level by thwarting or facilitating participation.
In section 5.3.1, I present the empirical model deployed to analyze participation
(both actual and hypothetical) in decision-making. In doing so, I discuss the dependent
and independent variables utilized, and state my hypotheses more explicitly. In sections
5.3.2 and 5.3.3 I present the results of the econometric exercise outlined here.
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5.3.1 Empirical Model
Building on the empirical investigations of the determinants of participatory
decision-making in natural resource management (Agrawal & Gupta, 2005;
Bandyopadhyay & Shyamsundar, 2004; Lise, 2000), I propose to estimate the following
probit model:

Pr(Yi = 1 | I1i ,..., Aip ) = F(∑ θ k Iik + ∑ γ l Cil + ∑ λm H im + ∑ φ n Sin + ∑ ψ p Aip ) ,
k

l

m

n

p

where Yi is a binary variable that equals 1 if the individual attended management

€

meetings or stated that s/he would have attended if was informed and 0 otherwise, F(.) is
the standard normal distribution, and i denotes individuals. The error term is assumed to
be independent across individuals. The explanatory variables are grouped into five
categories: (i) I are k individual characteristics that include age, gender, education and an
index measuring environmental values; (ii) C are l measures of the individual’s frequency
of participating in different types of community activities; (iii) H are m household
characteristics, including both demographic (household size, number of children under
14) and economic (household wealth, size of household landholdings, sources of
household income) characteristics of the household that individual i belongs to; (iv) S are
n variables that proxy perceptions of the Turkish state, including perceived priority given
to environmental protection and economic growth, the level of trust to a number of state
branches, and perceived equality in treatment by a number of state branches; (v) and A
are p variables proxying anticipations about the decision-making mechanisms, namely,
expected attendance by others in the community and expected effectiveness of
management meetings in enforcing environmental protection.
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The list of explanatory variables included in the model, together with motivations
of including them in the model and their hypothesized impacts are given in table 5.9. I
utilize the same empirical model in analyzing both actual and hypothetical participation.
This is based on my conviction that there is no reason to assume that the underlying
relationships governing actual and hypothetical participation are different.
Below, I restate my hypotheses regarding participation (both actual and
hypothetical) in a more concretized fashion:
• Age and education are correlated with power and social status, they are expected to
have a positive effect on participation.
• Gender-based norms are also an important dimension of power relations; thus, I
hypothesize that being a woman would be negatively correlated with
participation. I have demonstrated in chapter 4 that women have been excluded
from decision making-mechanisms via a number of ways; meetings were held in
village coffee houses (not appropriate places for women to go), women’s
responsibilities usually conflicted with meeting times, and many women stated
that it would not have been appropriate for them to have attended. Building on
these observations, I hold that gender norms would be operative in negatively
shaping women’s hypothetical participation.
• Household assets and household land size are included as measures of household
wealth. Theoretically, the impact of wealth on participation can both be positive
and negative. Since wealth signifies power, the wealthier might find it easier to
attend meetings and voice opinions, while the anticipation of not being taken into
account might be binding for the poor and lead to withdrawal from participation. I
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have demonstrated that this has been the case for the reed cutters in Sultan Sazlığı
and poor upland villagers in Köprülü Kanyon. Wealth, however, can also indicate
lower dependence on natural resources, and thus less stakes to participate. The
resource-dependent poor might be valuing the benefits from natural resources
more than the rich, especially if they do not have access to alternative livelihood
options. On the other hand, the costs of participation (in terms of time
contributions, for instance) might be more binding for the poor than they are for
the rich.
The fact that the prevalent dimensions of wealth inequality differ across the two
sites further complicates the picture. While land-based inequalities are more
pronounced in Sultan Sazlığı, landholdings do not vary as much in Köprülü
Kanyon (land is mostly fragmented due to geographical conditions), and
household ownership of non-land assets is more important. On the other hand, the
motivations of the wealthy also differ across the sites. While in Sultan Sazlığı,
landowning farmers have been more inclined to participate in decision-making
and shape the process in line with their interests, the wealthy in Köprülü Kanyon
(e.g. the farmers in the lower canyon area and the rafting facility owners) have not
attended meetings in order to resist regulation since they benefit from chaotic
regulation.
I introduce two measures of household wealth in an attempt to delineate these
contradictory channels in which wealth impacts participation: an index
constructed on ownership of non-land household assets and the size of household
landholdings. Although this strategy may pose multicollinearity problems and
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hence might result in statistically insignificant estimates, the motivation is to be
able to control for land and non-land wealth separately. Specifically, I
hypothesize that land-based wealth both in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon
would be positively correlated with actual participation, since land is associated
with considerable economic power. I hold, however, that non-land-based wealth
would be negatively associated with participation, since it signals lower
dependence on natural resources in Sultan Sazlığı and stronger motivation to
resist environmental regulation in Köprülü Kanyon.
• Source of livelihood: The motivation to include household dependence on different
livelihood activities is to account for the role of resource dependency in
determining participation. Dependence on different livelihood sources (farming,
animal ownership, reed cutting, oregano harvesting and tourism) is proxied by
shares of income accruing from them within household income.
Different livelihood activities imply differential levels of resource dependency
and stakes; reed cutters and oregano harvesters, for instance, depend directly on
the resource base, while farmers’ and tourism facility owners’ dependence is
through a more indirect channel. In a related vein, reliance on different resources
signal uneven costs and benefits associated with environmental processes; the
negative externality produced by farmers’ water use on animal grazers and reed
cutters in Sultan Sazlığı is a case in point. Different source of livelihoods map
roughly onto socio-economic status in the cases analyzed here, as I have argued in
chapter 4. Measures of reliance on livelihood sources can thus be considered as
indicators of power. Note that these two effects can work in opposite ways, e.g.
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reed cutters have the highest stakes in environmental protection and thus would be
expected to participate, but they are also the most marginalized and might find it
harder to participate than others.
Theoretically, inclusion of other proxies for socio-economic power should control
for the “power” dimension that livelihood sources signify. However, even after
household land and assets are controlled for, household reliance on different
livelihood activities might have a significant power-related impact on
participation. This especially holds in the absence of reliable data on household
income.
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In the specific cases I analyze, different sources of livelihoods, such as

reed cutting vs. farming, or tourism vs. animal grazing, correlate with household
income level and reflect household economic welfare. They also signify social
status, a dimension of power that economic variables might not capture, and
different time-use patterns that might pose constraints on participation.
Specifically, I hypothesize that reed cutting income would be negatively
associated with actual but positively associated with hypothetical participation in
Sultan Sazlığı. In other words, I hold that the power dimension would dominate
the dependency dimension of being a reed cutter. This hypothesis is largely based
on the qualitative findings, which suggest that actual non-participation of reed
cutters was driven by their inadequate informedness of the specifics of the
decision-making mechanisms. On the other hand, I hypothesize that acquiring
income from oregano harvesting and tourism would be positively associated with
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Although survey data includes a categorical measure of monthly income, given the
difficulties of capturing in-kind income prevalent especially in rural areas, I hold that it is
rudimentary at best, and choose not to include it as an explanatory variable.
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participation in Köprülü Kanyon.

This expectation is motivated by the fact that

oregano harvesting and tourism are the two resource-based income generating
activities in the area. Those who rely on these sources of livelihood, therefore,
would have higher stakes to be involved in decision-making.
• Perceptions of the state: Perceptions that are hypothesized to affect participation
through anticipations about the decision-making process and outcomes are
perceived equal treatment by the state, perceived importance given to economic
growth and environmental protection, and expected effectiveness of meetings.
Similar to the role of wealth, the role of these perceptions might work in
contradictory channels. This is partly due to existence of different motives behind
the decision to participate, and partly due to different types of behavior that these
perceptions may prompt. I try to delineate these channels below and draw
concrete hypotheses about them by deploying the findings of the qualitative study.
Theoretically, the perception of equal treatment and the perceived importance
given to environmental protection would be expected to correlate positively with
participation, while the perceived importance of economic growth would be
expected to have a negative impact on it. Those who anticipate to be taken into
account and to be treated equally are likely to participate. Similarly, those who
hold that the state prioritizes environment are likely to participate since they
expect the outcomes of decision-making mechanisms to be implemented.
Motivations underlying participation, however, might not be that straightforward.
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As I will explain in the next section, I only analyze hypothetical participation in
Köprülü Kanyon since the sample size is too small to conduct a meaningful econometric
analysis of actual participation.
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It is possible, for instance, that those who are more skeptical (of state agencies or
of the state’s intentions of implementing environmental protection) choose to
participate precisely because they are skeptical; the motivation, therefore, is
similar to “monitoring” and making sure the decision-making processes operate as
they are supposed to.
Building on the argument made above, I hold that observed participation does not
imply identical underlying processes and institutional channels of decisionmaking can be accessed for different, and even contradicting, reasons. It becomes
ultimately an empirical question as to which of these effects dominates in a given
situation. However, it is also conceivable that different types of behavior
prompted by perceptions such as those mentioned above are not completely
random, but rather context-dependent. In my analysis, I try to delineate the
contradictory ways that perceptions affect participation by drawing hypotheses
based on supplementary information provided by the qualitative findings.
Based on the insights provided by the qualitative study, I hold that the first
channel dominated in Sultan Sazlığı, namely, that trusting the decision-making
mechanisms and expecting the implementation of their outcomes induced
participation, while skepticism discouraged it. Within the context of Köprülü
Kanyon marked with considerable distrust both to the state, however, the second
channel seemed to dominate. Although the qualitative study does not provide
evidence that those who trusted state’s fairness and/or willingness to enforce
environmental regulation chose to free ride on others’ participation, it
demonstrated that skepticism of the decision-making mechanisms and of state’s
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intentions in implementing the GEF project was an important motivation to
participate.
To recap, I hypothesize that perceived equal treatment and the importance of
environmental priority to be positively and the importance of growth priority to be
negatively associated with participation in Sultan Sazlığı. I hold, however, that
these variables would have the opposite signs in Köprülü Kanyon.
Before moving onto the empirical analysis, two potential problems with the
empirical strategy proposed here need to be discussed.

The first concerns

multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, as the phenomena they aim at
capturing are closely related. I demonstrate in the following sections, however, that
correlations among the explanatory variables are not that severe with a few exceptions.
Expectedly, proxies of state perceptions are correlated, so are some measures of
economic power. High correlation among explanatory variables would result in
statistically insignificant estimates, and I interpret the empirical results with this caveat in
mind.
The second problem is related to the endogeneity of the explanatory variables,
which would lead to biased estimates. Potential endogeneity of environmental values and
perceptions of the state, in particular, poses a serious problem: it is conceivable that being
exposed to the projects, e.g. having attended project activities, has a significant impact on
environmental

values.

Similarly,

having

experienced

an

unsuccessful

project

implementation might have shaped local people’s perceptions of the state.
Although it is not possible to entirely rule out endogeneity threats due to the
nature of the phenomenon that is analyzed here, a number of precautionary measures

297

have been taken. As I explained in chapter 3, environmental values were proxied by the
degree to which the respondent agrees with statements that essentially posit the necessity
of environmental protection even at the expense of economic growth. These statements
were constructed so that they do not relate to issues or resources specific to the sites, and
were phrased in hypothetical terms so that some type of “distancing” could be possible.
Under the assumption that being exposed to GEF projects would mainly (or at least, in
the short-term) affect one’s concern about the local environment (e.g. GEF’s training and
awareness activities were specifically about the local environmental problems), the proxy
of environmental values deployed here should be exogenous to participation.
I maintain that the proxies of state perceptions also hold up against the issue of
endogeneity. Recall from chapter 3 that the proxies of state priorities capture information
specifically about the central state, while that of equal treatment is about the central and
local administrative agencies. The GEF projects, on the other hand, were seen primarily
as the responsibility of the national park employees. Locals seem to have attributed any
favoritism or lack of commitment to the national park employees rather than to the
central state. I argue, therefore, that any influence of having experienced the project
would be reflected on evaluations of the national park administrations, and not of the
Turkish state per se.
A final problem concerns the validity of analyzing hypothetical participation,
more specifically, the issue of over or understatement of how individuals would “really”
behave if they were in fact informed of management meetings. It is conceivable that
respondents have misstated how they would actually have behaved.

However, if

individuals’ over or understatements are not correlated with the explanatory variables, i.e.
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the richer, or women, or the less educated systematically tend to over or understate what
they would have done in the counterfactual, misstatement does not pose a threat to
identification.

There is obviously no way to directly observe the incidence of

misstatement or if it is endogenous. I hold, however, that there is no reason to assume
that misstatement is correlated with the explanatory variables.

5.3.2 Actual Participation in Decision-Making
In this section, I first present a descriptive analysis of (actual) participation in
decision-making by comparing subsamples of participators and non-participators in both
sites.

I then undertake an econometric analysis of the determinants of participation in

decision-making mechanisms in Sultan Sazlığı.

I do not, however, conduct an

econometric analysis of the Köprülü Kanyon case. Note that the sample size of those who
have been informed of meetings in Köprülü Kanyon is only 44, of whom seventeen
attended meetings, too small to conduct a meaningful econometric analysis.
The following analysis was conducted by utilizing the subsample of those who
have been aware of management meetings in Sultan Sazlığı. This strategy poses problems
in terms of sample selection bias since meeting-aware subsample (box 4 in figure 5.1) is
not randomly selected but rather is a subset of the project-aware subsample (box 2 in
figure 5.1), which is in turn a subset of the original (random) sample (box 1 in figure 5.1).
I have demonstrated in the last section that the double-stage selection underlying the
sample is not random, but rather correlated with a number of individual and householdlevel characteristics.

Therefore, the estimation strategy I adopt bears the risk of

under/overestimating the effect of those characteristics on participation.
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My main aim in undertaking this analysis, however, is not to make inferences that
apply universally, but rather to investigate the factors that determine participation in
decision-making mechanisms for those who are informed of their existence. Specifically,
among those factors, I am interested in the role of local power relations and the
perceptions of the state. That is to say, I set out to explore if power inequalities and
perceptions related to the Turkish state are significant determinants of whether or not an
individual participates in decision-making mechanisms given that the individual is aware
of these mechanisms. Therefore, I hold that my strategy is appropriate for the present
purposes.

5.3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.10 provides descriptive statistics on the characteristics of those who have
been informed of management meetings in the Sultan Sazlığı sample, decomposed by
participation. The pattern revealed by the descriptive statistics on individual
characteristics seems consistent with the hypotheses drawn in section 5.3.1. Specifically,
participators within the meeting-aware subsample have higher levels of education and
participate in informal labor sharing arrangements more frequently on average. Positive
correlation between education and participation is expected, since higher level of
education is likely to be associated with greater knowledge about the issues discussed at
the meetings, self-confidence and leadership traits. More frequent participation in
informal labor sharing arrangements, on the other hand, proxies involvement in
community activities and is likely to correlate with participation. Furthermore,
participators within the meeting-aware subsample are more concerned for the
environment on average, as suggested by the environmental values index. This is also in
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line with the expectation that greater concern for the environment implies higher stakes,
thus encourages participation.
The comparison of the sample means of local power proxies depicts a striking
picture. The proportion of women within the participator subsample is lower by more
than 35 percentage points, suggesting that gender-based power relations and norms might
have played an important role in individual participation. Land-based inequalities are
also very pronounced, as expected. While the average size of landholdings within the
participator subsample is close to 41 hectares, it is approximately 15 hectares within the
non-participator subsample. This pattern is echoed by the significant difference (33
percentage points) in the incidence of landlessness between the subsamples. Note also
that the livelihood-based dimension of participation mentioned earlier can be detected;
the proportion of reed cutters in the participator subsample is 10 percent, while that in the
non-participator subsample is 25 percent.
The hypothesized variation in state perceptions across the participator and nonparticipator subsamples is somewhat visible in table 5.10. The only significant difference
is manifested in the perceived importance given to environmental protection. The
participator subsample, on average, perceives the state to prioritize environmental
protection more (0.6 points on a 5-point scale) than the non-participator subsample. The
differences in the sample means of the other two proxies of state perceptions are not
statistically significant.
Table 5.11 documents the descriptive statistics on the same characteristics for the
meeting-aware subsample in Köprülü Kanyon, decomposed by participation. At this
point, it is worth reemphasizing that the sample analyzed here is very limited; the
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subsample of non-participators is made up of 27 individuals while that of participators is
made up of 17.
This caveat in mind, as expected, age and frequency of participation in informal
labor sharing is positively correlated with participation in management meetings. To
reiterate, I had hypothesized that older individuals in the community might have been
more likely to attend meetings since older age signals social status and confers power.
Participation in informal labor sharing, on the other hand, proxies overall involvement
with and concern for the community. The average age of participators in the Köprülü
Kanyon sample is almost 18 years older than that of the non-participators. The difference
in the frequency of taking part in labor sharing is also sizable; 0.8 points on a 4-point
scale.
I have argued, based on the qualitative study, that women’s participation in the
management meetings was almost zero in Köprülü Kanyon. This argument is not
endorsed by the descriptive findings, as they indicate that the 10 percentage pointdifference between the proportions of women within the participator and non-participator
subsamples is not statistically meaningful. Land-based inequalities, however, seem to
differ significantly across the participator and non-participator subsamples. Landless
make up a higher share of non-participator subsample and the average size of their
landholdings are smaller. Statistics on the prevalence of different types of livelihood are
in line with the landownership statistics: farmers make up a significantly larger
proportion of the participator subsample, while differences in the proportions of animal
grazers and oregano pickers are not statistically significant.
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5.3.2.2 Econometric Analysis
This section presents the results of the probit estimation of determinants of
participation in decision-making in Sultan Sazlığı. Before presenting the findings of the
econometric study, the measures of correlation among groups of explanatory variables
(based on the subsample of those aware of management meetings) are provided in tables
5.12, 5.13 and 5.14. As can be seen, the correlation between the perceptions of the state is
severe. That between measures of economic power, especially proxy of reed cutting
income and proxies of wealth, are also high. High levels of correlation among these
explanatory variables suggest that multicollinearity will pose a problem in estimation in
terms of inflated variances of estimates. The estimates should therefore be interpreted
accordingly.
Table 5.15 presents the results of the probit estimation of the determinants of
participation in decision-making for Sultan Sazlığı.

None of the individual level

variables hypothesized to have an impact on participation are found statistically
significant. Thus, the significant variations in average years of education and shares of
females across the participator and non-participators subsamples (see table 5.10) seem to
have been driven by other explanatory variables. A notable exception is the
environmental values proxy, which is positively correlated with participation. Since this
proxy is an indexed measure of environmental values, taking on values between -4.1 and
2.8, its interpretation is not very straightforward. Accordingly, one point increase in the
value of the environmental values index is associated with approximately 24 percent
increase in the probability of participation. Expected attendance at the meetings, included
as a proxy of anticipated free-riding by others, is also positively associated with
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participation, as the estimated effect of expecting one additional person (out of 10) to
attend increases the probability of participation by 7.5 percent.
Estimates of the effect of measures of household wealth have the expected signs,
although only that of household land is statistically significant. Recall that I have
included two different measures of household wealth in an effort to delineate the
contradictory ways that greater wealth might affect participation. Specifically, I had
argued while household land would be positively associated with participation since it
signifies power, non-land household wealth would be negatively associated since it
signals lower resource dependence. The results confirm these hypotheses: one additional
hectare of land owned by the household is estimated to increase the probability of
participation by 0.80 percent. The estimated effect is not very sizable, but suggestive
nonetheless.
Proxies of dependence on different livelihood activities, measured as shares of
income from farming, animal husbandry and reed cutting within household income, are
included in the model to control for different types of resource uses. I have argued, in
section 5.3.1, that these proxies are also correlated with socio-economic power and that I
expected to see a negative association between being a reed-cutter and probability of
attending meeting even after controlling for household wealth land.

However, the

estimated coefficients of the livelihood variables are not statistically significant in
general, with the exception of animal income. This is not surprising given the high
correlation between these variables and other proxies of economic power, which has
likely led to inflated estimate variances.
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Proxies of perceived priorities of the Turkish state, however, are both statistically
significant and have the expected signs.

Among those who were aware of the

management meetings, those who hold that the state prioritizes economic growth more
have been less likely to attend them, holding all other variables constant. A one-point
increase in the perceived importance of economic growth is associated with more than 20
percent decrease in the probability of participation. Those who hold that environmental
protection is prioritized, on the other hand, have been more likely to attend; a one-point
increase in the perceived importance of environmental protection is estimated to increase
the probability of participation by 28 percent.
To recapitulate, the results of the empirical investigation of actual participation in
Sultan Sazlığı illustrate both the role of socio-economic inequalities and the importance
of local people’s anticipations of the process and the outcome of decision-making
mechanisms. The findings demonstrate, first of all, that land-based inequalities in Sultan
Sazlığı have been operative in shaping participation: larger household landholdings are
associated with a higher probability of participating, holding other characteristics
constant. I have demonstrated in chapter 4 that these inequalities have been perpetuated
as a result of the policies pursued by the Turkish state in the area. Secondly, the findings
underscore that anticipations regarding the enforcement of the intended outcomes of
decision-making (regulation of resource use) are important determinants of participation.
I envision the extent to which local people are able to take part in decision-making
mechanisms as an integral component of local sustainable development implementation;
thus, I hold that the empirical evidence presented here, in particular of the impact of
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inequalities and perceptions on participation, attests to how the state’s failure in
implementing sustainable development crystallizes at the local level.

5.3.3 Hypothetical Participation
This section is aimed at conducting an econometric analysis of hypothetical
participation. Given that many people have been uninformed of the decision-making
mechanisms implemented by the projects, an important question then becomes whether
or not they would have participated in them if they had been informed of their existence.
This, certainly, is a counterfactual analysis. I hold, however, there are important insights
to be gained since hypothetical participation provides an additional arena in which factors
shaping participation, more specifically, the role of local inequalities and perceptions of
the state, can be investigated.
There is one potential endogeneity threat to the validity of this analysis, as I have
mentioned in section 5.3.1. People may over or understate what they would “really” have
done if they were informed of the management meetings, i.e. reported levels of
hypothetical participation is an over or underestimation of actual behavior.

If the

incidence of misstatement is systematically correlated with explanatory variables, e.g. if
women, or the poor, or the skeptical are more likely than others to misstate how they
would have actually behaved, the estimated effects of these characteristics on
participation would be biased. It is conceivable for the powerless within the communities
to systematically overstate their actual behavior; women, for instance, might be
overstating participation more than men, which would result in an upward bias in the
coefficient of the female dummy. If the skeptics, on the other hand, are more inclined to
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understate participation, the coefficient of the equal treatment index would be
overestimated.
I hold, however, that this is not the case. My conviction on this issue is primarily
based on the interviews and focus groups I conducted during the qualitative study, where
the issue of hypothetical participation was delved into with more detailed follow up
questions. My observations during the interviews and focus groups are not suggestive of
a systematic correlation between misstatement of actual behavior and the explanatory
variables included in the empirical model. Still, as incidence of misstatement cannot be
observed and there is no way of determining the existence or absence of its endogeneity
with certainty, the empirical results should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. A final
note should be taken of the potential statistical insignificance of the estimates due to
multicollinearity, since the measures of state perceptions are highly correlated in both
subsamples, as depicted in tables 5.18-5.23.
The remainder of this section is comprised of two parts. In the first part, I provide
a descriptive picture of the subsamples used in the analysis, decomposed by hypothetical
participation. Note that these decompositions correspond to the comparison of boxes 5a
and 5b in figure 5.1. In the second part, I present the results of the probit estimation of the
empirical model proposed in section 5.3.1 and discuss the findings.

5.3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.16 depicts decomposition of the meeting-unaware subsample in Sultan
Sazlığı by hypothetical participation. The expected pattern of more involvement in
community activities by participators is visible: the hypothetical participators within the
meeting-unaware subsample, on average, participate more frequently in labor-sharing
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activities (0.7 points on a 4-point scale) and in community-level activities (1 point on a
spread from -5.5. to 1.7).

The differences in the sample means of the perception

measures and household landholdings, on the other hand, are contrary to my
expectations, but not statistically significant. Similarly, that the hypothetical participator
subsample has, on average, more household assets is surprising in the face of the
hypothesized role of non-land wealth on participation. Finally, women make up a
significantly larger proportion (by 26 percentage points) of the hypothetical nonparticipators, as expected.
Table 5.17 tabulates the descriptive statistics on the same characteristics for the
decomposition of the meeting-unaware subsample in Köprülü Kanyon. As can be seen,
sample mean values of most variables are close, with a few notable exceptions. The mean
value the environmental values index is significantly higher in the hypothetical
participator subsample by 0.7 points (on a spread between -4.3 and 3.7). The only other
significant variation across the subsamples is the average perception of growth priority;
accordingly, the hypothetical participators within the project-unaware subsample, on
average, are more likely to think that the state prioritizes economic growth. This pattern
is in line with the argument I made earlier, where I suggested that the mistrust is an
important motivation for participation in Köprülü Kanyon.

5.3.3.2 Econometric Analysis
As I have stated earlier, the same empirical model is utilized in analyzing actual
and hypothetical participation. Consequently, the explanatory variables included in the
empirical investigation of hypothetical participation are identical to the ones included in
the analysis of actual participation, with two exceptions: while the actual participation
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model had a measure of anticipated success of meetings in producing solutions to the
resource management problems, the hypothetical participation model does not, since
being uninformed implies no such anticipation can be formed.
In addition, a proxy for the perceived severity of the conservation status is
included in the Köprülü Kanyon model with the aim of controlling for the mistrust
produced by the history of conservation policy in the region. The proxy is a dummy
variable which equals 1 if the conservation status of the area is listed as the most pressing
problem of the area. The motivation to include this additional control was to see if the
hypothesized relationship between perceptions and participation still hold after
accounting for the general level of skepticism in the area.
The probit estimates of the determinants of hypothetical participation are reported
in table 5.24. The set of estimates for Sultan Sazlığı demonstrate the expected impacts of
gender relations and community involvement on participation. Accordingly, being a
woman is associated with a 15.8 percent decrease in the probability of hypothetical
participation, holding other characteristics constant. This finding suggests that genderbased relations impinge on women’s hypothetical participation as well. On the other
hand, one point increase (on a 4-point scale) in the frequency of participating in labor
sharing raises the probability of hypothetical participation by approximately 5 percent,
while that in the community participation index, which takes on values between -5.5 and
1.7, raises the probability of hypothetical participation by 3.5 percent.
Contrary to my expectations, the coefficient estimate of household landholdings
in the Sultan Sazlığı model is negatively correlated with hypothetical participation. I have
argued that larger landholdings would have a positive impact on participation since land-
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based power relations are highly pronounced in Sultan Sazlığı. The results of the probit
estimation suggest, however, that one additional hectare of land owned by the household,
holding everything else equal, decreases the probability of hypothetical participation by
0.4 percent. Although the size of the estimated impact is small, it is significant at the 5%
level. I interpret this finding to be driven by the lower resource dependency effect
signified by landownership.

81

Another dimension of local power relations that I expected

to be significant, as can be recalled, was reliance on reed cutting. Specifically, I had made
the case that the share of reed cutting income in household income would be positively
associated with hypothetical participation. The proxy of reed cutting income, however, is
dropped from the specification since it predicts hypothetical participation perfectly.
Finally, the estimated impacts of perceptions of the state have the expected signs,
but only that of environmental priority is statistically significant; this is not surprising
given the high correlation between the measures of state perceptions. Accordingly, one
point increase in the perceived importance given to environmental protection by the state
is estimated to be associated with a 4.3 percent increase in the probability of hypothetical
participation.
The set of estimates for Köprülü Kanyon portrays quite a different picture than
Sultan Sazlığı, which is not that surprising given the uniqueness of the site. First of all,
the level of education is estimated to have a negative impact on hypothetical
participation. This is counter-intuitive at first sight, since education would be expected to
have a positive impact on participation. I argue, however, that the negative relationship
81

It should be noted that the negative relationship between larger land size and lower
participation might also have been driven by a systematic correlation between
landownership and understatement of participation, though I hold that it is highly
unlikely.
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implied here is driven largely by the negative correlation between years of education and
having stakes in the protection of the local environment in Köprülü Kanyon. I make this
argument based on the qualitative study, which suggests that the majority of the educated
people in the area tend to (or want to) immigrate to neighboring cities to get employment;
thus, they are likely to have lower stakes to participate in decision-making mechanisms.
Another counter-intuitive result is the negative coefficient estimate of the laborsharing variable.

Accordingly, one point increase in the 4-point scale of labor sharing

frequency is associated with a 14.7 percent decrease in the probability of participation. In
general, taking part in community activities is expected to be associated with higher
likelihood of participation since it signifies trust, norms of sharing and reciprocity, and
concern for fellow community members. In this specific context, however, the sign of
the estimated coefficient might be picking up the role of distrust, which is hypothesized
to dominate as a motivation to participate. The estimated impact of higher environmental
concern, on the other hand, has the expected sign: one point increase in the value of
environmental values index is associated with approximately 15 percent rise in the
probability of hypothetical participation.
Before moving onto the discussion of the estimated impacts of the state
perception variables, it is worth reiterating the argument made in section 5.3.1, where I
put forth a modified version of the hypotheses regarding the role of perceptions for the
case of Köprülü Kanyon. I claimed that skepticism of the process and outcome of the
decision-making mechanisms, produced by the strict conservation history in the area, was
in fact a strong motivation for participation (both actual and hypothetical) in management
meetings. This claim is somewhat supported by the positive, albeit not statistically
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significant, coefficient of the conservation problem dummy. Accordingly, those who
hold that the conservation status is the most pressing problem of the area would have
been more inclined to participate if they had been informed of the meetings.
More specifically, I hypothesized that the perception of growth priority would be
positively correlated with participation, while that of equal treatment and environmental
priority would be negatively correlated. As can be seen in table 5.24, the estimated
coefficients of the perception variables have the expected signs, though only that of
perceived importance of growth priority is statistically significant. Accordingly, one
point increase in the perceived importance given to economic growth by the state is
associated with almost 30 percent higher probability of hypothetical participation,
holding other variables constant.
Finally, note that none of the measures of socio-economic power are statistically
significant at the 10% level, most probably due to multicollinearity of the proxies used in
the model. The coefficient estimates, however, have the expected signs: the coefficient of
the female dummy is estimated to be negative, while that of household landholdings is
positive.

5.3.4 Power, Perceptions and Participation
The empirical picture portrayed above has limitations, notably in the way
participation is operationalized: the independent variables are proxies for participation
(actual or hypothetical attendance in meetings), but not participation in the sense of
voicing opinions or of shaping outcomes. This measure, therefore, is silent about the
ability with which the “participators” could (or would have) effectively participate. The
qualitative findings presented in chapter 4, however, demonstrate that few among the
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participators in fact took active parts in the decision-making processes, and even fewer
feel that their opinions were taken into account.
The econometric exercise presented in this section is nevertheless illustrative of
the significance of power relations and perceptions for participation, in addition to
highlighting the role of factors such as environmental values, norms of sharing, and
overall involvement in the community.

I have demonstrated that proxies of socio-

economic power, such as gender, land, and source of livelihood, and anticipations of state
behavior, in particular of the state’s fairness and willingness to enforce environmental
regulation, are systematically correlated with participation. In doing so, I have drawn
upon the qualitative findings to inform both the hypotheses motivating the questions
addressed here and the interpretation of empirical results. The qualitative study has
provided insights on the variety of motives underlying participation, and thereby
illuminated the often-contradictory channels through which individual and household
characteristics affect participation.
The two cases analyzed here provide an interesting comparison of how the same
institutional mechanism can have different, context-dependent, connotations. While
Sultan Sazlığı represents a “normal” case, where trusting fellow community members and
the decision-making mechanisms translates into incentives to participate, it seems on the
contrary that skepticism mobilizes people in Köprülü Kanyon. Given the history there
and the overall level of deprivation, the context is marked with constant fear that the state
will introduce regulations at the expense of people. The locals, therefore, approached
such mechanisms as some kind of conspiracy, and participated in them primarily to
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discover the “real” intention. This is manifested in the positive association between
distrust, both towards community members and the state, and participation.
Of course, this observation does not imply that the state should treat citizens
unequally to induce participation, nor that intra-community level of trust is detrimental
for participation, but rather that the specific contexts in which participatory decisionmaking mechanisms are operationalized are crucial for understanding how they function.
The same argument applies to the case of local power relations, as well. Context-specific
power inequalities related with income, wealth, gender, etc. should be at the center of an
analysis of such mechanisms, can be important impediments to democratic and effective
decision-making.

5.4 Willingness to Contribute to Local Sustainable Development
The second question that I address in this chapter is related to the extent to which
local people would be willing to take action to remedy the ongoing problems with natural
resource management. There are two motivations for analyzing willingness to commit to
local sustainable development: Firstly, I hold that community members’ willingness to
take such actions is a signifier of the possibility of community-level mobilizations and an
important component of local sustainable development. Therefore, I investigate if local
inequalities and perceptions of the state, conceptualized as indicators of how state-society
relationships materialize at the local scale, are significant factors underlying it. This
formulation can also be considered as a quantitative operationalization of how the
Turkish state’s smothering of the civil society impinges on sustainable development
implementation (see chapter 2).
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Secondly, by delving into the question of local people’s willingness to contribute,
it is possible to gain insights on factors that would facilitate community participation in
solving economic and environmental problems. Given the failure of the Turkish state in
implementing sustainable development, it is worthwhile to investigate what kind of
cooperative outcomes and alliances have potential to facilitate solutions at the local level.
Chapter 3 discussed the proxies used to capture local people’s willingness to
contribute to sustainable development. To restate, eight binary variables in Sultan Sazlığı
and nine in Köprülü Kanyon are utilized to capture willingness to contribute. Five
among these variables are identical, namely; willingness to constrain resource use in
general, willingness to work for a management mechanism, willingness to donate funds
to a trusted institution, willingness to attend an educational activity about the
environment, and willingness to collect neighborhood garbage. The remaining variables
capture willingness to contribute by refraining from site-specific activities found to put
pressure on the ecosystem (reed cutting, grazing and irrigated agriculture in Sultan
Sazlığı, and grazing, rafting tourism, oregano harvesting and illegal construction in
Köprülü Kanyon). Listed below are the six measures of willingness to contribute
constructed based on these variables:
•

Willingness to contribute by constrained resource use: An index measure
composed of willingness to constrain resource use and scenario measures of
82

contribution in the hypothetical cases of collective action.
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All indices are constructed by using a Principal Component Analysis, where index I
I

over variables X is defined as I = ∑ PCi (X i − meanX i ) /StdDevX i , where PCi is the first
i=1

principal component of the variable X i .
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•

Willingness to contribute by non-resource use: An index measure composed of
willingness to contribute work for a management mechanism, to donate funds, to
attend educational activity and to collect neighborhood garbage.

•

Willingness to contribute labor: An index measure composed of willingness to
work for a management mechanism, to attend educational activity and to collect
neighborhood garbage.

•

Willingness to contribute funds: Binary variable capturing willingness to
contribute funds to a trusted institution for environmental protection.

•

Scenario-based willingness to contribute: An index measure composed of the
willingness to contribute in the collective action scenarios (three in Sultan Sazlığı
and four in Köprülü Kanyon).

•

All measures of willingness to contribute: An index measure composed of all
willingness-to-contribute variables discussed above.
The following section lays out the empirical model and concretizes the

hypotheses regarding the role of local inequalities and state perceptions.

5.4.1 Empirical Model and Hypotheses
Building on the literature on collective action in natural resource management
(e.g., Baland & Platteau, 1996; Heltberg, 2001; Ostrom, 1990, 1996; Wade, 1987), and
the findings of the qualitative study, I propose to estimate the following OLS model:

WTCij = α 0 + ∑ θ k Iik + ∑ γ l Cil + ∑ λm H im + ∑ φ n Sin + ∑ ψ p Aip + υ i ,
k

l

m

n

p

where WTCij are the index measures of willingness to contribute discussed above, i

€

denotes individuals, j denotes different measures of willingness to contribute included in
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different specifications, and υ is the error term. For willingness to contribute funds, on
the other hand, the following probit model will be estimated:

Pr(WTCi = 1 | I1i ,..., Aip ) = F(∑ θ k Iik + ∑ γ l Cil + ∑ λm H im + ∑ φ n Sin + ∑ ψ p Aip ) ,
k

l

m

n

p

where WTCi is a binary variable which equals 1 if the individual is willing to contribute

€

funds, F(.) is the standard normal distribution, and i denotes individuals. The error term is
assumed to be independent across individuals. The explanatory variables are grouped into
5 categories: (i) I are k individual characteristics that include age, gender, education and
an index measure of environmental values; (ii) C are l measures of the individual’s
frequency of participating in different types of community activities; (iii) H are m
household characteristics, including both demographic (household size, the number of
children under 14) and economic (household wealth, the size of household landholdings,
sources of household income) characteristics of the household that individual i belongs
to; (iv) S are n variables that proxy perceptions of the Turkish state, including perceived
priority given to environmental protection and economic growth, level of trust to a
number of state branches, and perceived equality in treatment by a number of state
branches; (v) and A are p variables proxying anticipations, namely of other community
members’ commitment to sustainable development, and expected distributional impact.
The list of explanatory variables included in the model, together with motivations
for including them in the model and their hypothesized impacts, are given in table 5.25.
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Note that informedness of GEF or participation in its decision-making mechanisms are
not included as an explanatory variable. Although being exposed to GEF-related
activities is likely to have an impact on willingness to contribute to local sustainable
development, its inclusion would pose endogeneity threats. In the absence of a variable to
instrument for exposition to GEF, I hold that the best strategy is to exclude it.
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Specifically, I hypothesize the following in terms of the role of local dynamics and
perceptions of the state:
•

Gender-based power relationships might be important impediments on
willingness to contribute in collective-action type mobilizations. Although the
collective action literature suggests that women are more likely to be cooperators
than men (see, for instance, Molinas, 1998), I hold that women might be less
inclined to commit to actions that necessitate public mobility and visibility, such
as attending educational activities and taking part in a management mechanism. I
expect the gender effect to be more pronounced in Köprülü Kanyon, where norms
of appropriate female behavior are more repressive, as argued in chapter 4.

•

Wealth-based inequalities are proxied by household landholdings and ownership
of household assets, as before. As argued to be the case with participation in
decision-making mechanisms, wealth can have an ambiguous effect on
willingness to contribute: On the one hand, it might be signifying the costs of
engaging in collective action; the poor might find it more difficult to contribute
due to labor or income constraints. It might also be signifying the viability of exit
options and lower dependency on natural resources, and consequently, the
wealthy might have more outside options and choose not to contribute.
Wealth, however, signifies more than dependency on natural resources. As I have
illustrated in chapter 4, wealth is significantly correlated with the distribution of
costs and benefits of environmental degradation and, consequently, different
incentives to contribute to sustainable development. More specifically, in Sultan
Sazlığı, wealthy farmers have been enjoying the profits accruing from irrigated
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farming, whereas reed cutters and animal grazers have been the primary bearers
of costs associated with water scarcity. In Köprülü Kanyon, on the other hand,
the tourism sector (and the lower canyon villages in general) have been benefiting
from unregulated resource use, while the poor whose livelihoods are directly
dependent on the natural resources have started to feel the brunt of environmental
degradation. The benefits of committing to local sustainable development differ
considerably across these groups.
In the light of these arguments, I hypothesize that both proxies of household
wealth would be negatively correlated with willingness to contribute in Sultan
Sazlığı (possibly except the case of material contributions): while land-based
wealth signifies “winning” from degradation, non-land-based wealth captures
lower reliance on natural resources and greater viability of outside options. I posit
a negative relationship between household wealth and willingness to contribute in
the case of Köprülü Kanyon as well, since both signify “winning” from
unregulated resource use.
•

Sources of livelihood are included as additional controls of different stakes
regarding sustainable development implementation.

I argue that even after

controlling for land-based inequalities, household dependence on natural
resources would vary with reliance on different livelihood activities, and
consequently, incentives to contribute to local sustainable development.
In addition, the sources of household livelihoods connote the dynamics specific to
the cases analyzed here. First of all, they are associated with how binding labor
constraints are, and therefore expected to have a significant impact on ability to
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commit to labor-intensive types of contributions.

Reed-cutting and oregano

harvesting, for instance, are highly labor-intensive, but seasonal, productive
activities.

Animal grazing, on the other hand, is both labor-intensive and

practiced year-round. Furthermore, particularly in the case of Sultan Sazlığı,
reliance on different livelihood activities overlaps with perceptions of
responsibility; more specifically, reed cutters hold that they are not responsible for
the ongoing degradation and thus would be less likely to contribute to local
sustainable development. I expect this effect to be more pronounced in resource
use-based contribution: the qualitative findings have been indicative on the strong
conviction held by reed cutters that their practices do not hurt the viability of the
reed cover. I hold that the same argument applies to the tourism sector in Köprülü
Kanyon, since tour operators and employees were insistent that rafting tourism
does not pose a threat to the ecosystem.
Building on these observations, I hypothesize that income from animal husbandry,
reed cutting and tourism would be negatively associated with willingness to
contribute.
•

The final set of hypotheses regarding willingness to contribute is related to the
role of perceptions held by the local people. The proxies used for state perceptions
are perceived equal treatment by the state, and perceived importance given to
economic growth and environmental protection by the state. To reiterate, I hold
that the perceptions of how the state would behave can facilitate or thwart
community-level mobilizations towards sustainable development. Specifically,
perceived equal treatment is hypothesized to have a positive impact on
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willingness to contribute, since the anticipation of some group’s favoring would
lower incentives to commit to local sustainable development. If, for instance, the
state is believed to systematically favor the rafting sector or the irrigated
agriculture, the anticipated effectiveness of local contributions in implementing
sustainable development would be discounted. In a similar vein, the perceived
priority of environmental protection vs. economic growth signals how viable and
effective community-level mobilizations would be. For instance, the expectation
of state to prioritize economic growth and obstruct local contributions to
implement sustainable development would be a disincentive to commit to
sustainable development.
The discussion of the hypotheses presented above concludes this section. The next
section provides a descriptive picture of willingness to contribute. In particular, the
tabulation of willingness to contribute by levels of exposure to the GEF project activities
(i.e. awareness of the project, awareness of the management meetings, attendance to
management meetings) is depicted in order to detect if there is a systematic correlation
between experience with GEF and willingness to engage in community-level
mobilizations towards sustainable development implementation. Finally, section 5.4.3
presents the results of the econometric exercise.

5.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28 display descriptive statistics on willingness-tocontribute variables in the Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon samples. Given the history
of strict conservation policy of the national park in Köprülü Kanyon, it is expected that
the overall level of willingness to contribute would be significantly lower in the latter
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sample. As discussed in chapter 4, the hard-park style of governance produced
considerable skepticism, not only of the intentions of the national park administration, but
also of the genuineness of the environmental problems. This expectation is reflected in
the relative prevalence of willingness to contribute in the two samples, where the
proportion of those who are willing to contribute by all measures is significantly lower in
Köprülü Kanyon, most severely in the case of willingness to limit resource use and to
contribute funds. Figures 5.4 – 5.13, which depict frequencies of the five index measures
of willingness to contribute, are suggestive of the same pattern.
Tables 5.27 and 5.28 depict the average levels of willingness to contribute by
different layers of exposure to the GEF project, namely, project awareness, management
meeting awareness, and participation. I hypothesize that having experienced the project,
e.g. being exposed to information about its goals, attending meetings, etc., would be
positively associated with willingness to contribute to local sustainable development. I
have noted in the previous section that although participation in GEF’s decision-making
mechanisms is an explanatory factor of willingness to contribute, it is not included in the
empirical model due to issues of endogeneity. It is likely that the factors underlying
participation and willingness to contribute are correlated, so delineating a unidirectional
causation between the two is not possible. Since I lack a good instrument of participation
to include in the empirical model, I simply exclude it as the safest strategy.
Tables 5.27 and 5.28 reveal a positive correlation between involvement in the
project and willingness to contribute in both samples. Asterisks denote statistically
significant differences across corresponding subsamples, i.e. subsamples of project
awareness, meeting awareness, and participation. Accordingly, within the Sultan Sazlığı
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sample, those who have been aware of the project, on average, are more likely to
contribute by constrained resource use and providing labor, than those who have been
unaware of the project. The same pattern holds for subsamples based on meeting
awareness. The positive correlation between exposure to the GEF and willingness to
contribute is pronounced in the Köprülü Kanyon sample as well, albeit manifested mostly
at the layers of project awareness and participation. Accordingly, those who have been
informed of the project within this sample, on average, are more likely to contribute
according to four of the six measures tabulated, than those who have not been informed.
Similarly, the participator sample, on average, has higher levels of contribution in four
out of six measures, than the non-participator sample.

5.4.3 Econometric Analysis
Tables 5.35 and 5.36 tabulate the empirical results of the econometric analysis of
willingness to contribute for Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon, respectively. The
results of six specifications, which incorporate different dependent variables, are reported
in the tables. Since the dependent variables utilized in the analysis are index measures,
the interpretation of the sizes of coefficient estimates is tricky and not especially
meaningful. Thus, I discuss the signs and significance levels of the estimates, rather than
84

estimated coefficients in this section.

Another caveat to note before moving onto the

discussion of results is the high correlations between state perception variables and
measures of economic power as exhibited in tables 5.29- 5.34, which has likely lead to a
low statistical significance of estimates.
84

Only those estimates that are statistically significant at the 95% level are reported in
the tables. Full list of coefficient estimates can be found in Appendix C.
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As can be seen, the proxies of community involvement and environmental values
have the expected signs in the specifications they are statistically significant, in both
Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon. The expected positive correlation between concern
for the community and the environment and willingness to take action for local
sustainable development is illustrated by these findings. The findings here pose an
interesting contrast to the estimated negative relationship between participation in labor
sharing and hypothetical participation in Köprülü Kanyon presented in section 5.3.3. I
interpret this pattern as further evidence of the dominance of the distrust motive of
participation in state-initiated channels. That is to say, the findings are suggestive that
while distrust of other community members, proxied by infrequent participation in labor
sharing, is associated with participation in GEF’s management meetings, trust and
sharing with fellow villagers are associated with higher willingness to commit to
community-level initiatives of sustainable development.
The hypothesized impact of more repressive gender relations in Köprülü Kanyon
is displayed by the signs of the female dummy’s estimated coefficient. Women are more
likely to contribute to local sustainable development (by constraining resource use in
particular) in Sultan Sazlığı, as the positive sign of the female dummy in specifications
(3) and (6) indicates. In Köprülü Kanyon, in contrast, being a woman is associated with
lower levels of contribution by non-resource use type activities and by labor. This
demonstrates that the gender norms of appropriate female behavior can be important
impediments on women’s willingness in Köprülü Kanyon.
Although I hypothesized that the proxies of household wealth would be
negatively associated with willingness to contribute in both sites, their estimated effects
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are overall statistically insignificant. This is not wholly unexpected given the high
correlation between measures of economic power. One notable exception is the
coefficient estimate of household asset index in the willingness to contribute funds
specification in Köprülü Kanyon. I hold, however, that this result is driven largely by the
nature of the contribution measure used, as it is conceivable that the wealthy has a higher
willingness to contribute by monetary means.
Having income from animal husbandry and reed cutting in Sultan Sazlığı are
negatively correlated with willingness to contribute, as hypothesized. To reiterate, I had
argued that reliance on animal husbandry signals binding labor constraints; this is
confirmed by the finding that it is associated with a negative impact especially on the
measure of non-resource use and of labor contribution. I had also asserted that reed
cutters, in particular, would be reluctant to contribute since they do not assume
responsibility for the ongoing environmental problems. This claim is supported by the
estimated negative impact of having reed income on resource-based measures of
contribution. In Köprülü Kanyon, on the other hand, having income from farming is
associated with higher levels of labor contribution, which can be interpreted as the impact
of labor availability in farming households.
The hypothesized effect of perceived equal treatment is manifested in all
specifications for both Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon.

As can be seen, the

perception that the Turkish state treats its citizens equally is associated with higher
willingness to contribute. This can be interpreted as evidence that skepticism of equal
treatment produces disincentives to contribute. Perceived importance given to economic
growth also has the expected negative impact in Sultan Sazlığı, though statistically
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significant only in two specifications. Accordingly, holding other variables constant,
perceiving the Turkish state to be more growth-oriented is associated with lower nonresource use and labor contributions. The same variable, however, has a significant and
positive estimated effect on willingness to donate funds for environmental protection in
Köprülü Kanyon. Although the latter finding is counter-intuitive, it might be suggestive
of the relationship between hostility felt towards the rigid environmental conservation
practices and environmental values discussed in chapter 4. Accordingly, those who
perceive the state to be more growth-oriented might in fact be less skeptical of the state
and more willing to contribute to local sustainable development.
Finally, it is notable that the anticipation of commitment by other community
members, proxied by the variable capturing expected number of contributors within the
community, is positively correlated with all willingness to contribute in all specifications
both in Köprülü Kanyon and Sultan Sazlığı. Furthermore, the anticipated impact of
succesful implementation of local sustainable development on the household welfare,
measured on a scale of 1 to 3, is associated with higher willingess to contribute in all
specifications in Sultan Sazlığı. These findings further underline the role of anticipations
in motivating contribution to local sustainable development.

5.5 Conclusion
A number of important findings have been presented in this chapter, in particular
about the role of inequalities based on wealth, gender, social status, etc., and perceptions
of the state in operationalizing effective sustainable development at the local level. First,
I have scrutinized different layers of exclusion from participatory decision-making
processes by delving into multiple levels of informedness. In doing so, I have depicted
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that awareness of such processes, which is a prerequisite of taking part in them, is
systematically correlated with local power relations in both Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü
Kanyon. In particular, I have found that gender and source of livelihood to be
significantly correlated with being aware of the GEF project and its decision-making
mechanisms. Given that gender and livelihood are the most pronounced axes of
inequality in both sites, this finding demonstrates that the locally powerless have been
more likely to be denied opportunities to participate in the decision-making mechanisms.
Secondly, by undertaking an econometric analysis of the factors that can thwart or
facilitate participation in the GEF project’s decision-making mechanisms, I have shed
light especially on the role of power relations and anticipated state behavior. In addition,
the comparative perspective of this analysis enabled me to illuminate different, and at
times contradictory, motives behind participation. I attempted to delineate these motives
by supplementing the empirical analysis by the qualitative findings. Specifically, I found
that gender, wealth and livelihood-based inequalities are pronounced impediments on
participation. The perception of the Turkish state to be unfair or growth-oriented, on the
other hand, operates in context-dependent ways, as it can induce participation qua
monitoring. In particular, while these perceptions seem to thwart participation in Sultan
Sazlığı, they are found to induce it in Köprülü Kanyon. This finding illuminates the how
perceptions, and the historical processes by which they are formed, can entail
significantly different lines of actions.
Finally, I explored the local people’s willingness to take action, such as limiting
their resource use or contributing labor or funds, for implementing sustainable
development and showed that perceptions of the state, again, emerge as significant
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factors. Perceived fairness of treatment by the state, in particular, has a marked impact in
facilitating local-level initiatives for implementing sustainable development. The results
of this exercise have also illuminated the role of importance of intra-community trust and
anticipated commitment by the community members.
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Table 5.1 Discussion of variables used in empirical analysis
VARIABLES
Individual Level Variables
Demographics
Age
Gender
Education
Community Participation Measures
Participation in labor sharing
Participation in village decisions
Participation in problem solving-1
Participation in problem solving-2
Community participation index
Feeling of belonging
Environmental values and concern
Environmental values index
Local environmental concern
State Perceptions
Trust to the National Park
Trust to state index
Equal treatment by central state
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental
priority
Anticipations
Expected attendance by others
Expected meeting success
Expected commitment by others
Expected distributional impact

EXPLANATION

Age of the respondent
Female dummy
Years of education received by the respondent
Self-reported frequency of participation in informal labor
sharing arrangements in the community, measured on 1-4 scale
Self-reported frequency of participation in village-level decision
making, measured on 1-5 scale
Self-reported frequency of participation in village-level problem
solving, measured on 1 -5
Self-reported frequency of voicing opinions in village-level
problem solving, measured on 1-5 scale
Index constructed on 3 self-reported measures of community
participation listed above
Self-reported measure of feeling of belonging, measured on 1-5
scale
Index constructed on self-reported level of agreement, measured
on 1-5 scale, with statements on environmental protection vs.
economic growth
Self-reported measure of concern for local natural resources,
measured on 1-5 scale
Self-reported measure of trust to the national park, measured on
1-5 scale
Index constructed on self-reported measures of trust, measured
on 1-5 scale, to 4 local state agencies
Self-reported evaluation of equal treatment of citizens by the
state, measured on 1-5 scale
Index constructed on self-reported evaluation of equal treatment
by the central state, local government and the village head
Self-reported perception of priority given to economic growth
by the state, measured on 1-5 scale
Self-reported perception of priority given to environmental
protection by the state, measured on 1-5 scale
Expected attendance to management meetings by the respondent
when s/he first heard of the meetings, measured by number of
people out of 10
Anticipated success of meetings to produce solutions to resource
use before attending the meetings, measured on 1-5 scale
Expected number of people who would join collective actions to
implement sustainable development, measured by number of
people out of ten
Expected distributional impact of a conservation mechanism on
the respondents' household, measured on a scale of 1 to 3

Continued on next page
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Table 5.1 (continued) Discussion of variables used in empirical analysis
VARIABLES
Household Level Variables
Household size
Children under 14
Monthly income
Source of income
Household land size
Household asset index

Awareness of GEF
Awareness of meetings
Participation
Hypothetical participation

Willingness to limit resource use
Willingness to contribute labor
Willingness to contribute funds
Willingness to attend education
Willingness to collect garbage

Willingness to limit water use
Willingness to limit grazing
Willingness to limit reed cutting
Willingness to limit oregano
harvesting
Willingness to limit tourism
Willingness to limit illegal
construction

EXPLANATION
Number of people living in the respondent's household
Number of children younger than 14 living in the respondent's
household
Monthly income bracket of the respondent's household,
measured on 10 brackets of 250 TL ($159 PPP)
Share of household income from different sources of livelihood,
measured as percentage of total household income
Size of land owned by the household, measured in hectares
Index constructed on ownership of 10 household assets

Indicates if the respondent has heard of the project, binary
variable
Indicates if the respondent has heard of management meetings,
binary variable
Indicates if the respondent has attended management meetings
regularly, binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would attend meetings if s/he has
been informed, binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to limit own
resource use for local sustainability, binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to work for a
mechanism set up to manage resources, binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to contribute money
(an amount according to his/her budget) to an institution s/he
trusts to be used for environmental protection, binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to attend
environmental training activities, binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to collect others'
garbage to keep the environment clean, binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to limit use of
irrigation water for local sustainability if s/he was a farmer,
binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to limit use of
pastures for local sustainability if s/he was an animal owner
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to limit amount of
reed cutting for local sustainability if s/he was a reed cutter,
binary variable
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to limit amount of
oregano harvesting for local sustainability if s/he was an
oregano harvester
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to limit number of
tourists hosted for local sustainability if s/he was a rafting tour
operator
Indicates if the respondent would be willing to abide by
construction laws after a hypothetical one-time pardoning of
illegal buildings if s/he was living in a strict protection zone
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Table 5.2. Sultan Sazlığı sample characteristics, whole sample
Whole Sample (377)
Individual Level Variables

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Age
Education, years

47.6
4.7

46
5

12.7
2.4

25
0

80
13

Participation in labor sharing
Feeling of belonging
Participation in village decisions
Participation in problem solving-1
Participation in problem solving-2
Community participation index

1.8
4.8
3.2
4.3
4.2
0

1
5
4
4
4
-0.1

1
0.6
1.4
0.8
0.9
1.4

1
1
1
1
1
-5.5

4
5
5
5
5
1.7

0

0

1.2

-4.1

2.8

3.2
0
2.8
0
3.5
3.5

4
0.2
3
0.2
1.2
1.2

1.3
1.4
1.5
1.3
4.0
4.0

1
-5.5
1
-6.2
1
1

5
2.0
5
2.7
5
5

4.3
1.2
0
2.1
15.7
24.6
13
5.9

4
1
0.2
2
0
0
0
0

1.7
1.2
1.5
1.3
35.5
36.5
26.4
20.4

1
0
-22.4
1
0
0
0
0

9
4
0.6
10
500
100
100
100

Environmental values index
Trust to the National Park
Trust to state index
Equal treatment by central state
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority
Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Monthly income, category
Household land size, hectares
Farm income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, %
Proportions
Female
Landless
Farm income
Animal income
Reed income
Income <250TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($ 159-319 PPP)

46.2%
52.0%
44.0%
34.5%
9.8%
37.4%
31.6%
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Table 5.3. Köprülü Kanyon sample characteristics, whole sample

Individual Level Variables
Age
Education, years
Participation in labor sharing
Feeling of belonging
Participation in village decisions
Participation in problem solving-1
Participation in problem solving-2
Community participation index
Environmental values index
Trust to the National Park
Trust to state index
Equal treatment by central state
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority

Whole Sample (401)
Standard
Median
Deviation Minimum

Mean

Maximum

46.1
4.2

43
5

15.3
4

25
0

84
25

2.8
4.6
3.3
4
3.8
0

3
5
4
4
4
0.3

1
0.8
1.2
0.8
1
1.5

1
1
1
1
1
-5.2

5
5
5
5
5
2.1

0

0

1.4

-4.3

3.7

2
0
2.3
0
3.3
3.3

2
0.4
2
-0.1
4
3

1.1
1.5
1.1
1.4
1
1

1
-4.3
1
-2.6
1
1

5
3.0
5
3.7
5
5

4.1
0.9
0
2.5
7.6
5
14.2
8.6
3
13.9

4
0
0.4
2
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
1.3
1.5
1.6
20.2
19.2
28.5
22.5
14.6
31.9

1
0
-4.6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

15
7
2.3
10
300
500
100
100
100
100

Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Monthly income, category
Household land size, hectares
Number of cattle
Farm income, %
Animal income, %
Oregano income, %
Tourism income, %
Proportions
Female
Landless
Farm income
Animal income
Oregano income
Tourism income
Income < 250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

34.7%
50.1%
42.4%
32.7%
8.7%
20.0%
28.7%
29.2%
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Table 5.4 Comparison of select sample characteristics, Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü
Kanyon
Sultan Sazlığı
Individual Level Variables

Köprülü Kanyon
Sample Means

Age
Education, years

47.6
4.7

46.1
4.2

Participation in labor sharing *
Feeling of belonging *
Participation in village decisions *
Participation in problem solving-1 *
Participation in problem solving-2 *

1.8
4.8
3.2
4.3
4.2

2.8
4.6
3.3
4
3.8

Trust to the National Park *
Equal treatment by central state*
Importance of growth priority *
Importance of environmental priority *

3.2
2.8
3.5
3.5

2
2.3
3.3
3.3

4.3
1.2
2.1
15.7

4.1
0.9
2.5
7.6

Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number *
Monthly income, category *
Household land size, hectares *

Proportions
Female *
Landless
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP) *
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

46.2%
52.0%
37.4%
31.6%

34.7%
50.1%
28.7%
29.2%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.5 Sultan Sazlığı sample characteristics, decomposed by GEF awareness
Not Aware of GEF (203)

Aware of GEF (174)

Individual Level Variables

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Age
Education, years *

47.3
4.5

46
5

13.1
2.3

47.9
5

47
5

12.3
2.4

Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing
Participation in village decisions
Participation in problem solving-1
Participation in problem solving-2
Community participation index *

4.8
1.8
2.9
4.2
4.1
-0.3

5
1
3
4
4
-0.1

0.6
1
1.4
0.8
1.1
1.5

4.8
1.9
3.6
4.4
4.3
0.3

5
1.5
4
4
4
0.4

0.6
1.1
1.3
0.7
0.8
1.2

0

0

1.1

0

0

1.3

3.3
3.6
3.5
0.1
3
0.1

4
4
4
0.2
4
0.2

1.3
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.3

3
3.5
3.4
-0.1
2.5
-0.1

4
4
4
0.2
2
-0.2

1.4
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.5
1.3

4.2
1.2
0
12
23.6
12.3
4.6

4
1
0.2
0
0
0
0

1.8
1.2
1.7
21.8
37.8
26.7
17.9

4.3
1.1
0
19.9
25.7
13.7
7.4

4
1
0.2
3.5
0
0
0

1.7
1.2
1.1
46.3
35
26.2
23

Environmental values index
Trust to the National Park *
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority
Trust to state index
Equal treatment by central state *
Equal treatment index
Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Household land size, hectares
Farm income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, %
Proportions
Female *
Landless
Farm income *
Animal income
Reed income
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

56.2%
55.2%
39.4%
35.5%
8.4%
39.4%
35.5%

35.1%
48.3%
49.4%
33.3%
11.5%
35.1%
27.0%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.6 Sultan Sazlığı project aware subsample characteristics, decomposed by
meeting awareness
Not Aware of Meetings (92)

Aware of Meetings (82)

Individual Level Variables

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Age
Education, years

48.2
4.9

45.5
5

13.1
2.3

47.6
5.1

49
5

11.4
2.6

Feeling of belonging *
Participation in labor sharing
Participation in village decisions
Participation in problem solving-1
Participation in problem solving-2
Community participation index *

4.7
2
3.4
4.2
4.2
0

5
2
4
4
4
-0.1

0.7
1.1
1.2
0.8
0.8
1.2

4.9
1.8
3.9
4.6
4.4
0.6

5
1
4
5
5
0.7

0.3
1
1.2
0.6
0.7
1.1

Environmental values index

0.1

0

1.3

-0.1

0.1

1.3

Trust to the National Park
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority
Trust to state index
Equal treatment by central state
Equal treatment index

3.1
3.6
3.5
-0.2
2.6
-0.2

4
4
4
0.2
2
-0.2

1.3
1.1
1.2
1.5
1.4
1.3

3
3.4
3.3
0
2.4
0

4
4
4
0.2
2
-0.1

1.5
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.3

4.3
1
0
10.4
21.8
13.4
2.6

4
1
0.2
0
0
0
0

1.6
1.2
1.4
16.1
34.5
26.3
10.6

4.4
1.3
0.1
30.6
30.2
14.1
12.8

4
1
0.2
13
20
0
0

1.8
1.3
0.8
63.8
35.2
26.3
30.8

Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Household land size, hectares
Farm income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, % *
Proportions
Female *
Landless *
Farm income *
Animal income
Reed income
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

44.6%
56.5%
41.3%
32.6%
7.6%
37.0%
28.3%

24.4%
39.0%
58.5%
34.2%
15.9%
32.9%
25.6%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.7 Köprülü Kanyon sample characteristics, decomposed by GEF awareness

Individual Level Variables

Does not Know GEF (278)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev.

Knows GEF (123)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev.

Age
Education, years *

46.5
3.9

43
5

15.7
4

45.2
4.8

44
5

14.6
3.9

Feeling of belonging *
Participation in labor sharing *
Participation in village decisions
Participation in problem solving-1
Participation in problem solving-2
Community participation index *

4.6
2.7
3.3
4
3.8
-0.2

5
3
4
4
4
0.3

0.9
1
1.2
0.8
0.9
1.5

4.8
3
3.5
4.1
4
0.1

5
3
4
4
4
0.3

0.7
1
1.3
0.9
1
1.6

Environmental values index

-0.1

0

1.5

0.1

0

1.3

Trust to the National Park *
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority
Trust to state index
Equal treatment by central state *
Equal treatment index *

2.1
3.3
3.2
0
2.3
-0.1

2
4
3
0.4
2
-0.1

1.1
1
1
1.5
1
1.3

1.8
3.2
3.3
0.1
2.6
0.2

1
4
3
0.4
2
0.1

1.1
1
0.9
1.5
1.2
1.5

4.1
1
0
8.2
5
12.6
7.7
2.3
14

4
0
0.4
0
0
0
0
0
0

1.9
1.3
1.6
23.4
21.4
27.9
22.2
13.2
31.6

4.3
0.9
0
6.2
5
17.9
10.8
4.5
13.7

4
0
0.3
1.5
0
0
0
0
0

2.1
1.2
1.4
9.7
12.8
29.6
23.2
17.5
32.6

Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Household land size, hectares
Number of cattle
Farm income, % *
Animal income, %
Oregano income, %
Tourism income, %
Proportions
Female *
Landless
Farm income *
Animal income
Oregano income *
Tourism income
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

38.5%
52.2%
39.6%
30.2%
6.3%
20.9%
28.4%
29.5%

26.0%
45.5%
48.8%
38.2%
13.0%
17.9%
29.3%
28.5%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.8 Köprülü Kanyon project aware subsample characteristics, decomposed by
meeting awareness

Individual Level Variables

Does not Know Meetings (79)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev.

Knows Meetings (44)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev.

Age *
Education, years *

42.8
5.2

39
5

13.7
4.3

49.5
4

52
5

15.4
2.8

Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing
Participation in village decisions
Participation in problem solving-1
Participation in problem solving-2
Community participation index

4.7
3
3.5
4.1
4
0.1

5
3
4
4
4
0.3

0.8
1
1.2
0.7
1
1.4

4.9
3
3.6
4
3.9
0.1

5
3
4
4
4
0.4

0.5
1.2
1.4
1.2
1.1
2

Environmental values index

0.1

0.1

1.1

0.1

0

1.5

Trust to the National Park
Importance of growth priority *
Importance of environmental priority
Trust to state index *
Equal treatment by central state *
Equal treatment index *

1.9
3.4
3.2
-0.1
2.4
-0.1

2
4
3
0.1
2
0.1

1.1
0.9
0.8
1.5
1.2
1.4

1.8
2.9
3.4
0.5
2.9
0.7

1
3
4
0.8
2
1

1.1
1.2
1
1.5
1.2
1.6

4.5
0.9
0.1
5.9
3.4
15.8
8.3
4.3
16.1

4
0
0.6
1
0
0
0
0
0

1.9
1.2
1.4
9.4
8.1
28.8
21.2
18.6
34.5

3.9
0.9
-0.2
6.7
8.2
22
15.5
4.9
9

4
0
-0.1
2
0
2
0
0
0

2.5
1.3
1.4
10.2
18.5
31
26.3
15.2
28.2

Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Household land size, hectares
Number of cattle *
Farm income, %
Animal income, % *
Oregano income, %
Tourism income, %
Proportions
Female
Landless
Farm income
Animal income *
Oregano income *
Tourism income
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

26.6%
45.6%
44.3%
31.7%
8.9%
20.3%
24.1%
27.9%

25.0%
45.5%
56.8%
50.0%
20.5%
13.6%
38.6%
29.6%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.9 List of explanatory variables and hypothesized impacts on participation
Explanatory Variables

Hypothesized Impact

Individual Characteristics
Age
Education
Gender (female dummy)

Positive; older age might confer power
Positive; more knowledge, self-confidence and leadership
traits.
Negative; gender-based norms and power relationships

Environmental values index

Positive; implies higher stakes

Participation in Community
Feeling of belonging

Positive; implies concern and higher stakes.

Participation in labor sharing
Community participation
index
Household Characteristics
Household size
Children under 14
Source of livelihood
Household assets index,
household land size
Perceptions of the State
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental
priority
Anticipations about the
Process
Expected attendance by
others
Expected meeting success *

Positive; history of participation has positive spillovers,
implies other-regarding motivations.
Positive; history of participation in community decisionmaking has positive spillovers.
Positive if it signals resource need or labor availability,
might be negative due to increased labor burden and time
constraints
Negative; increased labor burden and time constraints
Different resource use signifies different stakes in decisionmaking and level of dependency on natural resources
Positive since signifies power; might be ambiguous if
signifies less dependence on natural resources
Positive if anticipation of equal treatment implies
expectation of being listened; negative if anticipation of
unequal treatment motivates to “monitor” the process.
Negative if anticipation of non-implementation of meeting
decisions discounts benefits of attending, positive if
motivates to “monitor” the process.
Positive if anticipation of implementation of meeting
decisions discounts costs of attending, negative if motivates
to free-ride.
Positive; anticipated free-riding would discourage
participation.
Positive; anticipation of producing solutions would
encourage participation

Note: Asterisked variable is not included in the hypothetical participation model.
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Table 5.10 Sultan Sazlığı meeting-aware subsample characteristics, decomposed by
participation
Did not Attend Meetings (50)

Attended Meetings (32)

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Age
Education, years *

48
3.8

49.5
5

12.4
2.5

47.3
5.9

49
5

10.8
2.3

Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing *
Community participation index

4.9
1.5
0.4

5
1
0.4

0.3
0.8
1

4.9
1.9
0.7

5
2
1.1

0.4
1
1.1

Environmental values index *

-0.6

-0.3

1.1

0.2

0.4

1.4

Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority *
Equal treatment by central state

3.2
2.9
2.3

4
2
1.5

1.4
1.4
1.6

3.5
3.5
2.4

4
4
2

1.1
1.1
1.5

Expected attendance, out of 10
Expected meeting success *

4.6
3.3

4.5
4

2.1
1.5

5.4
4.1

5
5

2.8
1.3

4.1
1.2
0.2
14.8
16
8.4
19.4

4
1
0.2
0
0
0
0

1.7
1.1
0.3
28.9
29.8
24.9
35.6

4.6
1.3
0.1
40.8
39.2
17.7
8.6

4.5
1
0.2
25
40
0
0

1.9
1.4
1
77
35.7
26.7
26.8

Individual Level Variables

Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Household land size, hectares *
Farm income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, %
Proportions
Female *
Landless *
Farm income *
Animal income
Reed income *
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

40.60%
59.40%
37.50%
25.00%
25.00%
31.30%
25.00%

14.00%
26.00%
72.00%
40.00%
10.00%
34.00%
26.00%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.11 Köprülü Kanyon meeting-aware subsample characteristics, decomposed
by participation
Did not Attend (27)

Attend (17)

Individual Level Variables

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Age *
Education, years

42.7
4.6

40
5

14.2
2.2

60.5
2.9

58
0

10.0
3.3

Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing *
Community participation index

4.8
2.7
-0.1

5
3
0.4

0.7
1.2
2.2

5
3.5
0.4

5
4
0.3

0
0.8
1.6

0

0

1.5

0.1

-0.2

1.7

Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority *
Equal treatment index

2.7
3.1
0.4

3
3
1

1.3
1.1
1.7

3.3
3.8
1.2

4
4
1.1

1.2
0.8
1.2

Expected attendance, out of 10
Expected meetings success *

4.6
2.2

4
2

2.9
0.8

5.9
3.3

5
4

2.9
1.3

4.5
1.1
0.1
4.9
13.1
11.9
5.2
14.3

4
1
0.4
0
0
0
0
0

2.7
1.4
1.3
9.8
24.8
23.5
17
34.6

3
0.5
-0.6
9.7
37.2
21.6
4.2
0

3
0
-0.2
4
20
2
0
0

1.7
1.1
1.5
10.5
35.2
30.2
11.8
0

Environmental values index

Household Level Variables
Household size, number *
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Household land size *
Farm income, % *
Animal income, %
Oregano income, %
Tourism income, % *
Proportions
Female
Landless *
Farm income *
Animal income
Oregano income
Tourism income *
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

26.6%
45.6%
44.3%
31.7%
8.9%
20.3%
33.3%
22.2%

17.7%
11.8%
82.4%
52.9%
23.5%
0.0%
47.1%
41.2%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.12 Correlation between measures of community participation and
environmental values, Sultan Sazlığı meeting-aware subsample
Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing
Community participation index
Environmental values index

Belonging

Labor sharing

Participation

Environmental Values

1
-0.0258
-0.0271
0.0841

1
0.1920
-0.057

1
0.1239

1

Table 5.13 Correlation between measures of state perceptions and anticipations
about meetings, Sultan Sazlığı meeting-aware subsample
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority
Expected attendance
Expected meeting success

Equal
1
0.4557
0.5048
0.1167
0.1475

Growth
1
0.7414
0.3912
0.158

Environment

Attendance

1
0.2822
0.1237

1
0.3145

Success

1

Table 5.14 Correlation between measures of economic power, Sultan Sazlığı
meeting-aware subsample
Household asset index
Household land size
Farming income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, %

Asset
1
0.1508
0.1474
0.1206
-0.4246

Land

Farming

Animal

Reed

1
0.2012
0.0378
-0.1974

1
-0.0115
-0.3150

1
-0.2242

1
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Table 5.15 Participation in decision-making mechanisms, Sultan Sazlığı
Meeting-aware subsample
Dependent variable: Participation in management meetings
Age

-0.22
(1.31)
-31.98
(25.62)
5.88
(4.88)
-22.48
(22.30)
17.31
(11.12)
10.46
(10.74)
23.86 **
(8.52)
-9.43
(8.46)
7.52
(10.52)
-6.09
(4.44)
0.80**
(0.32)
0.43
(0.37)
0.89 **
(0.41)
-0.01
(0.40)
-1.35
(8.04)
-20.66 *
(11.43)
28.23 ***
(11.99)
7.54 *
(3.72)
-6.30
(7.95)
75

Female
Education, years
Feeling of belonging, scale
Participation in labor sharing, scale
Frequency of community participation, index
Environmental values, index
Household size
Children under 14
Household assets, rank
Household land size, hectares
Farm income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, %
Equal treatment, index
Importance of growth priority, scale
Importance of environmental priority, scale
Expected attendance, number out of 10
Expected meeting success, scale
Observations

Notes: (1) Marginal effects at the mean of explanatory variables reported, standard errors
in parentheses, results are multiplied by 100 (2) *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels of significance (3) Scales are 5-point-based, except 4-point scale for feeling of
belonging (4) Rank (1-10) based on the index value of household assets (5) Village
controls are included but not reported
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Table 5.16 Sultan Sazlığı meeting-unaware subsample characteristics, decomposed
by hypothetical participation

Individual Level Variables

Would not attend if knew (15)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev.

Would attend if knew (77)
Std.
Mean
Median Dev.

Age
Education, years

50.3
4.5

50
5

15.2
1.6

47.8
4.9

45
5

12.8
2.4

Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing *
Community participation index *

4.9
1.4
-0.8

5
1
-0.4

0.3
0.6
1.7

4.7
2.1
0.2

5
2
0.2

0.8
1.2
1

0.2

0.2

1.3

0.1

0

1.3

3.5
3.2
-0.5

4
4
-0.3

1
1.1
1.3

4.8
3.6
-0.1

4
4
-0.2

10.9
1.2
1.3

4.9

5

2.4

6.3

5

11

3.5
0.7
-0.6
15.3
12.7
6.1
0

4
0
0.3
5
0
0
0

1.4
1
3.1
19.8
26
15.9
0

4.4
1.1
0.1
9.5
23.5
14.8
3.1

5
1
0.2
0
0
0
0

1.6
1.2
0.7
15.3
35.8
27.7
11.5

Environmental values index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority
Equal treatment index
Expected attendance, out of 10
Household Level Variables
Household size, number *
Children under 14, number
Household assets index *
Household land size, hectares
Farm income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, %
Proportions
Female *
Landless
Farm income
Animal income
Reed income
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

66.7%
40.0%
40.0%
20.0%
0.0%
26.7%
40.0%

40.3%
59.7%
41.6%
35.1%
9.1%
39.0%
26.0%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level

343

Table 5.17 Köprülü Kanyon meeting-unaware
decomposed by hypothetical participation

Individual Level Variables
Age
Education, years

subsample

Would not attend if knew (26)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev.

characteristics,

Would attend if knew (53)
Std.
Mean
Median
Dev.

42.7
6.0

40
5

14.8
3.6

42.8
5.4

38
5

13.3
4.4

Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing
Community participation index

4.8
3
0

5
3
0.3

0.8
0.8
1.5

4.7
3
0.4

5
3
0.3

0.8
1
1.3

Environmental values index *

-0.3

-0.3

1

0.4

0.3

1.1

Importance of growth priority *
Importance of environmental priority
Equal treatment index

3.0
3.2
-0.2

3
3
-0.4

1
0.8
1.3

3.6
3.2
0

4
3
0.1

0.8
0.9
1.5

2.8

2

3.0

3.6

3

3.2

4
0.8
0.3
4.7
18.9
6.8
4.4
11.5

4
0
0.8
0
0
0
0
0

1.8
1.0
1.1
10.1
34.9
15.3
18.3
32.6

4.6
0.9
0
6.6
14.2
9.2
5.7
17.9

4
0
0.3
2
0
0
0
0

1.9
1.3
1.5
9.3
25.5
23.7
21.5
35.2

Expected attendance by others
Household Level Variables
Household size, number
Children under 14, number
Household asset index
Household land size, hectares
Farm income, %
Animal income, %
Oregano income, %
Tourism income, %
Proportions
Female
Landless
Farm income
Animal income
Oregano income
Tourism income
Income <250 TL ($159 PPP)
Income 250-500 TL ($159-319 PPP)

30.8%
57.7%
42.3%
26.9%
7.7%
11.5%
15.4%
30.8%

24.5%
39.6%
45.3%
34.0%
9.4%
24.4%
28.3%
26.4%

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.18 Correlation between measures of community participation and
environmental values, Sultan Sazlığı meeting-unaware subsample

Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing
Community participation index
Environmental values index

Belonging
1
-0.0443
-0.1402
-0.0016

Labor sharing

Participation

Environmental
Values

1
0.1981
0.2032

1
0.1787

1

Table 5.19 Correlation between measures of state perceptions and anticipations
about meetings, Sultan Sazlığı meeting-unaware subsample
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority
Expected attendance

Equal
1
0.3964
0.3684
0.1351

Growth

Environment

Attendance

1
0.0543

1

1
0.5536
0.0789

Table 5.20 Correlation between measures of economic power, Sultan Sazlığı
meeting-unaware subsample
Household asset index
Household land size
Farming income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, %

Asset

Land

Farming

Animal

Reed

1
0.104
0.0457
-0.0591
0.0448

1
0.4381
0.068
-0.067

1
-0.1102
-0.0669

1
0.0983

1

Table 5.21 Correlation between measures of community participation and
environmental values, Köprülü Kanyon meeting-unaware subsample

Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing
Community participation index
Environmental values index

Belonging
1
-0.1749
0.0186
-0.0477

Labor sharing

Participation

Environmental
Values

1
0.2025
0.3681

1
0.1901

1

Table 5.22 Correlation between measures of state perceptions and anticipations
about meetings, Köprülü Kanyon meeting-unaware subsample
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority
Expected attendance

Equal
1
0.3323
0.2463
0.1991
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Growth

Environment

1
0.4634
0.3218

1
0.2459

Attendance

1

Table 5.23 Correlation between measures of economic power, Köprülü Kanyon
meeting-unaware subsample
Household asset index
Household land size
Farming income, %
Animal income, %
Oregano income, %
Tourism income, %

Asset

Land

Farming

Animal

Oregano

Tourism

1
0.1706
0.1034
-0.2584
0.1299
0.2819

1
0.3099
-0.0417
-0.094
-0.113

1
0.0822
-0.0672
-0.1752

1
-0.0603
-0.1273

1
-0.1201

1
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Table 5.24 Hypothetical participation in decision-making mechanisms
Dependent variable: Hypothetical participation in management meetings
Age
Female
Education, years
Feeling of belonging, scale
Participation in labor sharing, scale
Frequency of community participation, index
Environmental values, index
Household size
Children under 14
Household assets, rank
Household land size, hectares
Farm income, %
Animal income, %

Sultan Sazlığı
-0.09
(0.27)
-15.80 **
(8.79)
-1.22
(1.47)
-6.97
(5.39)
4.82 *
(3.38)
3.55 *
(2.39)
-2.60
(2.40)
2.06
(2.27)
-1.61
(3.04)
0.81
(1.93)
-0.41 **
(0.23)
0.14 *
(0.10)
0.17
(0.14)

Oregano income, %
Tourism income, %
0.67
(1.95)
-3.96
(3.20)
4.32 *
(2.86)
-0.01
(0.10)

Equal treatment, index
Importance of growth priority, scale
Importance of environmental priority, scale
Expected attendance, number out of 10
Conservation problem, dummy

85

Observations

Köprülü Kanyon
0.11
(0.60)
-30.55
(26.09)
-3.66 *
(2.09)
8.82
(10.17)
-14.76 *
(8.49)
1.10
(6.16)
14.88 **
(7.25)
2.36
(4.26)
4.39
(5.90)
-3.41
(3.31)
0.91
(0.76)
-0.12
(0.30)
0.04
(0.36)
0.42
(0.42)
0.42
(0.26)
-5.57
(5.07)
29.37 **
(12.12)
-17.44
(12.09)
-0.27
(2.98)
22.71
(13.13)
79

Notes: (1) Marginal effects at the mean of explanatory variables reported, standard errors
in parentheses, results multiplied by 100 (2) *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
of significance (3) Scales are 5-point-based, except 4-point scale for feeling of belonging
(4) Ranks (1-10) based on the index value of household assets (5) Village controls
included but not reported (6) Reed income dropped as it predicts hypothetical
participation perfectly.
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Table 5.25 Explanatory variables and hypothesized impacts for willingness to
commit to sustainable development
Explanatory Variables

Hypothesized Impact

Individual Characteristics
Age

Negative; the young are more inclined to mobilize

Education

Positive; correlates with awareness and responsibility

Gender (female dummy)
Environmental values index

Ambiguous; women are often better cooperators but gender
norms might be binding for some types of contribution
Positive; implies concern and higher stakes

Participation in Community
Feeling of belonging

Positive; implies concern and higher stakes.

Participation in labor sharing

Positive; implies other-regarding and reciprocity

Community participation index

Positive; implies concern for the community

Household Characteristics
Household size
Children under 14

Positive if it signals resource need or labor availability, might
be negative due to increased labor burden and time constraints
Negative; increased labor burden and time constraints

Source of livelihood (dummy of
having income)
Household assets index, household
land size
Perceptions of the State
Equal treatment index

Signifies level of dependency; correlates with power and
perception of responsibility
Signifies power and different incentives to contribute

Importance of growth priority

Negative; anticipated failure of mobilization

Importance of environmental
priority
Anticipations

Positive; anticipated success of mobilization

Expected commitment by others

Positive; anticipated free-riding would discourage
participation.
Positive; incentive to contribute if will win from sustainable
development

Expected distributional impact

Positive; anticipated success of mobilization

348

Table 5. 26 Descriptive statistics on willingness to contribute measures
Sultan Sazlığı (%)

Köprülü Kanyon(%)

Willingness to limit resource use *
Willingness to contribute labor *
Willingness to contribute funds *
Willingness to attend education *
Willingness to collect garbage *

78.0
91.5
86.5
83.3
93.6

48.6
77.1
70.8
57.4
88.5

Willingness to limit water use
Willingness to limit grazing
Willingness to limit reed cutting
Willingness to limit oregano harvesting
Willingness to limit tourism
Willingness to limit illegal construction
Willingness to limit grazing

84.6
81.2
80.4
92.2
95.8
86.9
90.3

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level

Table 5.27 Descriptive statistics on willingness to contribute dependent variables,
Sultan Sazlığı
Willingness to contribute indices

Knows
GEF

Knows
meetings

Attended
meetings

Min.

Max.

By constrained resource use
By non-resource use
By labor
By funds
Scenario-based measures
All measures

-0.11
0.20 *
0.22 *
0.84
-0.10
0.06

-0.21
0.45 *
0.46 *
0.87 *
-0.21
0.17

-0.18
0.54
0.51
0.90
-0.15
0.25

-4.16
-5.89
-5.51
0
-3.71
-7.07

0.96
0.70
0.56
1
0.81
1.18

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level

Table 5.28 Descriptive statistics on willingness to contribute dependent variables,
Köprülü Kanyon
Willingness to contribute indices

Knows
GEF

Knows
meetings

Attended
meetings

Min.

Max.

By constrained resource use
By non-resource use
By labor
By funds
Scenario-based measures
All measures

0.29 *
0.18
0.18 *
0.59
0.28 *
0.20

0.37
0.18
0.23
0.55
0.33
0.15

0.46
0.91 *
0.82 *
0.76 *
0.44
0.91*

-4.65
-3.57
-3.4
0
-4.55
-4.34

0.58
1.21
0.91
1
0.44
1.47

Note:* denotes difference statistically significant at 95% confidence level
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Table 5.29 Correlation between measures of community participation and
environmental values, Sultan Sazlığı whole sample
Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing
Community participation index
Environmental values index

Belonging
1
0.0268
-0.0414
-0.007

Labor sharing

Participation

Environmental Values

1
0.1677
0.1309

1
0.0969

1

Table 5.30 Correlation between measures of state perceptions, Sultan Sazlığı whole
sample
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority

Equal
1
0.3838
0.3225

Growth

Environment

1
0.6059

1

Table 5.31 Correlation between measures of economic power, Sultan Sazlığı whole
sample
Household asset index
Household land size
Farming income, %
Animal income, %
Reed income, %

Asset
1
0.0733
0.0594
0.0334
-0.0682

Land

Farming

Animal

Reed

1
0.3306
0.0231
-0.1096

1
-0.0948
-0.1634

1
-0.089

1

Table 5.32 Correlation between measures of community participation and
environmental values, Köprülü Kanyon whole sample
Feeling of belonging
Participation in labor sharing
Community participation index
Environmental values index

Belonging
1
0.006
0.0532
0.0062

Labor sharing

Participation

Environmental Values

1
0.3781
0.3466

1
0.1287

1

Table 5.33 Correlation between measures of state perceptions, Köprülü Kanyon
whole sample
Equal
Equal treatment index
Importance of growth priority
Importance of environmental priority

1
0.3323
0.2463
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Growth
1
0.4634

Environment

1

Table 5.34 Correlation between measures of economic power, Köprülü Kanyon
whole sample
Household asset index
Household land size
Farming income, %
Animal income, %
Oregano income, %
Tourism income, %

Asset

Land

1
0.139
-0.0688
-0.0642
0.0148
0.2092

1
0.2683
0.0516
-0.0101
-0.0478

Farming

1
0.0035
-0.0373
-0.1351
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Animal

1
0.0009
-0.1313

Oregano

1
-0.0953

Tourism

1

Table 5.35 Willingness to contribute to local sustainable development, Sultan Sazlığı
Dependent Variable: Willingness to contribute
(1)
(2)
Age
Female
Education, years

Household size
Children under 14
Household assets, rank
Household land size,
hectares
Farm income, dummy
Animal income, dummy
Reed income, dummy
Equal treatment, index
Importance of growth
priority, scale
Importance of
environmental priority,
scale
Expected commitment by
others, number
Expected distributional
impact, scale
Observations

(4)

(5)

- 0.02*
0.32*

Feeling of belonging, scale
Participation in labor
sharing, scale
Frequency of community
participation, index
Environmental values,
index

Sultan Sazlığı

(3)

(6)

0.38*

0.13*
0.16**

0.18**

0.33***

0.05***

-0.34*

- 0.36**

0.32***

-0.44**

-0.59**
0.16**

0.28***

-0.48*
0.15**

0.11*

0.04**

0.15***

0.22***

-0.15*

-0.15*

0.08***

0.10***

0.07***

0.03***

0.06**

0.13***

0.60***

0.27**

0.22*

0.05***

0.47***

0.62***

375

375

375

375

375

375

Notes: (1) OLS regression estimates reported in all specifications, except probit estimates
in (4) (2) Signs of significant estimates reported (3)*, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels of significance (4) Dependent variables are willingness to contribute indices based
on resource, non-resource, labor, funds, scenario and all measures (5) Scales are 5-pointbased, except 4-point scale for feeling of belonging and 3-point scale for expected
distributional impact (6) Rank (1-10) based on the index value of household assets.
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Table 5.36 Willingness to contribute to local sustainable development, Köprülü
Kanyon
Dependent Variable: Willingness to contribute
(1)
(2)
Age
Female
Education, years
Feeling of belonging,
scale
Part. labor sharing,
scale
Fr. community
participation, index

-0.43***

0.20***

(3)

0.18***

(6)

-0.41**

0.18***
0.05**

0.21***

0.06***

0.22***

0.02**
0.25*

Equal treatment,
index
Importance of growth
priority, scale
Importance of
environmental
priority, scale

Observations

(5)

-0.41***

0.22***

Household size
Children under 14
Hhold assets, rank
Hhold land size, ha
Farm income, dummy
Ani. income, dummy
Ore. income, dummy
Tour. income, dummy

Expected commitment
by others, number
Expected distributional
impact, scale

(4)

0.13**
0.20***

Env. values, index

Köprülü Kanyon

0.04*
0.10***
-0.06*

0.04**

0.09***

0.07***

0.03***

0.04**

0.10***

401

401

401

401

401

401

Notes: (1) OLS regression estimates reported in all specifications, except probit estimates
in (4) (2) Signs of significant estimates reported (3)*, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels of significance (4) Dependent variables are willingness to contribute indices based
on resource, non-resource, labor, funds, scenario and all measures (5) Scales are 5-pointbased, except 4-point scale for feeling of belonging and 3-point scale for expected
distributional impact (6) Rank (1-10) based on the index value of household assets.
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Figure 5.1 Overview of sampling stages
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Figure 5.2 Overview of awareness levels, Sultan Sazlığı
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Figure 5.3 Overview of awareness levels, Köprülü Kanyon
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Figure 5.4 Frequency distribution of willingness to contribute by resource use,
Sultan Sazlığı

Figure 5.5 Frequency distribution of willingness to contribute by resource use,
Köprülü Kanyon
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Figure 5.6 Willingness to contribute by non-resource use measures, Sultan Sazlığı

Figure 5.7 Willingness to contribute by non-resource use measures, Köprülü
Kanyon
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Figure 5.8 Willingness to contribute by labor, Sultan Sazlığı

Figure 5.9 Willingness to contribute by labor, Köprülü Kanyon
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Figure 5.10 Willingness to contribute by scenario measures, Sultan Sazlığı

Figure 5.11 Willingness to contribute by scenario measures, Köprülü Kanyon
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Figure 5.12 Willingness to contribute by all measures, Sultan Sazlığı

Figure 5.13 Willingness to contribute by all measures, Köprülü Kanyon
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CHAPTER 6
SEARCHING FOR LOCAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
PREREQUISITES
As the present chapter is being written, the Turkish state has initiated the process
to pave the way for the construction of eight hydroelectric power plants in Macahel
valley, a treasury of biodiversity that was declared a Biosphere Reserve by UNESCO in
2005. Ironically, Macahel was one of the four sites where the Turkish state executed the
GEF Biodiversity and Natural Resource Management Project, the very project whose
implementation in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon has been an object of analysis in
this dissertation.
The present work has hopefully equipped the reader with an analytical
explanation for this incident, one that connects the Turkish state’s practices to establish
and justify its existence with local-level dynamics. In this dissertation, I have carried out
an investigation of state-society relationships in Turkey through the lens of efforts to
implement local sustainable development. In formulating a theoretical framework and
mobilizing it to analyze two case studies, I have sought to demonstrate that the specific
way that the state hegemony is configured in Turkey, interacting with local power
inequalities, accounts for the failure of local sustainable development.
The problématique that motivated this dissertation was the observation that the
Turkish state failed in effectuating the vision of environmentally-sound and sociallyequitable development despite its apparent commitment to these goals and seeminglyhigh capability to pursue them. More specifically, the dissertation aimed at understanding
the state in Turkey, and the way it relates to the society, through the lens of its efforts to
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implement sustainable development at the local scale. The choice of sustainable
development as the object of analysis, rather than, say, economic growth, carries with it a
certain notion of development that I hold to be “desirable”; namely, a path of human
betterment that incorporates economic well-being, environmental quality and social
equity. Exploring sustainable development implementation vis-à-vis state-society
relationships, on the other hand, denotes an analytical focus on the question of the state.
While I have not engaged in a theoretical problematization of the former, i.e.
sustainable development, I have undertaken a detailed exposition of the latter. Given that
it holds remarkable power in navigating the social and environmental spheres in Turkey,
the state and its relation to the society emerge as domains that need to be examined in
understanding how processes of sustainable development are molded. In taking the statesociety relationship as the entry point of this project’s investigation, I aimed to surpass
reductionist approaches. Rather than portraying the state as a neutral technology utilized
for the fulfillment of individual economic interests, or alternatively reducing it to the
superstructure of class relations, I deployed a Gramscian understanding of the state and
the way it relates to the society.
Within this understanding, I have paid attention, expecially, to the constitution of
hegemony, the uneven impacts of the state on the society, and the differential abilities of
social groups to access the state. To recapitulate, I deployed the Gramscian argument that
states attempt to justify and reproduce their claim to rule and to acquire the consent of the
ruled by a variety of social, political and ideological practices. In this respect, they strive
to construct a national-popular outlook, through which they can appear as its impartial
embodiment, and elicit consent. States, however, are not impartial, and their inter-
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relations with the society are marked by asymmetries in both directions: social groups
differ in the ways they are impacted by state actions and in their ability to formulate
demands and access the state.
In mobilizing the Gramscian framework to analyze the making and reproduction
of the state in Turkey, I have argued that the urgency to modernize via rapid economic
growth has been contrived as the national-popular outlook and utilized to acquire the
consent of the society. Its operationalization depended on, and served to, reinforce the
paternalist way that the state relates to the citizens: as the goal to modernize was not an
aggregation of social interests, but rather reflected the motivations of the state elites, they
assumed the role of fulfilling it by top-down policy making and implementation.
Paternalism, however, brought patronage relations with it. That patron-client
interactions dominate state-society relationships in Turkey and curtail effective policy
implementation is widely acknowledged. In the absence of organic links connecting the
sphere of the society to the state, largely due to the distance inherent in the Turkish
state’s paternalistic governance, contestation came to be handled by way of patronage
networks. That is to say, in constituting its hegemony, the Turkish state did not so much
rely on the acquisition of active consent, but rather on the cooptation and preemption of
dissent by patronage.
The trinity of modernization, paternalism and patronage, summarized above, is
the foundation of state hegemony in Turkey and has remained largely resilient in the face
of historical changes. It has, on the other hand, had definite repercussions on the sphere
of civil society. I have underscored two mechanisms, in particular, in discussing how the
civil society was smothered against by the state’s hegemonic practices. Firstly, demands
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found to be incompatible with the growth-oriented modernization project, such as those
related to intra-society conflicts, were denied validity and consistently excluded, as
threats to the hegemonic project. In other words, the Turkish state was structurally
selective, to use the Gramscian term, in allowing the formulation and representation of
social demands, translating into varying ability of social groups to access the state.
Secondly, the fact that contestation was predominantly handled by patronage has
prevented civil society from becoming a domain of effective opposition and struggle.
I have argued that these state-society features, which embody the specific way in
which the state hegemony was constituted in Turkey, hinder the implementation of
sustainable development. The strength of the modernization impetus brushes social and
environmental concerns aside. Paternalistic governance evokes contestation, while
patronage-based handling of contesting voices further hampers the implementation of
effective sustainable development. Finally, the emasculation of civil society translates
into a political landscape where the quest for modernization is rarely questioned and there
is an overall reluctance to mobilize even in the face of pressing environmental and socioeconomic problems.
With this analytical map of state-society relationships, I embarked upon tackling
state-society-environment interlinkages at the local scale. In doing so, I have extended the
Gramscian framework by building on its premise of the social as a fragmented sphere and
complementing it with the political economy of the environment approach.

More

specifically, by pulling together the Gramscian state theory and the political economy of
the environment literature, I have argued that states, in relating to the society and
re/constituting their hegemony, shape local environments, both directly by altering the
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physical landscape, and indirectly, by forming/altering/reinforcing the relations
surrounding resource use. In more concrete terms, I identified two ways in which the
state-society interaction would mold local environments: by re/producing local
inequalities, and by shaping incentives and anticipations. I have further emphasized that
environmental processes are associated with costs and benefits, which are distributed
unevenly across different groups, and underscored the ways in which the inequalities
among these groups can perpetuate the failure of sustainable development.
In chapters 4 and 5, I substantiated the framework outlined above by empirical
input from qualitative and quantitative analysis of two case studies, Sultan Sazlığı and
Köprülü Kanyon. I have shown how the local manifestations of the Turkish state’s
hegemonic practices undercut the implementation of sustainable development, both in the
history of these locations, and during the implementation of the GEF projects. This way, I
provided a reading of these localities, and of the social-economic-environmental
processes they exhibit, where the reproduction of the Turkish state is manifested. In this
reading, local inequalities have been focal points, and I investigated their dynamics and
implications in detail.
In the case of Sultan Sazlığı, I have illustrated how the constitution of the
national-popular outlook qua growth-orientation has been translated into the relentless
pursuit of agricultural growth via the provision of irrigation infrastructure and financial
support for the cultivation of water-intensive cash crops. The consequent expansion of
irrigated farming and the prevalence of inefficient irrigation methods have resulted in
heightened environmental degradation in the wetland. The environmental costs were
mainly shouldered by the landless reed cutters and animal grazers who faced
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deteriorating living standards. The resulting perpetuation of inequalities had in turn
intensified the pressures on the ecosystem and accelerated degradation, as decreasing
viability of reed cutting and animal husbandry led to heavier reliance on the existing
resource base.
Against this backdrop, the GEF project’s attempts to promote sustainable resource
use were stifled above all by the persistent unwillingness to interfere with irrigated
agriculture and the incentive structures established by the history of growth prioritization.
More specifically, the project suffered from reluctance to take radical measures to
constrain water use in irrigation. Actions that were taken, on the other hand, were either
futile, as the three decades of available cheap irrigation water made farmers lethargic to
change their cultivation practices, or were hindered by patronage networks, as attested by
the salience of illegal well irrigation.
In Köprülü Kanyon, the story was one about the Turkish state’s paternalism,
crystallized in the 30 years of hard-park governance. The failure of top-down decisionmaking and the imposition of conservation policies have been manifested in two features
of implementation: the infeasibility of regulations, as they are cut off from the reality of
the local people’s daily practices; and the bitter contestation they invoke, as local users
explicitly refuse to comply by regulations that were made somewhere, by someone,
without their input. Within this context, patronage acts as a selective mechanism of
representation, whereby the locally powerful can access the state and make their demands
heard—thus the ability of the rafting companies to evade environmental enforcement.
The failure of the GEF project in Köprülü Kanyon was not so much about the
unwillingness implicated in the undertaken actions, but about the local reaction
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precipitated by them. The marked distrust and hostility on the side of the local people, a
legacy of rigid national park regulations, coupled with the lack of rural infrastructure and
income-generating opportunities, hindered the project at every step.

Not only have

villagers refused to take part in it, but also they have tried to (re)actively sabotage it.
Throughout this dissertation I have conceptualized local inequalities as one of the
mechanisms in which the state shapes the local. Building on this, I have underscored the
role of local inequalities in a number of ways in chapter 4, in relation to how they were
brought about or perpetuated by the Turkish state and the failure of local sustainable
development. I have made the case that the pursuit of agricultural growth in Sultan
Sazlığı has perpetuated land-based inequalities, as it has not only favored landed farmers
by directing resources to them, but also has triggered patterns of unsustainable water use,
which ultimately hurt non-land based rural livelihoods. Develi plain farmers enjoy the
profits accruing from highly lucrative sugar beet and apple production, while the reed
cutters suffer not only from the degrading resource base on which they struggle to
survive, but also from the restrictions introduced by the GEF project. Ironic does not
quite describe the fact that the only regulation that the project has fully enforced is related
to reed cutting, while irrigated farming goes undisrupted.
In Köprülü Kanyon, on the other hand, the absence of the Turkish state in
providing vital rural infrastructure, in contrast to its overwhelming presence embodied in
national park stipulations, has contributed to the deprivation in upland villagers, while
those in the lower canyon can capture the benefits of unchecked rafting tourism. The
escalating pressure on the ecosystem is likely to hurt upland residents even more as most
of them depend directly on natural resources for their livelihoods.
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Aggravated local inequalities are not only the outcomes of failed sustainable
development, but also its perpetuators. Given the unquestioned subscription to the
necessity of economic growth, the demands of the reed cutters in Sultan Sazlığı go
unheard by the Turkish state, while those of illegal well owners find their way through
patronage networks. The ability of the rafting sector, the engine of economic growth in
the Köprülü Kanyon region, to evade enforcement, likewise is a major obstacle standing
in the way of sustainable development, while the local people are impoverished by the
severe underprovision of basic services. Therefore, local inequalities in Sultan Sazlığı
and Köprülü Kanyon operate through two channels in impeding the resolution of the
interlinked social and environmental problems in these areas. As they correlate with the
types of demands formulated by different groups, local inequalities imply differential
accessibility of the state for their realization: the demands of the losers pose fundamental
threats to the hegemonic project of the Turkish state. Furthermore, patronage has been a
representation mechanism open only to the powerful, who win from the failure of
sustainable development, by which environmental protection was resisted and undercut.
Yet another way in which the role of local inequalities has played out was in the
implementation of participatory management by the GEF projects. I have illustrated, first
with qualitative evidence, and then with quantitative data, that the projects failed to
effectively implement participatory decision-making mechanisms, despite the lip service
paid to their necessity. Local inequalities have been important determinants of one’s
ability to participate in the decision-making processes. This was manifested, firstly, at the
level of awareness. Apart from the dismal failure of the projects in disseminating
information about such mechanisms—only 22 percent and 11 percent of the
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representative survey samples were aware of the management meetings in Sultan Sazlığı
and Köprülü Kanyon, respectively—being exposed to information was correlated, most
pronouncedly, with gender, wealth, and livelihood-based inequalities. For those who
were informed of participatory mechanisms, similar type of inequalities, in addition to the
anticipations of the decision-making processes, emerge as significant determinants of
participation, as shown in chapter 5.
Against the backdrop of the Turkish state’s failure to implement local sustainable
development, the dissertation took steps towards exploring what the local actors are
willing to do. Within the context of growing socio-economic and environmental
problems, an overall reluctance to take local action marks both areas. In Sultan Sazlığı,
the imperative of agricultural growth, the major factor underlying the socio-economic and
environmental problems that the area suffers from, is not being questioned. The losers’
grievances are mostly materialized in non-compliance--thus the illegal reed cutting. In
Köprülü Kanyon, reactionary politics as “weapons of the weak” is the main venue used
by the local people to voice demands, as attested to by their wall demolishing and road
blockading. I hold that the types of actions, or inactions, resorted by the local people are
reflections of the general stifled nature of civil society, and are shaped in important ways
by the perceptions of the state. That is to say, anticipations of state behavior, its policy
priorities and fairness to be specific, mold incentives to mobilize to address sustainable
development. Building on this observation, I empirically investigate the factors
underlying local people’s willingness to contribute to community-based mobilizations to
implement sustainable development, and find that the perceived fairness of the state, in
particular, has a facilitating impact.
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Arguably, this dissertation took the easy way of analyzing a failure that it had
predicted at the outset. I elaborated in chapter 2 on how the specific configuration of
state hegemony in Turkey undercuts the effective implementation of sustainable
development. The failure of the GEF projects could have been anticipated in this sense.
Their initiation and the occasional genuine attempts in their implementation, however,
cannot be explained by resorting to the structural accounts of state behavior in Turkey.
This is where the contribution of analyzing the local experiences, the “terrain of the
conjunctural” as Gramsci calls it, comes in.
Notwithstanding that they are both embodiments of ineffective implementation of
sustainable development, the failures manifested in Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon
are notably different. An unwillingness to undertake what effective implementation
called for could be intimated at almost every step of the GEF project in Sultan Sazlığı,
from the planning stage to the on-site activities. It was implied, in the narratives of the
project team and government officials alike, that the enforcement of measures to hurt
irrigated farming was out of the question to begin with. This was aggravated by the local
political economy dynamics, as the irrigated farmers hold considerable socio-economic
power vis-à-vis the landless group. Consequently, the unwillingness of the project to
ensure sustainable water use went uncontested. A similar pretense was manifested in the
operationalization of participatory management mechanisms, since no sincere attempts
were made to induce the participation of all local groups and render the decision-making
process democratic. They ultimately became venues where the locally powerful
dominated (and shared the grant money, according to the field interviews). They also
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serve as the scapegoats for the failure of the project, for which the executors deny
responsibility since it was based on “participation”.
The case of Köprülü Kanyon is sad, when juxtaposed to that of Sultan Sazlığı,
which is frustrating if not infuriating. The team in Köprülü Kanyon indeed made genuine
attempts not only to address the rampant chaos in resource use, but also to make up for
the deficient rural infrastructure in the area as much as they could. They were fighting a
deeply-rooted enemy with few weapons, however. It was clear that the feelings of
antagonism had to be overcome for the implementation of the project, which the project
team held could only be achieved by a full-fledged attendance to the needs of the local
people. They were well-aware that the resolution of property rights and the provision of
basic services were prerequisites to be fulfilled if the locals were to assent to the
implementation of a project in their villages. Their attempts were not only impeded by
the lack of funds and staff, but also sabotaged by the winners of chaotic resource use:
those who acquire the profits of rafting tourism and the political rents of perpetuated
conflict.
The preceding argument underscores the importance of looking at the local.
Although this dissertation has been primarily concerned with the Turkish state, from its
inception in formulating the research questions to its theoretical exposition, it also sheds
light on the ways in which the local is implicated in the failure of sustainable
development in Turkey. In this sense, it demonstrates why situating the question of the
state next to that of the society is needed. The way that the state has been addressed in
the present work surpasses its monolithic and simplistic treatments found in the
development and political economy of the environment literatures and highlights its
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different manifestations across contexts and the ways it relates to different groups in the
social sphere.
This dissertation has also taken a somewhat easy path in criticizing what went
wrong by analyzing the “failure”. The answers it provided are more in terms of what
should not be done, rather than what should be done, whose examination would be a
different project altogether. One such answer lies in why addressing inequalities and
ensuring effective and democratic participation are requisites in implementing local
sustainable development. In both Sultan Sazlığı and Köprülü Kanyon, lack of broad
participation by all stakeholders in decision-making processes contributed to the failure
to tackle the environmental and socio-economic problems marking these areas. The
exclusion of the powerless reed cutters in Sultan Sazlığı from decision-making not only
reproduced land-based inequalities, but also entailed ineffective environmental
protection. In Köprülü Kanyon, lack of formal voice given to the local people goes handin-hand with the informal voice of patronage networks, with adverse equity and
efficiency implications. It would not be far-fetched to suggest, therefore, unless there is
genuine democratization of state-society relationships in Turkey, we are likely to witness
more stories of failure than of success in sustainable development implementation.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS
In-Depth Interviews
Suade Arançlı, GEF Coordinator
Hatice Arslan, Köprülü Kanyon Project Team
Halil Agah, WB
Güray Çayır, Köprülü Kanyon Project Team
Serra Çetin, Köprülü Kanyon Project Team
Orhan Ceylan, Sultan Sazlığı Project Team
Erdoğan Ertürk, GEF Coordinator
Özge Gökçe, UNDP SGP
Kuddusi Karabulut, Sultan Sazlığı Project Team
Aysin Tektaş, Sultan Sazlığı Project Team
Mustafa Yılmaz, Sultan Sazlığı Project Team
Osman Yöntem, Köprülü Kanyon Project Team
Official, State Hydraulic Works, Kayseri Local Branch
Official, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Kayseri Local Branch
Sultan Sazlığı
B&B owner, 42, Male, Ovaçiftlik
B&B owner, 40, Male, Ovaçiftlik
Reed cutter, 38, Male, Yeşilova
Reed cutter, 28, Male, Yeşilova
Farmer and retired teacher, 56, Male, Yeşilova
Farmer, 45, Male, Yeşilova
Farmer, 42, Male, Yeşilova
Reed company employee, 53, Male, Ovaçiftlik
Reed cutter, 24, Male, Ovaçiftlik
Reed cutter, 34, Male, Ovaçiftlik
Reed cutter, 34, Male, Ovaçiftlik
Reed cutter, 26, Male, Ovaçiftlik
Reed cutter, 38, Male, Sindelhöyük
Reed cutter, 32, Male, Sindelhöyük
Reed cutter, 33, Male, Sindelhöyük
Reed cutter, 28, Male, Sindelhöyük
Reed cutter, 44, Male, Yenihayat
Teacher, 28, Female, Yenihayat
Farmer, 51, Male, Musahacılı
Farmer, 40, Male, Musahacılı
Farmer, 43, Male, Musahacılı
Farmer (village head), 36, Musahacılı
Farmer, 33, Female, Musahacılı
Farmer, 35, Female, Musahacılı
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Farmer, 52, Male, Musahacılı
Housewife, 62, Female, Ovaçiftlik
Housewife, 54, Female, Ovaçiftlik
Housewife, 44, Female, Ovaçiftlik
Housewife, 48, Female, Ovaçiflik
National park guide, 45, Male, Sindelhöyük
National park guide, 38, Male, Sindelhöyük
Reed cutter, 36, Male, Sindelhöyük
Reed cutter, 48, Male, Sindelhöyük
Reed cutter, 45, Male, Sindelhöyük
Housewife, 25, Female, Sindelhöyük
Housewife, 67, Female, Sindelhöyük
Housewife, 37, Female, Sindelhöyük
Housewife, 72, Female, Sindelhöyük
Housewife, 58, Female, Sindelhöyük
Engineer in irrigation union, 40, Male, Yahyalı
Farmer, 42, Male, Soysallı
Farmer, 57, Male, Soysallı
Housewife, 59, Female, Soysallı
Housewife, 27, Female, Soysallı
Housewife, 46, Female, Soysallı
Housewife, 54, Female, Soysallı
Farmer (village head), 55, Male, Soysallı
Farmer (village head), 53, Male, Çayırözü
Farmer, 34, Male, Çayırözü
Farmer, 45, Male, Çayırözü
Köprülü Kanyon
Housewife, 29, Female, Beşkonak
Housewife, 25, Female, Beşkonak
Farmer, 60, Male, Çaltepe
Animal grazer, 64, Male, Ballıbucak
Farmer (village head), 65, Male, Beşkonak
Farmer, 67, Male, Beşkonak
Ex-village head, 80, Male, Çaltepe
Housewife, 52, Female, Çaltepe
Service sector employee, 27, Male, Çaltepe
Animal grazer (village head), 38, Male, Ballıbucak
Teacher, 40, Male, Ballıbucak
Animal grazer, 53, Male, Ballıbucak
B&B owner, 37, Male, Çaltepe
Housewife, 45, Female, Çaltepe
Farmer, 53, Male, Çaltepe
Teacher, 30, Female, Yeşilvadi
Housewife, 31, Female, Demirciler
Housewife, 55, Female, Demirciler

376

Housewife, 22, Female, Demirciler
Animal grazer, 56, Male, Değirmenözü
Animal grazer, 65, Male, Değirmenözü
Teacher, 25, Male, Değirmenözü
Tourism employee, 37, Male, Altınkaya
Farmer, 54, Male, Altınkaya
National park guard, 66, Male, Altınkaya
Street vendor, 43, Female, Altınkaya
Street vendor, 33, Female, Altınkaya
Street vendor, 76, Female, Altınkaya
Restaurant owner, 32, Male, Karabük
Employee of Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 31, Male, Karabük
Farmer, 56, Male, Karabük
Farmer (ex-village head), 57, Male, Karabük
Focus Group Participants
Sultan Sazlığı Focus Group 1
Reed cutter, 36, Male, Yenihayat
Housewife and reed cutter, 33, Female, Yenihayat
Farmer, 46, Male, Sindelhöyük
Farmer, 44, Male, Sindelhöyük
Housewife and farmer, Female, 38, Sindelhöyük
Housewife, 25, Female, Yeşilova
Farmer, 33, Male, Yeşilova
Sultan Sazlığı Focus Group 2
Farmer, 55, Male, Musahacılı
Farmer, 35, Female, Musahacılı
Farmer, 55, Female, Musahacılı
Farmer, 36, Female, Musahacılı
Farmer, 30, Female, Musahacılı
Farmer, 42, Female, Musahacılı
Köprülü Kanyon Focus Group 1
B&B owner, 29, Male, Karabük
Carpenter, 33, Male, Karabük
Farmer, 48, Male, Beşkonak
Farmer, 40, Female, Beşkonak
Farmer, 42, Male, Beşkonak
Farmer, 46, Male, Beşkonak
Köprülü Kanyon Focus Group 2

377

Street vendor, 45, Female, Altınkaya
Street vendor, 28, Female, Altınkaya
Street vendor, 33, Female, Altınkaya
Street vendor and agricultural worker, 35, Female, Altınkaya
Farmer, 37, Male, Altınkaya
Tourism employee, 24, Male, Altınkaya
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APPENDIX B
SELECT SURVEY QUESTIONS
Reasons for participation:
1>
The residents of Sultan Sazlığı/Köprülü Kanyon themselves should make
decisions about how to manage the area
2>
The decisions made in the meetings were/could be in my and my family’s
interests in the long term
3>
It is important to monitor the decision-making process for it to be trustworthy
4>
I am concerned about the environmental problems of Sultan Sazlığı/Köprülü
Kanyon
Reasons for non-participation:
1>
I had no interest in the subject matter of the meetings
2>
Meeting times and places were not/would not be appropriate for me
3>
It would not be appropriate for me to attend or voice opinions in the meetings
4>
I doubted/would have doubted that the views of the participants would be taken
into account. I thought/would think that the project team would make decisions
themselves.
5>
I doubted/would have doubted the project team would respect everyone’s opinion
equally.
6>
The project team did not work hard enough for Sultan Sazlığı/Köprülü Kanyon
7>
I doubted/would have doubted that the state would enforce any decisions made at
the meeting
Reasons for not speaking up:
1>
I doubted that the views of the participants would be taken into account. I
thought/would think that the project team would make decisions themselves
2>
I doubted the project team would respect everyone’s opinion equally
3>
It would not be appropriate for me to voice opinions in the meetings
4>
I doubted that the state would enforce any decisions made at the meeting
5>
I could not get the opportunity to voice opinions during the meetings
Reasons for not being taken into account:
1>
My opinions conflicted with the interests of some participants
2>
The project team had no intention of taking participants’ opinions into account
3>
The project team did not respect everyone’s opinion equally
Evaluation of the project team:
1>
Project team worked hard to ensure wide participation in management meetings
2>
Project team was accessible by the local people
3>
I trust the project team to have worked honestly
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Reasons underlying ineffective environmental protection:
1>
Because the project team did not take local people’s opinions into account
2>
Because the project team favored some groups over others
3>
Because the project team lacked necessary information and resources
4>
Because powerful local groups resisted environmental regulations
5>
Because environmental regulations would have hurt the local economy
Environmental values:
1>
It is known that synthethic fertilizers, insecticides and pesticiders are harmful for
the environment. However, they should be used in Turkey since they can ensure higher
levels of output.
2>
It is known that dams have detrimental effects on the environment, such as loss of
biodiversity, soil salination, etc. Still, I support building more dams to provide more
irrigation water that is needed to have higher levels of output.
3>
Environmental protection should be prioritized in Turkey even if it slows down
economic growth and leads partly to unemployment.
4>
I would assent to paying higher taxes if I was sure they were going to be used for
environmental protection
5>
Even if economic returns would be high, I am against turning land that has
environmental value into agricultural land.
Perceptions of the state:
1>
In TURKEY, the state treats everyone equally when providing services.
2>
In TURKEY, the state favors certain provinces and towns when deciding on
investements such as building roads, opening schools, etc.
3>
In SULTAN SAZLIĞI/KÖPRÜLÜ KANYON, provincial government treats
everyone equally when providing services.
4>
In the VILLAGE I LIVE IN, village head treats everyone equally when providing
services.
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APPENDIX C
WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE COEFFICIENTS
Table A.1 Willingness to contribute coefficients, Sultan Sazlığı
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Contribute in Sultan Sazlığı
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

Age

-0.02

0

0

0

-0.01

-0.01

Female

0.32

0.22

0.18

0.05

0.28

0.38

Education, years

-0.05

0.01

0.02

0

-0.04

-0.02

Feeling of belonging, scale

-0.07

-0.01

-0.03

0.01

-0.08

-0.06

Participation in labor sharing, scale

-0.13

0.1

0.13

-0.01

-0.12

-0.02

Frequency of community participation, index

0.09

0.16

0.16

0.02

0.06

0.18

Environmental values, index

0.33

0.11

0.05

0.05

0.28

0.32

Household size

0.07

0.02

0.04

-0.02

0.05

0.06

Children under 14

-0.08

0

-0.04

0.03

-0.06

-0.05

Household assets, rank

-0.01

-0.03

-0.03

-0.01

-0.01

-0.03

Household land size, hectares

0

0

0

0

0

0

Farm income, dummy

-0.1

0.11

0.05

0.06

-0.1

0.01

Animal income, dummy

-0.29

-0.34

-0.36

-0.03

-0.22

-0.44

Reed income, dummy

-0.59

0.24

0.37

-0.06

-0.48

-0.26

Equal treatment, index

0.16

0.15

0.11

0.04

0.15

0.22

Importance of growth priority, scale

-0.05

-0.15

-0.15

-0.01

-0.05

-0.14

Importance of environmental priority, scale

0.08

0.09

0.08

0.02

0.08

0.12

Expected commitment by others, number

0.08

0.1

0.07

0.03

0.06

0.13

Expected distributional impact, scale

0.6

0.27

0.22

0.05

0.47

0.62
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Table A.2 Willingness to contribute coefficients, Köprülü Kanyon
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Contribute in Köprülü Kanyon
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

Age

0

0.01

0

0

0

0.01

Female

0.03

-0.43

-0.41

-0.08

0.04

-0.41

Education, years

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.01

Feeling of belonging, scale

0.1

-0.09

-0.09

-0.01

0.09

-0.09

Participation in labor sharing, scale

0.2

0.12

0.13

0

0.18

0.1

Frequency of community participation, index

0.06

0.2

0.18

0.05

0.07

0.21

Environmental values, index

-0.04

0.22

0.19

0.06

-0.03

0.22

Household size

-0.02

0

0

0

-0.03

-0.03

Children under 14

0.05

0.01

0.02

-0.01

0.05

0.04

Household assets, rank

0.01

0.04

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.04

Household land size, hectares

0

0

0

0

0

0

Farm income, dummy

0.13

0.21

0.25

-0.02

0

0.24

Animal income, dummy

-0.11

0.11

0.04

0.1

0

0.09

Oregano income, dummy

0.07

0.16

0.26

-0.08

0

0.15

Tourism income, dummy

0.01

-0.16

-0.16

-0.02

0

-0.16

Equal treatment, index

0.06

0.02

-0.02

0.04

0.05

0.02

Importance of growth priority, scale

-0.01

0.11

0.03

0.1

0.02

0.13

Importance of environmental priority, scale

-0.05

-0.07

-0.02

-0.06

-0.08

-0.11

Expected commitment by others, number

0.04

0.09

0.07

0.03

0.04

0.1

Expected distributional impact, scale

-0.04

-0.12

-0.14

0

0

-0.1
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